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TO THE

EDINBURGH REVIEW.

BY

HENRY, LORD BROUGHAM.

IN COURSE OF PUBLICATION.

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HENRY, LORD BROUGHAM, F.R.S.

MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, AND OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF NAPLES.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON AND GLASGOW:

RICHARD GRIFFIN AND COMPANY,

Publishers to the University of Glasgow.

1856.

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LONDON: W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

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III.

FOREIGN POLICY.

GENERAL QUESTIONS.

BALANCE OF POWER.

(JANUARY, 1803.)

Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe, pendant les règnes de Louis XV. et de Louis XVI., &c. MSS. trouvés dans le Cabinet de Louis XVI. Seconde Edition. Considérablement augmentée, par L. P. SEGUR l'aïné, ex-Ambassadeur. 3 tom. 8vo. Pp. 1238. à Paris. Chez Buisson. An 9 (1801).

THE balance of power, and the general system of international relations which has grown up in modern Europe, have afforded to one class of politicians perpetual subject of ridicule and invective, and to another class the constant opportunity of defending or attacking every measure, of discussing or affecting to discuss, every political subject, by a reference to certain terms of art and abstract ideas, of which it is fair to suspect that they little understood the meaning and the force.

Of these reasoners or declaimers, the former sect are undoubtedly the most dangerous. The refinements of modern policy which have sprung from the progressive improvement of the human species, and have, in their turn, secured that progress, and accelerated its pace, are in no danger of being either corrupted, or brought into disrepute, by the petulance of pretended statesmen. But the sophistries and cavils which political sceptics and innovators have founded, partly on a misconception of the theory, and partly on a misstatement of the facts, tend directly to a degradation of the system in the eyes of superficial reasoners, and may ultimately renew a state of things, from which the unassisted efforts of national

heroism would be altogether unable to redeem any one community.

The attacks of those men have, moreover, been extremely inconsistent and contradictory. While, at one time, they maintain, that the idea of a political equilibrium is pregnant with every species of absurdity, and would produce, if carried into the actual affairs of nations, those very evils which the system is extolled for preventing: at another time, we are told that the notion is simple and obvious; that it arises naturally out of the passions of men; that it is no refinement of modern statesmen, but has influenced the councils of princes and commonwealths in all ages of the world. Now—the balance of power is an unintelligible jargon, invented to cover every scheme; to furnish pretexts for every act of national injustice; to lull the jealousy of the people in any emergency; or to excite their alarms upon any occasion. Now—it is useless and superfluous; an interference with the natural order of things; or an attempt to effect that which would happen at any rate. Now—it is pernicious in the extreme; the parent of wars and offensive alliances; the exciting cause of national violence; the watchword of ambitious princes and destroying commonwealths; a refinement only of injustice; and a system of nothing but treachery or caprice. It is very manifest, without any argument, that the system of modern policy cannot be liable to all those accusations at once, and that the declaimers, who have used such language with respect to it, must have been talking of very different things at different times. But as the foreign policies of nations was never, at any period of modern story, so interesting as at present, we shall proceed to offer a few observations upon that system which has been so little understood, and which is the foundation of the important work now under review.

The national jealousy, by which at all times the European states are animated, and which ranges them on different sides in each public crisis, has been denominated, not a principle of policy, but a national emotion. Nations, it is said, like the individuals which compose them, are

moved by caprice, and actuated by passions; excited to contention by envy and hatred; soothed to reconciliation when exhausted by the efforts of their enmity; leagued in friendship by the dictates of an interested prudence; united together by the thirst of plunder; or combined for the gratification of some common revenge. The principle (we are told) which has been pompously called the great spring of civilized policy, is perhaps nothing more than a systematic indulgence of those natural feelings that impel the savage to attack his more wealthy neighbour, or unite rival hordes in a temporary friendship, when invaded by a powerful and common enemy. The policy (it is added) which we have heard extolled as the grand arcanum of modern statesmen, and dignified with the title of a system, is nothing more than the natural result of a conflict between desire of conquest and of security, refined on by ingenious men, and spun into a regular theory.

These remarks are partly true, and partly unfounded. It is true, that nations are guided by human councils, and subject, of course, to the passions and caprices of men; but it is no less certain, that the more regularly any system of government is established, the more will men of sober minds acquire a weight in the management of affairs; and that the longer the art of administering the concerns of empires is practised, prudence will gain the greater ascendancy over passion. It is true, that the dictates of feelings not always amiable, and often outrageous, are frequently, more than any impulse of reason, the springs which actuate the operations of states; but it is equally true, that in all animals the passions themselves are implanted for the wisest of purposes; that instinct is the principle to which, more than reason, the preservation of life, and the maintenance of order in the universe, must be ascribed; and that national councils may be operating what no foresight could combine, while they appear to be swayed only by prejudice and passion. The existence of rude states is indeed frequently preserved, and their civilization insured, by the operation of principles, to assist the development of which is the great pride of the most learned and skilful statesmen; yet, the want of this

assistance in those rude times, and the want of a constant superintendence and control, which renders the popular feelings useful in one case, and harmless in another, is certainly the cause of that instability of national power, and those perpetual changes in dominion—those constant broils, and that state of unceasing insecurity, to which we may attribute the many revolutions in the situation of savage communities, and the long continuance of their barbarism.

That the system which we are now considering has oftentimes been abused, no one can deny. What human institution can defend itself from this charge? But many of the evils which are ascribed to the principle in question, have been owing only to an erroneous conception of its nature. Many of them have arisen, from failing to carry the line of policy recommended by it, to the lengths which it enjoins; and, in not a few instances, those events which have been deemed pernicious, would have proved altogether fatal, had not its influence modified and controlled them. We are desired, with no small appearance of triumph, to view the history of the last century; and to mark the manifold wars which the balancing system produced; the various intrigues to which it gave rise; the destructive conquests of which it furnished the pretext; and the national catastrophes which it could not avert. But had it not been for that wholesome jealousy of rival neighbours, which modern politicians have learned to cherish, how many conquests and changes of dominion would have taken place, instead of wars, in which some lives were lost, not the most valuable in the community, and some superfluous millions were squandered? How many fair portions of the globe might have been deluged in blood, instead of some hundreds of sailors fighting harmlessly on the barren plains of the ocean, and some thousands of soldiers carrying on a scientific, and regular, and quiet system of warfare, in countries set apart for the purpose, and resorted to as the arena where the disputes of nations might be determined? We may indeed look to the history of the last century as the proudest era in the annals of the species; the period most distinguished

for learning, and skill, and industry; for the milder virtues, and for common sense; for refinement in government, and an equal diffusion of liberty; above all, for that perfect knowledge of the arts of administration, which has established certain general rules of conduct among nations; has prevented the overthrow of empires, and the absorption of weak states into the bodies of devouring neighbours; has set bounds to the march of conquest, and rendered the unsheathing of the sword a measure of the last adoption; whereas, in other times, it was always resorted to in the first instance.

In the beginning of that century, we saw the gigantic power of France humbled by a coalition of princes, each resolved to undergo immediate loss, and run a great present risk, in order to prevent the greater chance of ruin at the distance of a few years. In ancient times the Stadtholder would have been more jealous of Great Britain or Austria than of France. The Great Monarch, like Cæsar, would have found a Divitiacus in the heart of the empire. By splitting the neighbouring potentates into adverse factions, and fighting one against the other, he would, in a few years, have subjugated the whole. No power would then have conceived that common prudence required an immediate sacrifice of peace, in order to ward off a distant peril. All would have waited quietly till the invasion came on; then, fighting with a desperate, but an insulated valour, all would have been conquered in detail by the ambitious enemy of Europe; and the story of the Roman Empire would have been renewed, when submission to foreign power, and loss of liberty, and interruption of peaceful pursuits, were no longer the phantoms of vulgar terror, or the themes of idle declamation, but real, and imminent, and inevitable calamities.

In the middle of the century, we indeed saw an ancient crown despoiled of its hereditary provinces; and the neighbouring states in vain attempting to crush the newborn energies of the Prussian power. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether the principles of an enlightened policy would not have favoured the rise of a power, whose professed and natural object was the ba-

lancing of the Imperial House, and the protection of the smaller princes of the empire, against the preponderating, and formerly absolute, sway of the Austrian monarchs. And, at any rate, admitting the other powers to have been actuated by no such views, it is clear that the success of the Silesian usurpation must be attributed to the actual dereliction of the balancing system, and not to its inefficacy; for, both in the Silesian and in the Seven-years' war,[1] the part of Prussia was openly espoused by some of the great powers; in the former, by France and Bavaria; in the latter, first by England, and then by Russia herself. The preservation and accurate adjustment of the balance might perhaps have required some such event as the acquisition which Prussia actually made; but if the immediate object of the system, the maintenance of the established division of power, was held to be a more important consideration, it is clear that the part of Prussia ought not to have been taken by France and Bavaria, in the one case, or by England and Russia in the other, until the usurped dominions of Austria had been restored; and then the allies of that power ought instantly to have deserted her, if she did not remain satisfied with the fruits of their interference.

Soon after the Seven-years' war was terminated, the dismemberment of an ancient European kingdom was projected by the powers who had been most exhausted in the Silesian contest, and who wished to indemnify themselves for their losses at the expense of the Poles. The success of this iniquitous transaction, although it only demonstrates that the modern system has not been carried to its proper length—that it is incapable of changing the nature of men, or disarming the ambition and rapacity of princes—has been always quoted by a certain set of politicians, as an irrefragable proof of the futility and inefficacy of the great principle of modern politics. That calamitous event is indeed a sufficient proof, that the

[1] It is well known that the peace of Dresden was only a truce; that the war of 1756 owed its origin to the causes of the former contest; and that the possession of Silesia was only secured by the peace of Hubertsburgh.

statesmen of Europe had for a while forgotten their most sacred principles, and that the princes who did not interfere to prevent it, were blind to their best interests. It serves, therefore, to show us what would be the situation of the world, were the maxims of ancient times to be revived, and the salutary system of modern Europe to lose its influence over the councils of states; but, for this very reason, the partition of Poland cannot, with any truth, be said to prove the inefficacy of those principles, by acting in direct opposition to which, the great powers of Europe permitted it to happen. If, however, the policy of the neighbouring states provided no check to the injustice of the partitioning powers, the influence of the balancing system upon the conduct of those parties themselves, was productive of the most important and beneficial effects. Had the ancient maxims of national indifference and insulation prevailed in the cabinets of princes at the crisis of Polish affairs in 1772, the distracted state of that unhappy country would indeed have called in the interference of foreign force. But this interference would have proceeded from one quarter alone. Poland would have been overwhelmed, and its vast resources appropriated, by one only of the conterminous powers, probably by the Russian empire, which would thus have suddenly acquired a preponderance fatal to the rest of Europe; and, without receiving any check in the proportional aggrandisement of the neighbouring states, would have been enabled to stretch its resistless arm into the very heart of the great western commonwealth. But the prevalence of that national jealousy, and anxious attention to the affairs of other states, which is the master principle of the modern system, prevented the usurpation of Russia, even at the moment when she was actually mistress of the kingdom, garrisoned the capital with her troops, and ruled the national councils by a viceroy, under the name of ambassador. With all these circumstances in her favour, she was not even the first proposer of the partition. Her natural enemies, Austria and Prussia, actually gained a greater share of the spoil; and, instead of being the first victims of her extended empire, as they infallibly would

have been in ancient times, they have themselves acquired, at the same moment, an increase of resources, which enables them effectually to withstand the force of her augmented power.

Although, then, it is extremely absurd to adduce the partition of Poland as an instance of the balancing system, (after the manner of the Prussian statesmen),[1] it is equally erroneous to assert, that it proves the inefficacy of that system, or to deny that the rest of Europe has been saved by the influence of those principles upon the parties in the usurpation, which should have led the other great powers of Europe to prevent it. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that we by no means intend to assert anything further than the injustice and impolicy of the transaction upon a great scale: at present, we only look to the effects of the balancing system in maintaining the independence of the weaker states. The case of Poland, as it appears to us, is one of the very few instances, which have ever occurred, of a nation being placed in such unnatural circumstances of embarrassment, turbulence, and degradation of every sort, that scarce any change of affairs could render it worse, and scarce any revolution, by domestic violence, or foreign invasion, could fail to alter it for the better. Setting apart the high-sounding phrases of patriotism and national spirit, and the feelings of admiration which the very natural emotions of pity have taught us to couple with the name of Poland, it is impossible for a sober-minded observer not to perceive, that ages of the most debasing servitude had utterly disqualified the Polish boors for enjoying the privileges of free subjects; that a lifetime divided between unceasing tumult in public, and the revellings of a boisterous, barbarous hospitality, had unfitted the rest of the state from co-operating in the formation of a constitution which should possess either energy or regularity; and that greater part of the country has gained by a dismemberment, wept over and declaimed

[1] Count Hertzbergh (the king's first minister in 1772), in a speculative essay on this subject, gives the partition as an apposite case of the balancing system. It was made, he says, "Selon les principes d'une balance dont les trois puissances partageantes étoient convenues entre elles." Mém. tom. i. p. 296.

upon by those who had no experience of its necessity, or need of its benefits. Those benefits have most undoubtedly been the pacification of that unhappy kingdom, by the only means which could have been devised for accomplishing this end, without endangering the security of the other states, namely, a division of the country among the neighbouring and rival powers, and a consequent communication of the inestimable blessings which their ancient subjects enjoyed under a system of peaceful government and regular police. Of the Austrian and Prussian portions, at least, this is the real truth.

The memorable events which took place at the close of the eighteenth century, it is almost needless to observe, were the immediate consequence of an adherence to the principles of the modern system of international policy. The internal state of France would never have alarmed the neighbouring nations in ancient times. Without anxiety, they would have seen the overthrow of all regular government, the progress of Jacobin contagion, and the development of those popular energies which armed a people, devoted exclusively to war, with resistless power to accomplish the grand object of their demagogues, the overthrow of altars and thrones, and the establishment of universal empire. Far from combining to resist the progress of the new horde, they would have split into factions, and assisted its destructive course. No efforts to check it would have been thought of, until all resistance was too late; nor would those modern Gauls have found resistance effectual to oppose them from the Manlius of any capitol in Europe. That this has not been the fate of everything refined and valuable in Europe, is owing to the degree in which the maxims of the balancing system began to produce their usual effects at the very moment when the first changes took place in France. But that much injury has been done; that many independent states have been humbled; that some powers have been overwhelmed; and that melancholy changes have been effected in the distribution of dominion—has been owing to the unprincipled ambition of certain princes, and the taint of disaffection in the people of some countries, which

have, together, prevented the modern system of external policy from being followed out, and have given to the common enemy of national independence an advantage proportioned to the neglect of those sound and necessary principles.

It is not, then, to the last century that we can appeal as affording arguments against the balance of power. That eventful period in the history of mankind has been marked by the formation of vast schemes, which either by their success may allure, or by their failure may warn, future statesmen to cling still closer to those maxims of conduct which are necessary to the preservation of liberty and peace.

The remarks which have been frequently made on the knowledge of the ancients, in this branch of policy, are for the most part just. Mr. Hume, so far as we know, is the first who stated this point, in an Essay replete with acute observation, and distinguished by accuracy of classical illustration, but mingled also with some injurious perversions of facts in more recent history; and with the misstatement, in one or two points, of the great system itself, which he appears to treat with disrespect.[1] The celebrated passage in Polybius, which has so often been quoted,[2] is indeed a distinct statement of one general principle in that system; and the orations of Demosthenes contains some discussions of the most delicate parts of the theory—discussions which, from the events of his time, we may be assured were but imperfectly comprehended in those early ages.[3] But the number of discoveries or inventions, which have been suddenly made in any branch of knowledge, is small indeed. All the more important steps in the progress of the human mind may rather be termed improvements than inventions: they are refinements upon methods formerly known —generalisations of ideas previously conceived. By how many small and slowly following steps was the true nature of the planetary motions brought to light! By how many

[1] Essay on the Balance of Power.
[2] Polyb. lib. i. cap. 83.
[3] Particularly the famous speech "Pro Megalopolitanis"—*passim*.

insensible gradations did that theory receive its explanation from the great law of gravitation, which, constantly and universally acting, keeps each body in its place, and preserves the arrangement of the whole system. In like manner has that theory of political expediency been gradually unfolded, and its parts refined, which regulates the mutual actions of the contiguous nations of Europe; subjects each to the influence of others, however remote; connects all together by a common principle; regulates the motions of the whole; and confining within narrow limits whatever deviations may occur in any direction, maintains the order and stability of the great complicated system. As the newly-discovered planets are found to obey the same law that keeps the rest in their orbits; so the powers, which frequently arise in the European world, immediately fall into their places, and conform to the same principles that fix the positions, and direct the movements of the ancient states. And as, even in this enlightened age, we have not yet succeeded in discovering the whole extent of the planetary law, or in reducing certain apparent irregularities of the system to the common principles; so, in these days of political improvement, we have not attained the utmost refinements of international policy, and have still to lament the irregularities which continue to disturb the arrangement of the European commonwealth.

It is not, then, in the mere plan of forming offensive or defensive alliances; or in the principle of attacking a neighbour, in order to weaken his power, before he has betrayed hostile views; or in the policy of defending a rival, in order to stay, in proper time, the progress of a common enemy: it is not in these simple maxims that the modern system consists. These are, indeed, the elements, the great and leading parts of the theory; they are its most prominent features; they are maxims dictated by the plainest and coarsest views of political expediency: but they do not form the whole system; nor does the knowledge of them (for it cannot be pretended that ancient states were in possession of anything beyond the speculative knowledge of them) comprehend an acquaintance with the profounder and more subtile parts of modern

policy. The grand and distinguishing feature of the balancing theory, is the systematic form to which it reduces those plain and obvious principles of national conduct; the perpetual attention to foreign affairs which it inculcates; the constant watchfulness which it prescribes over every movement in all parts of the system; the subjection in which it tends to place all national passions and antipathies to the views of remote expediency; the unceasing care which it dictates of nations most remotely situated, and apparently unconnected with ourselves; the general union, which it has effected, of all the European powers in one connecting system—obeying certain laws, and actuated, for the most part, by a common principle; in fine, as a consequence of the whole, the right of mutual inspection, now universally recognised among civilised states, in the rights of public envoys and residents. This is the balancing theory. It was as much unknown to Athens and Rome, as the Keplerian or Newtonian laws were concealed from Plato and Cicero, who certainly knew the effect of gravitation upon terrestrial bodies. It has arisen, in the progress of science, out of the circumstances of modern Europe—the greater extent and nearer equality of the contiguous states—the more constant intercourse of the different nations with each other. We have been told by historians,[1] that the principle of the balance of power was a discovery of the fifteenth century, made by the Italian politicians, in consequence of the invasion of Charles VIII. Against such statements as this, it is perfectly fair to adduce the arguments of Mr. Hume and others, who have traced, in ancient times, vastly more refined notions of policy, than any that dictated the Italian defensive league. It was, in truth, not to any such single event, that the balancing system owed either its origin, or its refinement; but to the progress of society, which placed the whole states of Europe in the same relative situation in which the states of Italy were at that period, and taught them not to wait for an actual invasion, but to see a Charles at all times in every prince or commonwealth that should manifest the least desire of change.

[1] Robertson's Charles V. Vol. i.

The circumstances of the European states, by promoting national intercourse, have been singularly favourable to the development of those principles of easy and constant union. Consolidated into one system of provincial government under the empire of Rome, they were separated by the same causes, and nearly at the same time. Reduced by a people whose character and manners were never effaced by the most rapid conquests, or most remote emigrations, they were formed into divisions, under constitutions of the same nature, peculiarly calculated to preserve the uniformity of customs, which originally marked the whole. The progress of political government has been similar in all, from the dominion of the nobles to the tyranny of the prince, and, in these latter times, to the freedom of the people. That spirit of commercial intercourse, which produces a perpetual connection, little known in the ancient world, has conspired with the similarity of situation, and the resemblance of manners, to render Europe a united whole within itself, almost separated from the rest of the world;—a great federacy, acknowledging, indeed, no common chief; but united by certain common principles, and obeying one system of international law.

It is from these natural sources, through this gradual progress, and not suddenly from any accidental occurrences in the fifteenth century, or from the cabinets of particular statesmen, that we must deduce the refined system of interference, which has regulated, for so long a time, the councils of Europe in foreign affairs; and we are to consider the union of the Italian states against the invasion of Charles, merely as a symptom of the same progressive improvement, which has since taken place in the other parts of Europe.

The question of the propriety of a nation interfering with those concerns of its neighbours, which have only a remote connection with its own interests, may be stated in two different forms;—either as a general question applicable to any state, or in its particular reference to the situation of a nation placed in certain circumstances. Thus many politicians, who have no hesitation in recommending the balancing system to such powers as Austria

and Prussia, placed in the heart of Europe, and surrounded by many other states of various complexions and magnitudes, are yet of opinion, that the situation of Britain is very different; that she is, by nature, insulated from the rest of Europe; that she can defend herself against any invasion, by means of her natural barrier and internal resources; and that she ought not to sacrifice the improvement of those resources, and the means of maintaining peace, to the vain wish of holding the European balance, and embroiling herself in the stormy politics of foreign states. To enter fully into the discussion of this great national question, would carry us much beyond our necessary limits: But we cannot avoid remarking, that, so long as Great Britain is engaged in a commercial intercourse with other nations; so long as her insular situation only serves to promote and extend those commercial relations; so long as other states possess a large portion of sea-coast, engage in a wide commercial circle, and are acquiring a navy of formidable power; so long as Britain interferes with them in other quarters of the globe, where her dominions are the most valuable and extensive,—it is an abuse of language to talk of her being separated from the continent of Europe by the straits of Dover. The transport of an army by sea is often more easy than the march over a considerable tract of land. The fate of a naval engagement is generally more quick, decisive, and dependent upon fortune, than the siege of barrier towns, or the forcing of mountainous passes; and the elements may, by retaining the British fleets in Plymouth or Portsmouth, while they waft the enemy's squadrons from Brest or the Texel, destroy in a moment that bulwark to which we vainly intrusted the national defence, and render utterly useless the whole *natural force* of the country, which, after a change of weather, may display, triumphantly, its flags over every sea in Europe, while the Consular legions are revelling in the plunder of the Bank, or burning all the dockyards in the kingdom. To say that England may trust to her fleets, then, is to recommend a full reliance upon the chance of a single battle, or the event of a sea-chase; to

inculcate a silly confidence in good fortune, and to advise that the fate of Great Britain should be committed to the changes of the elements, the shifting of a wind, or the settling of a fog. It is to her armies, that every nation, insular or continental, must look for her sure and *natural defence*. But although it would be absurd to recommend, that the internal resources of a country should be neglected, either in order to favour its naval force, or in order to commit its defence to the movements of intrigue, and the efforts of foreign policy; yet he would be an equally dangerous counsellor who should advise us to neglect those means of preventing war, and of rendering it harmless when it does occur, which are only to be found in a compliance with the principles of the balancing system.

When the different nations of Europe placed their whole glory in the splendour of their warlike renown, and attended only to the improvement of their military resources, every person of free rank was a soldier, and devoted his life to the profession of arms. But as soon as the arts of peace acquired an ascendancy, and other fame besides that of martial deeds was sought after, war became an object of dread, as deranging the main operations of society, and exposing the national independence to unforeseen casualties and dangers. Instead of being followed for its own sake, it was now only resorted to as a necessary evil, to avoid a greater risk. The first great consequence of this change in the occupations and character of men, was the separation of the military from the civil professions; the intrusting a small class in each community with the defence of the rest; the adoption of standing armies, by far the most important improvement in the art of government, with which history has made us acquainted. As this great change has disarmed war of almost all its dangers, so, another change, equally important, has arisen out of it—rendered wars much less frequent, and confined their influence to a small portion in the centre of the Continent. The European powers have formed a species of general law, which supersedes, in most instances, an appeal to the sword, by rendering such an appeal fatal to any power that may infringe upon the code; by uniting the forces of

the rest inevitably against each delinquent; by agreeing, that any project of violating a neighbour's integrity shall be prevented or avenged, not according to the resources of this neighbour, but according to the full resources of all the other members of the European community; and by constantly watching over the state of public affairs, even in profound peace. Such, at least, would be the balancing system, carried to its full extent; and such is the state of the refinement towards which it is constantly tending. The division of labour, too, and the separation of the military profession, has been carried, by some of the richer nations, to a still greater extent than the mere embodying of standing armies. Those states, which are the most injured by the operations of war, are also the richest in superfluous stock. They have contrived a species of pecuniary commutation of war, similar to the commutation of military service, which paved the way for the introduction of standing armies: they have managed to turn off the battle from their gates, by paying less wealthy allies for fighting in their cause at a safe distance. The operations of war are in this manner rendered very harmless, and a foundation is laid for their gradual disuse. A few millions that can be spared, and a few lives are sacrificed; the arts of peace continue to flourish, sometimes with increased prosperity; and the policy of preferring to purchase defeat at a distance, rather than victory at home—of paying allies for being vanquished, rather than gain triumphs at home—has been amply rewarded by the safety, increased resources, and real addition of power, which result from an enjoyment of all the substantial blessings of peace, with the only real advantages of necessary warfare.

Such are the general outlines of the modern system, founded upon the preservation of a balance of power. The science which professes to discuss the general principles of this system, and their particular application in detail to the actual situation of the European powers, is, of consequence, next to jurisprudence, the most important that can occupy the attention of the statesman. It has, however, been alleged, that this is an inquiry reducible to no general or

fixed principles; that it does not deserve the name of science; that it depends on the caprices of a few individuals, and the variations in their views or measures, occasioned by accidental occurrences. Mr. Hume, in particular, at the very time when he recommends the drawing of our conclusions on subjects of domestic policy as fine as it is possible, adds, "that in these affairs, the inferences rest on the concurrence of a multitude of causes, not as in foreign politics, upon accidents, and chances, and the caprices of a few persons."[1] It may, however, be observed, that the very same general arguments, so irresistibly stated by that acute and profound writer, to prove that politics may be reduced to a science,[2] apply as well to the foreign as to the domestic policy of a state. A few more particular remarks on this point may serve to set it in a clearer light.

1. All the governments of Europe have tended uniformly, and not very slowly, towards greater freedom and mildness, since the rise of the commercial policy of modern times, and the general diffusion of knowledge by the art of printing. Instead of a collection of despots, actuated, in all their plans of internal and external arrangement, by caprice or accident, the system of European princes is now an assemblage of deputies from the different nations, which have intrusted them with certain powers and commissions, for the public good. In the execution of their trust, indeed, they are not directly accountable to any human authority; but, even in the states where no constitutional control is appointed to the power of the crown, the indirect influence of a numerous and enlightened people is uniformly strong upon the councils of the monarch. It is always his interest to rule by gentle and agreeable means, and to further, by every measure in his power, the prosperity of his state. This interest, though for a while it may be concealed from his eyes, or overruled by opposite passions, can never be long hidden from him; but must always, in the long-run, force itself upon his attention, and be, for the most part, the guide of his conduct. The government of the most despotic princes offers constant

[1] Political Essays. [2] Essay III.

examples of a submission to that opinion, which under them can scarcely make itself heard; exhibiting not a few instances of obedience to the voice, which, from its resistless power over divans themselves, has been emphatically called the voice of God. A check is thus provided for the violence of royal passions, and a guide or regulator for the movements of even a despot's caprice. In the comparatively free governments of modern Europe, however, the influence of public opinion is direct; the voice of the nation is acknowledged; and the will of the people is in general obeyed,—the only doubt being as to the particular line of conduct which that voice and will direct.

2. As almost all princes rule by the advice of ministers, and must execute their decrees by the assistance of a great number of deputies; the connection of those men with the people at large; their responsibility to their country; the odium and personal danger which attaches to a failure of any plan executed by their intervention, whether suggested by their councils or not, must quicken their perception of every national danger, and embolden them to withstand, in the cabinet, any pernicious measure dictated by the ignorance or caprice of their master. Where so many must thus, in some degree, concur in every act of the sovereign power, and so many are responsible, in the eyes of the country, for every abuse in the government, it is manifest that the chances of wilful misrule, through the unprincipled caprice, or rashness, or levity, or passions of a single monarch, are considerably diminished; and that the true interests of the country, in its relations to foreign states, can only be lost sight of or thwarted during casual intervals, when the ministers are utterly careless of popular opinion, in comparison of their master's will, and the prince is so shortsighted, and so corrupted by his unfortunate situation, as to despise his best interests, and disregard his chief danger. The actual responsibility of every minister to the country, even in governments the most unprincipled and despotic, and the submission of the sovereign to the will of the people, however debased, is proved by so many striking facts of common notoriety, that it is scarcely necessary to state them in illustration of the

foregoing remarks. "The Soldan of Egypt" (says Mr. Hume)[1] "or the Emperor of Rome, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclinations; but he must at least have led his Mamelukes or prætorian bands, like men, by their opinion." There is evidently somewhat of inconsistency between the two parts of this proposition. For, unless those Mamelukes and prætorian guards were so numerous as to command the whole state, and so separated from the rest of the commonwealth as to participate in no degree in their feelings, and to be altogether unconnected with their wrongs, it is clear that in the long-run they must have been influenced by the national opinion. At any rate, although, in the *domestic* concerns of Egypt or Rome, the interests of the two orders might be frequently opposed to each other, and those of the people be neglected, there can be no doubt that, in the *external* relations of the state, the two classes formed but one body, and the best interests of the whole were the same. The caprice of the soldan, or emperor, then, could never, for any length of time, stifle or disobey the voice of those bands whom he had to guide by their goodwill, and rule by their opinion; that is, by partly yielding to, and partly directing their wishes.

In the most despotic governments of the East, the fury of a mob frequently obtains a change of ministers, which is always a change of measures. The vizier who commands a vanquished army, who advises an unprosperous war, or concludes a disadvantageous peace, is bowstringed at the first murmurs of the mob, and his body thrown to appease them. This is a sacrifice made by the most absolute of monarchs to the will of the most enslaved people in the world. The power of the Grand Signior which lays every Mussulman prostrate at his feet, does not extend to the enacting of any law which might add to the taxes of the empire. He may crush the proudest of his bashaws, and squeeze from the richest of his officers every particle of their accumulated wealth: he may bowstring thousands, whom ancient opinion and religious

[1] Essay IV., on the Principles of Government.

prejudice has taught to believe that their lives were made for his sport; but he dares not issue any regular ordinance for a single general impost: or the same people, who, in the strange contradictions of this unnatural state of society, had kissed the axe that was lifted against their lives, would now raise their united voice with a force powerful to reach the innermost recesses of the seraglio.

When Peter the Great of Russia wished to invert the order of succession to the Imperial throne, from an unnatural antipathy to the Czarowitch, whose rights had formerly been in some degree acknowledged, he did not think it sufficient to issue an express edict, declaring the power of the Emperor to fix upon any successor that he chose. He began, by accustoming the minds of men to such an unsettled and arbitrary mode of inheritance, in cases of private property. He published a previous ordinance, obliging each father to bequeath his whole real property to one of his children, leaving him the choice of his heir. This singular barbarian, notwithstanding the many vices that stained his character, and the constant cruelties in which his reign was spent, had the merit of beginning the civilization of his boundless empire. He wished to raise his savage and enslaved people to the rank of men; and the ordinance which we have mentioned, is an instance of submission to their will, from a real or supposed necessity, and from a wish to bring about a change in their opinions. The succeeding Czars have adopted a regular mode of receiving the opinions of the most respectable and enlightened part of their subjects, and of imposing a check on their own authority. Upon a new and general law being drawn up, the *ukase* containing it is transmitted to each of the *governments;* and the viceroys may assemble the different *courts* to consider it. If they unanimously disapprove, they may present a *representation* against it to the senate. The law is reconsidered, and is not obligatory on the realm, until another ordinance has been issued, confirming the former.[1] The silly passion for legislation which distinguished the Emperor Joseph II. produced many laws disagreeable to the people: and al-

[1] Tooke's Russian Empire, vol. ii. p. 395.

though the whole tenor of that monarch's reign demonstrates how little he was disposed to recognise the rights of his subjects, yet those obnoxious regulations were generally abrogated almost as soon as passed. While he was dragooning the provinces of the Netherlands into a surrender of their most sacred privileges, and purposely acting in direct opposition to the wishes of his constituents in the Imperial diet, he could not obtain the acquiescence of Austria (where his power is absolute by law) in a trifling and absurd regulation prescribing the interment of dead bodies in lime-pits: and the discontent of that part of his empire obliged him to abandon this idle measure.[1]

3. It must be evident to every one, that the only reason why the theory of international relations has been supposed incapable of being reduced to fixed principles, is, the apparently small number of men concerned in regulating the external policy of states. Where a great body of people are nearly interested, and take a part in each measure; where their consent, advice, or acquiescence, is necessary to the execution of every plan, it is clear that there is always a much smaller chance of capricious and irregular operations being carried through, than where one or two individuals only are concerned. It is a remark of Machiavel, distinguished by his usual acuteness and depth, that although, in matters of general discussion, the people are often mistaken, yet, in matters reduced to particulars, they are most sensible and judicious; that the prince is much more apt to be ungrateful, both through avarice and suspicion, than the people; that the multitude is generally both wiser and more constant than the prince; and that those leagues or confederacies are more to be trusted which are made with free states, than those which are made with princes. For the demonstration of these important and curious propositions, both by reasoning and illustration, we refer the reader to the discourses of the Florentine Secretary,[2] more particularly the fifty-ninth chapter of the first book, which is most in consonance with our

[1] Mirabeau, Monarchie Prussienne, tom. iv. p. 472. 4to. edit.

[2] Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio. Lib. i. cap. 29. 47. 58. and 59.

present reasonings, and contains as strict a demonstration of the principle, as any that we meet with in geometry, making allowance for the different nature of the evidence.[1] As we have shown that in all states, whether free or enslaved, the regulation of public affairs is, in some degree, influenced by public opinion, and that the most despotic princes are not free from its influence, either directly, or through their subordinate agents; it may be inferred, that the principles of the Italian statesman are applicable, in some measure, to the movements of all independent communities; and that the external as well as internal affairs of states are the more steady, the more reducible to certain laws, the greater the number of men is, to whose management those affairs are intrusted, and the more extensive the circle is, whose opinion or will affects that management.

4. The relative interests of different nations are affected by various circumstances, either unalterable, or only slowly alterable, in their relative situation and domestic state. The knowledge and comparison of those circumstances forms the foundation of the science, the principles of which we are now considering; and it is very evident that this knowledge must be of as difficult acquisition as it is important and practically useful. For, in order to have a clear view of the foreign relations of any power, it is necessary to be acquainted with the circumstances, not only of that nation, but of all the rest which compose the European commonwealth; to learn accurately their political state; to investigate their national characters and habits; to consult minutely their statistical situation:—so intimately is the federal power (the *puissance fédérative* of the foreign politicians) blended with the internal force, and the relative position with the insulated state of any country. The temporary circumstances of the different powers deserve also to be considered in a practical point of view:—the court intrigues; the leading characters of the military or political departments; and the distinguished men in the literary world. These make up, in

[1] Cap. lix. *Di quali confederationi ò lega altri si puo più fidare, ò di quella fatta con una Republica, à di quella fatta con un Principe.*

the great book of politics, what may be called the chapter of accidents; and it is a chapter which perpetually sets all the inferences and calculations of the other parts at defiance. Except this last head, and it is obvious that every other branch of the subject is general and reducible to fixed principles, the circumstances which we have enumerated are of a general and invariable nature, or they vary slowly and regularly, and according to certain laws, which it is the business of the political philosopher to ascertain. The last kind of circumstances which we mentioned, are, indeed, more irregular, and their disturbing force is not denied. But, in considering the effects of the former, we must lay out of view those deranging causes, as we demonstrate (in Dynamics) the properties of the mechanical powers, without taking into view the effects of friction, or the resistance of the medium in which the machines work. In a practical point of view, those disturbing causes must be carefully weighed; and to investigate them, is the business of the lawgiver, the prince himself, his ministers of state, with his agents in diplomatic affairs: in a word, of the practical politician or statesman; a character of distinguished rank in every country, filling at once the most dignified and difficult place which man can occupy, and very little deserving of those ill-tempered invectives which Dr. Smith has been pleased to heap upon it, in a fit of peevishness, not unnatural to one who had seen how very seldom this great and important character has been adequately supported.[1]

That such disturbing causes do exist to affect the foreign relations of every state, is no more an argument against the science of which we are treating, than the undoubted existence and effects of causes exactly similar in the domestic policy of states is a reason for denying (what no one now thinks of doubting) that the principles of govern-

[1] The reader may be amused with the ill-humour which this truly great man vents upon the statesman or politician, in the passage here alluded to. He calls him "*an insidious and crafty animal*," forgetting, surely, that Cæsar, Cato, Demosthenes, Cicero, Richelieu, and many others, who have made the world tremble at their names, or revere their memory, must be ranged in this very class.—Wealth of Nations, Book iv. chap. 2.

ment are reducible to a general and certain science. The degree of vigour inherent in any form of government—the freedom enjoyed by the people—the influence of the privileged orders upon the great engine of the state—all these are liable to be affected every moment, and are actually affected by the characters of the leaders in the different departments of the constitution. Yet no one, since the days of Aristotle, has denied, that the doctrines of monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical polity, are reducible to certain general principles; and that the nature of government, in general, is a subject of scientific inquiry.

In fact, the foreign affairs of nations are much less apt to be influenced by accidental events, than is generally imagined. The death of a civil or military chief, who had supported the greatness of a state by the vigour and wisdom of his councils, or the glory of his arms, is seldom, if ever, a cause of great change in the relative importance of that country. Great men rise in certain circumstances; they are disciplined in particular schools; they train up successors for themselves; they are called forth by certain emergencies in public affairs. This is more particularly the case in great systems, either civil or military—in the extensive governments, or vast regular armies of modern times, all the operations of which are combined, and mutually dependent one upon another. As these can only be carried on by the united exertions of many persons of the same habits and cast of talents, their success must always depend on the union of men whose abilities and experience in their arts are extensive. If the general or the statesman fall, his place will be filled by some of those whose talents have assisted him in subordinate branches of employment; and the constant demand for merit in a certain department will generally excite men to apply their attention to the acquisition of the excellence so much wanted, and so splendidly rewarded. Great occasions draw into public life such men as have long been labouring to fit themselves for their station; and new talents, new powers, frequently spring up in a man's mind, when he is placed in a situation of pre-eminent difficulty and splendour sufficient to call them forth. The

great object of every nation should be, to remove every impediment or check which may prevent such men from rising into the stations for which their natural or acquired faculties render them fit. Under a free government, the restrictions upon the rise of real merit are much fewer than under a despotism; and the chance of preferment is extended to a much wider circle. In those countries, then, much less consequence may be attached to the existence or to the loss of a particular man. It is seldom that we meet with Fleurys, or Turgots, or Bernstorffs, or Hassans: but a Walpole, or a Pitt, is, happily for mankind, frequently reproduced in the course of an age. Thus the appearance of those illustrious characters, in whose hands the fates of nations are placed, is much less regulated by accident than is generally supposed, more especially in modern times and in free states. It follows, that, even in that branch of foreign policy which we have denominated the chapter of accidents, some principles may be traced; and that less is to be imputed to blind hazard than most men are at first apt to imagine. May we be allowed to hope that the time is approaching (not rapidly, or by violent changes, but slowly and quietly, like all those arrangements of nature which tend to the substantial improvement of the species), when the establishment of equal rights, and rational systems of regular government over the whole of Europe, shall diminish yet farther the consequences attached to the caprices and accidental fates of individuals, and shall reduce to complete order all the circumstances that affect the intercourse of nations; so as to subject their whole movements to certain general and invariable laws, to reduce every eccentricity of course, and to correct all accidental inequalities or alterations in the system.[1]

We have now finished the general observations which we purposed to premise upon the nature and first prin-

[1] The foregoing general conclusions are sanctioned by the high authority of our countryman, Professor Stewart. Had he added the demonstration of a proposition, simply enunciated in his celebrated work on the "Philosophy of the Human Mind" (chap. iv. sect. 8), the above inquiry would have been rendered unnecessary.

ciples of the science, a practical treatise or application of which is now before us.[1] Before offering our particular remarks upon this work, we have yet to call the reader's attention to some of the propositions in which the doctrine of the balance of power is contained: we shall arrange them so as to exhibit a sketch of the nature of the work before us; though in a more general way, and upon a more comprehensive plan, than can be found in that treatise itself, which is principally deficient in fundamental principles and extensive views. We have, in the foregoing statements, insisted the more at large on the possibility of reducing the external policy of nations to certain general principles; because, beside the direct negation of this proposition by Mr. Hume and others, it has been very much the custom of inferior politicians, and of the common run of mankind, more particularly in Great Britain, to decry such speculations as vain and illusive; to hold them up as objects fit only for the pedantic statist of Germany and Holland; and to describe them as points that should be settled by the finical personages, who are too often the representatives of the greatest nations, and who have brought a sort of ridicule upon the name of diplomacy. The gravest subject that can occupy the human mind (intimately connected too often indeed with our present inquiry, though not altogether of the same kind with it), the *Law of Nations*, has been exposed to a similar contempt. Montesquieu himself, lawyer and historian as he was, has, with his usual passion for an epigram, grossly misrepresented a subject as important and refined as any in his own department of municipal jurisprudence. He

[1] The foregoing remarks may appear to the reader unconnected with the particular works of *Ségur* and *Favier*. But we must observe, that the Notes of Ségur (the only new part of the publication) are, from beginning to end, a statement of the principles above refuted, viz., that in this branch of politics, all must be ascribed to the particular characters and fortunes of individuals. In fully examining this, we have therefore completely examined the leading doctrines of the work. It may be proper to add, that the work, of which Ségur's edition is now before us, has excited more attention on the Continent than any political publication of the present day; and that it is studied by all statesmen as a manual of one very important branch of their science.

seriously explains "the foundation of international law," by telling us, "that the whole system is a set of obvious corollaries to a maxim in ethics—that, in war, nations should do as little injury, and in peace as much good to each other, as is consistent with their individual safety." Without asking whether it is possible that the author of this witticism should ever have heard of the insults of flags, the precedence of states, the rights of neutrals, nay the whole admitted causes of justifiable war, and admitting that all the parts of the system may be strained, so as to come under the general proposition; we may be allowed to remark, with great deference to so high a name, that such observations are extremely useless and unsatisfactory; that we learn from this remark nothing which can give the slightest hint of the nature of public law; that it is as instructive as if one ignorant of mathematics were to say, "the whole of this troublesome science consists of obvious corollaries from a very easy axiom—whatever is, is." In this manner might all science be simplified; and learners, who knew what "*corollary*" was, might be charmed to hear that they had but one proposition to learn and remember, and that all the rest was "*corollary*" from it.

We trust that the remarks already stated will suffice to evince, how mistaken are all such views of foreign policy or international law; that those sciences will appear strictly reducible to certain general principles, and leading to important applications; that those subjects will be found highly refined and delicate, and as fully deserving of minute investigation as any within the range of the human intellect. As we proceed, further illustrations of these remarks will occur to confirm their truth.

1. *Treaties* or *public pactions* are the solemn and authentic expressions of certain agreements, which the governments of friendly or neutral powers have entered into for their mutual advantage. In so far as refers to our present subject, they are chiefly of three kinds, *amicable, defensive, offensive and defensive.* The first are simple cessations of hostilities; the next are agreements of mutual assistance in case of attack from a third power; and the last are more strict unions of interest, for the accomplish-

ment of certain objects beneficial to both parties. The second are seldom pure and unmingled. Many treaties bear the name of defensive, which, by secret articles, or more commonly by mutual understanding, and not unfrequently by the express tenor of the stipulations, are strictly of the third kind; and, in general, a paction *bonâ fide* defensive has a tendency to bring about one of this more intimate and effectual description.

The monopolising and jealous spirit of mercantile policy, in modern times, has added, to the kinds of treaties just now mentioned, a fourth known by the name of *commercial*; of which the object is, to settle a certain rate of trade between the high contracting parties; or (what comes to the same thing) to grant each other certain privileges of buying and selling, refused to other states. These treaties are in every case absurd; they are meant to restrain that which ought in its nature to be free, and to be regulated only by the unrestricted operations of private traders: they relate to subjects in which no government ought ever to concern itself: they are only tolerable, when their object is the abolition of restrictions formerly imposed by foolish rulers, or gradually arising from the prejudices of the people.

All treaties have been exposed to the invectives and sarcasms of those who do not duly appreciate the nature of the institution. They are bits of parchment, and may be torn; they are made by men of peace in their closets, and may be violated by soldiers in the field; they are deeds, by which states affect to bind themselves, while no court of public law exists, in which the party failing may be compelled to perform his part; they are intended to check the ambition of princes or commonwealths, but they are to be observed by those who feel the checks, and may in a moment throw them off. "Give me," said Prince Eugene, in the true spirit of these reasons—"Give me," said the General, when he saw that his allies were slow to fulfil conventions made against their obvious interests, and refusing to gratify his ambition, against their own safety and beyond their means—"Give me a battalion of soldiers; they will do more than a thousand treaties." If

all states were ruled by general officers, this sentiment would indeed be accurately true. In that case, a corporal would be a much more important personage than a publicist or an ambassador; but he would also be more interesting than a municipal judge or jurisconsult; for all municipal law, as well as all public law, would yield to the truncheon and the bayonet. The same sentiment would hold good, also, of all such treaties as those entered into about the time of Eugene, and those to which he evidently alludes—treaties evidently disadvantageous to one of the contracting parties, and wholly beneficial to the others. But it happens that, in the present state of society, generals receive their commission to act, and their orders to desist, from men strongly interested in the preservation of pacific relations; in the maintenance of the national faith; in the existence of a public code, to which all parties may at all times appeal.

If, by such declamatory arguments, it is meant to demonstrate, that treaties will not of themselves be sufficient to maintain peace, or that alliances—to preserve the independence of states — will not suffice to insure success in war—we must admit the position; for we certainly never imagined that an ambassador's seal and subscription communicated to the skin of a dead sheep the faculty of tranquillising or rousing the public mind, levying armies, gaining battles, and taking towns. We would trust more to its powers in the hands of a drummer, than of a statesman, to produce those effects. But that such solemn conventions as lead to treaties, and such discussions as attend them in the nations contracting, such ratifications as finish them, such ideas of pledge and promise as they are uniformly supposed to convey—that all those circumstances have a most powerful influence, we cannot conceive questionable by any one acquainted with the history of man, or the nature of the human mind. Independent of the spirit, indeed, with which those conventions were made, the mere paction is but a bit of parchment. Independent of the spirit which extorted the Magna Charta and Habeas Corpus Act, those records of the freedom and spirit of our ancestors, would be most

unavailing to the liberties of the present generation. Both the one and the other are conventional signs—legal modes of expressing a bargain—certain solemn acts, the performance of which intimates to the world that certain intentions were perfected in the minds of the parties at the time—certain deeds, leaving a record which may refresh the memory of the parties, and to which the party fulfilling may appeal. Neither the treaties of Westphalia (now, unhappily, a matter of history), nor the Magna Charta, can be enforced directly by the mandate of any human Court, superior to both parties. If the circumstances which gave rise to them were materially altered, they would both become obsolete; as, indeed, the former have already become. While no material change takes place, they stand on record before the whole world, to animate the parties contracting—to check them in their conduct on their honour and good faith—to show the surrounding nations what compacts have been made—and to hold up to execration those that break them.

The foundation of the stability of every treaty is, the mutual advantage of the parties. It is a just remark of the Florentine Secretary, that, even after the most unequal contest, no peace between nations can ever be solid, by which one gains much more than the other. If the one gains much real good, and the other only obtains safety from total ruin, the peace will be broken, either by the former, as soon as her power is recruited enough to complete the work of conquest, or by the latter, as soon as she has breathed a little, and can hope to regain her lost ground. All such foolish treaties are rather conventions of truce than of peace. They were one great means of conquest used by the Romans: they are rendered less frequent in modern times, by the principles of the balancing system.

The observation of Machiavel may be extended to alliances in general between nations. The leagues, particularly those of a nature both offensive and defensive, have generally owed their instability to a necessary disunion of parties, arising from each possessing views radically incompatible with those of the others; views, properly speaking, secondary to the main object of the convention,

but more interesting and more binding to the individual party, than any views of the common cause.

The remarks made above, apply to those subsidiary obligations entered into by nations not strictly concerned in the stipulations, in which the acceding powers guarantee the treaty, or bargain to support the party performing against all infractions by the other. These are generally modified by the disposition of all parties at the time of the requisition to fulfil being made to the parties guarantees. They are the refinement of the modern system of interference.

2. The circumstances in the relative situation of the European powers—their proximity, their constant intercourse, their rivalry, and the uniform desire that all princes have to extend their dominions, render it absolutely necessary that no one power should view with indifference the domestic affairs of the rest, more particularly those affairs which have a reference to the increase or consolidation of national resources.

For the purpose of acquiring such information, the institution of ambassadors has been adopted, or of *privileged spies*, as they have been called by witty men, with much the same propriety of speech as would mark the personage who should be pleased to call Generals master-butchers, or Judges hangmen. From the institution of ambassadors, an essential and peculiar part of the modern system, have resulted the important consequences—a constant intercourse between the two governments; frequent opportunities of detecting and preventing hostile measures or artifices; and still more frequent occasions of avoiding ruptures by timely complaint, and explanation or redress. The natural effects of the system to which this matter has been reduced, are certainly the prevention of wars, and the systematizing of the grand art of pacification.

The relative influence of the national changes that happen in one part of Europe, upon the proceedings of the other parts, might be illustrated by a variety of facts from modern history. That influence seems to be founded on natural circumstances, and wholly independent of all theory or system. Thus, to take an obvious instance—As soon as

the grand improvement of standing armies had been introduced into Europe, it was extended, in France, by the ambition of the King to the keeping of large forces always in pay; and this example was followed by the neighbouring states, not as a useful invention of policy, for securing the prince's power, but as a measure necessary for the safety of nations exposed to the new power with which this change armed the French King. A circumstance not so obvious, in the history of the formation of most of the European states, presents an illustration, equally striking, of the principle which we have stated. There can be no doubt that the consolidation of the smaller dynasties into which the different empires were once divided, took place, in all, about the same period. The united empire of the Franks under Charlemagne was too formidable a neighbour to the heterogeneous masses of divided power which were then presented on all sides—by Britain, Spain, Italy, and the Northern kingdoms. Accordingly, we find, that in the space of little more than half a century, all the great unions took place, of which the present nations of Europe are composed. The empire of Charlemagne was completed at the end of the eighth century; the Saxon Heptarchy was united under Egbert, first King of England, in 827; the Picts and Scots, by Kenneth II. first King of Scotland, in 838; the Norwegian petty lordships into one kingdom, by Harold Harfager, in 875; and the crowns of Castile and Leon, under one King of Spain, nearly about the same period. The more contiguous of those states were consolidated at the very same time; the rest within a few years afterwards.

The right of national interference (a late refinement of this right of proportional improvement) has, like all other valuable and sacred principles, been called in question. It has been denied, that the total overthrow of all regular government in the greatest nation of Europe; the abolition of every salutary restraint upon the operations of the multitude; the erection of a standard to which everything rebellious and unprincipled might repair; the open avowal of anarchy, atheism and oppression, as a public creed:—it has been denied, that the existence of this grand nuisance

gave the vicinage (to use Mr. Burke's apposite illustration) a right to interfere. Yet it is difficult to conceive what national changes, except the introduction of the pestilence, could give a better right to the neighbourhood to reject all intercourse with so infected a mass as France then was. And, if such defensive measures were absolutely necessary, it is evident, that the slightest aggression on the part of this neighbour justified that open war, which was so plainly prescribed by the slightest chance of its leading to a restoration of order. The immense acquisition of power which the French government acquired by the Revolution; the general levy and arming that immediately took place—would have justified all neighbours in extending their resources upon the common principles of the modern system. Now, if this increase of French power had taken place on the Spanish, instead of the Northern side of the Pyrenees; if it had been, not a sudden augmentation of internal resources, but an increase of territory and power by conquest—no one doubts the propriety of an immediate interference; nay, if this increase had only been in contemplation, no one would hesitate to consider the formation of the plan as sufficient cause for war:—So thought our forefathers at least, when they attacked Louis XIV. a hundred years ago. But what difference is there, as to foreign states, whether such an augmentation of power takes place at the expense of the Spanish Bourbons, or at the cost of the other branch of that illustrious house? whether this sudden change in the aspect of one powerful rival neighbour is the consequence of her foreign conquests, or of her rapid internal changes? whether the addition is drawn from the pillaged provinces of Spain, or the overthrow of all the peaceful institutions, and the plunder of all the wealthy orders at home? When such a sudden and prodigious increase of resources takes place in one country, as can only be matched by a similar revolution developing equal powers in the neighbouring nations, those neighbours are exactly in this dilemma;—either they must wade through all manner of turbulence and danger, to the sudden possession of resources sufficient to balance this new power; or they must submit to this new power. One mode of escape

only remains from alternatives equally cruel: they may unite against this common nuisance—they may interfere and abate it. If France had conquered the kingdoms of Leon and Castile, who doubts that England and Austria might have attacked her, though neither of them were friends of Spain? But this was not absolutely necessary; for, first, they might have perhaps saved themselves by defensive alliance, and the peaceable improvement of their internal resources; or, secondly, they might certainly have acquired in Holland, or Denmark, or Spain itself, an extent of territory equal to that gained by France. But the former measure would have been dangerous; the latter both dangerous and unjust. In like manner, England and Austria might have met the crisis of their affairs, arising from the new and sudden acquisition of resources which France made at the revolution. First, they might have united defensively as ancient allies, and worked all the while to improve their internal resources; or, secondly, they might have revolutionized, and followed the French example. The first, however, of those plans would have been dangerous; the latter, both dangerous and unprincipled. One alternative remained;—a union against the unheard-of nuisance.

We hesitate not, then, to lay it down as a principle, applicable to this extreme case, that, whenever a sudden and great change takes place in the internal structure of a state, dangerous in a high degree to all neighbours, they have a right to attempt, by hostile interference, the restoration of an order of things, safe to themselves; or, at least, to counterbalance, by active aggression, the new force suddenly acquired. If a highwayman pulls out a pistol from his bosom, shall we wait till he loads and presents it, before we disarm him? shall we not attack him with like arms, if he displays such weapons, whether he takes them from his own stores, or seizes them from some other person in our sight?[1] We do not attack a neighbouring nation for plundering or conquering a third power, because we wish to

[1] The doctrine of the balance of power is deduced, by Vattel, from similar grounds. *Vide* Droits des Gens, Liv. iii. chap. 3, sec. 44, *et seqq.*

avenge or redress the injury; but because we shall be ourselves affected by its consequences. Shall we be less injured by the same consequences, because the dangerous power of doing us mischief is developed from its recesses within, and not forcibly snatched from without?

That such a principle as we have now been considering, is liable to limitations, we do not deny: it is indeed only applicable to extreme cases. No one would think of asserting the right of interference to be applicable in the case of gradual improvement, however great, in any nation; nor in the case of that more sudden amelioration which national resources may receive from the operation of a salutary reform—or a useful law—or a beneficial change of rulers. We only think the right competent in cases of sudden and great aggrandisement, such as that of France in 1790; and then, we maintain, that, if it endangers the safety of the neighbouring powers, no manner of importance should be attached to the nature of those circumstances from whence the danger has originated. Indeed we suspect that the essential, though not always avowed principles of modern policy, would bear us out in a wider interpretation of the proposition. We conceive, that many of the alliances of states, formed with a view to check the growing power of a common rival, and always ending in offensive measures, have been formed without any pretext of violence having actually been committed by the dreaded power, or being apprehended from that quarter; and without any consideration whatever of the source from whence this dangerous strength has been derived, whether from external acquisitions (the most common case) or from the sudden development of internal resources, or from the gradual increase of national strength, while neighbouring states were more slowly increasing or were losing force. This increase it is—this comparative strength, which excites the salutary jealousy of modern councils towards neighbouring powers. The pretexts, indeed, for war have been various; but the cause of such wars has generally been the same: the pretext has been adopted in conformity to ancient usage or prejudices, or to humour the feelings of the multitude, and cause them to take part, by working on their passions much

more powerfully than if the real cause were stated. The great maxim has generally been, "*Obsta principiis*"—"*Venienti occurrite morbo.*" We recommend it as a general watchword to all nations placed in the European community—to those more especially, who are neighbours of Prussia and France; above all, we recommend it to the greater powers of Europe, the natural guardians of the great commonwealth; and to our country in particular, whose pre-eminent rank among them, gives her a title to interfere for others, as well as for her own immediate safety.

3. It has been urged as a glaring inconsistency in a system which has for its professed object the preservation of peace, that, according to its principles and technical language, certain nations are denominated *natural enemies*, and others *natural allies*. A little attention to the meaning of this classification, will at once demonstrate the futility of the allegation, and lead us to one of the most general and fundamental doctrines of modern international policy. It is not meant by this phraseology to assert, that some nations ought always to view each other with suspicion and enmity. The intention of such a form of expression is merely to state a very general, and, unfortunately, an unquestionable fact in the history of the human species—that nations placed in certain circumstances are found to entertain towards each other sentiments of rivalry and animosity. The balancing system prescribes the means of disarming this bad principle in our nature of its destructive tendency, by teaching us to consider other nations as our natural friends, and by making the members of each class unite, so as to act systematically, with a view to the preservation of national peace. A few obvious considerations will show what those principles are, and will lead us, by an easy transition, to the particular subject of the work now before us.

The circumstances which are found to constitute natural enmity between nations are threefold; *proximity* of situation, *similarity* of pursuits, and near *equality* of power. From the opposite causes arise the natural indifference or relative neutrality of states; a reasonable *distance*, *diversity*

of objects, and considerable *inequality* of resources; while natural alliance results from the common enmity produced by a concurrence of the three causes first mentioned, in the relations of two or more powers towards the same third power.

But it may often happen that a state is involved in hostile relations with another of which it is not the natural enemy, either from being the accidental ally of a third power, primarily the enemy of this second; or from being natural ally to this third power, in consequence of their common relations of enmity towards some fourth or fifth power. Hence indeed arises the intricacy, if it has any, of the balancing system; and hence the multiplied relations of every one power with all the rest, so as to permit no one to remain for a moment an indifferent spectator of what is passing in the most remote parts of the European commonwealth. A few examples will illustrate the foregoing proposition. These illustrations contain the theory of what is called in practice the European balance. The work before us consists, almost entirely, of a treatise drawn up by the Sieur Favier, a confidential servant of Louis XV. and Louis XVI. upon the actual relations of the different powers at the commencement of the last unfortunate reign. The principles upon which all such treatises proceed, we purpose at present briefly to sketch. The utility and application of such speculations may, like their object, be temporary and local; the principles are of all times and places—they are regular, fixed, and general.

In conformity to the proposition above enunciated, France is said to be the natural enemy of Great Britain. These states, separated by a narrow channel, are of sufficient relative strength to be mutually formidable; the one, by the extent and compactness of her territory, and by her large and useful population; the other, by her immense wealth, the defence afforded by her insular situation, and the myriads of her fleets which cover the ocean. They are both engaged in similar pursuits; because the circumstances of their situation are similar. The island, however, is more adapted to commercial occupations, by the genius of her inhabitants, the nature of her produce,

and the extent of her sea-coast; from whence has resulted a habit of application to manufactures, navigation and trade, and, in consequence, superior skill in the arts, and greater extent of trading capital. The other country, eminent also in those points of view, is, however, so far inferior to the island, that her attention has, for above a century, been constantly directed to emulate so valuable a superiority; while Britain finding herself deficient in direct power to sway the continental states of Europe, otherwise than by intrigue and gold, has returned France the compliment of attempting to beat, on her own element, the natural mistress of the European continent. From this reciprocal inferiority, and consequent emulation, has arisen that spirit of rivalry, which will, it is to be feared, permanently alienate from each other, the two nations most formed to love and esteem each other; best adapted to entertain close and profitable relations of commerce; and fitted, by their union, to secure the lasting peace, and sway uncontrolled the sceptre of the civilized world. Unhappily, most unhappily, the natural passions of the people, and the ambition of their rulers, have taught both to "bear no brother near the throne;" to suffer no equal in trade, in arts, or in learning; and to divide, by their irreconcilable enmity, the other powers in the system, of which that enmity has become the corner-stone.

Holland, from her proximity to England, her extensive commerce, and her splendid resources of national wealth, would have been our natural enemy, had France been out of the question. But as Holland lay still nearer to that ambitious power, with whose pursuits she interfered at least as much, beside the jealousy of her democratic government and Calvinistic religion, it became her interest to league with the enemies of her formidable neighbour. Accordingly, in all the wars of the two last centuries, Holland has been found on the side of England, with only two exceptions:—the impolitic contest of Charles II. when he was in the pay of France, and the jealous enemity of Holland at the end of the American war, as anomalous in Dutch politics, as the war of Charles had been in the history of Great Britain. After the peace of 1782, the

breach was kept open, chiefly by the successes of the Republican party, until the year 1787; when, by one of the most skilful and successful interferences in continental affairs, which the balancing system has ever accomplished, the Stadtholder's power was restored, French influence destroyed, and the Dutch restored to their natural alliance with England.

The present alliance of the French and Batavian Republics is obviously no anomalous case: it is in every respect a subjection maintained, as it was made, by the force of arms, and the influence of factious intrigue. The day is perhaps not distant, when even the slight appearances of national independence will be thrown off, and the absorption of the United Provinces into the modern empire of the Franks, be (shall we say?) the last great sacrifice to the sweeping principle of "*arrondissement*," one of the most signal inventions of the eighteenth century.

Next to France, the greatest power on the continent of Europe resides in the House of Austria, from the union of its hereditary dominions in Hungary, Bohemia, Austria, the frontier provinces, and the late acquisitions in Poland and the Venetian territories, with the Imperial crown, which confers an authority, chiefly of indirect influence, over the princes of the empire. Her losses of hereditary dominions in the late war, have, on the whole, been trifling; but she has lost much in the power of swaying the affairs of Italy, much of her influence in Germanic affairs, and still more of relative force, by the astonishing increase of France, and the augmentation also of Prussia (her natural rival in Germany), to one or other of whom, or their dependents, have accrued all that Austria has lost. After all, the Austrian power is great and formidable. It would be the greatest and most formidable in Europe, were its extensive territories somewhat more compact, so as to derive full advantage from their central position; were it to acquire a small addition of sea-coast in the Adriatic, so as to have easier vent in the foreign markets for its numerous and costly products; were its vast resources called forth and wielded by a better-formed Government, or a wiser race of statesmen, so as to take every advantage

of the finest climates, richest mountains, most fertile valleys, and greatest variety of hardy subjects; more especially, were its armies, the first in the world, organized upon a better plan, so as to place at their head younger leaders: Were these advantages (the most of which may be acquired) added to her immense natural resources, Austria might be deemed the first power in Europe, and dreaded by all her neighbours as resistless in the scale.

The circumstances which render Austria the natural enemy and counterpoise of France, render her also the natural ally of England,—the great continental support of British influence. In proportion to the enmity between those leading powers, this natural union between England and Austria has always been more or less close, since the separation of the Spanish from the Austrian branch of the house. It has experienced only one remarkable intermission, and that a slight one, during the peace-loving administrations of Fleury and Walpole. In the war which succeeded the fall of Walpole's ministry, France siding with the Bavarian Emperor, England naturally took the part of the Empress-Queen, at that time almost crushed by the union of her enemies. The singular alliance of 1756, the *chef-d'œuvre* of Kaunitz, and, according to the French politicians, the greatest error France ever committed, deranged, for a while, the natural relations of the continental powers. England was not thrown out of amity with Austria; but Austria, ceasing to be the enemy of France, ceased also to be the ally of England. Yet still it is worthy of remark, that the assistance given by us to Prussia, during the Seven-years' war, in consequence of France siding against Frederick II.,[1] was pointed, not against Austria or Russia, his two most formidable enemies, by checking whom we could at once have saved him; but against our own natural enemy alone,

[1] *Vide* Hist. de la Guerre de Sept-ans, vol. i. cap. 1, where that prince himself details the reasons that induced him to undertake the war. One was, the certainty of both England and France *not* taking the same side; whence he could count on the assistance of one of those powers.

to our desire of opposing whom, Prussia owed the aid she received from us.

The chief part of the "*Politique de tous les Cabinets*," is occupied with a treatise of the Sieur Favier on the Foreign Relations of France, evidently drawn up with a view to decry the policy of 1756, which dictated the Austrian alliance, and to show the necessity under which France laboured of increasing her military as well as federal power (*sa puissance tant militaire qùe fédérative*), in order to regain the rank of a primary power, said to have been lost through the consequences of the Austrian alliance, and the Seven-years' war. This treatise (with a few others, chiefly short excerpts from the memorials of Vergennes, Broglio, Turgot, and other French ministers) was first published in 1793, by authority of the legislature; and, after attracting so great attention over all Europe, as to be deemed the best popular manual of young diplomatists and politicians, it is now republished with a few additions, and with large notes, of considerable value, by the editor, M. Ségur, formerly an eminent diplomatic character in the service of the French Court. The theory of M. Ségur is precisely the reverse of Favier's. He approves of the Austrian alliance, and condemns only the misconduct that marked the management of both the civil and military administration of France, after the treaty of Vienna had sealed and perfected the new federal system.

Favier, adopting the opinion since universally received, attributes to the treaty 1756, and the consequent military operations of France during the Seven-years' war, not only the immediate loss of men and money at that crisis, all for the benefit of Austria, without any good to the concerns of France, but also the subsequent aggrandizement of the Austrian House, already too powerful by the exhaustion of Prussia, and the valuable acquisition of Poland, the natural ally of France, and scene of French influence, whose destruction he hesitates not to impute to the Austrian system. Ségur, on the other hand, without denying the losses experienced by France during the war, and the still greater evils arising to her from the Polish catastrophe, ascribes those consequences to the maladmi-

nistration of French affairs in the Seven-years' war, and in the whole interval between the peace of Hubertsburg and the Revolution. He maintains, that the wisest policy which France could possibly have adopted, was, the securing of a long peace by an alliance with her natural enemy. He argues this point upon much the same grounds as those chosen by the defenders of Walpole and Fleury; and he contends, that no danger whatever could have arisen to France from the alliance of 1756, if the administration of her domestic affairs had been as wise and energetic as the management of her foreign relations at that period. As Favier perpetually recurs to the same text, endeavouring, like all theorists, to reduce everything under one head, and twisting all facts to humour his main position; so, the new editor follows him through his whole course, and, under the head of each power whose relations to France are discussed by Favier in the text, we meet with a separate argument in Ségur's notes, tending either to modify or overthrow the favourite conclusions of the former politician.

It appears to us (although we cannot afford room for the discussion) that the doctrine of Favier, with a few limitations, is by far the soundest. All the benefits of repose would have been gained by France, although she had never entered into the defensive treaty of 1755, or the subsequent conventions of 1756 and 1757. The chance of France being attacked was chimerical. By whom, but Austria or England, could she possibly be annoyed? If by the former, of course the defensive treaty was absurd: if by the latter, clearly, Austria could never assist her; since the British forces would only attack by sea, or by a littoral warfare, or in the American and East-Indian settlements. But Austria was liable to attack from that power which had despoiled her of her finest provinces a few years before. Besides, the object of the treaty turned out to be (according to the remarks on conventions which we formerly made) not defensive, but offensive. France was, in fact, to assist Austria with 24,000 men to recover Silesia and humble the House of Brandenburg, or dismember its dominions. After the war broke out, the

stipulation was forgotten; that is, the terms were changed, as is very commonly the case; and, instead of 24,000, France sent 100,000 men, to be defeated by the British and Prussian armies. How could she possibly gain by such an object, though completely successful in attaining it? She was fighting for Austria, conquering for her profit, and, if defeated, sharing her losses. We object also to the general spirit of Ségur's reasonings. He always denies the possibility of drawing certain conclusions upon such matters; and, in the true spirit of an old diplomatist and courtier, he advises us to look more to the peculiarities of human character, and personal or accidental considerations, than to the *criteria* more philosophically appealed to by Favier. We have formerly treated at large of this matter, and have endeavoured to refute doctrines proceeding from so partial and erroneous a view of the subject. We ought to remark, however, that Ségur is by no means so ignorant of political philosophy, as we might expect from this specimen, and from the nature of his former pursuits. We find him decidedly rejecting, as absurd, the narrow notions of mercantile policy, which dictate commercial treaties, although he was himself successful in the negotiation of a very celebrated one, the foundation of his fame in the diplomatic world. We return to our general sketch.

The vicinity of Spain to France, their distance from the rest of Europe, and the compactness of their territories, which renders them, as it were, parts of one great peninsula, might have rendered them natural enemies, had not Holland and England been situated in much the same predicament, with respect to France on the north. Besides, the insulated position of Spain, joined to her great inferiority of strength, from political and moral causes, makes her naturally dependent on her powerful neighbour. But, above all, the separation of the Spanish from the Imperial crown and the Austrian dominions, and the consequent disputes between the Courts of Vienna and Madrid, about the dominion of Italy, have thrown Spain into the arms of the natural enemy of the House of Austria. We do not enumerate, among these causes, the

family compact which so closely united the two branches of the House of Bourbon, or the blood relationship which was the cause of that convention. Those circumstances may have drawn closer the natural ties of alliance between France and Spain; but still they are to be viewed as accidental and subordinate. If it was the evident interest of Spain to depend on France, and of France to rule over Spain, the death or marriage of one of the reigning branches could never for a moment have prevented the union of the nations. The last will of Charles II. indeed, set all Europe in arms to fight down this formidable union. But does any one imagine, that had Alberoni succeeded in stealing this document, the other powers would have shut their eyes on the strides which Louis was making to obtain dominion over Europe, by playing off Spain against Austria? Or, had the combined enemies of that ambitious prince been prudent enough to accept of the terms extorted by his humiliation, and terminated the grand alliance-war at Gertruydenberg, can any one suppose, that the union of the two natural allies, thus apparently broken (for Louis's offers went to this length), would have subsisted less close and compact at the next crisis of European affairs?

To such as believe that all great events depend more on chance than principle, and despise all general reasonings on the train of human affairs, we would recommend two obvious considerations: Did the alliance of 1756 maintain indissoluble the unnatural union of the two powers? Or, has the dissolution, with every cruel aggravation, of the marriage which had been intended to cement that temporary union, prevented peace and seeming amity from subsisting between the murderers and the nearest blood relations of the ill-fated Antoinette? Has not one of the various means tried by Spain to regain that power over her feeble neighbour, which the Bragança revolution (1640) overthrew, consisted in always endeavouring to have a Spanish princess on the Portuguese throne? And yet, has that prevented her from seconding her policy by open force, and attacking the throne which she had immediately before filled with her royal offspring? Or, to come still

nearer the present discussion, was not the family compact dissolved in 1793, under circumstances of complicated insult and violence to every branch of the House of Bourbon, as well as of imminent danger to the most despotic and bigoted government in the West of Europe? And have the ancient politics of the Spanish cabinet varied one jot, in consequence of all those personal considerations and extraordinary occurrences? No. After a few months of languid co-operation with the combined powers (from the expectation of crushing the infant Republic), as soon as Spain saw that the new State could stand alone against foreign attacks, and had some chance of surviving the revolutionary storms, she instantly returned to her natural policy, and resumed her alliance with France; that is to say, she resigned all her family regards, the consequences of which had once alarmed all Europe; sacrificed much of her trade; exposed her sea-coast to the troops and fleets of England; risked and lost her fleets by fighting the battles of France; and put the very existence of her weak-handed government to the severest trial, by a free intercourse with republicans and regicides—by acknowledging and receiving into her capital a Jacobin emissary with his associates. In a word, the Spanish branch of the Bourbon line is as closely united, or rather as submissively dependent on the usurper of that throne, which the sister branch once filled, as ever it was during the proudest days of the French monarchy. In return for his homage, the haughty Sovereign of the two Indies is pleased to receive for his son, from the Corsican chief, a crown patched up of the Italian spoils, taken from the natural enemy of Spain. The service performed, and the boon granted, are equally illustrative of our general principles.

We might now proceed to trace the relations between Portugal and England on the one hand, or its connexion with France and Spain on the other; between the Italian States and the Transalpine Powers to the right and left of the Rhine; between the Porte and Russia; or the Porte and England, or France; the connexions between the three powers surrounding the ancient and dismembered kingdom of Poland; the relations of the Northern Crowns;

the relations of the different powers possessed of settlements in the East or West Indies, both with the native states, and with each other, in consequence of their colonial possessions. All these juntos of states form separate assemblages of particular interests; smaller systems, influenced internally by the same principles, and connected by the same law with the general mass of the European community. We have, however, said enough to show, that, in practice, as well as from theoretical considerations, this important subject is capable of being reduced to systematic arrangement, and to fixed general principles. And we have only to conclude with repeating, in a form somewhat different, the proposition which at the outset we proposed to demonstrate.

It appears that, by the modern system of foreign policy, the fate of nations has been rendered more certain; and the influence of chance, of the fortune of war, of the caprices of individuals upon the general affairs of men, has been exceedingly diminished. Nations are no longer of transient or durable existence in proportion to their internal resources, but in proportion to the place which they occupy in a vast and regular system; where the most powerful states are, for their own sakes, constantly watching over the safety of the most insignificant. A flourishing commonwealth is not liable to lose its independence or its prosperity by the fate of one battle. Many battles must be lost; many changes must concur: the whole system must be deranged, before such a catastrophe can happen. The appearance of an Epaminondas can no longer raise a petty state to power and influence over its neighbour, suddenly to be lost, with the great man's life, by some defeat at Mantineia, as it had been gained by some unforeseen victory at Leuctra. In the progress of freedom, knowledge, and national intercourse, this great change has been happily effected by slow degrees: it is a change which immediately realizes the advantages that every former change has gained to mankind; a step in our progress, which secures the advancement made during all our previous career; and contributes, perhaps more than any other revolution that has happened since the invention of written

language, to the improvement and magnificence of the species.

Let statesmen, then, reflect on these things; and, in the present awful crisis of affairs, let them often ponder upon the principles which should direct their public conduct. Without neglecting the increase of their internal resources, by wise regulations, and gradual improvements of the civil and military constitution of the countries entrusted to their care, let them constantly look *from* home; and remember, that each state forms a part of the general system, liable to be affected by every derangement which it may experience; and, of necessity, obliged to trust for its safety to a concurrence of other causes beside those which domestic policy can control. "*Non arma neque thesauri regni præsidia sunt, verum amici: quos neque armis cogere, neque auro parare queas; officio et fide pariuntur.*"—Sal. Jugurth.

BALANCE OF POWER.

(JANUARY, 1807.)

Fragments upon the Balance of Power in Europe. Translated from the German of the Chevalier FRED. GENTZ. Peltier, London, 1806. Pp. 335. 8vo.

THE great reputation which Mr. Gentz's political writings have acquired, both on the continent and in this country, induces us to give a full account of the present work as soon as possible after its publication. That reputation has, in our apprehension, been considerably augmented beyond the author's intrinsic merits, by the peculiar nature of the junctures in which he wrote, by the boldness with which he adopted one marked line of political opinion, and by the constancy, rather than the discretion, with which he persisted in the same unbending tone of opposition to France, at a period when all open resistance to her power was chimerical. The people of England, too, were naturally pleased to find, among the venal or timid thousands of German authors, one, not the least considerable in talents and information, who had the liberality to despise those absurd prejudices against our commercial superiority so prevalent, for the last ten years, both among the vulgar and the statesmen of foreign countries; and as Mr. Gentz, in following out his views of hostility to France, necessarily made to himself an idol of England, in his devotion to which he surpassed many of its natural votaries, the people of this country came, as a matter of course, to regard him as their regular champion on the continent—to view him with the esteem due to a sort of fellow-countryman—and to prize him, at the same time, as a foreigner attached to their cause.

Though such accidental circumstances tended considerably to increase the reputation of Mr. Gentz, and especially contributed to his popularity in England, it must be

admitted that a large portion of his fame was justly earned, and that the foundation of the celebrity which his former writings attained, was laid in their intrinsic merits. Before starting as a political writer, he had applied himself to the pursuits of literature and science. He had qualified himself for bearing a part in the great discussions of the day by a course of excessive labour—by studying indefatigably almost everything that had been written on political subjects —by making himself master of those practical details which students seldom think of learning—by examining the domestic economy, of Great Britain more particularly, with an accuracy and industry which has marked the investigations of scarcely any other literary man, and which, we may safely aver, no other foreign author can boast of. After thus preparing in retirement for the life which he purposed to lead, he adopted, and has since strenuously pursued, the line of exertion most hostile to the progress of the French influence; and whatever we may think of his opinions on some points, it can scarcely be denied that his talents and learning have been meritoriously applied. The excellence of his intentions cannot be questioned; and his former writings, though certainly not always very judiciously contrived, and frequently displaying opinions either false or overstrained, produced, upon the whole, very salutary effects.

To the work now under review we can by no means apply the same general character; nor can we encourage our readers to expect from it the same good consequences. It derives almost all its interest from the former celebrity of the author, the importance of the subject, and the necessity of exposing some of its evil doctrines. On this account, principally, we are induced to bestow some attention upon it; and we shall accordingly exhibit a sketch of its substance, with such remarks as a careful perusal has suggested. We shall begin with our abstract, interspersing it with observations on the errors into which Mr. Gentz seems to have fallen; and we shall afterwards offer a few general notices of those practical doctrines which we are disposed to substitute in the place of his.

This publication, as its title indeed implies, is part of an extensive work which Mr. Gentz had begun upon the

mutual relations of the different European powers. Pursuing his constant aim of pointing out the dangers to which Europe has been exposed by the growth of France, and anxious to exhibit the proper remedies for a malady so fatal as that indifference to French tyranny which was growing up in the European system, it had been his intention to take a general view of the principles recognised by our ancestors, as fit to regulate the mutual connexions of the different states—to show what a "balance of power" had been in its original purity—and to trace the progress which this salutary principle had lately made towards a decline. The further prosecution of this plan led him to consider the relations which France bore to her neighbours, to indicate the various circumstances in her internal situation, as well as in their domestic policy, which rendered her so formidable, and to appreciate the effects of the revolution war upon the liberties of those countries which still remained nominally independent. From a proof that the balance was wholly deranged, and the ancient principles destroyed, he was led to attempt the investigation of such new principles as might be sufficient to create a barrier against French usurpation, and preserve what yet remained of the system.

A work of this nature, being one of the great *desiderata* in political science, we cannot help regretting that a person so well qualified to execute it as Mr. Gentz should have been interrupted in his design. He would have given us a treatise replete with valuable information and ingenious argument, though, no doubt, we might have laid our account with both prejudice and declamation interfering where they are peculiarly calculated to do mischief. But when he had made some progress in his work, and had begun to write with a view of rousing Europe from a torpor which he considered as the sleep of death, he was thrown into great consternation by finding her completely conquered almost before he knew of her being awakened. He therefore changed his plan; and resolved, without writing any more for the present, to publish what he had written already, with very little alteration. We are persuaded that he has given us the worst portion of his projected work, and that,

as he proceeded, he would have found the necessity of adopting greater accuracy in the investigation of his principles, as well as of leaving off declamation and rant. But we have now only to do with the portion which he has published; and to this portion, the terms, inaccurate and declamatory, are most justly applicable. It was written in the months of September and October 1805, and is now published, with a long introduction, dated April 1806. We have stated these things in justice to Mr. Gentz, before entering upon our review of his '*Fragments.*' We must add, with the same intention, our belief that the translation now before us is more than commonly deficient in fidelity. It appears to be executed by one very moderately acquainted with the different idioms of the two languages; and, beside a degree of clumsiness and obscurity which we are sure belongs not to Mr. Gentz's German style, it abounds in phrases wholly foreign to the English tongue. To give only a few of many instances.—We presume "*egotism*" and "*egotists,*" which occur perpetually for "*selfishness*" and "*selfish people,*" are entirely imputable to the translator. So "*regents*" for "*rulers,*" in almost every page, and "*states' system,*" for "*system composed of different states,*" are German, not English expressions. We know enough, too, of Mr. Gentz's style, to believe that he could not speak, as the translation makes him do (in p. 142), of "a great change being necessary in our views, calculations, measures, and arrangements." And to the same cause, we ascribe such marvellous tautology as the following sentence unfolds. "At the end of this most important, eventful, and now hopeless and desperate war, Austria stood alone, insulated and forsaken, opposed to the colossal power of a revolutionary mass, disciplined by time, experience, and victory."—(p. 146.) Although, however, these and a thousand other passages of similar merit, belong, we are certain, to the English manufacturer, yet from the length of the sentences, and the constant superabundance of epithets attached to each substantive, we suspect that a part of the diffuseness and tautology observable in this composition, must be set down to the author's own account. To himself also, or to the haste in

which his work is got up, and the heat in which his speculations are carried on, we must impute much of the inflation of the style, and the bad taste of most of the imagery. Almost every extract which we shall have occasion to make, will give some specimens of the unpleasant structure of the sentences, the heaving, and plunging, and labouring of the style. But the following short extract may suffice to show of what stuff Mr. Gentz's flowerets are woven. It is the conclusion of his address to "the high-spirited and magnanimous Germans."

"If Providence has irrevocably decreed that the evil, the iron times in which your lot is cast shall extend beyond the limits of your days, and that the darkness shall be completed before the enlivening influence of the sun again is felt, retire within yourselves, and enjoy through faith and hope what the troubled realities of the present deny you. But let your enjoyment be fitting minds influenced by the most serious impressions. The grounds of consolation with which persons such as you should arm themselves against the terrors of the present have nothing in common with those by which selfish and short-sighted weaklings endeavour for a time to escape from the feeling of misery, the sentiment of shame, till at last the miserable bolster on which they thought to forget the loss of everything that is great and good, and to slumber out existence, sinks into the all-devouring gulph. Yours are of a higher nature, more active, quickening, and balsamic, but they must be purchased at an incomparably higher price, and enjoyed on much harder conditions. It is not permitted for you to shut yourselves up in sloth, cowardly to withdraw from the field, to retire with cynical disgust, or monkish apathy, from the world; and to indulge in inactive and inglorious repose. You must contend as long as you have breath with the enemy, how great soever his might, how menacing soever his violence; you must not surrender a foot breadth of the sacred territory which you are appointed to defend, without resistance, and without a struggle; you must yield to no danger, to no difficulty, nor must you give up the cause entrusted to you under any pretence or probability, not even when, to all human appearance, it seems irremediably lost. That is the law of your being; it is only thus you can insure peace with yourselves, tranquillity during the raging of the storm, and an exaltation above every fortune. It is fortunate that what duty enjoins your advantage requires, and that your interest is in perfect harmony with your obligations. Recollect that in past scenes every moment of repose proved dangerous to those who engaged in the race, and that restless redoubled endeavours to attain their object, was always the maxim of those who were familiarized with victory. In your career to stop is to lose the prize. As soon as you stand still, your strength abandons you, the sleep of discouragement overcomes you,

and the night comes and mantles you with its terrors. With the more constancy and determination you advance, the more certainly you will escape this feeling of fatigue; the more hope will fan you with its freshest breezes; the sooner you will be saluted by the purple dawn of morning."—*Introduction*, pp. li.–liv.

We are, however, quite ready to admit that in works of real importance, style is a very secondary consideration. Criticism, which is a part of our function, requires us to mention it in passing; but we hasten to the substance of the work before us, having premised whatever remarks on its form seemed likely to come in our way during our more serious examination of its essential merits.

The introductory matter is, for the most part, such as might well have been spared. It consists of a long and laboured harangue against yielding to the power of France, addressed to the Germanic nations. The topics of this declamation are such, and the tone so violent, that we cannot imagine how it could be addressed to those persons who alone bear sway in foreign affairs—the political class of society—statesmen and rulers, and speculative economists. Our author adduces, for instance, a multitude of reasons to dissuade his countrymen from wishing to be conquered (p. xxv.); to prove that national ruin is a thing not to be rejoiced at (p. xxx.); to encourage the Germans to long for the reduction of French influence (*passim*). No sober view, however, is taken of the means of resistance. No estimate is given of the time when an attack on France would be desirable. Nor is any attempt made to point out a plan of operation which might unite the contending interests of the empire in this their common cause. All is general and undefined. We find nothing but page after page, to the number of fifty-four, filled with a very middling kind of declamation, which neither teaches nor proves. In truth, nothing can be less adapted to the improvement of a system of practical policy than eloquence. It always exaggerates or diminishes the objects of our contemplation, and leads us blindfolded over the path, so as to make us pass by the plain things which we are looking for. If, then, this introductory harangue is addressed to rulers and statesmen, it will tell them nothing intelligibly, except what they probably knew well enough before, that they ought not

to wish for subjugation. If it is addressed to the multitude, it is placed, with singular want of judgment, in a large volume upon what multitudes never think about, the balance of power, and the international system of Europe. The introduction concludes with an exhortation, rather furious than zealous, to all the Germans, to unite hand in hand to cherish right sentiments, and to expect the coming of some perfect hero, who will spring forth as a saviour and sovereign, "to wipe off the tears from all faces, and again build up Germany and Europe." It is distinctly asserted, that such a person must necessarily arise ere long in a country like Germany (p. 50); and that the business of all good Germans, or, as Mr. Gentz phrases it, their "mighty calling," is to prepare fit instruments with which he may work out their salvation. Touching this part of the subject, we cannot help remarking that some of the Germans appear rather too prone, without our author's exhortation, to wait for a saviour, like the Jews; and we are disposed to think the best advice he could give them would be, to believe in the renowned leader whom they already have been blessed with, and to give up, at length, the fatal error, the hardness of heart, which has hitherto possessed them in every crisis of their affairs, of withholding from him all their confidence, until inferior men have brought upon them such ruin as not even his genius can avert.

The first chapter is occupied with a general statement of what has usually been meant by the balance of power, and a short sketch of the system of mutual relations, established for upwards of three centuries among the different members of the European commonwealth. We have so often before had occasion to dwell upon this subject, and have so fully entered into the discussion of its fundamental principles, that we should only be repeating parts of our former statements, were we to give any abstract of this branch of Mr. Gentz's work. We shall content ourselves with remarking that he has very properly modified some of his former doctrines relating to this question, and that, instead of viewing the equality of power as the corner-stone of the system, or the ultimate object of the arrangement, he most justly considers it as only desirable for the purpose of

attaining the real end of the whole scheme, the maintenance of each individual state in its independent existence and entire rights. This is the sole object of the policy in question; and, by applying themselves to its attainment, with a common consent, modern statesmen succeeded in raising that structure which it required all the profligacy and folly of the year 1772 to shake. Even then, the principles which had slowly grown up, and were incorporated with modern society, could not be suddenly eradicated. They continued to exert a sensible influence, until new partitions and indemnities completed their destruction, which has only happened in these last and worst of times. The second chapter is composed of observations on the shock which the balance of power thus received from what our author calls the partitioning system. We are glad to find him speaking with more detestation than formerly upon that most fatal transaction, to which all the sufferings of Europe may be traced. He distinctly states the partition of Poland as the first great blow which the modern system had received; and, after observing that this nefarious proceeding is the more to be reprobated, because it was covered over with the forms of the very law which it violated, he adopts a principle illustrated in a former article of this Journal, as leading to a refutation of some of his own doctrines, that the partition system arose unfortunately out of the balancing system itself. We cannot help regretting, however, that Mr. Gentz should still interpose his great authority between the conduct of the partitioning powers, and that full weight of censure which ought to fall upon them. This is one of the feelings in which statesmen should never be afraid of indulging, and we fear Mr. Gentz contributes not a little to check it by his attempts to withdraw our attention from its proper object. As this transaction, always eminently important, is now more urgently presented to our view than ever by the new development of its consequences, which every successive year brings about, we shall endeavour to correct the aberrations into which Mr. Gentz is led, in discussing it, partly by his fury against France, and partly by his turn for apologising, wherever France is not concerned.

In the first place, we must object to his unnecessary phrase of "partitioning system;" and this on every account. Why should we denominate a crime, an act of plunder, or a course of such acts, by a name so little descriptive of the thing? Ancient usage, indeed, has made men talk of the slave *trade*, by which they mean repeated acts of robbery and murder, accompanied with unnecessary torture for the purpose of gain. By this usage, too, the punishment and prevention of such horrible crimes has been in no small degree retarded; and therefore, so far from furnishing any defence of the courtly epithet applied to the enormities committed against Poland, the example alluded to should warn us for the future to call things by their proper names, whether in the case of cabinets, or of traders.

Secondly, We more than doubt the propriety of inculcating so strenuously to the German cabinets, that this partitioning system arises naturally out of the balancing principle. A speculative writer on political subjects may be allowed to perceive some connexion between things which nations and practical politicians should be taught to view only as diametrically opposite. In truth, the partition of Poland has just the same connexion with the balancing system that the maraudings of a banditti have with the functions of a police-office; and to describe the partition to the courts of Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin, as an abuse, or a something arising out of the balancing system, is like talking to the inhabitants of Newgate concerning "that species of police corps usually termed a gang of thieves." As Mr. Gentz is the apostle of ancient principle, and as his work is intended to work the proper reforms in the sentiments of his countrymen relative to national virtue, we counsel him to speak boldly against profligacy, whether it be committed by French or by Germans; and warn him, when he speaks of the partition of Poland, not to imitate the preacher, who was afraid of calling hell by its own name before a courtly audience.

Thirdly, Mr. Gentz has no sooner taken up the subject of Poland than he leaves it, in order to prove, what he observes he had chiefly in view when he broached it, that

the enormities of 1772 are no vindication of the enormities committed since by the French in different parts of Europe. This absurd pretension set up on the part of France, was quite undeserving of notice, and might have been safely left unanswered. In an elaborate exposition of it, however, our author is not only drawn away from the expression of indignation against the partitioning powers, and from the development of the consequences which their crimes have entailed upon the world; he must also describe the partition by certain remarks extremely apt to diminish our horror of it. "The fate of Poland," he says, "is long ago decided, not only in fact, but in right. By a number of treaties of peace and conventions between the partitioning powers and all the other European states, their old and new possessions are recognised and guaranteed; the former Polish provinces are now so completely united and incorporated with their old territories, as to make it impossible to separate the one from the other." And in another passage, we have an enumeration of the positive advantages that have resulted to Europe from the partition, which has rendered the enemies of France, it seems, more able to resist her new power (p. 87). It is very true, that these remarks, and others of a similar complexion, are accompanied by certain caveats, such as a few words in a parenthesis, purporting that the rest of the passage is not meant to vindicate the transactions in question. But the best condemnation of a foul crime is always to execrate it in a plain, unqualified manner, and to leave its extenuation to those who do not wish to speak harshly of it; and unfortunately, in a popular production, the established mode of vindicating any act, bad in itself, is exactly to say all you can in its behalf; and to add just so many parenthesis, disclaiming what is your real intention, as may render the apology effectual, by making it appear moderate. Wherefore, viewing the partition of Poland as the act by which one-half of the great European powers, with the concurrence, rather than by the connivance of the rest, abandoned all public principle, and proclaimed, with a loud voice, that the safety of nations should be no more, we lament that Mr. Gentz did not feel the necessity of tracing the

fatal fruits of this crime, and of showing all Europe, without reserve, to what they owe their present degradation. The tone which we wish he had sustained, is exactly that of the following excellent passage. He is speaking of the indifference with which the transaction was viewed.

"Even among the enlightened and upright of the time, only a few escaped the dreadful contagion. Notwithstanding that what is purest in its nature may be profaned, and what is most wholesome may be poisoned—notwithstanding that the fatal blow which the federal constitution of Europe had received, called upon them the more loudly to unite, to establish the foundations of the building on a firmer basis, and more vigorously to exert themselves in its defence, they either gave themselves up to a comfortless incredulity in the inefficacy of political maxims, or to a systematic indifference. The multitude, misled by the former, or not sufficiently warned against the latter, sunk every day deeper in the bottomless void, and became more and more accustomed to expect their law from violence, and their salvation from chance. How much this fatal habit of thinking must have contributed to facilitate crime, and spread desolation, when at last the evil days arrived when all right was trampled under foot, the ruin of all order conspired, and the whole social machine disjointed and broken, can have escaped only the inconsiderate observer."—pp. 78, 79.

After remarking that the partition of Poland, and the injury to public principle resulting from it, were but as passing clouds compared with the thick darkness which has since involved us, and intimating thereby (we apprehend very erroneously) that the crimes of the revolution war are of a description infinitely worse than those of 1772, Mr. Gentz enters upon a very general view of means by which the balance of power may be restored. We say a very general view; for in fact he goes over the subject so lightly, touching only the *summa vestigia*, that we conceive his proposed remedies will be found altogether useless. The whole derangements of the system, he observes, have been owing to a dereliction of principle on the part of some governments, apathy on the part of others, and careless indifference among the inhabitants of the countries exposed to French invasion. Nothing can be expected to restore the situation of national independence, which these causes have lost, but a careful retracing of the steps by which we have fallen. We must therefore begin by *wishing*, one and all, with our whole might, for the success of the

arms, now combined against the common enemy of Europe. From thence he makes rather a sudden transition to what should be the conduct of the combined powers, supposing them victorious. And no one can object to any of the advices which he gives them for their government in this happy predicament. They must abandon for ever all views of individual aggrandisement; they must cease to attack their defenceless neighbours; they must never forget the dangers from which they have escaped: and, keeping the fear of destruction always before their eyes, they must so order all their steps, as to guard against a return of the past evils, by taking care not to deserve them. Such are the duties of the governments themselves. But the mass of the people also have their part to play. They must rouse themselves to a sense of their danger; and every individual of the smallest influence in the state, must lend his aid to quicken and invigorate the general enthusiasm for national independence. Having thus, as it were, taken everything his own way, our author, somewhat awkwardly, *concludes* by saying, in a single sentence, that "above all, it should never be forgotten, that these measures of security depend upon our being able to weather the storm, and that this must be the fruits of victory in the present contest;" a position, indeed, which is unfortunately as evidently true as any of the foregoing general doctrines, and which, no doubt, greatly diminishes their importance. For Mr. Gentz thus appears to us in much the same light with a physician, who, being called in during the crisis of a disorder, should prescribe prayers for the safety of his patient, advise him to follow a certain regimen after his recovery, and leave the room, with a judicious remark, that everything, after all, would depend upon the poor man getting over his present malady.

The next subject which occupies our author, is a comparison of the relative situations of France and the other Continental powers. He begins by observing, that the right of interfering in the affairs of any foreign state, is competent only to those who may be immediately endangered by its encroachments; and that nothing which passes in the interior of any country can, in the general

case, be a cause of war to any of its neighbours. It follows, from this principle, that whatever form of regular government a people may live under, or in whatever manner their constitution may have been established, no foreign nation can have any right to refuse acknowledging it; and our author explicitly admits, that, provided a dynasty be once established, other powers have no right to inquire whether it is founded on usurpation or on justice.

To these positions, it is scarcely any exception to add, that if a nation is suddenly thrown into anarchy, the neighbouring powers are not bound to acknowledge its existence, or treat with those who for the moment may govern it. But the well-known argument in favour of the neighbouring states interfering with the internal affairs of France at the beginning of the revolution, is put by Mr. Gentz in a manner peculiarly weak and unsatisfactory. He does not contend that the fear of the French revolution was the ground of interference. He does not say that the other powers attacked the French revolution because its neighbourhood threatened their existence. This position is at least intelligible; and, with certain modifications, we are disposed to admit the principle of interference on which it rests. But Mr. Gentz lays down another principle. He maintains the only right of interference to be derived from such a change in the neighbouring state as reduces it suddenly to imbecility, or renders its annihilation as a substantive power, matter of immediate apprehension. When a nation is thus brought low, and when its very existence is in danger, the other powers are called upon to interfere; "because the state which is a prey to general disorder, has lost all its political functions, and is incapacitated from acting as a substantive member of the league; likewise because it is uncertain when it may be able to resume a place which it is essential to the interests of the whole not to permit to remain vacant."—p. 113. This, we fairly admit, is to us incomprehensible doctrine. If self-defence alone gives a nation the right to interfere by force in the affairs of its neighbour, surely the weakness of this neighbour is anything but a ground for the exercise of such a right. When one of the European powers is threatened

with the dreadful fate of becoming, for ages, a prey to anarchy, which is evidently a chimerical, if at all a possible danger, but which is all that Mr. Gentz can mean by annihilation, we are at a loss to see how any danger can result to its neighbours from such a risk, or such a calamity, were it actually to happen. The doctrine, that the other states must interfere, because the total loss of one power would derange the system, is altogether vague and unsatisfactory; it is a proposition founded on false metaphor, on the dynamical language employed too frequently by writers on this subject of the balance of power. The total loss of one member of the confederacy can never derange the system. What we mean by the system being deranged, is the destruction of one member by the violence of the rest. The principle stated by Mr. Gentz is exactly conceived in the language adopted by the three partitioning powers in 1772. They affirmed that Poland was the seat of anarchy; they asserted that it could hardly be said to have a substantive existence as a state; they inferred, by no legitimate reasoning, but by the same vague, theoretical mode of talking which Mr. Gentz still adheres to, that the neighbourhood of such a scene of annihilation was dangerous to their own existence, therefore they concluded that it was their duty to interfere; and from this there was only a short step, easily taken by a repetition of the same vague and loose doctrines, to the final assertion, that the disease which afflicted the country was incurable; that no change of constitution was practicable; that it was a mass of disease, and must be cut in pieces by the sword;—*and, accordingly, they interfered.* And they sat down upon Poland with all their forces; they drove the people like herds of oxen, and butchered those who would not be driven; they overturned all law, and put down all constituted authorities; they plundered and murdered, until neither riches nor resistance was left; sometimes, in their mockery, they wrung formal grants from assemblies of the state, surrounded by bayonets and cannon; sometimes, in their mercy, they massacred, to the very infant at the breast, for days and for nights together; sometimes, in their blasphemy, they chanted the praises of God, because

the measure of their wickedness was filled up. It is for these reasons that we will neither permit Mr. Gentz to call the enormities of the French revolution unparalleled, nor to repeat, in favour of the confederates of Pilnitz, the very doctrines, in the very language by which the same confederates prefaced the first of their crimes. In our apprehension, the attempt to partition France in 1792, resembled the scheme which had begun the calamities of Europe twenty years before, in everything but the event. Mr. Gentz has himself stated the avowed ground of the interference in terms so remarkable, that we must be permitted to cite the passage.

"No opportunity must therefore be neglected of repeating, even should half a world-full of philosophers, and (should it please God) of philosophical writers, die of chagrin in consequence of it,—that it was *not* fear for the preponderance of France—for this first unfolded itself in the course of the war—that it was not a wish to profit from France's misfortunes, but that it was compassion for the helplessness of France, the dread lest its splendour, so necessary for Europe, should be eternally eclipsed, and the purest maxims of high and genuine state policy, which dictated the war against the French revolution."—pp. 113, 114.

This is the precise language of 1772. Neither the Poles nor the French were left to themselves, lest their anarchy should continue, and lead to a kind of national suicide. Their neighbours must attack them, to save their existence, not to defend themselves, and, in consequence of this interference, had the Poles been as strong as the French, we should in all probability have seen Europe overrun from the Vistula westward, soon after 1772, instead of finding it conquered from the Rhine eastward a few years later. But we shall be told that the original plan of the confederates of Pilnitz was to cure, and not to profit by the disorders of France. Into this question of fact, we will not now enter. For our present purpose, it is sufficient to observe, that the changes which Mr. Gentz admits to have subsequently deformed and degraded the original project, are essential to the very nature of all such combinations; that there is no real difference between uniting to partition a neighbouring nation because it has become too feeble, and uniting to attack it because its internal de-

struction may eventually prove dangerous; that so long as the nature of man continues the same, all combinations of the latter description will speedily degenerate into the nature of the former; and that the certainty of this constitutes precisely the evil of interfering or attacking upon Mr. Gentz's principle, and abandoning the safe and wholesome doctrine so often maintained in this Journal, of strictly confining offensive leagues to those cases wherein evident danger is threatened by the overgrown power of any one state.

There is another ground of alarm, according to our author; and the principles which he applies to this case appear altogether sound. It is, when, by the progress of improvement, by the gradual development of internal resources, or by any other domestic cause, the power of one nation becomes formidable to the rest. Here, Mr. Gentz observes, that interference is out of the question, and that neighbouring states have nothing more to do, but to watch very closely every change which ensues, and to observe with the more jealousy all the proceedings of their powerful rival, because her hostility would be the more dangerous. In pursuance of this view, he proceeds to examine the circumstances which render France so formidable to all other states since the revolution. These he reduces to three;—the extraordinarily absolute form of her government; its military nature; and the revolutionary forms which it uses in all proceedings with foreign states, where such forms may prove dangerous to the stability of their governments. In illustrating the first of these circumstances, he compares the French constitution with that of Austria, Prussia, and even Russia; giving the superiority, in point of despotism, very clearly to France. He alludes to the checks provided by hereditary rights, the wealth of great families, the influence of powerful individuals in all the countries of Europe except France alone; and, neglecting the circumstance of hereditary right in the monarch himself, and the advantages which he always contrives to derive from the influence of h i grandees, when he cannot entirely crush them, Mr. G ntz scruples not to maintain, that the French chief alone is uncontrolled in his tyranny, and possesses a sway more formidable to his neighbours than any other sovereign in

Europe. We think that the second particular, the military character of the French government, is the only circumstance which renders its tyranny more formidable than the despotism of its neighbours; and we do not find Mr. Gentz sufficiently full upon the fatal effects of this military character, in rendering France a military nation; a change by far more dangerous to the repose of Europe, than any alteration in its constitution. Respecting the use of revolutionary weapons, such as the separation of the people from their rulers in addresses to foreign nations, and the tendency to excite insurrection which these proceedings may have, we own ourselves but little disposed to agree with Mr. Gentz. Not only have the enemies of France had recourse to the very same means of dividing her, but, it is obvious, that such appeals to the people have now entirely lost their virtue, since the experience of the Swiss, Italians, and Dutch, has proved how far a French army favours the nations whom it overruns, and since the inhabitants of France themselves have become altogether enslaved in the midst of their loud cries about liberty, and their officious attempts to make the rest of the world free.

Now, besides these partial objections to the enumeration of circumstances just now abridged, we have others of a more general nature to urge against the conduct of this comparative view. But as these will come naturally under the concluding remarks which we shall have to offer upon the whole subject of this work, we shall, at present, go on to the remaining part of the abstract in which we are engaged.

The last half of Mr. Gentz's work is employed in a very copious enumeration of the encroachments made by France subsequent to the peace of Luneville, prefaced by some laboured declamation against all who were anxious for that peace. Our author admits, however, that it was not to be avoided; and, without blaming the Austrian government for concluding it, he bewails it as the most disastrous of modern treaties, as the "final result and lasting expression of a general disorganization." The following passage is pointed against the general eagerness for peace which preceded the treaty in question.

"With this spiritless disposition of the courts, the complaints of

the people, the dejection of the great, the decay of the sentiment of public interest, and the influence of the never-ceasing outcries of the treacherous or scrupulous apostles of peace, were all in unison. A considerable part of Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, was in fact depressed in a degree scarcely supportable by the evils of the war; the most flourishing provinces of Austria grievously felt the scourge; the condition of the more opulent classes was straitened, painful, and perilous; the condition of the lower classes was equally comfortless. To long for the conclusion of the war in so distressing a situation, was what no friend to humanity could condemn, and no statesman could disapprove. But the characteristic of the time, as well in the cabinets of princes as in the opinion of the people, in every circle of society from the highest to the lowest, in every conversation and written production of the day, was, that no limits were set to this desire of peace; that peace, *on any condition*, was the universal watchword, the wish of all wishes, the ultimate object of all human efforts. In no other epoch of history has the feeling of present necessity so completely subdued the public mind, as to benumb and paralyze all power of reflection, as to confuse and falsify the judgments of every one. To investigate what might afterwards happen, to look at the most immediate consequences, merely to inquire what was the amount of the ransom, seemed then a sort of martyrdom to the minds of the nations; they would not even know—how and where they were about to fall; and after the negotiation was concluded, and the violent irresistible wish of so many millions was accomplished; had, in place of all other information and formalities, a board with the inscription *peace is signed!* been carried through the towns and countries, the public would willingly have consented to be left in total and perpetual ignorance of the conditions."—pp. 148, 149, 150.

He proceeds to observe, that such a treaty, imposed on Austria by force, extorted from her, rather than granted by her, though not the less binding on that account, should certainly be interpreted most strictly against France, the powerful party; and that any breach of its terms on her side was a much more just cause of war to Austria, than a similar infringement on the part of Austria could have been to France. He then states, and with perfect justice, that the treaty was rigorously observed by Austria, in every minute particular; and he very properly remarks, that the best proof of this may be found in the grievances assigned by France in her manifestoes. It may, indeed, be safely admitted, that Austria had given no cause of hostility, when all that her enemy could ever find to accuse her of, was, the purchase of Lindau, the Emperor's sway over the south of Germany, and his not having resisted the British

maritime code. On the other hand, Mr. Gentz shows very fully, though we are disposed, after our view of the case, to think, unnecessarily, that the conduct of France, after the treaty of Luneville, was one continued act of hostility to its most important stipulations. He goes over those instances in which the violence and treachery of the French government broke through that convention; and dwells, at great length, on its interference with the affairs of the empire—its conduct in Switzerland, and the Cisalpine Republic—the seizure of Piedmont—of Parma and Placentia—of Genoa and Lucca—the encroachments upon Tuscany, Naples, and the States of the Church. All these acts, whether of open violence, or of intrigue, backed by the terrors of a French army, were either in direct breach of the terms of the treaty, or in complete contravention of its spirit; for no one can, with patience, hear it asserted, that because the integrity and independence of certain states was not positively guaranteed at Luneville, therefore, one of the contracting parties had a right to seize on their territories when she thought fit. Agreeing almost in every sentence of this branch of Mr. Gentz's work, we have only to regret that it is so much extended beyond the necessity of the occasion. About one hundred and fifty pages are devoted to the history of the French usurpations, which, we conceive, have never been defended even by the French government itself; for we cannot call that argument a defence of any act, which consists in an appeal to cases of real or supposed similarity, in the conduct of other powers; and France, so far as we recollect, never attempted to justify her proceedings in Italy and elsewhere, except by alleging that they were no worse than the usurpations of Russia in Persia, and of England in the East Indies. If, indeed, the whole of Mr. Gentz's invectives against his countrymen, not only for want of patriotism, but for love of the enemy, be well founded, his elaborate exposition of the conduct of France, may serve some good end, provided they will read it. In this case we should, especially, recommend to their perusal the description of the conduct held towards Switzerland, as extremely well executed, and as abundantly conclusive against France. To readers in

England, however, all such statements are quite superfluous. The tide here runs altogether the other way; and the sense of French injustice requires rather to be modified, and usefully directed, than stimulated, among the patriotic and warlike inhabitants of these realms.

The concluding chapter of this work, after briefly recapitulating the injuries and insults to which the two imperial courts had submitted in patience and peace, states the proximate cause of the war, now sorrowfully remembered as the fruit of the third coalition. We are not a little surprised to find, that this cause is, according to Mr. Gentz, neither more nor less than the seizure of Genoa. Into the discussion of such a point, it would be superfluous to enter at present. We shall content ourselves with quoting the two following passages, as containing the substance of Mr. Gentz's admissions respecting the temper of the court of Vienna previous to the affair of Genoa, and the influence of Russia, in producing a total alteration of its views.

"We have already shown the manifold occasions of discontent, and the weighty grounds of hostility with which this court had been furnished. But to provoke Austria to war was no easy task. The keenest shafts of injury had fallen blunted when pointed against the pacific spirit of the Emperor; his modest zeal for everything that is good, and his honest and tender anxiety for the welfare and happiness of his people. Besides, the imperial court had been abandoned for several years, not merely without any prospect of assistance, but, as if it had wanted enemies, exposed to the oppression of those who alone could yield it succours, till at last, as in all similar situations, the circumstance of having suffered much became a reason for suffering more. In the last months of the year 1804, it is true the Russian cabinet had entered into a more intimate connexion with this court, and into confidential consultations with it upon the common interest; but one must be very ill informed indeed respecting the progress and character of the intercourse then subsisting, to believe that had the affairs of Europe remained in the situation even in which they at that time were, and in which they continued down to March 1805, any warlike resolution would have been adopted. It required a new provocation to overcome the mass of difficulties, of cares, of indisposition, of open and secret opposition, which on all sides obstructed the path to such a resolution in will, much more in execution. The constitution of Italy must once more be violently shaken; the French dominion extended by proclamation of a new kingdom, by arbitrary caprice; a despite of forms and realities, a contempt of all the relations and duties of neighbouring powers arising out of the law of nations, must be

pushed to the uttermost in one great and comprehensive act of violence, finally to *drive* the court of Vienna to a resistance to which it could not have been *tempted* by any one of the preceding measures, nor by them all put together. Nay, more, after so much had been done, it still depended upon him who had kindled the flame, either to nourish or extinguish it. The aversion to actual war, the longing desire of setting any bounds to the evil by means of pacific negotiation, of arriving at any tolerable result, even if it was not satisfactory, at any decent compromise with duty and honour, was everywhere, and particularly at Vienna, so much superior to every other feeling, and to every other propensity, that any proposition which had a specious appearance of justice and moderation would have been grasped at with alacrity and joy. The union of Genoa, and the failure of the Russian mission, left Austria no alternative."—pp. 319, 320, 321.

"It was Russia, and Russia alone, which by its example, by its encouraging language, and by its mighty preparations, gave to the counsels of the Austrian cabinet not an unnatural direction which they would not have themselves taken, but merely a more precise character and a degree of stability, to which, at last, all considerations gave way."—p. 333.

Viewing the English government as having created the third coalition, we nevertheless have always maintained, that Russia was the prime instrument in this fatal work. The foregoing passages must be coupled with the fact, that the Emperor Alexander actually sent a messenger of peace to France, after all the usurpations in Germany, Switzerland, Piedmont, Parma, Placentia, and the Cisalpine had been completed; and that this mission was utterly frustrated by the comparatively nugatory affair of Genoa and Lucca. When these things are viewed together, it will be extremely difficult to repeat the praises of judgment and magnanimity so often lavished on the court of St. Petersburg, or to avoid lamenting that the ruin of the Continent, which Russia has been the means of England effecting, should have knit our fate inseparably with hers, subjecting to the understandings of a Russian cabinet the counsels of the most enlightened nation in Europe.

We now proceed to close this article, by suggesting a few general remarks to such of our readers as busy themselves with that branch of political science of which Mr. Gentz treats; and to those who are occupied with reflecting on the foreign affairs of England, during the present momentous period.

The statesmen of the Continent have, of late years, been divided altogether into two classes; those who have resolved to have war with France at all risks; and those whom no provocation could ever induce to encounter that great hazard. Between those who excessively overrated the dangers of peace, and those who, with far greater reason, but still in an extreme degree, undervalued the chance of safety to be obtained by war, there appears to have been, at least in Russia and Germany, no medium; and unhappily the former party, stimulated by the influence of England, have generally preponderated. Of this cause Mr. Gentz is the chief literary champion. Its doctrines, after making the round of Europe, with the exception of two or three very feeble powers, have at last realized the very fears of universal sovereignty, upon which they were originally founded; and the Continent of Europe has been piecemeal subdued by France, in twelve years, by dint of attacking France to prevent her from conquering the Continent of Europe at some distant period. Such being at any rate the fact, it is not altogether unfair to suspect the soundness of the principles upon which the war party have proceeded; and to conjecture, that if ever the zealots of this faction are to assist in repairing the evil which their counsels have occasioned, it must be by revising their fundamental doctrines, or by correcting the application of them. The following remarks may assist us in estimating the kind of revision and correction which will probably be found necessary.

1. The advocates for continual war in order to prevent ultimate danger, have uniformly neglected a consideration in itself, one should have thought, sufficiently obvious, that their counsels led to great and certain calamities in the mean time, without in any degree answering the more remote object in view. These well-meaning and high-spirited persons, altogether overlooked, probably because the topic was trite, the necessary evils of war; and whoever ventured to hint that the father of his people should pause before he took a step which must lay waste his provinces, kill many thousands of his subjects, cripple many more, and impoverish the whole of them, was looked upon

as a sentimental enthusiast, or a friend of the common enemy. Now, without attempting to maintain that these constant attendants on continental wars should, upon every occasion, prevent the adoption of hostile measures, we must be permitted to think that they are sufficient reasons for preferring in every case measures of conciliation, where there is any chance of succeeding thereby; nay, for temporizing (we are not afraid to use this dreadful term), in order to put off the evil day; unless in those emergencies which render war at last inevitable, and delay dangerous; emergencies which occur much more rarely than some men have been apt to suppose. But as these principles, though scarcely ever acted upon, will probably be admitted when stated in the abstract, we must observe,

2. In the *second* place, that the certainty and extent of the evil which the war party require us to embrace, is the best possible reason for carefully reflecting, before we make our choice, whether we have a tolerably good chance of gaining the end proposed, in return for the sacrifices demanded; and we will venture to assert that this part of the question has been uniformly neglected by all the powers who have attacked France. They began their hostility when there was some little hope; and with everything in their favour—her lawful rulers hostile to her interests—a civil war raging through her provinces—total anarchy in many great towns—a revolution happening about once a month in the capital—a new constitution in church, state, and army—the revolt of some generals—the old age, or destruction of the rest—scarce a soldier who had seen service, or an officer who knew anything of his profession—her trade destroyed—her colonies gone—her credit torn up by the roots;—in spite of all these powerful aids, the allies completely failed in their attack; one of them left the league, and the rest lost some of their finest possessions. This was a lesson to the belligerent faction, but it was altogether thrown away; and the two allies having been conquered by France during her worst times, the one that now remained never thought it possible, that by renewing the war during the better days of France, she might be utterly undone. Such we presume to have been the grand

error. Austria was induced to embrace all the certain evils, and to run all the mighty hazards of a war with France, when Prussia refused to join her, and when the extent of the French force was well known. It is needless to add that she went to war, without improving the constitution of her military, or her finances, after she had found both the one and the other unfit for service. Nor can it be necessary to enlarge on the manifold advantages which a prolongation of the truce of Leoben (since she was not wise enough to stop the war sooner) must have procured her, in the event of a future rupture with France, when Prussia might be prepared to take part in it.

3. But if the court of Berlin was resolved not to give the cause of England and Austria any chance of success, there was a new ally preparing for us in the North, never thought of by our short-sighted forefathers; but now esteemed much more than a substitute for the power bequeathed by Frederic the Great to his prudent successors. The Empress Catherine, after augmenting the resources of her dominions as much as human wisdom could do, by reigning in peace with her powerful neighbours, never quarrelling with anybody but Turks and Poles, and maintaining a sort of character for great power with the rest of Europe, by cautiously avoiding every movement that might ascertain her real strength, departed from the scene of wars and coalitions, leaving her son in peaceable possession of the throne. This prince, being found much less untractable and less politic, was forthwith courted by the allies. The amount of their panegyrics upon him was that he possessed a warm heart and a hot head; so we may fairly doubt whether he was the best of possible associates in the new war; and whether his opinion of the strength of his empire, and his views of its true interests, were as much to be trusted as his mother's, who, with all the ambition in the world to take a direct part in European affairs, and all the wish to aid the common cause, had never sent armies, nor indeed anything, but manifestoes, into Germany; and had only lent England as many seamen as she wished to have taught in our service. But these were topics which the allies thought as little of as Paul himself. Accordingly,

Russia, in an evil hour, began to move, ceased to be invincible, and lost her sway in Europe. Her influence sensibly declined at every successive event; for, after once beginning, it was part of the evil, that she must take a share in all the affairs which occurred; and we have now a right to assert, what we formerly predicted, that the effects of her first, accidental successes, have vanished before the repeated proofs of her unfitness for holding the balance of the Continent; and that as little now remains of the fear of Suwarrow, as of the influence of Catherine. We conceive, then, that the next grand error of the war party has been, the confidence which they have reposed in the assistance of Russia; both because it has made them renew their hazardous warfare against France, without the aid of Prussia, and because it has induced them to push forward into the field a power, whose assistance they might always have commanded in the cabinet—a power, whose influence was never doubted, until its strength was tried. As, however, this part of the subject is at present the most important of all, we shall stop to suggest one or two considerations in support of the low estimate which we are disposed to make of Russia as an European ally. These we are compelled to run over very quickly; but it is enough to mention them.

4. There is a natural enmity between the two great powers of Germany and France. Those who once thought that Prussia had for ever deserted the Germanic cause, may now be convinced, that had Austria not been hurried on to her ruin in 1805, she might have made head against France, with the assistance of Prussia, at a future and a better time. At all events, when those two powers should league against France, we might always, for reasons too obvious to mention, count upon their active and steady cooperation. It is not so with Russia. She is too far removed from the danger. She interferes too little with France. She has too few points of contact. Her natural enmity is rather with Germany, with Sweden, and with Turkey. She has more than once been found ranged on the side of France in the great European contest. It is more by accidental peculiarities of personal character in

her rulers (very praiseworthy, we admit), than by the operation of any regular and steady principles, essential to her situation, that she has done for the common cause the little of which so much is said. She is naturally under no *necessity* to attack France, until Poland becomes a French province; and when that inducement arrives, obstacles will no doubt come along with it. It is manifest, that if Russia is to interfere, according to her caprices in European affairs, and not according to the fixed law of her necessities, she may attack France this year, and Austria the next; but it is equally manifest, that she may succeed in the one case, and must fail in the other. Of these things, we are humbly of opinion, the cabinet of Vienna has been more aware than our own statesmen; and we imagine it will scarcely be doubted, that a fear of Russia hurried them on to their ruin in 1805.

But even if we were sure of the aid of Russia against France, what is the value of that co-operation? It may be worth something, if Austria and Prussia unite to begin the war (in which case, we venture to predict, it will never be given). It is worth absolutely nothing, in the only case in which it has been afforded, when Austria or Prussia, meeting France single-handed, are destroyed before Russia can come into the field.

It will be asked, however, why this immense empire should be unable to pour forth numerous armies, with so vast a population, and so small a risk of being attacked? To this, it may be answered, that she evidently cannot; because, with all the wish to do everything, she has done nothing; and, if there is some flaw, some hidden impotency in her constitution, it is for those who count upon her assistance, to find it out; or, if they deny its existence, at least to show us why her aid has been so useless. But we shall simply allude to several causes of weakness, enough to show why the performances of Russia fall always so far short of her promises. Her armies, though exceedingly brave, are ill-officered, and must be badly disciplined; so that, though ten thousand Russians might beat an equal number of French, five hundred thousand French are sure to beat a much greater force of Russians; and unfortu-

nately, France will not agree to fight with small detachments. The state of the internal administration of the country; the total want of able and prudent men in the important offices under the government; the poverty of the empire; above all, deficiency of sound sense in their statesmen; the exclusion even of their talents from their councils, and the proportional influence of barbarous nobles or intriguers; all these and other fruits of the half-civilized state of Russia, which Catherine in part rendered harmless by remaining at rest, and in part counteracted by her own genius, must be fatal to the foreign influence of the empire, under a monarch of inferior ability, who excels that great princess only in rashness. The partial successes of Suwarrow, confirm, rather than modify, this statement. For, how long will an army be victorious, in which only one man can be found fit to command? While the right wing is annihilated by the Russian tactics of Korsakoff, what avails it that a European should lead on the left to a momentary triumph? Truly, when we take these things into the account, and consider how little the same defects exist in the French system, we must limit our hopes of Russian assistance to a very humble scale. Far from thinking of triumphs over France, we shall be extremely well pleased if Russia can save herself—happy if she shall be found stronger at home than abroad—if the folly of 1805, and the phrensy of 1806, shall not enable the conquerors of Austerlitz and Jena, as they are called, but we will only say the conquerors of Jemappe, to transfer, from St. Petersburg to Moscow, the seat of those counsels which have ruined Europe.

5. When the advocates of the war faction refused to be taught by experience, the lesson of the strength of France, it was a natural consequence of their obstinate blindness, that having, more by good fortune than by their own merits, obtained an interval of peace, they should wholly waste a period the more valuable, as they were resolved it should be of short duration, and should apply themselves to nothing but attempts of renewing the war, instead of undertaking such improvements in their domestic economy as their past losses had plainly suggested. Nothing can

more evidently demonstrate the length to which this blindness had proceeded, than the abstract of Mr. Gentz's comparative view of France and the allies, given above. In describing the superiority of France, he enumerates none of the circumstances to which she really owes her constant success. He altogether overlooks the grand difference between her and the powers whom she has destroyed, the singular display of talents in every department which the revolution has occasioned. While this fatal event has placed at the disposal of the French government, by whomsoever administered, the whole genius and acquirements of the state, that is, the whole power of thirty millions of civilized people; and while all the successive rulers have persisted in availing themselves of this mighty force, by employing, on every occasion, merits, and not men: Can we wonder that they have beaten enemies who have as uniformly persisted in the opposite line of conduct; have despised the very talents which were overwhelming them; and, far from being taught by their own defects, have only become the more perverse and infatuated after each disaster? All this Mr. Gentz and his party know; and yet they tell us that France has destroyed them by "*using revolutionary forms!*" All this we know, and yet we believe at each new coalition that France will be conquered. With the fatal contrast before our eyes, of talents matched against imbecility, we gaze with a stupid wonder each time that victory is given to the strong; and we cannot imagine how the greatest mass of genius and experience which the world ever saw, should ever lower the drill-sergeantry and the heraldry of Germany, until we find Vienna, and Dresden, and Berlin, the head-quarters of French armies. If the peace of Leoben, or even of Luneville, had been prolonged, and devoted to the strenuous cultivation of the allied resources—if, wise by experience, they had adopted such reforms as all the disasters demanded in their domestic economy—if steadily contemplating the great engine by which France had defeated them, they had resolved to fight her another time at her own weapons, by choosing ministers and generals from their talents, and not from their quarters, or their grey hairs; then we might have

had some right to indulge hopes of success, and our wonder would have been less silly had we failed.

6. The last remark which we shall at present offer upon this melancholy subject, is in some degree connected with the preceding. The general conduct of the war, it is needless to observe, was extremely injudicious on the part of the allies. But England, too, always adopted the line of operation the least calculated to assist the common cause. We allude at present to the military history of the war merely. The history of our alliances is partly anticipated, and partly too obvious, to require any further notice.[1] But, unhappily, our wisdom has not been much more conspicuous, even when we were acting by our individual force, and attempting to assist our allies with our fleets and armies, unfettered by their separate interests, or by the weakness of their counsels. To describe, in a single sentence, the fundamental errors in which England has so fatally persisted, it may be sufficient if we remark, that she has revived the ancient doctrine of conquering America in Germany; and has preferred defending her German allies in the West Indies. She has sent fleet after fleet, and army after army, to seize upon those distant and defenceless settlements; spending millions of money to purchase the temporary possession of an useless territory, or create a hurtful drain of her mercantile resources;[2] sacrificing thousands of men to obtain graves for thousands more. If all these expeditions, or the greater part of them, which have thus, at any particular time, been employed in seizing spice or sugar islands, had been united,

[1] Mr. Gentz has made a number of excellent remarks on the necessity of adhering to principles of justice and honour in all attempts to restore the balance of Europe. He has entirely overlooked the conduct of Russia in 1802 and 1803, relative to the German indemnities, the most unfortunate blow which public principle has received since the partition of Poland. We entirely agree with him in his general tenets; and therefore we think that no restoration of the balance can be expected from the efforts of cabinets, who one day publish manifestoes against usurpation, and the next are found sharing in its spoils.

[2] We have formerly explained, No. VIII., the manner in which West India conquests must always divert the capital of the mother country into the worst channels.

at a proper season, in one army, we should have possessed a formidable means of annoying the enemy in Europe Not that, in this case, it would have been advisable to repeat a similar error, and to send our force upon such expeditions as could only end in temporary advantages, where the enemy had little or no interest in opposing us.

It is evident that we might retake Holland,[1] and defend Naples[2] or Portugal,[3] without materially benefiting the great cause, or ultimately saving even Holland, Naples, and Portugal themselves. For the plan of France has always been, to strike the grand blow in the right place—in the heart of her enemies; to win the great game first, and then to sweep the small states at her leisure. She cared not though England, in the mean time, should take possession of a few detached and naturally defenceless spots of the Continent, quite sure that, as soon as she overcame the main body of the enemy, she could recover those little outworks when she chose; and equally aware, that, if she was worsted in the centre, it availed her nothing to have her troops secure elsewhere. Therefore, we conceive it cannot be denied that England, after withdrawing from her colonial schemes sufficient supplies of men to form a respectable army, should have assisted the allies in Europe, either by directly joining them with this large force, or by making such a formidable diversion on one side, as could insure their success on the other. In the former case, she must have acquired a salutary influence over their counsels, as well as their operations in the field, besides immediately contributing to their success. This was probably the best mode of carrying on her part of the combined operations. Next to it, some great and efficient diversion would have been the wisest measure; but not those paltry attacks, weak from their number and dispersion, which only tend to provoke the enemy's contempt, or to irritate a few of his peaceable subjects; which can secure no permanent advantage; which, even if successful in the mean time, will be neglected by France until she has fought the great battle, and placed herself altogether above them; which being neglected by her, and locking up our own disposable

[1] In 1799. [2] 1805. [3] 1797.

force, are in truth diversions in her favour. Had such obvious considerations prevailed over the love of sugar islands, and our eternal activity in the line of small, secret expeditions, England would not now have been reduced to lament the decay of her influence in the counsels by which France must be opposed; or to see the Continent ruined, as was truly observed by that illustrious man, to whose prophecies we were deaf, before an English sword had been drawn in its defence.

The result of all our errors has been the present calamitous state of Europe. Nor have our misfortunes taught us wisdom. It cannot be denied that the people of this country are still blind to their real situation; that they have not given over hopes of conquering France by a continuance of the war; that they have rejoiced in the last and greatest of our calamities—the failure of our attempts to save Europe by a peace. This infatuation will continue until the public burdens press with an intolerable weight upon the higher, as well as the lower orders of the community; or until Englishmen acquire the *real* courage to look their situation in the face, and ask themselves, once for all, what is to be gained by continuing the contest. We heartily wish that the cure may be effected, not by the first, but by the last of these changes; and to contribute our humble assistance towards this salutary work, has been the object of the present tedious and unpleasant discussion. For we are satisfied that the change in question never can happen, while the people persist in flattering themselves with hopes of continental assistance, and pray for their destruction in the shape of a fifth coalition.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

(JULY, 1809.)

The Orders in Council and the American Embargo beneficial to the Political and Commercial Interests of Great Britain. By Lord SHEFFIELD. Pp. 51. London. G. and W. Nicol. 1809.

The Speech of James Stephen, Esq. in the Debate in the House of Commons, March 6th, 1809, on Mr. Whitbread's Motion relative to the late Overtures of the American Government; with Supplementary Remarks on the recent Orders in Council. Pp. 130. London. Hatchard. 1809.

State of the Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, for the Year 1809. By GOULD FRANCIS LECKIE, Esq. Pp. 36. London. Chapple. 1809.

THE critical state of our foreign affairs, and the gross delusions which prevail respecting it, call loudly upon all good citizens to contribute their assistance towards the introduction of more sound and enlightened principles of policy, while it is yet possible to save the country by any change of measures. However much the people may have been misled upon these subjects, we are convinced that they entertain far less extravagant views than the Government; and that the contempt in which they hold the late measures of their rulers, gives us some security for the favourable reception of more just and rational opinions. A general expression of the public sentiments may even yet reclaim the Government from the course in which they have so long persisted; and the very weakness which has, especially of late, rendered our administration the object of contempt at home, and distrust among foreigners, may have the desirable effect of giving scope to the good sense

of the country. In truth, the subject of our connexions with foreign states, from some imaginary difficulties supposed to attend the discussion of it, occupies far too little of popular attention. Ordinary readers, who will cheerfully go through the details of a budget containing some half-dozen of new taxes, are afraid to grapple with topics relating to distant countries, and the operations of war,—at the same time that the paramount importance of the latter is so universally felt, that every man considers the value of his property as affected by each skirmish on the Ebro and the Danube; and while the tidings of events in those remote quarters are sought after with almost as much avidity as if they were passing in the neighbouring counties of this island, the bulk of the people either judge of them blindly by their wishes, or are satisfied to rest upon the authority of others—just as if there were some mystery in the subject, and as if there were one which common sense and ordinary information are wholly incapable of mastering. For our parts, we are satisfied that, until the understandings of the people of this country are steadily and habitually directed to the dealings of their rulers with foreign states—until the nation is in the practice of exercising its judgment upon these matters, and of raising its voice against their gross mismanagement—until, in short, Englishmen learn to form opinions, and to express them, upon measures which, though not immediately acting upon their individual concerns, are nevertheless inseparably connected with them,—it is in vain to expect from the Government that steady and enlightened pursuit of the national good which can only be secured by the constant vigilance of a jealous and intelligent public. In order to contribute our humble assistance to the promotion of discussions so essentially necessary on every account at the present moment, we have brought together, as the foundation of a single article, the tracts mentioned in the title. They may seem to fall under different classes; but it will speedily be perceived, that the subjects are not to be separated without inconvenience. We shall first of all endeavour to make our readers acquainted with the merits of these publications.

Lord Sheffield has frequently come before the public as an author of pamphlets on commercial subjects; and, in so far as his works are remembered, he is universally allowed to hold the first place among political writers distinguished for the narrowness of their views, and their want of general information. While the science of which he professes to treat has been making great and continual progress,—while persons of all parties in practical politics have vied with each other in doing homage to the liberal philosophy of the new school, while even those who were bred under different systems have shown sense and manliness enough to adopt the modern improvements, and some of them[1] in their old age have been found to desert the erroneous doctrines of their former years—Lord Sheffield alone remains exactly where he was before—alone rejects all improvement—nay, appears as if quite unconscious of what has been doing on every side of him—stands stock still in the midst of a rapidly-advancing age—and is seen poring over his little custom-house note books, stone blind to the lights which are breaking in upon him from all quarters. Nor is it by this ridiculous posture only that he has attracted notice:—his little motions are always observed to point one way; he bends to existing ministries, and present measures;—his face is turned toward the King's gate;—his small outcry is always heard in behalf of "*whatever is.*" It is true, his workmanship is so heavy and so clumsy, that he can render but little service to his patrons; and, were he an untitled candidate for readers, these patrons would very certainly cease to employ him. But they have made a Lord of him; and it looks well to see such a one bepraising their measures far more extravagantly than any of their daily papers. We presume, too, that Mr. Canning may feel it gratifying, that a Lord should be found to prefix his name to a work in which Lord Grenville's strictures on his diplomatic correspondence are actually ascribed, without any hesitation, to envy of his (*Mr. Canning's!*) "superior talents, energy and judgment;" and of the "greater success of his (*Mr. Canning's!*) measures."

[1] The late Lord Liverpool is an honourable instance. See our review of his valuable work on the Coinage of the Realm.

The object of the pamphlet now before us (which considerably surpasses any former display of those qualities generally recognised in Lord Sheffield) is to show, not merely that the measures of our own Government, and the American embargo, have done no harm to our trade, but that they have actually proved beneficial. To give any abstract of the argument by which this strange position is supported, would be impossible; for the desultory chat (reasoning we cannot call it), and unconnected estimates of this writer, are incapable of abridgment. We shall, however, give a few specimens of his attempts to bring good out of evil; from which our readers will perceive, that if any ministry were suddenly to prohibit all foreign commerce, or, by an order in council, to prevent the land from being tilled, they might still hope for an advocate, who should discover that these measures were beneficial to the country.

The embargo, Lord Sheffield contends, has destroyed the American carrying trade. Previous to this happy event, the supply of British commodities to foreign countries was daily getting more and more into the hands of the Americans. Our own tonnage was constantly decreasing, and theirs was augmenting in the same proportion. But they are kind enough, all at once, to destroy their trade by the embargo;—they can no longer supply foreign countries with British goods;—this lucrative trade must therefore return to ourselves. Had he only explained in what manner the suspension of trade between America and France opened the French ports permanently, or even for a day, to us, we should have derived much comfort from this ingenious person's discovery. Nor is this all. The trade between England and foreign countries, it seems, is so beneficial, that the embargo is to be thankfully received as tending to give us an additional share of it. But, somehow or another, this embargo cuts us off from trade with at least one foreign country, viz. America itself; and this country happens to be *the only one* with which we had any trade remaining. Lord Sheffield, however, is not dismayed by any such trifle. He boldly affirms, that this is no loss. And here we must quote his own words, lest

we should be accused of misrepresentation. In truth, it might well be doubted that such a passage as the following could be found in any publication.

"Of this we may be assured, that they (the Americans) never have, and never will, take from us any article which they can procure cheaper or better from other countries. They find it highly advantageous to take our manufactures and produce, to enable them to carry on their commerce with other nations; especially on account of the long credit which they obtain here, and which no other country can afford. They have the advantage of drawing immediately for the produce received from them, though they require and are allowed from twelve to eighteen months' credit from us. Indeed, so pertinaciously are the magnified advantages of the American trade insisted upon, with the view of intimidating us into measures highly injurious to British interests, that they require even further contradiction. It has the characteristics of the worst trade. The apparent balance in our favour becomes nearly a nonentity. A trade with every country is certainly desirable; inasmuch as an extensively general commerce with the world secures us from a state of dependence on any one individual nation. But what advantages do we derive from an exportation, if we are not paid for it? Which, most assuredly, is much more frequently the case, in the course of our trade with the citizens of the American States, than with any other country. Immense sums have been continually lost to our merchants and manufacturers, by the insolvency of their American customers; and the payment of any part of their accounts is always very slow and uncertain."—(p. 13)—and so forth.

Again, the stoppage of the cotton trade is beneficial. Their cotton was in such abundance, that it had become a drug. We had glutted the market with yarn and goods. There was no telling where the evil might stop, when the embargo came and acted, says Lord Sheffield, "the part of a salutary medicine upon a previously diseased body." Previous to that happy event, the states of the Continent were supplied with cotton-wool from America. They might have learnt to manufacture it without our assistance; but the embargo, and "our very politic prohibition of the export of the raw material," have removed this risk, and restored to us—the supply of the Continent with cotton yarn, and goods! After this we should perhaps stop; but we must mention one other instance of benefit resulting from the embargo, because it is, if possible, still more unexpected. The linen manufacture of Ireland, it seems, flourishes as well as ever it has done; and one proof is given,—a late rise on Irish linens of 40 or 50 per cent.

This, to be sure, is in part owing, says Lord Sheffield, to the scarcity of flax-seed arising from the embargo, and in part to the exportation of German linens having been checked; but then, the scarcity of foreign flax-seed, while it raises the linens in the mean time, will ultimately encourage the cultivation of the article at home.

This very profound writer, however, seems conscious that he must not always occupy such high ground. He therefore descends to combat with those who accuse the Orders in Council, and the embargo, of having injured our trade; and proceeds with some warmth, but with his usual success, to repel such insinuations. He accordingly asserts, that other causes than those famous measures produced the defalcation which our trade suffered last year. The only one, however, which he specifies, is the abolition of the slave trade. This event, he says, happening during last year, deprived us of the African market for our merchandise. We must stop to wipe out so foul an aspersion. The defalcation in question was seven millions upon the exports. The African slave trade never employed one million; as Lord Sheffield either knows, or ought to know, before he presumes to touch such a subject. The slave trade was *not* abolished last year, but the year before; as this writer either knows, or ought to know, before he dares to range himself on the side of any question espoused by Mr. Stephen.[1] With what indignation must that distinguished person have spurned at such an apology for his favourite measures!—a defence of the Orders in Council at the expense of the abolition!

The estimate of our trade having suffered a defalcation of fourteen millions, in consequence of the Orders in Council and the embargo, is attacked, in different ways, by this noble author. He first tries to beat down the sum by various means; but, failing in this, he has recourse to the following. "Nothing," says he, "can be more absurd, than that of adding import to export, by way of marking our loss of trade; because it is the difference between import and export, and not the aggregate of both, which constitutes the gross amount of the balance of trade, and

[1] The slave trade, by the Act of March 1807, ceased 1st Jan. 1808; but all the shipments for it, of course, ceased in 1807.

which furnishes the only basis upon which an estimate of the profit or loss to the country can be founded." So that, according to Lord Sheffield, it is better for a country to have a trade of one million of exports, and one hundred thousand pounds of imports, than a trade of one hundred millions of exports, and ninety-nine millions and a half of imports.. We presume it is unnecessary for us, after this, to pursue any further the lucubrations of the Lord Sheffield. We cannot, however, refrain from asking him, before we part, never, as we earnestly hope, to meet again, how it happens, that he, who has, during a long life of bad pamphlets, been harping perpetually upon the wisdom and necessity of the navigation laws, should have suddenly become the most zealous advocate of measures professedly hostile to those laws—measures, the whole effects of which are expressly stated to be an infringement upon the navigation and colonial system? We put it to his discretion, if he will allow no higher appeal, whether anything that may have passed between himself and the late administration, can justify such a breach of consistency in a prudential view? What though the members of that administration are no longer in power? The time may come when they shall again rule. And if Lord Sheffield could suspend his attack upon them until they were entirely out of place, his ground of quarrel having been laid early in their short reign, he might surely have waited a little longer for the chance of its proving unnecessary.[1]

Mr. Stephen is a champion of a different character. His speech, like all his other publications, is replete with talent and information; and, erroneous as we conceive it to be in its general tendency, it has undoubtedly the merit of much ingenuity and perfect precision. Mr. Stephen

[1] As if to cover over the inconsistency which we have complained of, Lord Sheffield introduces a violent invective against the American Intercourse Act, repeating all the gross misrepresentations of that measure which were first propagated by the shipping interest. Can he be ignorant that the Act only made two changes in the monopoly law, of which one was nominal or formal merely, and the other a change in favour of the monopoly? The power of suspending the law formerly exercised by colonial governors, was transferred to the Privy Council; and the barter of sugar and coffee, with the Americans, formerly allowed, was, we think very improvidently, prohibited.

understands the subject, and the science to which it belongs, too well, to contend, like Lord Sheffield, that the Orders in Council were in themselves of advantage. He contents himself with maintaining, that they had a tendency to relieve us from a greater evil; that our trade with Europe was gone at any rate, in consequence of the Berlin decree; and that this act of retaliation might restore, but could not further impair it;—and finally, that the embargo, which closed our trade with America, was not occasioned by these Orders; but, on the contrary, was most likely to be removed by a steady adherence to them. Without entering at large into a discussion which has now lost its chief interest, we must beg leave to make one or two remarks on those several propositions.

In the first place, we conceive it to be no longer a matter of doubt, that the issuing of these Orders, or the apprehension of their issuing, was one of the main causes of the embargo. In point of fact, it is established, that the substance of the Orders was known at Philadelphia on the 10th or 12th of December; and the President's message, suggesting the embargo, was not delivered till the 18th. But the fact is officially confirmed by a letter from Mr. Maddison to the American ambassador in this country, in which he expressly says, "that, among the considerations which enforced the measure of the embargo, was the probability of such decrees as were issued by the British government on the 16th November 1807;—the language of the British gazettes, with other indications, having left little doubt that such were meditated." If anything more were wanting to demonstrate that our Orders were among the main causes of the embargo, it can only be necessary to recollect, that America has made a distinct offer to withdraw the embargo, provided we would recall those Orders.

With regard, again, to the alleged destruction of our foreign trade by the Berlin decree, we have to observe, in the first place, that this decree was issued in November 1806, just twelve months before our Orders in Council; and that, in this intervening year, when the Berlin decree stood *alone*, our foreign trade is admitted to have been *greater than it had ever been at any former period*; while

it is equally certain, that, in the year after the date of our Orders, that trade was diminished to the extent of no less than fourteen millions. The fact is, that, after a feeble effort to enforce the decree immediately after it was issued, it became a mere dead letter till the month of September or October 1807, when this effort was repeated, and a few vessels were captured or detained; in consequence of which, we are *now*[1] satisfied that a considerable alarm was excited; the premium of insurance was raised; and some suspension of trade took place. The effect, however, had been precisely the same when the decree was originally issued in November 1806; but, after a momentary panic and alarm, the edict was disregarded both by us and by America; and the trade went on as if it had never been enacted. If it ever can be safe to reason from the past to the future, it was natural to have anticipated the same consequences in October 1807. Without waiting for this, however, and without allowing a moment's time to see how the late proceedings were received in America, our Government issued the Orders in Council, which necessarily gave permanency and real effect to the decrees of

[1] When, on a former occasion, (see vol. XII. p. 232, &c.) we denied these facts, and maintained that the Berlin decree had remained quite inefficient up to the date of our Orders, we proceeded altogether on the evidence brought by the petitioners against these Orders, and were not aware of the tenor, or even of the existence of the counter-evidence produced by the ministry in their support. Mr. Stephen, we are confident, will believe us upon our solemn averment; but, for the satisfaction of more ignoble partisans, we beg leave to observe, that while the evidence upon which we proceeded had been made *publici juris*, by being printed in a vendible pamphlet, the counter-evidence was in the possession of members of the legislature only; and we rather think had not found its way to Edinburgh, in a single instance, if indeed it had even been printed at the time [April 1808] when the article now referred to was written. That the writer of that article was altogether ignorant of its import, and uncertain even as to its existence, is manifest from the language he uses in p. 233, where he says, that though he understands that Mr. Perceval has *announced his intention to bring other evidence*, he cannot help relying entirely upon that now before him. This much it seems necessary to have said in explanation of our mistake, in point of fact. It must be evident, from what is stated in the text, that it has scarcely any effect upon the true and substantial argument of the case.—It may be added, that the article in vol. XII. was by another hand.

the enemy, and increased and insured all the evils by which they are said to have been suggested.

But, even supposing that our foreign trade had been, in a great measure, destroyed by the Berlin decree, how, we would ask Mr. Stephen, was it to be *restored* by our Orders in Council? This, it may be remarked, is a question which is cautiously avoided by the learned gentleman through the whole course of his statement; and indeed the answer to it is decisive of the case before us. Our Orders could only prove beneficial to our trade, by producing an effect which, it must now be admitted, they *failed* completely to produce; and which we humbly conceive every man of common sense might have been aware that they had no chance of producing. They could only promote our trade by annoying and impoverishing the enemy, so far as to make him rescind *his* decrees, and restore neutral commerce to its original freedom. Now, it is certain that they did not produce this effect; and indeed it has always been inconceivable to us, that any person of a sane mind should have thought it possible that they should.

If this effect were not produced, the Orders could evidently do nothing to restore the trade which the Berlin decree had taken away; and the probability, or, we may say, the certainty, was, that they would take away a part of what that decree had left. The most favourable of all suppositions is, that America had acquiesced in these Orders, and agreed to conform herself to them at all points. If she had done so, however, it was evidently ten to one at least, that France would have gone to war with her; and there was of course an end of all the neutral trade of the world, and of our share in it. But even if France had still recognised her neutrality, there was an end, at any rate, of her trade to the Continent of Europe; and as it is admitted that at least two-thirds of the goods she takes from us during the war are destined for the Continent, there was an end, at the same time, of two-thirds of our trade with her, or, in other words, of two-thirds of our whole foreign trade. Mr. Stephen does not speak to this point either; which we humbly conceive to be conclusive against the policy of the Orders, even on the most

favourable supposition as to their reception among the neutrals.

But the fact was, that they were not so received nor submitted to—and we must say, that it was utterly extravagant and absurd to imagine that they ever would be so submitted to. Instead of trading with us under these Orders, America lays on an embargo, and passes a non-intercourse law, which are enforced with a rigour hitherto unprecedented in the history of such regulations. The consequence is, that the year after these salutary and restorative orders are issued, our commerce suffers a diminution to the extent of at least fourteen millions sterling; and this, although their natural operation was counteracted in that year, by a great variety of accidental circumstances which could not be reckoned upon when the rash experiment was begun. We allude to the opening of Spain and Portugal, and our military expeditions in those countries,—the struggle made by Sweden, and the increased communication with Brazil and Spanish America, —not to mention the fact, that the year which gives this amount of loss, comprehends the period when shipments were made on both sides, before the operation of the embargo, and when hazards were run by neutral adventurers, upon the presumption that neither of the regulations would be enforced, as they actually were. Had it not been for these circumstances, our loss of trade in consequence of the Orders, would probably have been more than double of what it actually was;—and this boasted cure for our commercial embarrassments, would, in all probability, have reduced our whole foreign trade to a little wretched smuggling in Europe and America.

Such, it appears, too, was the slow and reluctant conviction of the very persons who projected this most perilous experiment. They saw that to persist in it was ruin; and accordingly, on the 26th of April 1809, they, with a very bad grace, rescinded, and utterly revoked those portentous proclamations; and substituted in their place a nominal blockade of *a part only* of the countries from which our trade is excluded. This measure was adopted several weeks after Mr. Stephen had made his speech in support of the Orders; but, fortunately, before the printed report

of it was ready for publication. He has an opportunity, therefore, in a postscript, to attempt to reconcile his arguments in behalf of the Orders, with this practical and complete acknowledgment of their impolicy; and, dexterous and ingenious as he is, the task, it may easily be conceived, proves somewhat embarrassing. For our own parts, we were so well satisfied with the revocation, that we were not disposed to have inquired very strictly into any pretence with which our baffled experimentalists might have covered their retreat, had this not been rendered necessary by the tone of defiance with which the delusion is maintained in the work now before us.

The hint for Mr. Stephen's plea of consistency is contained in the late Order itself In consequence of "diverse changes in our relations with foreign powers" since the date of the former Orders, it has become necessary, it is said, to alter them; and the alterations, it is added, are merely such as were necessary to accommodate the said Orders, the principle of which it seems is not abandoned, to those new relations. Now, we would merely observe, 1st, that no changes had taken place which required any alteration on the old Orders, if the principle was not to be abandoned; and, 2dly, that the alterations adopted, amount to a total and radical change of system, and have no reference to the change of our relations with foreign powers.

The substance of the original Orders was, that neutrals should not trade with any country subject to the control of France, or any country from which our trade was excluded by decrees similar to that of Berlin, without previously coming here, and paying for a license. Now, the only change which had taken place previous to April last was, that Spain had ceased to be under the control of France, and that our trade was no longer excluded from its ports. It was not even necessary, therefore, we humbly conceive, to make any public declaration whatever, in order to exempt neutrals trading to Spain from the restriction of our Orders; but, at all events, nothing more than a simple declaration, that Spain was no longer in that situation, could possibly have been necessary, had it really been the intention of Government to adhere to the spirit and principle of the Orders of November 1807.

The fact is, however, that they have totally and entirely abandoned that principle; and that these Orders, with the whole system on which they proceeded, have been retracted and renounced, in the most complete and unequivocal manner. In the first place, the whole provisions for forcing neutrals to touch at this country, and to submit to a certain tax on their ulterior commerce, which formed the most characteristic, and by far the most offensive part of the original Orders, are entirely given up. In the second place, the order for condemning all vessels having a certificate of origin on board, the only other unprecedented and very oppressive part of our regulation, is also absolutely and totally rescinded; and, finally, the blockade, instead of extending to all the countries from which our trade is excluded, extends only to France, Holland, and the north of Italy. When such a relaxation is permitted in words, it is perfectly well known, that a still greater relaxation is reckoned on in practice. A partial blockade, without actual investiture, is always violated to a great extent, without any great hazard. A neutral clearing out for Ancona, which is without the limit, may easily run into Pezaro, which is within it, unless some of our cruisers be actually on the station; and so with all the other ports, except those of France herself, and the central districts. The Orders in Council, then, are utterly and entirely withdrawn; and the blockade, by which they have been replaced, might be admitted to be no more than an ordinary act of retaliation, if our situation was not such as to render retaliation on the enemy as ruinous to ourselves as to the neutrals.

The pamphlet of Mr. Leckie consists of five short tracts, as he calls them, written in his dogmatical and pedantic manner; but evidently the work of an acute man, well informed upon most parts of his subject, accustomed to think for himself, and rather betrayed into error by his boldness, than by any ordinary defect of understanding. In these pages, he continues the view of foreign affairs published last year, and noticed in our twenty-fifth Number. His present lucubrations are apparently more hasty, and contain much less of valuable matter, with a large portion of his former paradoxes.

He sets out with much general abuse of the present ministry, and seems, indeed, to be no great admirer of any of the measures pursued by any British statesman. Of the conduct of the Spanish war, it is certainly not easy to speak with too much disapprobation. But Mr. Leckie is almost equally severe upon those who think peace with France is possible under any circumstances short of such a change of system as could only, we apprehend, be expected from a counter-revolution, accompanied by a dismemberment of that empire. He concludes his remarks, or rather *dicta* upon this topic, with the following passage, which we extract, as very characteristic of his usual manner of writing.

"Those who have reflected maturely on the real position of the French government, and the conduct it has held in all negotiations for peace, must be convinced that it could never be sincere, and that it could not, from its situation, desire peace.

"If members of the House of Commons would give themselves time to reflect, we should not hear them making vague propositions on this topic: if they did reflect, their minds could not be occupied by that which, from the nature of things, is at the present moment impossible. When we are told, in the same assembly, that we had better agree to bad conditions to-day, than worse to-morrow, and are put in mind of the buying of the sibylline books,[1] we must doubt the sincerity of the speaker, for his own credit: the sibylline books were to be obtained only by purchase. If Britain should ever be reduced to buy peace, she must acknowledge her own slavery. This reasoning is so unworthy of a Briton, that it is to be hoped it will not often be obtruded on so respectable an assembly."—p. 13.

It is perhaps scarcely necessary to remind our readers that the argument here alluded to is altogether misconceived by Mr. Leckie. No man has ever ventured to recommend that England should purchase a peace, because she cannot do without it—or should lower her tone, and humble her high spirit more this year than she did the last, in consequence of any losses she has sustained. But in treating with France respecting the affairs of our allies, it is quite obvious that the terms which we obtain for them must, in some degree, be governed by the fortune which has attended their exertions against the common enemy;

[1] "We are certainly not under the necessity of purchasing sibylline prophecies to enable us to foresee the national ruin arising from such miserable reasoning."

and that we cannot expect to place Austria, Prussia, and Sweden upon the same footing, now, on which we might fairly have hoped to secure them, before Vienna, Berlin, and Stralsund were overrun by the French armies.

Having laid peace entirely out of the question, our author proceeds to trace the probable aggrandisement of France. She will, he thinks, make war upon Austria,[1] and wholly dismember that monarchy. The subjects of the imperial states have no attachment to their rulers; and, as long as the feudal institutions remain, no reason for making common cause with them. France, he says, is aware of this; and will take care to address herself to the vulnerable point of the House of Lorraine. The Turkish frontiers are covered with principalities in a state of nominal submission to the Porte, or open rebellion against its authority. Greece is ripe for insurrection; and the French army in Dalmatia will easily raise the standard for the people of that country. By popular commotion at Constantinople, the way will be opened for the French troops to the capital of this disjointed empire; and the Turk, being driven across the Hellespont, will establish himself in Bithynia; while the rest of Asia Minor, being under a powerful and rebellious pasha, Cara Osman Oglu, both that chief and the Sultan will become subservient to the intrigues of France; and, keeping one another in check, will be made the ministers of her further aggrandisement in the East. Our author is particularly indignant at the British government for having attempted, by a second mission, to conclude a treaty with the Porte, after Sir Arthur Paget's had failed. He conceives this to be a humiliating step; and predicts a repetition of failure and disgrace, which we rejoice to think has by no means occurred. He is offended chiefly because Turkey is weak, and may soon be destroyed by France; but, in our view of the subject, these are the very reasons why the pride of England may sleep secure in her negotiations with Turkey.

Mr. Leckie's next step is an easy one. Persia has long been distracted by civil commotions; and is both occupied

[1] This work was published some months ago, just before the war broke out between France and Austria.

in part by rebellious chiefs, and surrounded by predatory tribes, whose incursions that government is too feeble to repress. Here, then, says our author, are materials in abundance for the "*divide et impera;*" and the influence of France in the councils of that weak power is sure to become paramount as soon as she enters fairly upon her favourite plan of Eastern conquest. He considers it as quite certain, that, this footing once established, Buonaparte will form a native army in Persia upon the model of our sepoy system; and, uniting with himself the Mahrattas, will be enabled to overthrow our empire in India. This event, Mr. Leckie views as synonymous with the ruin of our finances, our commerce and our naval power. (p. 26 *et passim.*) And, as he holds it to be of little moment whether we quietly await such a catastrophe, or adopt imperfect measures for warding it off, he is very anxious, and, as usual, perfectly decided in recommending that a course of violent proceedings, formed upon the model of our late East Indian policy, should forthwith be applied to the court of Sheraz or Ispahan. One is really at a loss whether most to admire the thoughtlessness which dictates this exaggerated view of the evil, or the strange forgetfulness of principle which suggests the remedy. It is, however, only a particular application of his universal medicine, which he prescribes in the conclusion of his work, for all the ills the world is now labouring under.

The only way to counteract the progress of the French arms, according to Mr. Leckie, is to adopt "a plan of insular conquest."—"We constantly complain," says he, "that our population is inferior to our want of men; and yet we reject the only remedy in nature, which is, to increase our territories, and embody other nations in the pale of our own empire." In short, that which France is by land, England should become by sea; and, if our author recommends the plan of alluring by benefits the people of the countries which we are to seize from their lawful rulers, in preference to the attack of both government and people by mere force, it is only because he holds it to be the plan most likely to succeed, and that which the French themselves have commonly found the most prac-

ticable. In pursuing the details of this dignified system, and explaining in what cases it may be acted upon, he no doubt stops short rather prematurely; for unfortunately it is one of the evils attending such an abandonment of all principle, at least in the case of England, that extremely little is to be got by it; and, indeed, we fear this is the only reason why our rulers have not carried it into effect upon a large scale. However, as far as they have gone, Mr. Leckie highly approves of their policy. The expedition to Copenhagen is, according to him, the only right thing they ever did. The giving up of Zealand, and their refusal to receive the homage of the people of Norway, which he believes was offered, were in his eyes the very height of folly; and he now calls upon them to seize the Greek islands,—invite over the Greeks from the mainland,—and thus (for he can make a stride as well as most projectors) both establish an effectual check to the progress of the French views in Asia, Africa and Egypt, and prevent them from ever requiring a naval power in the Mediterranean. Although, by entering into this exemplification, Mr. Leckie has, more than any other person, displayed the emptiness of the scheme, he is only one of a numerous class of politicians who at present favour the adoption of this, or something nearly approaching to this, system of maritime aggression. In the sequel, we shall have an opportunity of considering its merits more fully.

We shall now proceed to lay before our readers a summary of the reflections suggested by the present state of this country, with a view to its external relations. The prospects of our allies, and the policy which ought to be pursued towards them, and towards the common enemy, are the leading topics that enter into this discussion. In treating of them, we cannot promise the reader either any great novelty, or any immediate consolation. A repetition of the same fatal errors abroad, which began the destruction of the old established order of things—and of the lamentable blunders at home which prevented us from assisting Europe with our immense resources—naturally calls for a renewal of those remarks which we have upon former occasions submitted to the public—while it almost

extinguishes the hope of any immediate good being now done, even by the most radical change of system. We are now beset, however, with dangers more imminently affecting the safety of this empire, than any with which it has heretofore been menaced; and these it may yet be possible, by prudence and spirit, to turn away.

Of the states which France has either completely subdued, or so far mastered as to render them subservient to her purposes,—some are held in subjection by force alone, while others are willing instruments of her oppressions. The former class is more numerous than the latter; which, but for the impolicy of England and her allies, would have been small indeed. It is impossible to doubt, even if we had no direct information upon the subject,—that in Switzerland, where so much violence has been done to the freedom and national spirit of the people,—and in Holland, where, beside the disregard shown to all the political feelings of the inhabitants, the comforts of each individual have been abridged by the stagnation of trade, the name of French oppression must be as odious as it would be in England itself, should it ever unhappily be known amongst us. In those two countries the French are hated by all ranks and descriptions of men; and any change that would restore to the one her ancient constitutions, and to the other a pacific intercourse with England, would be hailed with universal acclamation. But both have suffered so severely by war, and are indeed so thoroughly overrun with French agents and troops, that they are probably the last spots of ground on the Continent where resistance to France can be expected to spring up, until something shall have happened elsewhere to render the experiment at once easy and sure.

The case of the Italian states is somewhat different. There, indeed, an abhorrence of the French prevails; but it is confined to the regular clergy and the lower orders of the people—with such of the other ranks as have suffered individually by exactions or changes in the government. The former classes are not very important, and are likely soon to follow the general feelings of their superiors: the latter are, of course, not very numerous. The secular

clergy, and the middle ranks of the people, have been considerable gainers, in most of the Italian states, by the change; and such of the higher classes as have not suffered by it, having only but a slender attachment to the ancient order of things, would certainly risk nothing in any attempt to restore it. In Italy, however, as in most of the continental states, there is a general feeling of dislike and dread of France; which, were the question capable of such a decision, would no doubt lead men to give their voices against having any further connexion with that powerful and restless neighbour. The petty states in the north of Germany, among which we must unhappily now reckon the Prussian monarchy, are only kept in subjection by the constant application of force. The temper of courts, reduced to a state of the most galling dependence, either upon a French prince, or an ambassador with paramount authority, may easily be conceived; and the symptoms of open revolt, which in many places manifested themselves, are a sufficient proof that the spirit of the people even goes before that of their superiors. Of Austria it is unnecessary to speak in this view of the subject. Whether the result of the present war shall be to leave the House of Hapsburg a nominal sovereignty, or to reduce it within the limits of a petty principality, and distribute its vast dominions amongst a set of new potentates, the people of those countries, and their rulers (by which we of course always mean the class of persons possessing great natural influence, without considering who may be accidentally placed at the head of affairs) will long continue hostile to French oppression, and disposed to avail themselves of any promising opportunity of regaining their independence. The same may be safely asserted of Spain, but in a much greater degree. If, which seems but too certain, France should establish her power in the Peninsula, she will long find it a source of weakness and distraction,—a province only to be kept in subjection by the same strong hand which subdued it,—and ready, at the first favourable moment, to shake off the yoke. But the states which may be formed out of the Austrian and Spanish monarchies will at first be almost as submissive to the conqueror as Switzer-

land or Holland. They may require, especially the Spaniards, more French troops to keep them in order; they may feel a greater degree of stifled indignation at their oppressions; they may be somewhat less calculating than the Dutch in their designs of resistance:—but we cannot have any doubt that, for some time at least, they will be averse to a renewal of the scenes through which their dependence shall have been secured; and will only venture to move when the course of events shall render success nearly certain.

Let us then stop here for a moment, to ask what prospect there is of an effectual resistance to France from the efforts of those states upon whom her yoke now presses with the greatest weight? Unless some unexpected change takes place in the posture of her affairs, there is not a chance even of any attempt being made by those countries to regain their independence. They are animated, indeed, by a common feeling of hatred towards their common tyrant; but they are separated—divided—insulated: they have no communication among themselves,—no confidence in each other: they are, like the subjects of a tyrant, whose cruelties have long made every mortal under his dominion ardently pray for his speedy downfall. He has no counsellor whom he can trust,—no support to expect from any part of his empire, were a struggle to commence: his forces are trifling in power, compared to the multitudes who are daily and hourly panting after his destruction: the pretorian guards themselves hate him, and would willingly help to cut him off: the whole frame of his government is rotten, and wants but a breath to overthrow it;—yet still is he secure from insurrection, if endowed with a tolerable share of promptitude and courage. He has always strength enough to overwhelm a single individual, or a small knot of conspirators. Each man considers this; and reflects on the certain ruin that awaits himself, should he begin the resistance, and meet with no support;—the more than equal chance of destruction to which he exposes himself, should he commence a resistance likely to succeed in the end. Even among the guards of the tyrant, a similar feeling prevails. No man trusts his fellow. A

partial insurrection speedily defeated, from time to time strengthens the common apprehension; or a plot, prematurely disclosed, increases the mutual suspicions of all classes. A general belief prevails, that things will continue as they are at present; and that the ruling power will always succeed. And thus are despotisms perpetuated amidst the universal execrations of mankind, nearly by the operation of the same feelings which support the most regular, enlightened, and beneficent systems of government, that have been reared up to bless the species. It would be as chimerical to expect a mutiny among the vassal states of France, who are the most impatient of her yoke, as amongst the inhabitants of Nantz and Bourdeaux, or the conscripts of the years 1808 and 1809. In making this comparison, we are indeed putting the case much more strongly against France than the facts warrant; for, with the exception of Holland, and the states into which the conscription has been introduced, either immediately, or by means of large requisitions of men made to their governments,[1] the changes effected by the French invasion have been favourable to the individual happiness of the inhabitants; so that the hatred of France is liable to considerable diminution, inasmuch as the national antipathies, and spirit of independence, are gradually undermined by the solid benefits which the change of masters has conferred. Thus, while the Dutch from the ruin of their trade, and the Genoese and Wirtembergers from the conscription, feel an unmingled antipathy to the French oppressions, because the national feelings, and the interests of

[1] We believe it will be found, upon mature consideration of the subject, that this is the only line which can safely be drawn. The effects of a number of the inhabitants of any country serving with the French armies, and sharing in their conquests, are, no doubt, to be estimated as tending somewhat to unite that country with France, and to make it share in her enmities towards other nations; but, at the utmost, this is only a deduction to be made from the great and permanent effects of the conscription, in implanting a rooted antipathy to French tyranny, wherever that most odious of all oppressions is introduced. Where this is the case, no beneficial changes, which can be effected in any other respect, will ever go far to counteract its consequences, or reconcile the people to their new lot.

individuals, concur to produce this sentiment, the Hungarians, should they fall under the dominion of a French chief, will feel their dislike to the change mitigated by the boon which the policy of the conqueror will not fail to bestow along with it—a relief from feudal oppressions, and from the present galling system of commercial restraints.

Thus far we have been considering the situation of those countries which are held in subjection to France by force, contrary to their interests and inclinations. It is unquestionable, however, and much to be lamented, that there are others which yield a very willing obedience to her commands; and although the number of these, as well as their alienation from the good cause, has been greatly increased by the impolitic conduct of England and her allies, there are several whose natural leaning is towards the enemy. Among these Russia stands first. Her distance from France, her vast ill-peopled territory, her want of sea-coast, and the desire which she has long felt to supply this deficiency—a desire which cannot be gratified by co-operating with England;—her jealousy of Austria:—These, and other circumstances, obviously suggest themselves as likely, in general, to incline that great unwieldy empire to co-operate with the enemy, and conspire with him in spoiling the rest of Europe, however accidental occurrences might, for a time, give a better direction to its policy. From such considerations it was, that we long ago ventured to predict a speedy termination of the alliance between Russia and England. The reader who may do us the honour of referring to our Number for January 1807, will find a full statement of our views upon this point. It was published in the midst of very confident hopes, prevalent, as usual, of victories over France by our Russian allies; but those whom that statement might satisfy, could neither be disappointed by the progress of the French arms during the remaining part of the campaign, nor surprised at the termination of the alliance which followed. Soon after the peace of Tilsit, indeed, the operation of the circumstances to which we have alluded, received a most powerful support from the wretched policy that induced England to attack a state placed under the especial protection of

Russia,—and at once to lose all chance of reclaiming the court of St. Petersburgh from French influence,—and to convert a friendly nation, naturally hostile to France, and jealous of Russia, into a bitter enemy. From that unfortunate period, may most probably be dated, not only the hostile disposition of Denmark, but the cordial co-operation of Russia with France; but we cannot deny the possibility of a similar result having followed from the temptations of Turkish spoil, independently of the alienation occasioned by our expedition to Copenhagen. This alliance is likely to continue—at least as long as the Austrian monarchy remains undivided,—and until Russia, having got as much in Turkey as she can from the profits of the co-partnership, a difference arises about the further distribution of the spoil. It does not appear certain, that, even then, the ambition of France will be pointed towards a Russian throne. But, considering how little that power has shown itself capable of effecting for the salvation of Europe—how wretched the state of its subjects is under the present government—how trifling an acquisition of strength the common enemy could expect to obtain from the entire possession of its resources; we acknowledge that we should contemplate with great composure any change which might lay the foundation of future improvement, and scatter the forces of France over the dominions of the Czar.

The extreme unpopularity of a ruinous war,—a dislike, unfortunately not without foundation, of their late monarch, —and an old attachment to French connexions, has given France considerable influence over the councils of Sweden. The war must be viewed, in that country, as intimately connected with the English alliance; and the still greater antipathy to Russia will probably be gratified by France, at a trifling expense to Sweden. To permit Russia to seize upon any considerable part of the Swedish territories, is certainly very far from the policy of our enemy; and he will most probably suffer the new king to redeem the greater part of his dominions, by serving in the war upon our trade.

The attack upon Bavaria, which signalised the com-

mencement of the third coalition war,—and the rank to which that state has been raised by France, and which it must immediately resign, were the ancient order of things restored;—these are sufficient pledges of its good-will to the French cause, until a combination of circumstances takes place, which shall enable it, without sacrificing its accessions of territory, to assert its independence. As for the Tyrolese subjects of that new kingdom, they retain their attachment to their Austrian masters with a disinterested generosity altogether astonishing, when we reflect on the treatment which they formerly experienced. Such of our readers as choose to compare the facts stated in the sketch of this brave and loyal people, given in our Number for January 1806, with the noble efforts which they have recently made, will be disposed to admit, that, under particular circumstances, men act without any view, either to the pursuit of their private interest, or the gratification of their just resentments. It is from instances of this kind that we derive the only faint glimmering of hope which still remains to us, that the Hungarians also may forget both their interests and their resentments, and only remember that Francis fills the throne of "their King, Maria Teresa."

With respect to the Poles and Greeks, we apprehend they may be considered as natural friends of France—or of whatever power steps forward to attack their oppressors. She cannot, indeed, look for a very active assistance from the divided people of Poland; but, if there is any truth in the principles upon which we have stated that the rest of the Austrian monarchy will form several principalities radically inimical to France, we must equally conclude that the provinces taken from Poland will operate as a diversion in her favour. Indeed, it is not easy to perceive why the restoration of the Polish monarchy should not once more be attempted. In as far as it was tried two years ago, it certainly failed: but the Poles were then called upon to act offensively in the first instance; and even this demand could only be urged to the Prussian part of Poland with any prospect of success. Austria was at peace with France; and the Russian division, from the similarity of

the nations, and the maintenance of the seignorial rights,[1] was always the most peaceably disposed towards its new masters. Now, when the Saxons may be compelled at a moment's notice to give up the duchy of Warsaw; when Austria may, in all probability, be forced to yield Gallicia, and an equivalent in Turkey may induce Russia to quit her share of the spoil; when no immediate exertions are required on the part of the Poles, and the re-establishment of their country would be the work of a little diplomatic arrangement; no one could be surprised at witnessing an event which would give France a strong hold in the east of Europe, upon the confines of the Russian territory. From the Greeks, she may in all probability receive more immediate assistance; and, although the speculators in Greek empires, who have so long been preaching in this country a sort of crusade against the Turks, overrate most extravagantly the powers of that people, either to throw off the yoke at present, or to form hereafter a great monarchy; there can be no doubt that they would, to a certain degree, co-operate with any regular army which should appear in their country in sufficient force to meet the Ottoman troops; and would, if formed into a separate state, contribute materially to the resources of their French and Russian masters.

It must be confessed, then, that the prospect is at present sufficiently gloomy for the continent of Europe and for England, in so far as her interests are connected with the fortunes of her neighbours. France is surrounded either with states who murmur in silence, and vent their indignation at her oppressions in solitary and impotent curses; or with nations favourably disposed to her, willing to aid her iniquities, and well pleased to share in their fruits. This calamitous state of things has been brought

[1] The Russians alone retained the Polish peasantry in a state of villenage. It is easy to imagine how the sudden abolition of that tenure must have alienated the nobles from the Austrian government; and, this without making it in anything like the same proportion popular among the inferior orders. In fact, the first promulgation of the new law, displeased lord and peasant almost equally. It is well known to have occasioned a great desertion of the peasantry to the Russian side of the line.

about by the mutual jealousies of the great continental powers,—by their want of principle towards their weaker neighbours, and by their domestic corruptions—the profligacy of their governments—their obstinate infatuated resistance to those improvements which alone could have opposed an effectual barrier to the conquests of the French Revolution. These are the remote causes of the almost universal dominion which has crowned the darings and the crimes of our enemy. But we must look nearer home for his accomplices—for those who have betrayed the Continent into his hands, when they might have saved it by their prudence from the certain destruction of premature and insulated efforts—united it by the justice and forbearance of their councils—and rendered it powerful assistance by a disinterested and generous application of their resources. Placed at a distance from the petty quarrels of the different courts; exempt from all suspicion of ambitious views; destined by her situation to derive advantage only from peaceful intercourse with every neighbour; forbidden, by the nature of things, to reap any benefit from that intercourse, without conferring an equal good in return; enjoying a high character among all nations for honour and generosity; too weak by land to excite any jealousy; by sea too powerful to have any rival; capable, by her resources, of turning the balance when it hung even, though unable to act alone:—England, at the beginning of the last war, stood in the very situation which the fancy of a statesman would have selected, had he been required to choose one for a common umpire of national disputes!—And how does she stand now, when an account of her talent is demanded of her?—and by what steps has she fallen from her eminence, and made herself an accessary to the subjugation of Europe? Let us not shrink from this reckoning; for it is only by retracing those steps, that any hope remains of regaining the situation she has lost, and of preserving a rallying point for national independence in better times.

The war began against the French Revolution in aid of Austria and Prussia, who had attacked France with the avowed object of dictating a form of government to its

inhabitants, and with a design, perfectly well understood, of seizing upon some of its provinces. Admitting that the former purpose was justifiable, every admixture of the latter should have been scrupulously guarded against; and the only way at once to accomplish the one, and to disavow and banish all thoughts of the other, was to place the exiled family and nobles at the head of the combined operations. England should never have become a party to any invasion of France, which was not accompanied by this pledge of the purity of the principles in which it originated. Nor should she have expected to succeed in the undertaking, by measures which must of necessity unite every class of men in France against her. Accordingly, the allies were soon reduced to act on the defensive; and a coalition, formed upon selfish grounds, was dissolved by the first serious reverses.

But Austria, though deserted by Prussia, and driven out of the Netherlands, was still entire; and England, though she had failed in her attempts to rescue Holland, was possessed of resources which, in the hands of a bold and sagacious leader, might have checked the victories of her enemy, and enabled her ally to retreat with honour from the contest. But then began the reign of contradiction and imbecility.—Then came into vogue the doctrine of *British objects*, and the practice of fighting blindfolded. We no longer dared to hope for a counter-revolution in France; we discovered, that the more she was attacked, the stronger she grew: yet we were afraid of allowing Austria to make peace; and, while we pretended that she was continuing the war to regain her lost provinces, and make a barrier for Holland, we avoided every measure which could effectually assist her in the pursuit of those great objects. The burning of a few ships at Toulon,—the capture of Corsica and Minorca,—a descent to destroy sluices at Ostend,—the easy conquest of some islands in the West Indies,—the seizure of other settlements with the pleasing approbation of their owners,—the Cape—Ceylon —Pondicherry; or, as if to show that it was the importance only, and not the difficulty of the enterprise, which deterred us from invading France directly—a long, hopeless, costly

and murderous war against climate and pestilence in St. Domingo:—These were the objects on which the whole of our force was squandered; while the enemy was, in a single morning, well spent on the Adige or the Rhine, redeeming all those petty losses as surely as if he had extorted from us the treaty of surrender, and at the same time causing our allies to tremble on their thrones. Hence that character which we began to acquire, among foreign nations, of selfish policy,—of only intermeddling with their concerns when somewhat might be got by it for ourselves, —of looking at the balance of power with eyes rather better accustomed to the scales of a counter,—of always loving to drive a little trade, happen what would to the cause of Europe,—of hankering constantly after some dirty bit of gain, something in the sugar and ship line—and undervaluing, as quite unprofitable, whatever operations of the copartnership only tended to the discomfiture of the enemy, without making a figure in the balance-sheet of our own books. Hence, too, another imputation, equally well founded, (but, to the country of Marlborough and Wolfe as galling as it was new), that whatever England might do by sea, on shore she was insignificant; for, in truth, our arms were only successful, where conquest was equally easy and useless; and we had always so many irons in the fire—such an infinity of small jobs going on at once—that when, by some unaccountable accident, we, upon one or two occasions, tried to carry a point of real difficulty, we failed, in a manner if possible more disgraceful to ourselves than it was injurious to the common cause.

During the sad period in question, our activity was boundless and incessant. Indolence and parsimony are perhaps the only faults of which we could never be accused. The bustle of our dockyards was dreadful. The pressgang never ceased from troubling. The marches and countermarches of troops gave the country every outward appearance of war. We had recruiting, and drafting, and balloting, in perpetual succession—loans by the dozen, and taxes by the score. Scarce a session passed without some new military system; and we generally invented at the rate of two systems of finance per annum. Nor did all

this preparation end in nothing. Our harbours were under an almost weekly embargo. There was as regularly "the *secret expedition*," as if it were some part of the island. Our little armies were constantly coasting from port to port, and sailing and returning, and whisking about from shore to shore with incredible nimbleness, and crossing one another, and playing at cross purposes, in the most innocent and affecting manner possible;—there was firing of guns, too; and ringing of bells; and one eternal interchange of gratulatory messages—with votes of thanks and pensions—and cabals about appointments, and disputes about islands; —so that any person who had suddenly been transported to this country from some distant region, and saw everything except our gazettes, would infallibly have concluded, that every nerve of a vast empire was straining for the general attack of an enemy—that our whole endeavours were to meet the adversary—that we were not making all this bustle to get out of his way—and that our success was as important as our efforts deserved.—Alas! we were all the while crushing flies with a steam-engine, and puncturing an elephant with a needle!

The opportunity which a new ally and a second coalition afforded, was rendered still more inviting, by the symptoms of weakness and mismanagement which appeared in the affairs of France. Instead of trusting the fortunes of the league to the cordial co-operation of Russia and Austria, and resting secure in the superiority of the Calmuck to the French generals, because a single good commander had appeared among the Russians,—it would have well become England to have sent a large army, either into Germany or Italy, for the sole object of fighting against the French armies, without regarding the petty squabbles of Vienna and St. Petersburgh. But we were busy in Lisbon and Surinam just at that particular time! and, when we sent an army to Holland, we took good care that it should land at the greatest possible distance from the scene of action, and not until the tide had begun to turn against our allies. The enemy, however, was alarmed:—he did not then know us quite so well;—he guessed, from our preparations, that we meant something, and was apprehensive we might

really intend to operate a diversion. He found we were safe in North Holland!—And, leaving a few troops to watch us, with the assistance of the Dutch army, he quietly pursued the destruction of the second coalition.

Notwithstanding our disasters in Holland, an excellent army was assembled—unrivalled in courage—respectable in point of discipline—most ably commanded—fitted beyond all others for landing at any point of the enemy's coast—capable of being greatly increased in numbers, without inconvenience or delay. The contest in Italy was critical between our allies and the enemy;—and therefore our armament remains quietly at home, until that is decided: and, much about the time when the last struggle is making for Austria within a short march of the Adriatic, away sails our excellent army to Malta and Egypt!—as if our fleet had not sufficiently settled the fate of these spots two years before, and as if the French armies could be better employed than by wasting their strength in fruitless expeditions to the East. The glorious result, indeed, of the campaign in Egypt, has indirectly done inestimable service to us by improving our troops. It has given a new character to our army—a character which, as far as depends on themselves, they have since more than supported. Perhaps it has begun the revival of our fame as a military power; but the remark is not the less obvious, that as much advantage might have been gained in these respects from operations of real importance to the great interests of the nation and its allies—while it is lamentable to reflect, that, so far from turning the military renown and strength thus gained, to a better account in our subsequent schemes, we have been almost systematic in pursuing the same infatuated course; and gaining, from each exertion of our force, only some dear-bought improvement to our troops, while squandering their valour upon projects in which success was either hopeless or unavailing.

Towards the latter end of the war, of which we are surveying the outline, those pretensions of maritime right were advanced, which have since been revived with such fatal additions, and which laid the foundation of the enmity ever since shown by this country to neutral nations.

With respect to the question of strict right, there is very little doubt that we had the best of the argument,—to the extent, at least, to which it was pushed in 1800 and 1801. But so very little could be gained by the fullest exercise of those rights, that it is impossible sufficiently to regret the stirring of the question. Our character and our popularity with the rest of the world has suffered incalculably: every suspicion relative to our narrowness and selfishness has been confirmed. Among ourselves, too, such extravagant notions have been raised up of maritime rights, and of the importance of asserting them to their full extent, that the prevailing opinion seems to be divided between those who think the maintenance of them essential to our welfare, and those who think our honour requires it, whether useful or not. So that, until the war broke out in Spain, it was difficult to discover any difference between the hatred which was bestowed on neutral nations, and that which was reserved for our enemies. It might even be suspected, at one time, that the former was the stronger feeling of the two. But, in all this, we have been liable to any charge rather than that of inconsistency. The mistake of what we had a right to do, for what it was expedient to attempt, has prevailed through our whole conduct (with the exception of that disgraceful enterprise in which right and expediency were equally disregarded); and they who could prefer a sugar colony to the interests of one ally—and an island with a good harbour, to the friendship of another—were surely acting like themselves, when, in attempting to deprive France of a little hemp and iron, they gave her a permanent influence over all neutral and maritime powers.

After the dependence of the Continent had been well nigh secured,—when no chance of a favourable alteration remained but in a change of system,—when it became manifest, that France could only be resisted by such reforms in the neighbouring states, as might enable them to draw forth all their resources against her—that a long interval of repose was absolutely necessary for this purpose—and that a renewal of hostilities on the part of one power, without the cordial co-operation of the rest, was

only devoting to destruction the little of national independence that was left;—England, seduced by the fatal delusion, that fighting is expedient as often as just cause of war exists, first broke the peace herself; and soon after drew Russia, and, through her influence, Austria, into the quarrel. The history of the third coalition, as far as we were concerned, differs but little from that of the two first, —except that it was from the beginning much more hopeless. Whatever chance of being useful to the common cause the exigences of our allies held out, we threw away with an improvident selfishness, to all appearance confirmed, and even increased by habit. The march of the Austrian armies into Bavaria, was the signal for a British force making sail to the Cape of Good Hope. The struggle, at first doubtful, between the Archduke and the French in Lombardy, was witnessed by our army at the respectful distance of Naples, where a truly British object was to be accomplished, the expulsion of an old ally from his dominions. And another English expedition arrived at the Weser, just in time to learn that peace had been dictated to Austria upon the Danube. An infatuation, hitherto unmatched even in our own history, soon after revived the war in Prussia; and, for once, England had no further share in the ruin of a coalition, than by not having sufficiently exerted herself to prevent its formation. At no one moment of this short but fatal conflict, did any opportunity present itself of taking a part in it with the least prospect of success; and, although the expeditions in the Levant were rather formed upon the old model, yet the utter impossibility of acting with effect in the North, and the advantage of detaching the Porte from its French connexion, might be pleaded in behalf of those schemes,[1] while the prudent reserve of our strength in other quarters for a favourable opening, in defiance of ignorant and thoughtless clamour, was an earnest of a wiser policy than had for many years been exhibited by the English Government.

[1] The failure of the expeditions in question, is well known to have arisen from the unaccountable mistakes of the officers employed to command them.

These prospects, however, were of short duration. A change of men speedily restored the reign of activity, with all its expeditions. But here a difficulty occurred. There were no more coalitions to be had; so we could not any longer desert our allies, and starve the common cause for some trifling object of our own. We contrived, however, to pass the time in plundering one friendly power at a vast expense of money, and an incalculable loss of character; and in quarrelling with another, to get rid of our commerce also. At length an accident, equally unexpected and auspicious, threw into our hands the means of rendering a far greater service to the Continent, and striking a more deadly blow at French influence, than the success even of all our coalitions could have accomplished. How we wasted this precious opportunity—how, by a conduct strictly conformable to all that was weakest in our past transactions, we suffered this season of promise to pass away unimproved, has already been so fully demonstrated in our last Number, and must indeed be so fresh in the remembrance of every one, that we shall gladly spare ourselves the mortification of again handling the subject.

After this opportunity was lost; when the affairs of the Peninsula appeared to be desperate; when the blame of having done worse than nothing was, by turns, laid upon the Convention of Cintra—the lukewarm dispositions of the people—the dissensions of the Juntas—the want of a central government—the season of the year—the weather—in short, upon anything that might help the real authors of the mischief to shift it off themselves; when, as is usual in human affairs, men, wise by the event, united in condemning everything that had been done, and in wishing that it were to do over again, secure that all past errors would be retrieved, but not venturing to hope for so unlikely an opportunity,—suddenly the rare felicity was bestowed upon us, of repeating our experiments from the beginning, and with all the benefits of our past experience. The operations of the enemy were suspended in the Peninsula. It was manifest, that while the war lasted in Germany, he could send no more troops to Spain. Every man was satisfied, that regular armies alone could stand against

the French forces in that country. The chance was once more afforded us of driving them out, and then leaving the defence of the territory to Spanish hands—or, of assisting the common cause where our enemy was deciding its fate, and contributing, by a great effort, to the emancipation of Spain, as well as the rest of Europe, in Germany. It may be difficult to determine which of these plans was the wisest. Some persons might think that no effort of ours could have turned the scale in favour of Austria, during the present awful campaign; and that our forces should have been concentrated in Spain;—others may be of opinion, that all the force we could muster in the south of Europe (upwards of 40,000 men), sent up the Adriatic as soon as the war broke out in Bavaria, might have got into the rear of the French army immediately after the memorable battle of Aspern;—while nearly 50,000 more might have been employed in the Baltic, either to prevent the junction of the Russians, or to land in the north of Germany, and encourage Prussia and the insurgents. A third view of the subject may possibly have its supporters,—that we could neither decide the contest in Austria, nor drive the French out of Spain; and they who hold this opinion, must object to any armament whatever,—must counsel us to abandon Spain, and to keep our troops at home.

These three lines of conduct are intelligible and consistent. But, how did the English government act,—wise by the experience of the last war, and, above all, of the first Spanish campaign? It recollected those fatal transactions,—not to avoid them, but to copy them with absolute servility. It followed *none* of the plans just described, but took a little bit of each. It despaired of Austria, but threatened a trifling diversion in her favour after she was subdued; and has probably, before this time, turned that into a ship-plunder expedition. It did not quite despair of Spain; but sent an army to Portugal, too large for any opposition in that country—infinitely too small for the liberation of the Peninsula. It adopted the only plan which could be entirely wrong, and was sure wholly to fail.

We confess that, although the second of the schemes which we have mentioned appears the most alluring, con-

sidering the position in which our armies actually were, and the limited time allowed for executing it, the first seems to us the most judicious. We had 30,000 men in quiet possession of Portugal, with the south of Spain occupied by the only good army of the natives, and Cadiz or Gibraltar to retire upon. From Sicily we might have sent above 10,000 more excellent troops; and from England near 50,000,—more completely appointed, perhaps, than any armament in the world. Whatever might be the final issue of the war in Austria, this formidable army would, in all probability, have had time, during the struggle of that gallant and ill-fated monarchy, to overpower all resistance in Spain, and drive the French beyond the Pyrenees. But if even this could not have been effected,—or if the Pyrenees are indefensible, and the utmost that our whole force could accomplish was a temporary expulsion of the enemy; surely they are frantic who have sent one wing of an army to attempt the same enterprise—who have wasted 30,000 men upon a service above the powers of thrice the number. Nothing in calculation can be more evident, than that we have either done too little or too much during the precious breathing-time which our Spanish allies have so unexpectedly had; and if the German campaign is now at an end, the total ruin of the great cause, which has made every free heart throughout the world beat high, during a long year of anxious expectation, can only be retarded by a miracle.

We have now surveyed the present hopeless state of affairs, and traced the steps which successively led to it. There remains the less painful task of inquiring, by what efforts those steps may be retraced, in so far as it is yet possible to better the condition of our allies, by any exertions of ours; or to provide for the safety of the only empire which still continues free and entire. The conduct of this country, indeed, should now be pointed solely to the two great objects of obtaining such an influence in the minds of men as may hereafter be turned to good account,—and of providing for its own safety. The means best adapted for the attainment of both these ends, are happily the same.

And, first of all, we must lay our account with the establishment, or rather the confirmation of the paramount influence of France, in every part of the Continent. For the present, at least, this is unavoidable. We have in a great measure brought it upon our allies and ourselves;—and it must be borne with patience. Many changes in the distribution of territory must be expected. Kingdoms will be broken down into dukedoms—and electorates, or principalities, consolidated into kingdoms. Monarchs will be threatened, perhaps deposed; and upstarts raised to their thrones at the will of the conqueror. A nominal war will be proclaimed against England in every part of Europe; and attempts to abridge her commerce with the Continent, though often failing, will be constantly repeated, until its total amount is sensibly diminished. If we are wise, however, there are limits beyond which this branch of the French power can hardly reach. In the meantime, as the repeated attempts to assail us in this direction are quite inevitable, and ought not to discompose us; so, neither should their partial success create any undue alarm. We must lay our account with finding the rest of Europe no longer free; and accommodate our conduct to the novelty of our circumstances. All direct intercourse with our allies being of course at an end, it is needless to observe, that we should cautiously abstain from any new attempts at stirring them up against France. Such attempts, if successful, could only lead to a wanton waste of blood and treasure—render the sway of the enemy more intolerable, and our own character more odious. We must be on our guard against listening to fables of insurrections. An appearance of impatience under the yoke may from time to time show itself in different parts of the Continent; but, far from such single and divided efforts tending to its emancipation, they must arm the tyrant with new powers, and only ruin their instigators. With respect to Spain, surely the common feelings of humanity, as well as the soundest views of policy, should incline us to wish, that when the struggle of that gallant people is over, peace may as speedily as possible be restored to them. Their spirit has already been sufficiently exerted, to secure them a

reign of mitigated severity. For the present, this is all they can expect. It would be bloodthirsty and cowardly in us to foment petty insurrections, after the only contest is at an end from which any good can spring, in the present unfortunate state of things. Nor will it be of any avail to cry out against this doctrine as pusillanimous, and to abuse us as recommending a base submission to France. France has conquered Europe. This is the melancholy truth. Shut our eyes to it as we may, there can be no doubt about the matter. We shall afterwards consider how far a better prospect opens in the back ground; but, for the present, peace and submission must be the lot of the vanquished.

But it is not only consistent, both with right principles and with our interest, to avoid stirring up the conquered states against France, and even, if we have an opportunity, to discourage any premature resistance on their part:—we ought also, in the conduct of our own warfare against that country, constantly to keep in mind, that our whole quarrel is with her; and that with her vassals we have no ground of difference, unless their interests and inclinations are identified with hers—or unless no other means remain of affecting her strength materially, and providing substantially for our own security. It is not enough, that, at her instigation, the Tagus should be shut against us; or even that the court of Lisbon should break off all friendly intercourse with us. A wise policy would not, on this account, prescribe a blockade, and still less a bombardment, which can only tend to distress the inoffensive people—the unwilling instruments of our enemy's malice. Even if a few ships might be got at the expense of such measures, it is, in all probability, better policy to preserve our character for generosity, and take the ample chance which remains of capturing them when they shall venture out to sea. Of course, no rule of this kind can be laid down absolutely. A fleet might be so large, and arsenals might be capable of fitting out so formidable an armament against us, that when they had fallen under the enemy's control, it might be necessary to attempt their seizure, though at the risk of inflicting great calamities upon the place where they are

situated. But if England has recourse to such extremities only when the magnitude of the object justifies them, her plea of necessity will be generally recognised; and her character will not suffer in the estimation of the world. Judging by these principles, the alleged object of the expedition[1] which has been so long preparing does not seem liable to reprehension, provided that all hopes of assisting our allies are gone, and that an attack upon Holland forms no part of the plan. If we can now do nothing better, the destruction of the fleet in the Scheldt may be worth our while; because the expense of the enterprise may not be much greater than the cost of blockading the mouth of that river. But the preparation of this armament, the greatest ever sent from our ports, for an object so exclusively British, and confined within so narrow a sphere, at a moment when it might have decided the fate of Austria or of Spain, forms one of the gravest charges against the management of our military affairs. For the rest, it scarcely deserves to be remarked, that, *cæteris paribus*, enterprises of this kind should be directed against the arsenals of France, in preference to those even of her most obedient and willing vassals;—to Brest,[2] for example, rather than to Cronstadt; but much rather to Cronstadt than to Ferrol or Cadiz, supposing them in the enemy's hands. In truth, Russia has been unaccountably spared in our plans of maritime warfare. We may be assured, that she is completely with France in the present contest. The merchants of St. Petersburgh and Riga, and many of the landed proprietors, are certainly favourable to an English connexion; but those classes go for nothing in a country like Russia; and, though they counted for something, any attack upon the arsenals, while they are discontented with the measures of their government, could not greatly affect their feelings towards us. In all probability, such a step was the only one by which any prospect could be afforded of detaching Russia from France during the present war in Austria. All such

[1] Walcheren.

[2] Antwerp comes properly under the same description; but it cannot be attacked without commencing operations against Zealand, which is certainly a drawback.

schemes, however, when planned without any view of making a diversion in favour of a general attack, are of small importance; and, now that war on the Continent is over, nothing could be more unwise than to extend them beyond those arsenals, from which an immediate danger to this country may be apprehended. It is by conciliatory, or at least inoffensive conduct, even towards the confederates of France, that we can now best defeat her purposes; and to oppose her, not them, should be the great end and aim of all our plans.

This leads us to consider the only serious risk to which the subjugation of the Continent has exposed us—the war which it enables France to make upon our trade. It may be expected that she will speedily cause orders to be issued for the exclusion of the British flag from all the ports of Europe. But these will be executed very imperfectly in some countries; in others, they will be little more than a form and a name; in none will they be rigorously enforced —except where French troops are stationed in great numbers—or where, by some violence of our own, we may render the inhabitants as hostile as the French themselves. The temptations to evade orders of this description are so strong, that connivance may, in general, be expected on the part of the government; and we are always sure to find the people in favour of the evasion. Even in Holland, the whole French power has for years been maintaining an unequal conflict with the interests of merchants and consumers; in whose favour the inclinations of the civil functionaries almost always, and of the French soldiers themselves not unfrequently, are found. To execute similar mandates in the Adriatic or the Baltic, where comparatively few French agents of either description are scattered, amounts to an impossibility. The armies of France could not exclude our ships effectually from the ports of Spain alone, were they all distributed along the coasts of the Peninsula. But a very considerable diminution of our trade must be occasioned by these attempts; and that which can no longer be carried on in British bottoms, will be transferred to neutrals.

But, even if we were to suppose that our exclusion from

the Continent was complete, and that the whole trade between this country and the rest of Europe passed through the hands of neutrals, it does not appear to us that any very ruinous consequences would follow. Our shipping, instead of sailing the whole way from England to the foreign markets, would be employed in carrying goods to and from some convenient entrepôts; while the other part of the voyage would be performed by neutrals,—or, if we as well as they chose to connive at it, by the shipping of the continental ports themselves. We should retain the whole of our colonial and coasting trade—and should carry to and from our neutral customers a great deal more than we now do—more, *to wit*, in proportion to the tonnage which they would be employing in the trade between the entrepôts and the Continent. Thus, instead of carrying goods in 1000 tons of British shipping direct to Trieste, we should employ 500 tons in carrying the same goods at two trips to Malta or Gibraltar; from whence 500 tons of American shipping would continue the voyage to the Adriatic—while the other 500 tons of British shipping would naturally occupy the place of the same American tonnage displaced from the trade between England and America. In order to facilitate such a change, the possession of Minorca might probably be found useful—as well as of Milo, or some other island in the Levant;—and Heligoland will prove advantageous, in the same point of view, for the trade of the North. The possession of Sicily[1] for such purposes, when we have Malta, seems altogether unnecessary;—and our own coasts are so conveniently situated for France and Holland, that very little temptation is presented by any of the Dutch islands.

As long, then, as a neutral carrier remains, we are secure from any serious loss of trade or navigation, even if the ex-

[1] The expense of our military establishment there, is a serious evil; and that force being locked up on so useless a service has, during the late critical times, been still more unfortunate. We have done more than enough for the acquittance of our debt to the Sicilian court, which must be left to itself, if it persist in opposing the only measures which can either enable the island to defend itself in the mean time, or render it ultimately secure from the attacks of the enemy.

clusion of our flag from the Continent were far more effectually accomplished than in all likelihood it ever can be. The enemy will therefore proceed a step further, and cause his vassal states to adopt the famous Berlin decree, or at least so much of it as prevents vessels which have touched at British ports from entering the ports subject to his influence. But it must be our own fault if he ever succeed in executing this prohibition, even in his own states; and still more difficult of execution will it prove in places where there is no French agent to watch over it. No man can feel very apprehensive that an American from Malta to Trieste would run any great risk of condemnation as having touched at a British port. All the vigilance of our cruizers, eager after prize, and restrained by no one common interest with the neutral, is every day set at nought by the arts which he practises to conceal the matter now in question—the port from which he last sailed. The custom-house officers at Trieste are strangely constituted, if their acuteness and zeal increases with the difficulty of the detection, and their own interest to avoid the scent.

There is one way, indeed, of preventing a neutral from ever escaping seizure—and a way, too, which is practicable to England alone. She may renew the famous Orders in Council—and thus make it plain to every revenue officer on the Continent, that every neutral which enters is lawful prize; but, unless some such measure is adopted, we may set all the decrees of our enemy, and all his tributary states, at defiance. The Orders in Council have most wisely been repealed,—if indeed a relinquishment of the most foolish measure ever conceived in any country deserves the name of wisdom. In their place has been substituted a plan more consistent and intelligible, and much more limited in its operation; but, in principle, quite as unwise —and, so far as it goes, equally hurtful. Those parts of the enemy's territory which adopted the Berlin decree, have been virtually blockaded. It is manifest, that if the Berlin decree is adopted by the whole Continent, and this blockade extended with it, in proportion to its rigorous enforcement will be the destruction of our commerce. In whole, or in a considerable part, we must depend upon

neutrals for continuing our intercourse with the Continent. The blockade cuts us off from this only means of carrying it on; unless, indeed, we expect that our own vessels shall be admitted the more freely, the more we exclude those of neutral nations. The wretched folly of this system is, that it succeeds against the neutral, and against ourselves, as completely as heart can wish; but, for any good that might be expected from it, we must depend upon the enemy. We can prevent, what our enemy never could do of himself, a single bale of British goods from finding its way into the Continent on board an American vessel; but, when we come to the main point of getting it on board of our own vessels, we find that the enemy will not consent. As for the wild fancy of starving Buonaparte out by this mode of warfare—of appealing from the strength of his government and the force of his armies, to the desire of sugar and coffee among his subjects—nay, of appealing from his own hatred of England to his tenderness for his people—what shall we say, but that it is worthy of those who expected to overpower his feelings by the dearth of medicines, while they were accusing him of butchering his prisoners in cold blood, and getting rid of his sick soldiers by poison?

It follows demonstratively from what has just now been stated, that the neutrality of the New World is our best safeguard from the subjugation of the Old. While America covers the ocean with her ships, England may defy the conqueror of Europe;—she will trade, in spite of him, with his vassal kingdoms—nay, with the ports subject to his own immediate dominion. He can only destroy her European trade, by putting an end to the neutrality of America, —and by causing all Europe to do the same. It is the interest of England, first of all certainly, to remain at peace with America; but next, that America should remain at peace with the rest of the world. The interest of America is one and the same;—and, if this common object is pursued, the only free states that now remain, may defy the common enemy of civil liberty and national independence. How ridiculous then is it to make a rupture between America and France, the chief object of our endeavours!

—Except a rupture between America and England, it is the greatest evil that could befal us; and yet we are perpetually running after the one of those ills, at the risk of encountering the other;—threatening to inflict upon ourselves the calamity of a war with America, if she will not do us the injury of going to war with France;—threatening to cut off our whole trade if she will not instantly destroy one half of it. The season of conciliation with her is happily not gone past; and it is to be hoped that the popular feelings on both sides, are considerably more calm than they were a few months ago. No concessions are required from either party; for America is willing to wave the immediate discussion of former differences; and all that England hesitates about is, to allow America to retain the undignified attitude of an *unarmed* remonstrant against the idle decrees of France. That she ever should acquiesce in those decrees, is utterly inconceivable. No man has dreamt of it;—no man has ventured to assert that America would suspend her intercourse with England, merely because France asked her to do so, and threatened utter impossibilities if she did not comply. The whole question is, whether we shall quarrel with America, because she is less resentful of empty insult—less jealous about airy trifles than we are. Let us rather rejoice that such a nation is to be found—ready to bear those rubs which we are too proud to put up with,—and to save our honour, trade, pride and all together, at the expense of its own dignity. The friendship of such a nation, and its neutrality with respect to the rest of the world, is now become invaluable to us. We should purchase it cheaply by great sacrifices; but, from an happy concurrence of interests, we have it absolutely for nothing; and the sacrifice, if any be required, is tendered by America to France, not to America by England.

It is impossible to leave this branch of the subject, without adverting to the strange delusions under which the country has so long laboured, with respect to what are termed points of national honour; and these are the more dangerous, because they have their foundation in the best feelings which a people can cherish,—or rather, they are an imposition practised upon those feelings. The practice

is, amongst vulgar politicians, to assert on behalf of the country, a variety of very doubtful, or even unfounded pretensions,—to maintain them as undeniable rights,—and to contend that the degradation of the state, the ruin of its honour, and a speedy termination of its independence, is the immediate consequence of receding from any one of those claims. Now, to us it is by no means so clear, that the abandonment of the clearest right which a nation can possess, necessarily involves either its dishonour or its ruin; unless there be something important in the thing given up —or something humiliating and base in the thing submitted to—or, finally, something disgraceful in the mode of yielding the point. To allow the search of national ships, would be degrading, because it cannot be practised without constant humiliation to the feelings of part of your troops. Rather than submit to this, a people should be prepared to perish with their swords in their hands. And accordingly England, with perfect wisdom, as well as strict regard to justice, did not even ask America to yield this point. On the other hand, England claims the right of searching private vessels—and, as it appears to us, justly. Nor could she, consistently with honour, have abandoned it, when the Northern Powers had once publicly threatened to make her give it up by force. But the value of that right was not above all estimation; and no degradation could have ensued from fairly agreeing to wave it previous to any menaces, and for a just equivalent. In favour of nations, whose friendship we wish to cultivate,—more especially of those whose power is altogether inferior to our own,—whose aggrandisement we have no reason to dread,—and to whom no one can suspect us of yielding through compulsion,—it may often be wise, and never can be dishonourable, to make temporary concessions of rights which are indisputably ours, provided the compromise is not discreditable in itself. Much more easily may cases of this sort be figured in our transactions with a people naturally united to us by so many indissoluble ties as those that knit together the English of the Old and the New World. They are our natural allies; and, as it is quite impossible to have too much jealousy of France, so, towards America we can scarcely have too little. When such

reasoners as Mr. Leckie, gravely talk of our being insulted by the Porte, we plainly perceive the errors of a man who has lived in the immediate neighbourhood of the Turks, until he has forgotten their insignificance. But when France is stretching her iron coasts on all sides of us,—when her fleets and her camps are within sight—and we alone, of all Europe, have not been conquered by her arms;—it is almost as ridiculous to be jealous of America as of Turkey—of a nation three thousand miles off—scarcely kept together by the weakest government in the world,—with no army, and half-a-dozen frigates—and knowing no other means of intercourse with other countries than by peaceful commerce.

While we reserve all our jealousy for France, then, let us at last learn, that kindness towards our allies is sound and honourable policy. It has never been sufficiently our aim to attach them by liberality to our cause. We forget that their strength is our own—and fall far short in this respect of France herself. Had she been in our place, Russia might have had Malta for the asking, and a West India island or two to boot. America would never have been left to quarrel about trifling speculative points; and, instead of a silly contest about the little company of Ostend, and its yearly shipment, Austria would have been complimented, had she been so disposed, with some millions of subjects in Hindostan. We have never learnt the lesson of making our friendship worth having; and the consequence is, that our enmity has not been very dreadful.

To some of our readers it may perhaps appear that we have dwelt too long upon the commercial interests of the country, in a general discussion of its foreign affairs. But the question between France and England has, since the subjugation of the Continent, become entirely commercial. The war of the enemy against our trade, is now the only contest that remains. While our naval superiority lasts, he can never acquire seamen, unless, indeed, we force all neutrals out of the market, and compel him to carry for himself—which, though in a limited degree, he will then do. It has repeatedly been shown by the adversaries of the Americans, that they drive even the coasting trade of

France. This fact is quite irreconcileable with the notion of her having any nursery for seamen; and those active mariners will doubtless engross the greater part of the trade between the other countries now subjected to France. The stations formerly mentioned in the Mediterranean and the North, will be sufficient to watch any naval armaments that may be attempted in those quarters; and the danger of invasion, though unquestionably increased in a very great degree, is by no means such as should make us despond, while we have still the means of supporting our fleets, and carrying on with unbroken spirit the business of the government.

The prosperity of our trade, however, is much more essential to this than it ever was before. It cannot be denied, that the public burdens press upon the people of this country with a weight, only not intolerable. There are even manifest symptoms, that an increase of taxes could scarcely be effected, whatever might be the call for new contributions. The revenue is raised, partly by direct taxation, and partly by duties on consumption. The property-tax, which forms the bulk of the direct imposts, has been, of late, collected with much more rigour than at first, —the persons entrusted with the management of it having, of course, become more skilful, and acquired a more intimate knowledge of people's affairs. The effect of this has been exactly the same as if the rate of that tax had been augmented. But the difficulty of procuring payment has also increased in an alarming degree. The assessment of 1805 was not quite six millions and a quarter; that of 1806 amounted to above eleven millions and a quarter— although there had only been imposed an addition of three and a half per cent. But the arrears have increased at a much higher rate. Last April, there remained due, of the assessment 1805, only 92,000*l.*; but of the assessment 1806, above 900,000*l.*; and of the assessment 1807, no less than 2,357,000*l.*[1] The difficulty of procuring payment has thus rapidly increased; and this can only be ex-

[1] Parliamentary Returns, 8th June 1809.—The arrears of last year's assessment were above eight millions and a quarter; but these cannot be taken into the computation.

plained by the augmentation of prices in consequence of the war, and the increase of taxes upon articles of consumption. The produce of this other class of taxes has accordingly suffered a great diminution. The net produce of the permanent taxes (which, with the trifling exception of the legacy-duty, are all laid on consumption) last year, fell short of their net produce the year before by about 300,000*l.*, although new taxes, to the amount of two millions and a quarter, had been collected. The deficit upon the former taxes was therefore above two millions and a half;[1] and a similar defalcation took place in almost all the war taxes, which fall on consumable articles.

It appears, then, that when the property-tax was strictly levied, the difficulty of paying it increased;—that an imposition of new taxes upon consumption occasioned a diminution in the produce of the old;—and that the increased payment of direct taxes was compensated by a defalcation in the indirect taxes. The facts which we have stated warrant the inference, not merely that the one species of taxation operated at the expense of the other, but that, independent of all duties, the difficulty of raising the same amount of taxes had increased;—that, in short, the circumstances of our situation—the wasteful consumption of war—the rise in the price of labour from the demands of the army—and the checks upon our commerce, had so far straightened the means of the people, and raised the price of commodities, as to disable them from contributing the accustomed proportion to the exigences of the state. But we are willing to hope that the conclusion needs not be pushed so far; and we shall, for the present, confine ourselves to the position, unquestionably supported, not only by the foregoing statement, but by facts within

[1] The taxes on which the greatest proportional deficit is perceiveable are, as might be expected, those on articles of luxury. The duties on horses, carriages and servants, fell off from 2,150,000*l.* to 1,523,000*l.*—Customs and Excise from 19,178,000*l.* to 17,960,000*l.* These deficits were in part covered by the new and most impolitic stamp-duty, and the increase of the assessed taxes known by the name of, "*a new arrangement of them*,"—and in part by an increased receipt upon the 10 *per cent.* of 1806 laid on the assessed taxes, and the duty of the same year on British spirits.

every man's knowledge—that we have now arrived at the point where the attempt to raise one tax will only lower the produce of another—that a man cannot pay the full amount of his property-tax, and at the same time consume as many of the articles which pay duties to government, if these duties are raised; and, *vice versa*, that he cannot consume as much of those articles at the former duties, if his property shall be taxed more heavily.

If the nation has at last reached this point—if the revenue of the people is now made to pay as much towards the revenue of the state as any human means can extort from it—if the natural period of taxation is at length arrived—by the public income outstripping that of individuals—(and, surely, when we reflect, that beside twenty-two millions borrowed, above seventy millions sterling are at present raised within the year by taxes, we cannot marvel at this crisis being come[1]);—how clearly must every thinking man perceive, that the whole system of our policy depends, for its existence, upon the continuance of our commerce,—that inextricable confusion will arise from any considerable diminution of the income of the country,—and that the only means of augmenting the public revenue, must be sought in the extension of the revenue of the people, by opening new channels of employment for their capital at home and abroad, while we carefully preserve those which are already accessible? At the same time, every practicable method should be resorted to, of diminishing our expenditure, by a rigorous and discerning reform of abuses. We are persuaded, that (we will not say a great, but) a very considerable income may be derived from this source. Let any man reflect on the remark which he must so frequently have made, while passing through the halls, the chambers, the offices and the gardens, of an English grandee's palace, and, still more, while considering the manner in which his estates are managed—"The loss and

[1] The revenue raised by Great Britain, in 1809, is estimated at 65,885,342*l.*, including the surplus of 1808, and exclusive of money raised by loan and Exchequer bills, to the amount of 18,660,000*l.* The net revenue of Ireland, in 1808, exclusive of about 4,000,000*l.* loans, was 4,571,250*l.*; so that the revenue of the empire may be reckoned at 70,456,592*l.*

the waste of thousands by the year," is the thought which ever and anon presents itself. Who can doubt, then, that much is wasted in an establishment which costs above ninety millions a year,—which is spread over many thousand square miles,—entrusted to multitudes who have no interest in being economical, and watched over hastily, incidentally, and according to rules devised when it was in the bud, by a few persons who volunteer their services, change every day, and must see all abuses at a vast distance, if they see them at all? In the present state of our affairs, we may be well assured, that the danger which chiefly besets us is not that of parsimony. From this source we can descry nothing to appal us, except, perhaps, the risk of bringing the cause of reform into a temporary discredit, by too rash and indiscriminate a pursuit of it. But, from a continuance of our present scale of expenditure, coupled with what is infinitely more ruinous—a contempt for the only means of meeting it;—from a disinclination to retrench whatever is useless in our outgoings, and, still more, from an aversion to those conciliatory measures, which, with perfect safety to our honour, may enable us to keep up, and even to augment, our national income;—from a conduct so infatuated as this, we foresee, at no great distance, the approach of confusion and dismay in every branch of our affairs,—and the final conquest of an empire which, we sincerely and proudly believe, nothing else can ever shake.[1]

It has often been our lot to speak with despondency, amidst the extravagant hopes of our countrymen; and the task, which a sense of duty alone could force upon us, has been more painful than can easily be imagined. It is with no small satisfaction, therefore, that we now think our despair of the fortunes of this country, and of the ultimate fate of the Continent, is much less deep than that which is spreading rapidly over the community. A better spirit

[1] A blind desire of peace, arising from the pressure of taxes, would scarcely prove less pernicious than the love of war, in which those taxes have had their origin. As soon as the contest in Spain is over, we shall feel it our duty once more to consider this most important subject.

has of late begun to manifest itself among the people of England. The language of conciliation towards neutrals has been listened to with more patience. The popular antipathies have been pointed more exclusively against France. A marked contempt of those silly half-measures, which the Government has generally adopted in the conduct of the war, begins to be displayed; the folly of what are misnamed British objects, is daily more and more recognised; and a wish seems about to prevail, that we should either direct the resources of the empire to some worthy object, or reserve them for our own defence. These are excellent symptoms; and we devoutly pray that they may daily improve. Nor can we see, without satisfaction, the prevalence of an inquiring spirit as to domestic abuses,—the stern aspect which the people, awaked from its apathy, has turned upon the malversations of the higher orders;—and the signal failure of all the miserable attempts to cry down reform, by the raising the yell of Jacobinism. From the progress of these experiments, we augur most favourably for the stability of the empire; because we foresee an improvement in the administration of its affairs at home and abroad. It is plain, too, that in spite of all our attempts to save them, the abuses of other governments have destroyed them; and, with the governments, the abuses themselves have for the most part been crushed. The states which France has overrun, cannot continue in their former weakness. To the decrepitude that bent them down before her, must succeed a period of vigour, which, after making them useful as her coadjutors, will hereafter render them turbulent and formidable. The evils of the changes which she has made in their government and in the distribution of their territory—the incalculable mischiefs of the military spirit which she is diffusing will, at a future season, be alleviated by the means which they will afford of resisting her oppressions. Should any disaster befal her present ruler,—or when he yields to the course of nature,—it requires no gift of prophecy to foresee, that the strong government and improved system of administration which he has established in his tributary kingdoms, will raise an insurmountable barrier round France, on

whatever heads his many crowns may fall. Then will England be enabled to resume her place as the arbiter of Europe—to count among her natural allies all those nations whom France shall for a season have been holding in thraldom—and to establish her connexions with a set of able and vigorous dynasties, instead of so many worn-out governments—masses of feebleness and abuse,—whose friendship has hitherto been known to her, only by its vexations and its costs.

When the tempest has overturned the venerable but inwardly decayed trees of an ancient forest, two results may be anticipated from the visitation. The space where they stood may be covered for ages with a loathsome and unprofitable morass—or a new wood may arise from the fertilised soil, more gracefully disposed, and more firmly rooted—less gloomy and unhealthful, and less entangled with the base undergrowth of creepers and brambles. We look confidently for the last of these events—and trust that, instead of trying any more to lift those dead and fallen trunks, or to prop those that are already tottering in the blast, we should reserve our exertions to prepare the soil for the new shoots by which they must soon be replaced, and train the rising grove to flourish in the sun, and bid defiance to the storm.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

(JANUARY, 1839.)

Some Remarks on the Foreign Relations of England at the present Crisis. By MONTAGUE GORE, Esq. 8vo. London: 1838.

IT is now some time since we have touched at all upon the vast subject of Foreign Affairs; and many years since we entered at length into the consideration of the important questions connected with it. We have thus abstained, not certainly from any disposition to underrate the importance of these matters, for they are among the most grave and the most interesting that can occupy the thoughts of statesmen; and they are inseparably connected with the peace and the improvement, as well as with the liberties of the world. But after the lengthened and dreadful contest in which all Europe had been engaged, and after the almost exclusive interest possessed by such speculations during the progress and at the close of that warfare, the too long neglected things of peace naturally called for an extraordinary share of attention, both from statesmen and from publicists; so that questions of domestic policy unavoidably came to engross for many years the same undivided regard which the external relations of the country had enjoyed during the continuance of hostilities; and while those mighty revolutions were in progress which had convulsed society and altered the whole face of affairs in both hemispheres. It has thus happened that many important questions, deeply affecting the welfare of this and other nations, have passed before our eyes with less attention than they merited; and that it becomes necessary to undertake at once a review of the whole subject. This has

its advantages as well as its inconveniences; for we are enabled to see the actual workings of the new arrangements of dominion made at the peace, in 1814 and 1815; and we can determine with more accuracy, by having the light of experience to guide us, how far many departures from sound principle, made upon the specious but hollow and dangerous pretext of securing order and peace, have been in the event subservient to this end.

The fault, no doubt, of the people of this country has always been that they care little for such matters. When any continental changes lead immediately to a war with ourselves, or when a great popular movement is observed among our near neighbours, in the one case a regard for our own immediate interest, in the other a sympathy with conduct which may be imitated at home, creates a general anxiety among us; and for the moment we are disposed to look abroad upon the affairs of surrounding nations. But changes may take place, the tendency of which is most fatal to our national interests; events may happen which in their consequences are decisive on the question of peace; things may be done which, if suffered, will seriously injure our prosperity, endanger our independence, or involve us in war, although the immediate effects of such transactions may not appear to be of any near or deep concernment to ourselves; and it is such transactions, accordingly, that the people are little apt to regard with any more concern than if they took place in another planet. One inevitable result of this inattention is that the foreign affairs of the country are left entirely in the hands of the Government; that Parliament, imitating and sharing the apathy of the nation, suffers all manner of errors to be committed without any kind of interposition; and that when a course of impolicy, encouraged by being tacitly permitted without warning or even remark, has brought our commercial relations with foreign states into inextricable confusion, or carried us to the very brink of a war, the country awakens from its trance, but finds that it has been aroused too late.

It becomes very important, then, if possible, to impress other and sounder views upon the minds of the considerate and reflecting portion of our countrymen—to show them

how unwise, how extremely shortsighted such indifference to their most important interests is—and to produce that wholesome attention to the foreign concerns of the country, —that constant watchfulness over the conduct of its rulers in this essential department,—from whence so many substantial benefits have flowed to the administration of public affairs in all the other branches of the national polity. The subject, then, of the present discussion is the existing state of our Foreign Relations; and the course which it becomes England to pursue in the actual position of the European powers.

There cannot be a greater delusion than those labour under who entertain a jealousy of this country meddling with the affairs of the Continent. Many very worthy and enlightened men,—men whose views are sound upon most other subjects,—are persuaded that such connexions lead to war. They probably might, if formed on bad principles; and they certainly would, if conducted in a meddling or encroaching spirit. But even then it would be difficult to conceive a state of things, involving us in hostilities, which would not also have existed and brought on the last of national calamities, just as much as if we had kept aloof from all concern in European affairs. War becomes inevitable to this country when the Continent is involved in hostile operations; and one state, by threatening the independence of all the rest, menaces us with the fate to which all the others will have yielded when universal empire shall be established. Our previous interposition might very possibly have rallied and combined other states in a timely opposition to the encroachments of their too powerful neighbour; or in imposing upon that neighbour the restraint of wholesome awe; but nothing which we could either do or leave undone would have the effect of exciting his ambition or of calming it, of disarming him or of making him too powerful in his own resources—these are things wholly beyond our influence in any way. Again—a quarrel may at any time break out, and accidentally lead to war. England can never properly—that is, without the grossest blunders or the most infatuated ambition—be the principal in any such rupture; but she may often, by her timely interfer-

ence, have the power of preventing it, or of making up the difference. Her position gives her, and gives her alone, this salutary influence; for she has no direct and immediate interest in these matters,—no end of her own to serve,—and consequently will always be regarded with less jealousy and suspicion than any of the continental states themselves; and will thus have almost always the opportunity of assuming the mediatorial office. But it is her interest that peace should prevail; and any quarrel, how trifling soever at first,—any hostilities, how limited the sphere of their operation,—are sure to spread, and must endanger the general peace. Furthermore—by allying herself with some of the more powerful states, whose interests are like her own, or, without any such similarity, whose wish is for peace, she may compel the others to preserve the tranquillity which is the highest interest of all; and which can only be broken by the criminal ambition of individuals, or by some momentary and passing delirium coming over a nation. Lastly—the diversity of institutions in different countries, the similarity which prevails among some in religion, and in the frame of their state policy, and the opposition in which these stand to others, draws a natural line, and separates the different powers into different classes, in one or other of which England may be found. This will obviously make her views approach to those of the powers whom she resembles; and may give her an influence in preserving the general tranquillity, without exposing her to the least risk of hazarding her own insular independence, or being drawn into any mere continental quarrels.

The present state of Europe differs from any recorded in history. It is not that there has of late years been a great convulsion in the political system, and a new distribution of power among those potentates who bear sway; for that has happened in former times; and the extraordinary events which attended the latter years of Napoleon's reign restored things to a much nearer conformity with their position before the French Revolution than could ever have been supposed possible, after the prodigious changes effected by the conquests of the Republic and the

Empire. But the diffusion of free principles, which the Revolution and the War had occasioned, has placed the whole frame of society everywhere upon a new footing; and these principles have begun to exert an active influence upon the conduct of governments,—an influence not unconnected with the relation in which the different powers stand to each other.

The American Revolution, first in the history of our species, brought into contact and mutual action the principles of liberty and the structure of government. Nothing, or next to nothing of the kind had been experienced in the English Revolution of 1688; for although the religious feelings of the people then operated upon their conduct, and, combined with a resolution to resist arbitrary power in civil matters also, obtained, through the help of the Prince of Orange and a small body of regular foreign troops, a victory over the tyrannical and bigotted dynasty of the Stuarts, still nothing was claimed beyond the former constitution, and some few securities for its protection; the whole change was effected upon the most moderate, and indeed narrowest principles; precedent was constantly regarded, and even form cautiously adhered to: the problem which all the statesmen of the day set themselves to solve was how the existing evil might be got rid of with smallest possible alteration, either in the frame of the government or even in the persons who were to exercise its powers; the wishes of the country were only consulted through the appointed organs of corporations and other public bodies, heads of great families and representatives of the landed aristocracy, the magistrates in towns, and the borough proprietors; and as for the interference of the popular voice, there was in those days little necessity to exclude it, and as little reason for listening to it, because the people had not yet learnt to take any direct part in the management of their own affairs.

The Grand Rebellion, indeed, came a good deal nearer to a collision between public opinion and the Government of the country; for a strong religious feeling, widely spread and deeply rooted, was the mainspring of all the movements in the middle of the seventeenth century. Never-

theless, the Parliamentary contests which marked the reign of James I., and continued during the earlier years of his son's government, were carried on by learned lawyers, and with all the pedantry of the age. In these controversies, though important principles were involved, the people bore no share at all; and they led to the events which brought about a temporary change of dynasty, placing a military chief on the throne. For some years before this event, and during the whole of the brilliant administration of Cromwell, the power was entirely in the army's hands; and though the soldiery were actuated by the spiritual propensities of the age, and fought against Agag, under the conduct of Gideon, and in the belief that the sword of the Lord, too, was joined with his; the influence of popular opinion only bore upon the Government through the military oligarchy, and because the soldiers felt the same enthusiasm which inspired the nation at large.

The American Revolution was conducted in a very different way, as it had its origin in different principles, and was pointed towards a different end. Its purpose and objects, however, were materially changed by the course of events during its progress. For as men who have, by ill-treatment, been driven to resistance, are generally, and very naturally, ready to take the easiest and speediest road to a redress of their grievances, on the restoration of tranquillity, and the termination of general danger and suffering; the Americans, who most certainly never contemplated separation and a republic at the beginning of the contest, would willingly have remained under the monarchical government, and in its vice-regal or provincial administration, had not the infatuated obstinacy of George III., and the tame acquiescence of his Ministers and Parliament, closed the door to reconciliation,—made submission hardly possible, and by degrees produced the resolution to form a popular constitution upon the ruins of the colonial empire. We must be aware, however, that all the materials for this ultimate explosion had long been collected and prepared, although those under whose control they were, so slowly and so reluctantly were induced to form a train, and then to fire it. A spirit of inquiry and indepen-

dence in religious matters had caused the original emigration which founded the Northern colonies. The same free spirit had advanced and extended itself to all other matters in State as well as in Church, with the advancing improvement of the age. More newspapers were printed, and at a far lower price, in America than in any part of Europe. Political matters were more canvassed, and by a larger proportion of the community, because the society was smaller; and because, in a country where land was exceedingly cheap, and labour very dear, there were neither paupers nor rabble, and every man was an important member of the state. Hence there was in America, especially the New England States where the Revolution began, a vast mass of free and enlightened opinions, professed by men who had early been accustomed to inquire, and to think for themselves,—to form their own judgments, and be guided by their own principles. No great abuses could long keep their place in such a community; no great time could elapse before popular feelings had free scope; no oppression could be patiently borne during any considerable period. Government more nearly resembling that of a commonwealth was the appointed lot of such a country, and the relation of provincial subjection was only its temporary condition, or transition state. Something more popular than a limited monarchy was substantially in the hearts of the people; though they might never have communed one with another saying, "Go to—this thing we will do." The days of the mother country's power, as well as of individual sovereignty, were numbered; and although the precise moment when Independence and a Republic should be proclaimed might depend upon accident, and be accelerated or retarded by the conduct of European rulers, the ultimate possession of both these treasures was decreed by the circumstances, the habits, the taste, and the character of the American nation. Thus the world saw, for the first time, a great people proclaiming their principles, acting upon them, choosing a Government for themselves, and accomplishing the first and most natural desire of all enlightened and free-spirited men, to keep the control of their own affairs in their own hands, and never

to obey the commands of a master.[1] But the world also, saw, for the first time, a republic formed at the fit period of the people's history, and the process begun at the right end. Ancient times had witnessed commonwealths indeed; but these were founded in rude ages, when the people, uninstructed, unimproved, had not learnt the art of self-government; or became attached to the duties which it imposes, and the forbearance which it requires. A republic is the last stage of political progress—the consummation and not the commencement of national polity—demanding far more refinement than ever the people had attained in those early ages when the accidental revolt against a tyrant called the republican principle into a forced action, and gave premature existence to the form, rather than the substance, of a commonwealth; at a period when the community only knew that kings had maltreated them, and had no knowledge whatever of the republican form, nor any reason for preferring it, except that it was different from the regal. But very different was the condition of the Americans when they chose their own constitution. They were in an advanced period of society; they were fully educated; they had applied themselves to political affairs habitually for a century; they had been practised in administrative pursuits; they knew from long experience the nature and intricacy of popular institutions; above all, they lived at a period of the world when Representative government, the greatest political improvement in modern times, had been long fully understood,—had, to a great extent, been carried into practice, and had mingled its principles and its habits with all the arrangements of the state, and all the proceedings of the people. This mighty discovery alone enables any extensive country to adopt the republican structure of government; or, indeed, to establish any form of polity in which public liberty could be maintained, without partitioning the state according to the cumbrous and inefficient scheme of Federal Union,—the ancient substitute for representation.

[1] Μη ποιειν κελευομενον—as the Greeks were wont to say when they would express their rejection of what they deemed to be the most intolerable of all things.

The effects in Europe of this great triumph, gained by free opinions in America, were speedily apparent. During the struggle, the debates in the British Senate partook of the new principles upon which political contests must now be maintained between conflicting parties; and public men, the whole race of politicians, in all their arguments, their disputes, their intrigues, their strifes, were compelled to recognise the change: for principle now became the great element in all their movements, and party could no longer bind men together without the mask at least of principle, or create dissensions upon mere personal grounds. Before the year 1775, the political history of the eighteenth century in England had presented a spectacle of unvaried meanness, selfishness, and corruption, at once humiliating and disgusting. No more important question ever marshalled the heads of parties, than what share of the great offices of state should be apportioned to this powerful family or to that; how many members of a cabinet should belong to one connexion or to another. The debates in Parliament, except that now and then a Chatham rose to illuminate the dark horizon, generally partook of the same corrupt nature, and were, for the most part, lowered to the same mean level. Mere wranglings of faction, personal attacks, recriminations among factions, bandying to and fro of the same charges, with about as much reference to principle as might be conveyed by appeals to a few known topics in set phrases, the watchwords of party—as Protestant establishments—Church in danger—power of France—Popish influence—colonial supremacy—balance of trade—these formed the staple of debate, for which rising senators were trained by early study of ancient history, the classical orators and poets, the political discourses of Machiavel, the writings of Bolingbroke, and French Memoirs, or Secret History; with the knowledge of mankind to be derived from a visit to different courts of Europe under some bear-leader of the fashionable world. But no sooner had the principles of political science been brought to tell by the Americans upon the existing frame of Government, than a different struggle was maintained in our Parliament, and with other weapons. The whole founda-

tions of Government, nay, the very basis of the social system, were freely scrutinized; the great inquiry was carried into all the arcana of political affairs; public men became known by the liberal or the servile opinions which they professed on the great interests of the nation; and parties were now marshalled according to the diversities of public principle which distinguished their deeds. Above all, the people, as well as the statesmen in the Senate, took a part in political controversy; and the opinions which statesmen might only affect, were really entertained by the people; the example was set before their eyes of some millions of their fellow-countrymen become a nation of politicians; they saw men of all ranks in America consulted upon the course which their Government should pursue, and the form which it should take; and they saw this new people successfully resisting all the force which their common rulers could bring to bear upon their efforts to govern themselves. No man who either reads the Parliamentary debates since 1775, or reflects upon the history of our country between that period and the year 1789, could easily believe that he was perusing the annals of the same senate and the same country;—the senate in which the Walpoles, the Pultneys, the Pelhams, the Foxes, squabbled for victory—the people which took an interest, a feeble interest certainly, but as strong as in those times they ever took, in the scrambles maintained for the profits and the patronage of the Treasury, or the Horse-Guards.

The progress of political improvement thus begun, or, if it ever before existed, revived from the period which preceded the Great Rebellion in the seventeenth century, was now constant and accelerated. But the prodigious change which soon after took place in France, not unconnected in its proximate causes with the American war, though prepared by more remote events, completed the ascendancy of popular principles, and established for ever the influence of public opinion upon the Government of all states whose constitution is not purely despotic. The French Revolution, the greatest event recorded in history, whether regarded in itself or in its consequences, was the result of the gradual advances which the people had been

for some ages making in knowledge and refinement; and of the influence which speculative men had acquired over public opinion in consequence of this progressive improvement; and the change, instead of being worked gradually, temperately, and peaceably, was rendered sudden, universal, and violent, by the resistance offered to the further progress of improvement, and the attempts made, both at home and abroad, to retain the people in a state of pupilage which they had outgrown. This great event, therefore, not only was calculated to produce great changes elsewhere, but to afford a salutary lesson to rulers upon the evils of such a shortsighted policy as had overthrown the dynasty of the Bourbons; and to teach the people everywhere the miseries which impatience and violence bring along with them, and their tendency to bring odium and disgrace upon the cause of Reformation.

But the French Revolution has, in every material respect, altered the whole face of political affairs in almost all parts of the world. The entire destruction of every vestige of the feudal system in France; the consequent cessation of that hereditary submission to the claims of rank, which had till then been universally yielded; the refusal any longer to esteem men on account of their descent; the low value henceforward set upon birth and station independent of personal merit, or power, or property;—these radical changes in men's opinions and feelings were not confined to the French people, among whom they began, but spread rapidly over Europe; and as there could be nothing less founded in natural reason than the arrangements of the feudal ages, and the sentiments to which they gave rise, the "new philosophy," which set all such prejudices at defiance, and ran into an opposite extreme, found everywhere a ready acceptance with the bulk of the people; to whose understandings its appeal was made, and whose self-love it largely flattered. Even in countries where the Government is unlimited,—in the old monarchies of Germany, Italy, and the Peninsula, an instantaneous effect was produced upon the minds of men. The whole privileged orders were everywhere alarmed; the sovereigns tacitly or openly leagued themselves against

the irruption of liberty which threatened their power; and the people everywhere awoke to a sense of their own importance, and of the ideal nature of those fetters by which they had principally been controlled. But this immediate consequence of the French Revolution, important though it was, did not by any means comprise its whole operation upon the institutions of society, and the fortunes of mankind. A yet more powerful effect was produced in the other lesson which it universally taught, and of which the former was but an example,—that no existing institution was sacred from inquiry; that mere establishment, or even antiquity, afforded no protection to anything which reason condemns; and that all laws, all customs, all establishments, must henceforward rest, not upon prescriptive titles, but upon their merits, when tried at the bar of public opinion, and judged by the canon of reason. The spirit of unsparing scrutiny into all institutions in Church and in State was universally diffused; and each one of these time-honoured relics of a former world had now to show its title, or suffer judgment of prostration[1] by default. Add to all this, the scene actually displayed in France before the eyes of the world, and which everywhere gave life and courage to popular resistance—the spectacle of twenty-four millions shaking off the trammels of their old Government,—gaining a complete victory over arbitrary power—dislodging all tyranny, temporal and spiritual, from its strongholds in the prejudices and the fears of ignorant and submissive men, and assuming the entire control of their own destinies and management of their own affairs. The public mind being applied to the exposure and extirpation of abuses, would have given the people a formidable power to accomplish these salutary changes. The French example before the public eye, teaching the people their own power, would have turned their mind to exercising that power, and undertaking the work of change. But now both these things were combined; and the French Revolution everywhere begot both the spirit of untrammelled political inquiry and the force of popular opinion; and even awakened in every quarter the physical

[1] The judgment by the law of England for a nuisance.

strength which always slumbers under regular Governments in ordinary times, and in the absence of local or occasional excitement.

The errors and the deplorable excesses committed after a short time, by the French leaders and their followers in Paris, and one or two other great towns, had a direct tendency of an opposite description. The reflecting part of mankind were alarmed; a dread of similar scenes being enacted elsewhere became general; and there was a reaction pretty generally produced; the people, especially men of property and personal weight in society, rallying round the existing Governments, and postponing all attempts at reform until a safer time should arrive, and the multitude being disarmed, the extent of meditated changes should be more under the control of their authors. The most imprudent and unjustifiable act of the Convention in November 1793, holding out the hand of fellowship to whatever people should rebel against their rulers, further increased the odium into which France, and with France, revolutionary principles, had fallen, ever since the massacres of September and the execution of the King. A general spirit of resistance to the new doctrines and to the arms of the republicans was everywhere excited, and became the guide of all independent states. But the whole resources of France had been drawn forth by those mighty changes which had overthrown the old Government and established a Commonwealth upon its ruins. The Allied Princes, too, by their incredible folly, contrived to put the republicans in the right, and themselves wholly in the wrong. A nation was now in arms, first to repel unprovoked aggression; then to carry the war abroad for the purposes of conquest and revolution. The old and effete dynasties of Europe, supported by the cold zeal of mercenary troops, and defended according to obsolete rules which hampered and embarrassed every exertion, had to encounter the indomitable energy of a whole people intoxicated with newborn freedom;—exulting in newly-found strength, and fired with the lust of military glory, as well as the desire of universal change. The march of victory was scarcely ever retarded; the genius of the Napoleons succeeding to that

of the Carnots, new means were found of continuing the exertions of the nation after the fervour of revolutionary zeal had cooled; the Conscription worked almost as great miracles as the Republic; and after subverting half the thrones of the Continent, a monarchy was established, which the existence of England and Russia alone prevented from being universal. All the relations of the European states with each other now became changed, and the whole system simplified. They were marshalled by one rule—according as they sided with Napoleon, held aloof from him, or opposed him. To the first class belonged those whom he had subdued, and whom he governed as he chose; to the second, the few whom he had yet to conquer; to the third, England and Russia, and perhaps their dependencies, Portugal and Turkey. America, of course, entered not into the list at all. The United States were entirely beyond the control of France, and equally free from the influence of England; and the colonial power of Spain being broken up, new and independent states were forming, which as yet had not time for settling into any fixed or definite shape. All these had to struggle with the expiring power of the mother country, and were placed in relation rather to the naval power of England than to France, which had no means whatever of reaching them in any way.

The vaulting ambition of the great conqueror at last overshot itself. After his most arduous and perhaps most triumphant campaign, undertaken with a profusion of military resources unexampled in the annals of war, the ancient capital of the Russian empire was in his hands; yet from the refusal of the enemy to make peace, and the sterility of the vast surrounding country, the conquest was bootless to his purpose. He had collected the mightiest army that ever the world saw; from all parts of the Continent he had gathered his forces; every diversity of blood, and complexion, and tongue, and garb, and weapon, shone along his line;—"exercitus mixtus ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis; alius habitus, alia vestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra"[1]

[1] Liv. xxviii. 12.

—the resources of whole provinces moved through the kingdoms which his arms held in subjection; the artillery of whole citadels traversed the fields; the cattle on a thousand hills were made the food of the myriads whom he poured into the plains of Eastern Europe, where blood flowed in rivers, and the earth was whitened with men's bones; but this gigantic enterprise, uniformly successful, was found to have no object, when it had no longer an enemy to overcome, and the conqueror in vain sued to the vanquished for peace. The conflagration of Moscow in one night began his discomfiture, which the frost of another night completed! Upon the pomp and circumstance of unnumbered warriors—their cavalry, their guns, their magazines, their equipage—descended slowly, flake by flake, the snow of a northern night;—"tantaque vis frigoris insecuta est, ut ex illâ miserabili hominum jumentorumque strage, quum se quisque attollere ac levare vellet, diu nequiret, quia torpentibus rigore nervis, vix flectere artus poterant."[1] The hopes of Napoleon were blighted; the retreat of his armament was cut off; and his doom sealed far more irreversibly than if the victor of a hundred fields had been overthrown in battle, and made captive with half his force. All his subsequent efforts to regain the power he had lost never succeeded in countervailing the effects of that Russian night. The fire of his genius burnt, if possible, brighter than ever; in two campaigns his efforts were more than human, his resources more miraculous than before, his valour more worthy of the prize he played for—but all was vain; his weapon was no longer in his hand; his army was gone; and his adversaries, no more quailing under the feeling of his superior nature, had discovered him to be vincible like themselves, and grew bold in their turn, as the Mexicans gathered courage, three centuries ago, from finding that the Spaniards were subject to the accidents of mortality. But a change had been impressed both upon the French and the Germans in the course of the long and eventful wars since his accession to supreme power; and to that change the nature of the present inquiry necessarily directs our attention.

[1] Liv. xxi. 58.

The misconduct of the French troops, in Prussia especially, had exasperated the high-spirited people, and made them anxious for revenge as soon as an opportunity should be presented. The inhabitants of the other German states —indeed those of almost all the smaller and middling ones—exposed peculiarly to French aggression, and feeling for the humiliation of their chiefs, partook of the same enthusiasm. The diffusion of knowledge had become general in a country which reckoned its colleges and schools by the hundred; its writers by the thousand; and where so cheap is literature, that the gains of the author are lower than the wages of many common handicrafts. The people had everywhere sympathized with these myriads of learned men in complaining of abuses and oppression at home; and had joined heartily with the republicans of France in desiring to see an end of their own exclusion from all share in the administration of affairs. But this and every other feeling was now superseded by the desire of national independence; and the disposition to resist domestic tyranny was for the moment lost in the desire of throwing off a foreign yoke, and resisting the oppression of its insolent satellites. While a powerful national feeling was thus almost universal in Germany, a corresponding depression of popular spirit in France had been caused by the discouragement of all free institutions, and the length of an exhausting warfare; nor could the gratification of national vanity, that love of glory so peculiarly the characteristic of the nation, maintain its ground against the sufferings with which the merciless conscription scourged all ranks of the people. Hence there was no renewal in Napoleon's favour of the national exertions which, in former times, had risen in proportion to the perils that menaced the country; had first repelled the invading powers in an unequal conflict; and then borne the tricoloured banner of the republic across the Rhine till it floated over the citadels of the allied monarchs. The military tyrant had only the resources of his own genius, and of a defeated and diminished army upon which to rely; with the public feeling of Germany against him, and no help from the enthusiasm of the French people. He

was defeated — deserted — dethroned — exiled — confined. The Bourbon dynasty was restored. Their folly in conciliating no Royalists, and exasperating all Republicans, gave the Imperialists an occasion of once more setting up Napoleon. Again he appealed to the nation, when the Allies flew to arms; and again the spirit of Frenchmen was found to be dead. He professed the principles of freedom and peace in vain; he was once more overthrown in the field; and his restored sceptre having its root no deeper than in the troops that surrounded his person, the hearts of the people remained unmoved. He was expelled, banished, imprisoned; and his dynasty for ever destroyed.[1]

[1] An Epigram (Epitaph) written on Napoleon by Mr. Justice Williams is worthy of the classical scholar's attention—it is now first made public.

"Τολμαν Αλεξανδρου και αρηία Καισαρος εργα
Μαυρωσας, νικην αρματ' εφαψαμενος·
Τηδε Νεαπολεων αφιλος τ'αταφοστε επι πετρᾳ
Κειμαι αμοβαιην αρνυμενος νεμεσιν·
Σωμα μεν ουν, δαμασασθε γαρ, ὑβριζεσθε τυραννοι
Νηπιοι· ἠμετερος δ'αιετος αθανατος·
Ουδεν εμοι τυμβου· θες δ'ω ξειν'αντι ταφοιο
Ἡσπεριην, Ιστρον, Πυραμιδας, Σκυθιην."

The learned reader will recognise here some faint resemblance (in the concluding lines) to the exquisite inscription on Themistocles in the Greek Anthology—

"Αντι ταφου λιτοιο, θες Ἑλλαδα," &c.

The genius of Napoleon was allowed by all military observers to have shone brighter in the campaign in France in the winter 1813-14, with one army opposed to two, than at any other part of his wondrous career. His political courage was as felicitously shown by the march from Elba to Paris. His military talents and political combined were never more conspicuous than in the boldly-devised movement by which he reduced the many chances against him to an even one at Waterloo. But little do the world at large know the extent of the dread with which Napoleon, even when vanquished, awed his combined antagonists. After his Russian disasters, when Murat had joined the Allies as well as Bernadotte, he was offered and he refused peace at Prague, the only concession required being the independence of the Rhenish confederacy. After the battle of Leipsic he refused peace at Frankfort. After the restoration of Holland, and with the Allied armies in the middle of France on the one hand, and the English advancing from the Pyrenees on the other, still the terror of his name prevailed; the dread of advancing among the French people smote the hearts of

The former arrangements of territory were re-established, and with a few trifling exceptions Europe was again parcelled out as of old.

The Germanic people had been induced to take an important part in the contests of 1812, 1813, and 1814, and were prepared to pursue the same course in 1815, if a reverse at Waterloo should render further struggles necessary; not more by their indignation against the conduct of the French troops, and the love of national independence, always characteristic of the Teutonic nations, than by the appeals which their rulers made to them, and their lavish promises of constitutional government, should the conflict prove successful to which they were thus invited, and the French yoke and influence be shaken off. Success *did* attend the conflict; there *was* an end of the French yoke and influence; but the Germans soon discovered the shortness of royal memories, and looked in vain for reforms and constitutions. Popular enthusiasm, and patriotic feeling had served the turn of the Court, and restored to each prince his lost dominions. That these should be better governed than before was no part of the regal plan; and that they might be subject to the same arbitrary power as before, the public spirit which had been awakened and had brought about the restoration must be laid asleep as speedily as possible!

But all this proved not to be so easy as it was desirable. The fear of a foreign yoke being at an end, the cumbrousness of a domestic one was felt the more vexatious. Threats and prosecutions could no longer bridle the spirit which had been slowly gathering, and had burst forth in such force during the late struggle with France; nor could the national voice be stifled when it vented complaints and remonstrances which the people had a right to urge; and

their conquerors; even the heart of Bernadotte, who best knew him and them, sunk within him; all seemed unmanned, and at Chatillon all were desirous of again making a peace which should fix Napoleon upon his throne. Of this the reader may be sure; and if much is due of Europe's escape in those times, to the vigour and energy of some few able counsellors, perhaps more is owing to the inextinguishable ambition of Napoleon himself, his sanguine temper, and his untameable pride.

which nothing but the ingratitude and broken faith of their rulers could disregard for an hour. Hence some few immunities were partially obtained; some good measures, connected with education, adopted; some restraints even upon the prerogative imposed; and in some of the middling states, as Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg, constitutions were established upon a form approaching nearly to popular government. If something was obtained, far more was desired; and the free spirit which had become generally prevalent during the war, instead of languishing, gained new strength during the peace; when no alarm from without could be used by the courtly authorities to repress it, and when each step made towards liberty both increased the wish for it, and augmented the means of attaining it.

Such was the state of Germany prior to the important events of 1830. In Italy the struggle had been carried on between liberty and power, more openly, on less equal terms, and with far worse success. The Neapolitans, by a sudden, unprepared, and ill-concerted movement, had overthrown their arbitrary government; but without displacing the branch of the Bourbon dynasty which filled the throne of the Two Sicilies. A representative government was established; and by the testimony of no less experienced and Conservative an authority than the late Lord Colchester, then residing at Naples, it appears that nothing could be more regular and satisfactory than the manner in which the Parliamentary business under the new constitution was carried on. Austria, however, immediately took the alarm—apprehensive of the contagion spreading towards the north, and reaching her dominions in Tuscany, Lombardy, and Venice. The other members of that Holy Alliance to which she belonged, made common cause with her; and under the pretence that change of internal constitutions would lead to change of dominion; in other words, that the Italians after they had gained domestic liberty would next throw off the hated foreign yoke, and expel the Austrian power from their noble country—proclaimed the territorial arrangements of 1815 in danger, and the Neapolitan constitution an usurpation

—upon the false and empty ground that it had been established by a military force; although they had never objected to Ferdinand VII. overturning the popular Government of Spain by the self-same means. Wherefore, to undo what the soldiery had done, Austrian troops, under the authority of the Holy Allies, were marched into Naples, and the old abominable constitution re-established. The spirit of freedom, however, which this invasion had stifled, was not extinguished; nor did the cruel punishments inflicted by Austria upon the illustrious patriots of the Milanese, either reconcile the Italians, or foreign nations, to that odious dominion which, in defiance of the people's unanimous desire, and in galling opposition to all their most rooted prepossessions and tastes, she exercised over the finest portion of the Italian Peninsula. The desire of liberty at home is in all parts of that country intimately blended with the love of national independence; and the small extent of the states into which it is divided, has hitherto alone prevented a successful resistance, and maintained the Austrian and the Bourbon power.

In Spain, events of a similar description had taken place. The Spaniards had, by a sudden movement, restored the representative Government of the Cortes; when the Holy Allies once more took umbrage, though with even less pretext for interference than ever; and France, in concert with them marching a large force across the Pyrenees, speedily overthrew the new constitution, and restored Ferdinand to absolute power. In Portugal things had suffered no violent change; the dominion of the Braganzas was preserved entire; but Don Pedro, who had been established as Emperor of Brazil, voluntarily gave a free constitution to his European dominions, and resigned their sceptre to his daughter, the present Queen.

In the meantime, the infatuation of the restored family in France was preparing an event, only second in importance to the mighty Revolution of which, forty years before, that great country had been the scene. Untaught by experience; insensible to the warnings everywhere held out; impenetrable to any suggestions of prudence or of caution, or of natural fear—callous, as it were, even to

the impressions made upon all animal nature by the instinct which tends to self-preservation—the family of Charles X. gave itself up to the counsels of weak men; in whose congenial bigotry they found a solace, and from whose constitutional feebleness, whether of understanding or of will, the wayward caprices of their pampered nature met with no manly resistance. Blind to all that was going on around them, deaf to all the lessons of wisdom, and oblivious of all their own past history, they deemed the time now come for absolute government; when the universal determination of the country was to obtain an enlargement of popular rights, and to impose new and effectual restraints upon the royal power. Partaking in the judicial blindness of the Court, the clergy impatient of a titheless and stipendiary lot, and looking back to the former history of their order, indulged the hope of once more seeing their hierarchy resume its pristine and palmy state. The ousted and impoverished owners of ancient domains, who had abode in the feudal faith through the changeful times of the Revolution, saw pleasing visions of havoc made among all new titles; and a restoration of their castles, and their forests, and their seignories, as if the Assembly and the Convention had never been. The aristocratic circles of Paris, the coteries and the salons, the haunts of the effeminate of either sex—that *gynocracy* which exercises so large an influence over society and over politics among our neighbours—saw, or thought they saw the dawn of a better day; or rather the restoration of that old and elegant ease in which the time of polished minds was wont to glide away, with no patriotic storms to ruffle the serenity of their atmosphere—no rude moralist's hand to tear aside the curtain that veils all the endearing and elegant immoralities of patrician life—no prying, impudent, vulgar press to disturb the noiseless tenor of their way. An appeal had also been made to the nation at large; and a successful expedition was thrown out as an alluring object to a people rapacious of military glory: but all would not do. No boon could be received from the hands of Charles, and his Polignacs, and his Jesuits; nor was the insult to their common sense, and indeed to that of

every rational community, overlooked, when that wretched bigot made some of his veteran marshals carry tapers at the processions in which he and his children officiated like princes of the twelfth century, to the scorn of all ranks in his polluted capital. Thus, with the whole country against him, the priests and heads of a poor and despised nobility alone his friends, a few unprincipled military chiefs his tools, the army generally feeling with the people, this infatuated bigot tried to crush the liberties of the state, and was crushed, with his family, in the very outset of the mad conflict. The people resisted his guards with unparalleled gallantry; the rest of his troops left him to his fate; and a new dynasty was raised to the throne of a new and a free constitution. The Revolution in France, where the people acted on the defensive only, and resisted an attempt at changing their form of Government, was soon followed by one of another description in Belgium; where the people rose against the Dutch family, expelled them, gave the crown to another, and established a free constitution upon the plan of the English and the French Governments.

But the important scenes which had been enacted in France, extended their influence far more widely than to Belgium,—a neighbouring state, in close intercourse with the French provinces, and connected with its Government by so many years of incorporation during the war. A free constitution had been erected, upon principles even more liberal towards the people than that of England itself. The French citizens had been formally embodied, and not only armed by public authority, but invested with the power of choosing their officers; hereditary peerages had been abolished; and the Government in its forms, and titles, and dates, as well as in substance and effect, was the child and creature of a Revolution. By no possibility could this great change have taken place, and this revolutionary constitution been established, without creating at once much alarm to the "legitimate dynasties," as they were termed, in the other countries of Europe—exciting sanguine hopes of improvement among the people everywhere—and forwarding by many years the progress of free institutions. The great cause of representative government had in three

days made a more rapid progress than it had done in the century which preceded 1789; and the strength and stability of arbitrary constitutions had in the same proportion declined. That such was the universal feeling upon the subject, soon became apparent, from the movements everywhere made among the popular bodies in all countries where the Government is not despotic; from the storms which seemed gathering even in those countries themselves; and from the line of conduct pursued by the courts of arbitrary princes. In England, a general election was near its close when the intelligence arrived of the French Revolution. It immediately formed the topic most interesting to all public meetings; and had it been known a few weeks earlier, the result of the election would have proved still more propitious than it did to public liberty. In Spain and Portugal movements were presently attempted, which, in the course of a year or two, led to the establishment of popular government upon the most ample and liberal scale. The great measure of Parliamentary Reform itself, in England, was not uninfluenced by an event which seemed calculated to accelerate every improvement in the condition of the people, and augment every accession to their strength. They were animated with the hopes of obtaining further changes in their Government, and being allowed a greater share in its powers, by the spectacle almost before their eyes, of the ample privileges now acquired by their enlightened neighbours across the Channel. The English people, indeed, were naturally more influenced by these feelings than any other; because they had fewer restraints upon their free discussion of abuses, and their exertions to reform them. But everywhere an effect was produced. From France a sound had gone forth, which was like the trumpet to rouse the misgoverned many, and like the knell of death to the hopes of the misruling few. Thus, while joy and hope spread through the people in all lands, anxiety, jealousy, alarm smote the heads of the ancient dynasties, and set them upon schemes of preparation against the coming storm. Some, as Russia, even refused for a while to acknowledge the new dynasty of France; because its title was derived from the people's choice, against

an exploded hereditary right. Others coldly maintained the relations of peace and amity with the King of the French. The exiled family—exiled for crimes, and against whom the blood of their subjects massacred in the attempt to grasp despotic power, cried aloud for vengeance—found not only an asylum but comfort and respect, first in England,[1] and then in Austria. The Ambassadors of the European powers might be in Paris, but their hearts were in Saltzburgh or at Prague.

Meanwhile, the arrangement made for the affairs of Belgium, after a year spent in negotiation, and conferences innumerable, and protocols by the cart-load, was peremptorily rejected by the Dutch Government; in the hope that something might happen to bring on a general war, through which, aided by Russia, it expected to regain the possession of the Flemish provinces erected into a new monarchy. This resistance went to the length of hostilities; France had to assist the Belgians, with whose sovereign she had formed a family alliance; it required first an army in the field, then a regular siege of the principal seaport and citadel, to drive the troops of Holland from the Belgian territory; and even while we write, the dispute between the parties is still unsettled;—the new Government never having yet been acknowledged by the singularly obstinate Dutch King;—a prince served by men as pertinacious as himself; for his commanders in the campaign of 1831 actually fired their guns against a defenceless town, after they had been formally acquainted with the fact of an armistice being concluded by their government!

These events, from their dawn in the American war, to their consummation in the two revolutions of France, have at length distributed the powers of Europe into two great classes; divided from each other by principles far more deeply-rooted, by a line of demarcation far more broad and profound, than any of those accidental circumstances which of old used to separate or combine them. It is no longer

[1] Charles X. was received in England, and allowed to pass without payment of customs; but, unable or unwilling to pay a debt demanded, he took sanctuary in Holyrood House.

a family alliance founded in marriage, or a connexion cemented by such personal ties, that knits the different powers together; it is no longer the intrigue of one court overreaching another, and gaining it over to partake in some project of ambition, that lays the foundation of a politic union; it is no longer the accidental qualities of some individual like Peter III. or his son Paul, or the whimsies of a Joseph II. or an Alexander, or the bad repute in which a Constantine may be holden, that can regulate the movements of European policy, and divide some powers from the rest; consolidating the friendship of one class, and exciting the jealousy or enmity of another. Even that ancient ground of amity or hostility, the proximity of one powerful state, and the remoteness of another which makes it safely trusted, although it will always have some weight in the nature of things, and may occasionally suggest measures of paramount importance, has lost by far the greater part of its influence in governing the course of international policy. The friendship and co-operation of states may now be said to rest upon a broader basis; and to be guided by views more enlightened and more favourable to peace, as well foreign as domestic; the great end and aim of our political being. In the centre of Western Europe there now exists a vast empire of freemen, governed by popular institutions, and whose affairs are entrusted, in a great measure, to the hands of the people themselves. We are well aware that this is rather what will soon be the condition of France than what already has been established; the elective franchise requiring much further extension. Nevertheless, the people are armed; they are to a certain degree represented; aristocracy is weakened; oligarchy destroyed; and no sovereign can either govern arbitrarily, or set himself above the law, or rule against the public opinion, or long refuse the further improvements which are still required. This empire of freemen, to the number of thirty millions, cherishes a constant sympathy with liberty, wherever suffering, and enmity towards oppression, wherever practised. England is in the same circumstances; and these two great powers are naturally friends and allies from similarity of constitution, unity of interests, and a position

which enables them to mantain the peace of the world, as it enables them to defy the world in arms. Both, then, naturally are prone to favour and to co-operate with all other countries living under a free government. To this happy description belong both Holland and Belgium; the latter now and without dispute; the former as soon as the national jealousy fomented by the Court shall have been laid to rest, by forgetting the separation of Belgium and the war of 1831. Belgium, indeed, has an evident interest in leaning towards France and England, independent of her similarity of constitution; for she is too weak to withstand the powerful neighbours which surround her on the east; and these are always sure to regard with an evil eye a popular form of Government, which as yet they have not given to their subjects. From Holland she has nothing to fear, now that her forces are placed upon so respectable a footing; but as Prussia must desire her downfal, as Austria cannot be averse to it, and as Russia would encourage any such attempts if she dared, the only security of Belgium is in the preservation of the continental peace; the virtual protection of France and England; the continuance of their good understanding, and their resolution, no less politic than just, to resist all attempts of arbitrary monarchs against the independence of their neighbours and the liberties of mankind.

Bavaria and Wurtemberg are both placed under constitutional Governments; although far from being as freely constituted as those of the states of which we have been speaking. Nevertheless, it is impossible to doubt that their interests and their feelings must all point towards a good understanding with France and England; and must lead them to resist, not only all encroachments from the north, but all attempts to interfere with the internal policy of any nation whatever. Suppose, for example, that any such outrage were once more attempted upon the feelings and the liberties of mankind, as the Holy Allies offered to both in 1821 and 1823, it would be a most short-sighted policy in the Court of Munich to take no umbrage at this, or to conceive no apprehension for its own independence, however distant from Bavaria the scene of the operation might

be laid; because its own turn would be sure to come before a long time elapsed after the success of such an enterprise. If, indeed, from private motives, the Court should fail to take the alarm, the suspicions of the country could not fail to be aroused by this *laches*, indicating, as it would, a hostile disposition towards the liberties of the people, and a lurking design to retract the meagre portion of constitutional rights already bestowed upon them, instead of extending its amount according to the people's ardent wishes. But the position of this third-rate power, exposed to the body of both the Austrian and Prussian monarchies, will never allow a prominent part to be borne by the Bavarian Government in any struggle. The importance of its good dispositions towards the constitutional cause, is derived from the part which it might be enabled to play in the case of any reverses,—such as happened to France under Napoleon; or in any other circumstances of an equally turned balance between the free governments of the West, and the arbitrary powers of the North and the East of Europe. In such a critical juncture, it may safely be affirmed, that in proportion as the public voice is heard in countries circumstanced as Bavaria and Wurtemberg are, will the conduct of these states be regulated by a disposition hostile to the arbitrary, and friendly to the constitutional monarchs engaged in the conflict; while their influence in peace, whatever it may be, will always incline to the same side.

The two nations of the Spanish Peninsula are clearly ranged on the side of the constitutional powers. They have both obtained free and popular governments, and the resistance both of the servile party at home, and of its allies, the arbitrary sovereigns of the north, to the liberties thus acquired, secures the adhesion both of Portugal and Spain to the liberal cause; that is, to the side of England and France. It must, however, be observed, that when we thus speak of those two monarchies, and especially of Spain, we are assuming that the party at present dominant in each shall ultimately prevail; and in both there is a great division of opinion. To the crown of both there is a pretender, patronising the worst principles of despotism; affecting absolute power in his own person; and backed by

the priests, the rabble, and the effete aristocracy of the country. Even in Portugal, where the great capacity, the strong perseverance, and the extraordinary gallantry of Don Pedro,—after maintaining a protracted contest, with various success, often in all but hopeless fortune, against the usurper Miguel, a tyrant, a coward, a murderer,—finally reconquered his crown for his daughter, there still exists a considerable party of absolutists; and among the liberals a division of sentiment that may at any moment shake the Government to its centre. Nor can a firm reliance be placed at any time on constitutions the handiwork of an armed force,—the unripe fruit of revolutions which the soldiery have suddenly brought about, and may as swiftly counteract.

This observation, the result of all experience, and the just deduction from all sound political principle, applies with still greater force to the actual condition of the Spanish Government. The aspect of its affairs is, indeed, truly lamentable. A civil war of seemingly endless endurance harasses the Government, wastes the northern provinces, and distracts the people. An exhausted treasury, even if the Government were endued with any natural strength, must keep it utterly feeble and inefficient. Partly from want of money, partly from the divisions in the nation, partly from the listless languor naturally consequent upon a long-protracted struggle, in which the people have done nothing but patiently endure conquest and misery in all their forms, no power exists of making the very slender efforts which, to all appearance, would be capable of driving the pretender from the country and terminating the war. Then nothing can be more revolting to the feelings of all mankind than the barbarities which mark the conduct of both parties in this civil strife. Every resource of savage warfare is remorselessly employed, and every form of inhuman cruelty displayed, to rouse the hatred and disgust of mankind, and make all bystanders nearly indifferent which party shall conquer. So that it requires an effort of our principles to control our feelings, and make us wish well even to that side whose success will further the cause of constitutional liberty, when we find that sacred name

made the cover for crimes as black as those which pollute more congenially the track of the tyrant usurper. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that any such reverse as should overthrow the Spanish Queen's Government, and place the servile party in power, would be most inauspicious to the security of the constitutional cause in Europe. A body of intriguing, reckless, bigoted Carlists upon the southern frontier of France, would at all times be a rallying point for the disaffected in that country; and a kind of encouragement would be afforded to the absolute party among the Cabinets of the North, extremely unfavourable to the progress of free institutions; possibly tending even to foster those longings after foreign interference, for some time nearly dead, and to rekindle the expiring embers of that Holy Alliance, which the Revolution of 1830 had seemed almost to have extinguished for ever. The policy of France is, in these circumstances, more than questionable. Of the deliberate opinions formed and steadily held by a prince so eminently able and politic as the King of the French,—whose views are so enlarged, whose experience of men has been so ample, whose knowledge of the Spanish people is only surpassed by his intimate and intuitive acquaintance with the nation over which he rules,—it certainly becomes us to speak with profound respect. Nor should we hazard any dissent from such high authority, were we quite satisfied that his Majesty's views are wholly uninfluenced by some lurking unwillingness to offend the Powers whom he has sometimes been disposed to court, at least by acquiescence and neutrality, if not with occasional compliances. The King is persuaded that were he to interfere in the Spanish contest, no sooner would a French force march across the Pyrenees than the ancient national antipathy would revive; and all parties unite in resisting the side taken by the intervening army. In this belief he is supported by the great captains who have served in Spain, and particularly by Marshal Soult. But we are convinced that these opinions all belong to a former period of the contest;—the period from which the experience of those high military authorities has been derived; and that the view taken by M. Thiers and his supporters is the more

just one, and the more adapted to the existing circumstances of the country. The Spaniards, as a nation, according to these politicians, will neither unite to help, nor to oppose an intervening force. They are quite exhausted; they are weary of the contest; they will prove altogether sluggish and indifferent; and the conflict may be ended by a moderate exertion applied to back one of two very feeble antagonists. It appears to us that the whole events of the last three years strongly confirm this view of the subject; but it seems to be demonstratively proved by the extraordinary and romantic march of the chief who last winter traversed Spain in every direction; met with no resistance anywhere (while the regular troops of the Government were always following him a day's march in the rear), collected as much booty in each place as he chose to take, or had the means of carrying away; and returned in perfect safety to the country north of the Ebro, as little harassed in his dangerous retreat as he had been in his seemingly desperate advance. This small band moved through the "invincible Spanish nation"—the "heroes of Castile"—the "tribes never to be subdued on their own ground"—as through an unresisting medium. But it is equally certain that the people, wholly inert to resist their progress, were as inert to be moved by it in any way, and resumed their former attitude after the handful of marauders had passed; as an unresisting medium closes after the transit of the missile that cuts a path through it. Can there be any reasonable doubt that such a people would endure the interference of even a French army, as patiently, as passively as they bore the impression of the Carlist force, moving through the provinces most attached to the constitution; nay, as they bore the movements of the Bourbon army on the servile side in 1823,—the story of which seems to be wholly forgotten, by those who regard with such apprehension the effects of French intervention, on the liberal side, at the present day? The policy in which the French Court perseveres appears, for these reasons, to be justified by no sound view of the facts; and its consequences to the liberal cause in Europe, as well as in Spain, are undeniably most injurious.

The same arguments do not at all apply to the policy of England. We should not be justified in taking a direct share of the war. Some doubt may even be entertained whether we are justified in going so far as we have done, by furnishing arms and ammunition, by lending naval assistance, and by encouraging our people to serve in the Spanish Queen's ranks. Our concern in the Spanish civil war is remote and indirect. It is only in proportion to the bearing of that contest upon the affairs of Portugal, long a kind of dependence upon this country; and, accordingly, the treaty of Quadruple Alliance expressly specifies the danger of the Portuguese Government from the disputed succession in Spain as the ground of interference; and states the object of that interposition to be the removal of the Portuguese Pretender from Spain, and preventing the Spanish Pretender from aiding the Portuguese. All that we agreed to do by the treaty was to furnish naval assistance, if needful; and a late attempt made to countenance this as an obligation to blockade the Spanish coast, and forbid the access of neutrals to Don Carlos, was at once disclaimed by the Government. The dangers to which France is exposed, under her constitutional Government, from a Carlist usurper triumphing in Spain over the constitutional party,—nay, the risks her domestic tranquillity runs from the existence of a protracted civil war, on political grounds, upon that frontier where she is most defenceless against foreign attack, and in the vicinity of the provinces most distracted by a party hostile to the existing dynasty and established constitution,—afford a ground for interfering to terminate a state of anarchy perilous to her if it continues, and fraught with yet greater danger to her security if it ends in the establishment of the usurper.[1]

The States of America, in some sort, enter into the European system. Their origin is European. They all have been portions of the dominion of European powers

[1] The acts of individuals taking part on either side of this conflict, we have often had occasion to reprobate. Indeed, in *any foreign* war, the lawfulness of this interference seems abundantly questionable. What say the Articles of the Church of England? They pronounce taking arms lawful to Christian men, "by command of the civil magistrate."

till very lately. Our intercourse with them by commerce, by residence, by interchange of lights, is constant; and by the discoveries of science and the consequent improvements in art, our communication becoming daily more easy and more swift, their distance is really less than that of many European countries from each other. We have seen how large a share the United States had in producing those changes in the Old Hemisphere which have so altered its political aspect, and created a new principle to regulate the mutual relations of its parts. Through the storms which shook the continent of Europe during the French Revolution, the firmness and the virtue of Washington kept his country safe in an honourable and respected neutrality. If profound sagacity, unshaken steadiness of purpose, the entire subjugation of all the passions which carry havoc through ordinary minds, and oftentimes lay waste the fairest prospects of greatness,—nay, the discipline of those feelings which are wont to lull or to seduce genius, and to mar and to cloud over the aspect of virtue herself,—joined with, or rather leading to the most absolute self-denial, the most habitual and exclusive devotion to principle,—if these things can constitute a great character, without either quickness of apprehension, or resources of information, or inventive powers, or any brilliant quality that might dazzle the vulgar,—then surely Washington was the greatest man that ever lived in this world uninspired by Divine wisdom, and unsustained by supernatural virtue. Nor could the human fancy create a combination of qualities, even to the very wants and defects of the subject, more perfectly fitted for the scenes in which it was his lot to bear the chief part; whether we regard the war which he conducted, the political constitution over which he afterwards presided, or the tempestuous times through which he had finally to guide the bark himself had launched. Averse as his pure mind and temperate disposition naturally was from the atrocities of the French Revolution, he yet never leant against the cause of liberty, but clung to it even when deformed by the excesses of its savage votaries. Towards France, while he reprobated her aggressions upon other states, and bravely resisted her pretensions to control his own, he yet never

ceased to feel the gratitude which her aid to the American cause had planted eternally in every American bosom; and for the freedom of a nation which had followed the noble example of his countrymen in breaking the chains of a thousand years, he united with those countrymen in cherishing a natural sympathy and regard. To England, whom he had only known as a tyrant, he never, even in the worst times of French turbulence at home, and injury to foreign states, could unbend from the attitude of distrust and defiance into which the conduct of her sovereign and his Parliament, not unsupported by her people, had forced him, and in which the war had left him. Nor was there ever among all the complacent self-delusions with which the fond conceits of the national vanity are apt to intoxicate us, one more utterly fantastical than the notion wherewith the politicians of the Pitt school were wont to flatter themselves, and beguile their followers,—that simply because the Great American would not yield either to the bravadoes of the republican envoy, or to the fierce democracy of Jefferson, he therefore had become weary of republics, and a friend to monarchy and to England. In truth, his devotion to liberty, and his intimate persuasion that it can only be enjoyed under the republican form, constantly gained strength to the end of his truly glorious life; and his steady resolution to hold the balance even between contending extremes at home, as well as to repel any advance from abroad incompatible with perfect independence, was not more dictated by the natural justice of his disposition, and the habitual sobriety of his views, than it sprang from a profound conviction, that a commonwealth is most effectually served by the commanding prudence which checks all excesses, and guarantees it against the peril which chiefly besets popular governments.

So great a sway had the integrity of his noble character over all his feelings, that, had he been spared for a few years longer, the tyranny and the wars of Napoleon would have inclined him towards England as the refuge of freedom and the stay of national independence; nor can there be any doubt at all, that in the present day his policy would have ranged him on the side of the French and

English alliance against despotic government, and for the support of liberty and peace. On that side will his country ever be found; and though they will always pursue the wise course which he chalked out, of never interfering in the quarrels of Europe, yet, as far as countenance and national sympathy go, those who in the Old World are maintaining the battle "which often lost is ever won," in the sacred cause of human rights, will still find the freemen of the New their most hearty allies.

Some apprehensions have been entertained by the friends of liberty, and of democratic government, lest the American Union should fall to pieces. The two risks to which it is exposed are its size becoming unwieldly, from vast extent and thick population, and the diversities between the Southern and the other States, more especially in regard to the admixture of the coloured race. It would, however, be extremely rash to think of setting bounds to the powers of the representative principle, especially when united with the federal, if no very manifest opposition of interests were interposed. The statesmen of ancient Greece could no more have believed in the possibility of a republic extending over sixteen degrees of latitude, and numbering twelve millions of subjects—they who with extreme difficulty could govern a commonwealth of one city and twenty thousand free inhabitants—than they could have believed in the voyage of Columbus, or the steam-navigation and steam-travelling of the present day—no more than we now can believe in a republican or any other empire holding together when its people shall amount to fourscore millions—no more than those who went before us could, and did believe, that the American Government could subsist when its subjects should increase to their present numbers. Yet it seems just as easy to conduct the federal representative government now, as when it had only two or three millions of subjects; therefore, the mere increase of numbers and extension of territory are not of themselves sufficient to make the split necessary; although these circumstances may very possibly give rise to important modifications in its political structure.

But the great question of negro slavery presents a more

formidable risk to the eye of the attentive observer. There certainly exists a material difference, not only of opinion, but of feeling, and feeling of a very strong kind, in one of the parties, upon this important subject. The northern and middle States, which have scarcely any slaves, are friendly to emancipation. The principle of the federal constitution requires a certain majority in the Congress before the state of slavery can be affected by any legislative provision. Should that majority be obtained, the southern States threaten, it is said, to fall off from the Union. Now, assuredly, the inhabitants of the South do feel, and must naturally feel, in a very different way, upon the question, from those of the other States, who only hear of slaves and slavery at a distance, and do not live surrounded by thousands of another colour, blood, and character, in whose power they unavoidably would be, were there any possibility of combination among them against their masters; and we have, therefore, no doubt that much violence will be shown in discussing a subject which must naturally excite so deep and universal an interest. But, in the first place, we place our unabated confidence in the powers of discussion and the energy of truth, to force its way through all obstructions, and overpower all resistance. The Americans must perceive, that the great experiment of complete and instantaneous emancipation made in Antigua, where the disproportion of the colours was far greater, and the territory much more confined, has been attended with no risk whatever; nay, that the negroes have acted more prudently and peacefully since they obtained their freedom than they ever had done while in bondage. They must also perceive, that the refusal to follow, not our example, but that of our planters, whose circumstances are the same with their own, will not at all lessen the danger of their position; nay, that unless all the discourses of England, and all the events of the West Indies, could be kept from the knowledge of the Virginian slave, he is a far safer inmate of society in freedom than in chains. Finally, they must be aware that the delay of the measure is only an aggravation of the mischief; and that as the disproportion of the coloured race increases, so must the danger of the white inhabitants.

That all these reasons will find acceptance sooner or later with our American kinsmen, and the sooner, if unaccompanied with the unthinking and the unseemly abuse lavished upon the Southern men by those whom it costs nothing to profess free opinions,—who are fond of exercising a cheap virtue and displaying a vicarious contempt of the dangers they would have other men encounter—we firmly and confidently believe; however inauspicious the aspect may be which the controversy at present wears.

But, secondly, we believe, that should emancipation be even forced upon the Southern States, there is not any very great hazard to the continuance of the Union; and that, as happened with the ominous threats made on the Embargo and Importation questions, when the menace is disregarded, having spent its force and served, or rather failed to serve its turn, it will be forgotten. For suppose those States should separate because of the vote hostile to slavery; and separate with the purpose of maintaining this abominable *status*, what hope can they have of accomplishing this end? Surely it will be far more difficult to refuse the negro his liberty, after not only England has declared him free in the Islands, but North and Central America shall also have joined in the same righteous and politic measures. Nor can it be doubted, that whatever risks the Southern men may run from either granting or withholding emancipation, those risks will be prodigiously increased by the separation; which leaves them to themselves, and withdraws the countenance, the comfort, and the actual help, of so many States where there are none but whites, their natural allies, against any insurrection of the coloured race. We should really as soon expect the Protestants of Ireland to repeal the Union, and then complete their folly by throwing off all connexion with Great Britain, in revenge for the emancipation of the Catholics—as entertain any very serious fears of the Virginians and Carolinians separating from the men of New York and New England, with a view of better enabling themselves to make head against their sable fellow-citizens. If men acted as suddenly as they speak, adopted plans as swiftly as they uttered threats, and carried into instantaneous execution all the resolutions of the moment, there would be no

small risk of such a calamity. The course of human action is, happily, far otherwise arranged; and our fears of the catastrophe happening are, consequently, inconsiderable.

We have in these remarks spoken with unfeigned repugnance of the bare chance of such an event as a separation in the American Union; we have treated this, were it to happen, as a great calamity; and we mean a calamity to the world no less than to America herself. The interests of freedom must suffer incalculably from such a disaster; but the interests of peace itself will also be endangered. There can be no better security for its preservation than a federal union of all the provinces among which the territories of the North American continent are distributed; and the erection of separate independent states, even under the republican form of government, would certainly be attended with risk of hostilities.

On the northern frontier, however, of the United States, we can easily foresee some prospect of change. That Canada should sooner or later become an independent state, and in all probability unite with the great American confederacy, seems probable. The late events in that province have no doubt augmented the likelihood of such an end to our remaining colonial empire. Into this question we are extremely unwilling to enter, on account of the angry and, we trust, the ephemeral disputes to which it has given rise, dividing for a time the friends of liberty in this country. But one error we must mark, because it pervaded the reasoning of those who affected to treat the argument upon more enlarged views, and is one of the merest delusions imaginable. They spoke of forming a great North American empire, or kind of Colonial Federacy, of which the end and object should be to act as a balance to what they justly called the Colossal and rapidly increasing power of the United States. Now, of what use is it to us, or to any one, that the colossal States should be balanced, unless because we have some fears of their extensive power? And what dread can we have of this power unless we have colonies to be attacked? There, therefore, cannot be any use whatever in balancing the United States, if we have no "Northern Colonial Fede-

racy;" so that the only conceivable use of this balancing federacy is to protect itself; unless, indeed, we listen to the fears of those who dread an American *naval* ascendency. In colonial possessions, there may be some advantage; much benefit there certainly is from such settlements at an early stage of the industry, and especially of the trade of any country; and these advantages do not cease with colonial dependence, but are often even more valuable after the political connexion has been severed. But for the purposes of political power;—as an element in our foreign policy—nothing can be more obvious than the indifference of those North American colonies either way; because from the United States we never can have any apprehension whatever, even if their natural policy were not to side with France and with us; and the only point of our system in which we can be exposed to their force or their influence, is the very spot in question. So that the error alluded to is just an instance of reasoning in a circle.

The vast and fertile regions of South America remain to be mentioned. Since the breaking up of the splendid colonial empire of Spain, the state of the independent commonwealths which arose out of it has been uncertain, and their fortunes various. With the exception of Bolivar, no eminent men have been produced to enlighten this empire by their wisdom, or to sway it with their firm hands, A deplorable want of public virtue has been displayed among the leading characters who have assumed the direction of public affairs. Bad faith has but too frequently marked the conduct of the republics; nor have appearances of pecuniary corruption been wanting. The successive Governments formed have been possessed of but feeble resources; and the confidence of the people has not enabled them to draw forth the national resources, unless when connected with the spirit of resistance to the parent state; if so stepmother a Government as that of Spain can deserve the name. Hence the want of all stability in any one of those commonwealths; hence the sudden and violent revolutions to which they have been subject—the ceaseless anarchy in which they have had their political

being—and their dangerous conflicts with their neighbours. That the spirit of independence will keep them free from all foreign yoke there can be no doubt; but for domestic liberty they are plainly little prepared. A greater contrast can hardly be conceived than their history has presented to that of the United States; and the difference is entirely owing to their struggle against the monarchy of Spain having led them, as it did the republicans of ancient times, to found popular Governments, before the people had learnt the difficult and late-acquired lesson of self-government. These remarks, of course, extend not to Brazil. The emigration of the Portuguese Royal family has retained that noble country in subjection to a kingly Government; and the constitution on a representative principle, which it has obtained, as well as its connexion with old Portugal, at once has consulted the best interests of the people, and allied it with the constitutional party of England and of France.

In the East, that is in the Levant, comprising Turkey and its great and rich province Egypt, the enmity of Russia, and her constant system of encroachment, pursued without a year's interval or a month's, for much above a century—the constitutional cause has natural allies. The spirit of improvement, even of Reform, has penetrated into the Divans of Constantinople and Alexandria; nor is there a doubt that liberal policy has made more progress among the Turks of the South, than among the Calmucks of the North. Any approach, indeed, to representative Government, or to a direct interference of the people with the administration of affairs, neither has made; nor, in the present debased state of the ignorant community, is any such share practicable. But important amendments are daily introduced into their institutions, which must speedily change the face of affairs; and above all, education is, in Egypt, so much cared for, that schools have been established, with great profusion, all over the country, and infuse principles at once liberal and practical. Removing popular ignorance, and raising the long-neglected inhabitants to a higher scale in society, will unquestionably lead to the development of the talents which they possess; and which

all who have had any personal knowledge of them agree in representing to be combined with a spirit of rectitude, a feeling of honour, that forms, we fear, a sad contrast to the low cunning implanted by long servitude in the character of the Greeks.

Whether the encroaching policy of Russia shall be suffered to extend on the side of Turkey, is undoubtedly a question for the serious consideration of the other European powers. She is at the head of the Absolute Party; her influence affects habitually, when it does not rule, the courts of Austria and Prussia. Her gigantic power, her resources of men, at least, if not backed by a plentiful treasury, and, above all, her position, which exempts her from all the dangers of attack that tend to keep other nations in awe, and bind them over, as it were, to peace and good behaviour, have given her a weight of late years in European affairs, very different from any she possessed, even under the reign of the ambitious Catherine. The only thing that has hitherto made this colossal empire at all a safe member of the European community, has been that remote position which, in another view, makes her almost irresponsible by making her secure. But it will be far otherwise if she moves to the southward, and adds Constantinople to her vast dominions. She will then have the footing on the Mediterranean which has always been her most favourite object; she will become in reality what as yet she has only affected to be, a naval power; and, with the resources of the Levant, added to those of the north, no one can doubt that she will be a naval power of the first order. The independence of Egypt, on any account a matter of the greatest importance to all the commercial states of Europe and America, will, of course, be a mere impossibility; and all the improvements now beginning in the East will be at an end. The view taken by some that there will be an advantage gained over Russia, inasmuch as she will be brought into the circle of the other European powers, and exposed to be attacked in her new dominions, appears a refinement too absurd to require a serious refutation. She still has her vast and inaccessible empire behind, on which to retreat; and, admit-

ting the utmost weight that can be assigned to the argument just stated, it would only follow, that she might always run the risk of losing her new acquisitions, in an attempt still further to extend her encroachments; thus playing the safe game of either winning universal monarchy or remaining where she was before she seized on the Dardanelles. Other powers would still be in the very difficult position, that they could only play for that forbidden prize by staking their existence, by "setting their lives upon the hazard of the die;" while she might play for it at the risk of only losing the last of her unfair gains.

To these considerations regarding the dangers apprehended from Russia, many reasoners add another, derived from observing her progress in the East. No doubt in that quarter she has been constantly advancing; and Persia may be said to exist at her good pleasure. But of such a mighty operation as a march to the northern provinces of India, where, independent of the distance, and the barren and difficult country through which the route must lie, there would be found a powerful army, inured to the climate, admirably commanded, strictly disciplined, and amply appointed in all respects,—we really cannot entertain any very serious apprehension; as long, at least, as the justice and lenity of our Indian administration shall avoid all collision with the natives; and our grasping spirit after territory and revenue shall not throw the country powers into the arms of the first adventurer among themselves, or the first European rival, by whom our immense dominions may be assailed. Besides, long before England could have to contend for her Eastern dominions at Delhi, Cabul, or Lahore, Russia would have to encounter our fleets at Cronstadt, and to defend Petersburg itself. Miserably ill-informed must our Government be of her movements on the East of the Caspian, if she could make any advance towards India before an overpowering armament laid Petersburg in ashes.[1]

[1] This article was written in June last, which will account for its making no reference to the more recent events in the East, where the Russian policy has been found marked with its usual grasping and restless character.

The name of Russia can hardly be pronounced without the figure of Poland, the victim of her crimes, possibly the instrument of her punishment, rising before our eyes. Nor is the position of that ill-fated and gallant nation immaterial to the view we are now taking of the European system. The Poles exist in the centre of Europe, nominally subjects of three powers, among whom they are distributed by acts of mere brute force;—beginning in foul treachery, consummated with wanton cruelty, universally execrated by all beholders, never to be forgiven or forgotten by those upon whom they were perpetrated. Though enslaved for the moment, their spirit is unsubdued,—their hatred is the more rancorous for being suppressed—their animosity the more fierce for being bridled—their purpose of vengeance the more fixed for having its execution delayed. Though divided at present by political boundaries, these are to them arbitrary and imaginary; they still regard themselves as one nation, and this determination makes them one. Though presenting a blank to mark where Poland once had been, they exist in reality, and the meanness and the cruelties of their oppressors betoken that they know it. At any favourable opportunity presented by the conflicts of other states, the Poles may rise and take a part. They are a mine ready at any moment to explode; and they must always of necessity be found upon the side of the liberal or constitutional party,—the party ranged against those powers who form the Holy Alliance, identical with the partitioning confederacy,—their tyrant, their oppressor, their scourge. The peculiar circumstances of the Poles, however, make them an exception to the rule which ranks all the powers of the liberal side among the friends of peace. While the existing tranquillity continues, the unfortunate Poles know that there is no prospect of their country being restored; and hence they are anxious for any event which may disturb it.

We have now gone through the whole system of European policy, and contemplated the distribution of the powers which compose it, according to the new principles which govern their alliances and their oppositions. On the one hand, we have the Liberal or Constitutional Party,

headed by England and France; on the other, the Absolute Party, headed by the Holy Allies, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The principle of the classification is not accidental or arbitrary; it is founded in the nature of things and of man; it is the similarity of political circumstances; the community of political feelings; and the identity of political interests. Those states which enjoy the benefits of a free Government, those nations which are ruled and administered by the body of the people, differ essentially in all important respects from those which are subject to the will of a single individual;—where the voice of the people is hardly ever to be heard, where they exercise no direct control over the Government, and where they are wholly excluded from all share whatever in the management of their own concerns. The conduct which the two classes of states are prone to pursue in these instances with their neighbours (the only proper subject of our present consideration), is as essentially different as their situation in point of internal constitution; and the one diversity is the result of the other. This leads us to the very important subject of the effects which are produced by Arbitrary and by Popular governments "severally" upon the Foreign Policy of nations.

1. The natural and indeed altogether unavoidable tendency of an Absolute Government must be to desire the establishment everywhere of the same constitution; and to dread as an evil pregnant with danger to its own existence, the progress of liberty in other countries. It has this desire much more at heart, and feels this apprehension far more than a free Government can be supposed to wish for universal liberty, or to dread the progress of despotism. Little danger comparatively can arise to a Popular Government in one country from the existence of despotism in the neighbouring states; because there is little risk of the example proving so attractive as to obtain advocates and imitators. But the case is very different with Popular Governments surrounding a Despotism. The example of freedom is contagious; and the people suffering under the oppression of an arbitrary sovereign, or in-

jured in their most important concerns by his maladministration of their affairs, are very likely to demand a change of Government; aiming at the enjoyment of those rights which they see their neighbours possessing, and using to their great advantage. The facts of the case in general, but particularly the history of the last half century, and more especially of the latter portion of it, abundantly prove that this position is strictly true. The league of the allied princes on behalf of the French Royal Family in 1792, was a league of the Absolute against the Constitutional principle; originating in the fears of despotic Governments, that liberty once established in France might soon cross the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. All the earlier policy of the European Courts was governed by the same principle, and it was not even wholly forgotten, when a far more immediate risk was to be encountered, first, from the mighty successes of the republic, and then from the conquests of the empire. The downfal of Napoleon, and the restoration of the Bourbons, for a while quieted the alarms of those absolute princes; but they were soon revived by the events which happened in Spain and in Italy; nor did even the remote triumphs of liberty in South America pass without affecting the sensitive nature of arbitrary rulers. Indeed, so provident were they, by a kind of instinctive dread of a long peace bringing about various domestic changes, that, long before any movements had been made by the people in any part of Europe, the Holy Alliance was formed, almost as soon as the peace was concluded in 1815; and though its avowed object was the maintenance of peace, the real end and aim of its being was the prevention of revolution, and the resistance to popular principles, all the world over. The great events of 1830, both in France and Belgium, gave rise to much intrigue and many secret attempts, though the princes durst not openly avow their designs; because, while France and England were united, all resistance must be vain. But it is as certain that, underhand, the former have assisted both Carlos and Miguel, as that the latter powers have more openly aided the constitutional cause in both portions of the Peninsula.

It is scarcely necessary to add, that there is no more right, in the liberal party among the European states, to interfere with the affairs of a neighbour, for the purpose of producing a revolution favourable to liberty, than in the absolute princes to interfere between the people of any state and the freedom which they have acquired, or are seeking. The proceedings at Laybach and Pilnitz were not greater outrages on all the principles of national independence, than the decree of the French Convention in November, 1793, which amply justified the hostility of other states, even if the anarchy in which France was plunged had been passed over unheeded. Indeed, it always appeared to us that Mr. Canning's celebrated declaration in November, 1826, was unstatesmanlike, and reprehensible on the same ground. If it was more than a rhetorical flourish, it conveyed an unworthy threat, and it implied the assertion of a claim founded on an unsound title. It was an intimation, that if the absolute powers interfered in Portugal, England might raise their own subjects, and excite them to seek liberty through revolution —a menace only to be used defensively, because a proceeding only to be embraced in the very last extremity. But it also was grounded on a false assumption, that we have a right to revolutionize one country, or in any way, to interfere in its domestic affairs, for the benefit, not of the country itself, but of some other country attacked by its rulers. These remarks apply to that part of the speech which regarded European insurrections, and was garnished with the quotation about Æolus and his winds. As for the other part, relating to the South American states, the recognition, the very tardy recognition, of whose independence he termed "calling the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old," there was neither fact, nor sense, nor even good trope, nay nor correct language, to recommend it. The result of the whole is, that unless, where the state of affairs, in any one country, is such as immediately to endanger the tranquillity, and even threaten the existence of its neighbours, the latter have no right whatever to interfere, either to overturn or to restore its Government. But if another power, or combination of powers, shall, in

breach of this cardinal rule, interpose; undeniably the right to take part against them, and obstruct their operations, immediately attaches; and so the liberal powers, France and England, would have both a right to exercise, and a duty to perform, of assisting any free state against tyrants, if the Holy Allies should think proper to act. The perfect knowledge that this right exists, and that this duty would be discharged, is the best security against all such aggressions upon the constitutional principle by these absolute princes, and is the most valuable service which the liberal alliance can render to freedom.[1]

2. The next diversity of Popular and Absolute governments, to which we shall advert, is the different degree in which they are fitted for the operations of diplomacy. The unity and the vigour of Absolute Monarchy, as giving it great advantages in negotiation, have been much relied on; and, undoubtedly, it has some advantages, in performing this function, over a Popular form of Government. It is more secret; it can more easily lay its plans; it has more ample discretion in accepting or refusing terms. There is always some risk of the ambassador of a republic being disavowed by its senate; or even of the senate being thwarted by the people at large. There is always a chance of matters being made public, which are unfit to be disclosed. Hence there may often be a reluctance to treat with, or to trust the republican negotiators. Now, without denying this statement, or underrating the imperfection to which it relates in Popular Governments, we conceive that against it must be set a far more important advantage, which those Governments enjoy for maintaining the relations established by treaty. The insolent caprice, or the sinister views, the personal feelings, or the private interests, of an individual are far more likely to

[1] It exceedingly behoves the Liberal party never, by putting themselves in the wrong, to arm its adversaries with arguments of serious weight against them. For this reason, the issuing illegal orders to the cruisers on the Spanish coast was deeply to be lamented. Those orders were an infraction of neutral rights, and they were grounded on a construction of the Quadruple Treaty of 1833, which its authors at once disclaimed.

make the Absolute Government swerve from its engagements, than any reverse of popular opinion or sentiment is to create a similar departure. An act of bad faith, which may be committed in the closet, and cannot be either submitted for previous approval to the public, or prevented or resisted by any other power in the state save the wrongdoer, is far more likely to be committed; and, if committed, far less likely to be retracted, than if it must undergo, in the first instance, a free discussion among the people to whose judgment it appeals; and may immediately, after being perpetrated, be reviewed and reversed before the same popular tribunal. Outrages upon all principles of honour and honesty have often been committed by absolute princes, which never could have even been propounded to the representatives of their people, and which, if propounded, must have been instantly repudiated. Therefore, if certainty, security, the improbability of faith being broken, the likelihood of what is for the honour and interest of the country being consulted, and therefore sudden, capricious changes of policy being averted—if these make a nation safe to treat with and to trust, a Popular Government is far better fitted for negotiation, and for maintaining the relations of alliance, than an Absolute Prince.

3. The superiority of a Monarchy for military operations, that is, for the policy of war, and among other branches of it, for maintaining the relations of belligerent alliance, has been also much vaunted; and here, as under the last head, there is undeniably some advantage on its side; while there is an advantage of much greater magnitude possessed by a Popular constitution. The promptitude with which a single mind can plan, and the vigour with which a single hand can act, is undoubtedly a material advantage; although, by judicious arrangements, even a commonwealth, and much more a limited monarchy, may be enabled so to employ individuals as to gain the greater part of this benefit. But the power of drawing forth the whole resources of the country belongs to a free and limited Government alone. The exertions in raising

men made by France, the incalculable sums of money drawn from the people of England, are incontestable proofs of this position. No absolute prince could have raised a tenth part of the money; and although Napoleon, availing himself of the relics of revolutionary spirit and republican habits, and working on the epidemic love of military glory and national fame which marks that martial people, succeeded in raising enormous masses of troops, he fell, because the spirit was gone which made all France rise as one man against invasion under the Convention, and Paris saw the Allies enter it unresisted, except with groans and curses, by the people. It is, indeed, frequently said that the turns of popular opinion may prove fatal to military policy, by their sometimes urging hostilities—sometimes prematurely opposing them, and requesting peace. But this point will be considered under the next head.

4. The great question of Peace is the last and the most important point of view from which we have to survey the difference between Popular and Absolute Governments. It seems quite evident that the chances of war are far greater, at all times, under the latter. Kings are, by their nature, that is, their education and their position, lovers of war. Its pomp, its gratification to vanity and ambition, its direct gains when successful, in which they chiefly share, while its losses, if disastrous, fall on their subjects—all conspire to make this their favourite pursuit. The very necessity of maintaining a standing army for their own security at home, leads to war; for it provides the great instrument of war, the possession of which always furnishes a temptation to use it. Even when poor and exhausted by former conflicts, sovereigns will, like the father of Frederic II., pass their lives in collecting treasures and troops, in order that their sons, like him, whom thoughtless men have, for his crimes, called "Great," may squander the one and use the other in ravaging peaceful, unsuspecting provinces, to increase the number of his vassals. So, too, the league of Absolute Princes for the spoliation of their weaker neighbours is an easy operation. How little difficulty did the Governments of

Austria, Russia, and Prussia find in secretly plotting the division of Poland, and concealing that deed of darkness until it was too late to prevent its perpetration! How few words did it cost Lewis XIV. to consummate the inhuman devastation with which despotism, more unsparing than the tempest, ravaged the Palatinate! But, unless in the most barbarous times, no such atrocious outrages could be suffered in any state where the public voice is heard, and the measures of Government are subjected to free and popular discussion. Indeed, we may lay it down as a certain truth, that, in proportion as the people in any country become enlightened and well-informed of their interests and their duties, the love of peace will prevail among them; and the chances of their regarding war with any feelings but those of abhorrence will diminish. But no hope whatever can be entertained of any education eradicating from the minds of Absolute Princes the love of military glory, the thirst for extended dominion, the disposition to embark in the horrid pursuits of war; and all princes would be absolute if they could. Besides, the risks of war being undertaken are further multiplied, in an Absolute Monarchy, by the ease with which it can at once be declared, when a single voice alone decides for it. *L'état! c'est Moi!*—were Louis XIV.'s memorable words. A match broken off, or refused—a family quarrel to be espoused—the desire to extend some cousin's territory—an offence to the individual prince, or his dependents, or his relations—nay, an insult, wholly unintentional, and which he had brought upon himself; as when Charles XII. took umbrage that he was not treated like a king when he was travelling in disguise, and went to war for it; such are the causes of war, where Princes can determine with a word upon the misery of mankind; and the people, who can by no possibility have the least interest in such matters, or in the contests they create, are punished, according to the Roman poet's saying, for the frenzy of their rulers.

It is an undeniable fact, that, in a popular Government, much less is always left to chance and uncertainty, than in a Government where the will of one man forms the rule; and where caprice, and personal influence, and as-

cendency must generally prevail; and this maxim applies to the foreign as much as to the domestic concerns of the state. The greater the number of persons who must be consulted before any measure, whether of treaty or of war, is resolved upon, the less will the deliberation that leads to the decision, and the motives that regulate the execution of the plan, be subject to accident or to error. Great bodies of men discuss the whole of each matter propounded; nothing escapes them from neglect or oversight; no access is afforded to haste or caprice;—above all, there is but one object in view—the general interest, the common good; and this controls all private feelings, neutralizes all sudden impulses, and counteracts all individual peculiarities. So, too, a course once adopted for the public benefit is not hastily departed from; it is persevered in until experience shows it to be erroneous, or a change of circumstances requires a change of policy. Nothing is taken up on the whim of the moment, or the fashion of a day; nor is anything, once taken in hand, upon mature reflection, and after full discussion, laid down without just and solid cause. What misleads men in arguing on this subject, is the confounding of the proceedings of a mob with those of popular bodies regularly constituted, and acting by fixed rules. The former may easily go astray of itself, or be misled by demagogues to form hasty conclusions, and enter into precipitate courses of action,—but the latter never can, if it be not most viciously constructed. If its constitution be such as gives the reins to mob influence, or enables leading men to carry away the ruling assembly by sudden impulses, the fault is not in Popular Governments generally, but in the defective structure of the one in question. Now, it is manifest, that where the constitution is such as to afford time for reflection and deliberation before any measure can be finally resolved upon, the good sense of the community is sure to prevail over the folly of the mob; and the interests of the many over those of the few. The rational portion of the people will be convinced by argument, and drawn to the side of reason, and their weight will, in the end, regulate the voice of the whole.

Hence, generally speaking, war will be much less likely to find favour with a Popular Government than with an Absolute Court. We speak with reference to the general case; without denying that republican Governments have sometimes proved warlike, as that of the barbarous Romans, from their want of knowledge, their savage thirst for plunder, and the accidental circumstances of their situation—a band of outlaws forming their institutions, while they lived by rapine; and adhering to them through superstition. So wars will, now and then, be popular from the national feeling of the moment; as that with Spain in 1739, when public clamour drove the wise and politic Walpole from the helm he had so long and so usefully held in times of imminent domestic peril, and complicated difficulty; and, indeed, the American and the French wars were, at first, popular in this country. But then it must be recollected, that the personal influence of a narrow-minded and bigoted King, and a nobility wielding such overgrown power in Parliament as to make our Government rather an aristocracy than a popular constitution, both urged on the people to join in the cry, and prevented the return of reason and sober sense, and with them peace as soon as the neighbourhood of France had become safe. It was to the vices of our constitution that we owed the unnecessary continuance at least, if not the popularity of those fatal contests, the effects of which we have not yet outlived; for had a popularly formed legislature then existed, it is very probable neither wars would ever have been made; and perfectly certain that both would have been over in a few months.

It thus appears incontestable, that the course of Popular Governments is always likely to be more steady—less under the guidance of caprice, or at the mercy of accidental circumstances,—than that of Absolute Monarchies; that they are more to be relied upon in maintaining all the relations or intercourse with other powers; that they are sure to be better neighbours, and less prone to acts of injustice of violence; above all, that their policy is more certain to be moderate and pacific.

The happy footing upon which England and France

have been together, ever since the Revolution of 1830, is, no doubt, the result of that popular influence, whose beneficial effects we have been tracing upon the whole frame of international policy. The ancient maxim, that the two countries were natural enemies, has been succeeded by a conviction that the near neighbourhood which makes each the best customer of the other ought, in a merely commercial view, to make them natural allies. But, indeed, the very circumstance of their proximity and their strength, which exposes each in war to the greatest hazards from the other, offers an irrefragable reason for their living upon friendly terms, and never suffering any trifles to interrupt their amicable intercourse. These things were always sufficiently evident; yet the Government of the two nations being in the hands of courtiers and princes, while the people had little or no weight in the administration of affairs, the course taken by the two states was directed not by the enlightened reason and the common sense of mankind, so much as by the refinements and caprices and prejudices of the governing few; the interests and the feelings of the many being alike disregarded. Hence a spirit of rivalry and mutual enmity grew up on both sides of the Channel; and the two nations, formed by nature to be friends, were filled with a spirit of hatred and apprehension. This is now happily past; and for this we have to thank the French Revolution, and the English Reform. He would be a bold as well as a wicked Minister, in either country, who should attempt to revive the old hostility between the two; but he would speedily be a defeated and disgraced and punished Minister; and his fate would serve as an example to deter others from endeavouring to thwart the well-grounded desires, the deliberate, and rational, and virtuous principles of a mighty people.

The salutary influence of this amity and union between those great powers is felt to the very ends of the earth: it tends to the security, to the improvement, to the pacification of the world. England now resumes her station as the head of the Liberal Interest in Europe. What noble part she bore in the contests of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for Religious Freedom and the Re-

formation, that same part she now maintains for Civil Liberty and National Independence. But now her course is more clear, her success more secure, because now she has France for her mighty coadjutor; and with France her co-operation is cordial, as her amity is assured.

The peace, not of these two states alone, but of all Europe, and of the world, is in the keeping of France and England. While they continue friends, not a gun can be fired in any part of the globe without their consent. No aggression upon national independence can be attempted; no war against public liberty waged; no invasion of the rights of man and the law of nations undertaken. The occupation of the Holy Alliance is gone; it has ceased to reign; it can no more trouble and vex mankind. The police of Europe, which the conspiracy of the Calmuck, the Goth, and the Hun had affected to administer, is no longer in their hands; it is entrusted to less suspicious parties; the thief and the receiver, the murderer and the robber are no longer suffered to play the part of watchmen; or, under the disguise of patroles, to spring upon the wayfaring man. The high police of Europe, by land and by sea, is in purer hands, ay, and in stronger hands too! The great Continental power of France—the mighty Naval force of England—the sword and the trident—the eagle that has perched upon every capital of Europe, save one—the flag that "braved a thousand years the battle and the breeze" —are united under the banner of liberty; and, marshalling those two free nations, appealing, if need be, to all other people, calling to their aid the *posse comitatus* of Europe, they will have no nation molested because of its liberties—nor any tyrant protected against his subjects—nor any opinion proscribed because of its truth and worth—nor any wrong done to the weak by the strong—nor any rebellion attempted of might against right.[1]

[1] The unhappy Revolution of 1848, and the grievous errors of parties in the Legislature that followed, are chiefly to be deplored for the disrepute into which they have brought constitutional government, suspended, let us hope, rather than abolished, in France. To the powers of the Crown there, how absolute soever by law, there are bounds fixed by the influence of public opinion, and the monarchy is practically, perhaps, limited.

IV.

FOREIGN POLICY.

PARTICULAR QUESTIONS.

SPANISH AFFAIRS.

(JULY, 1808.)

A Letter from Mr. Whitbread to Lord Holland, on the present Situation of Spain. Third Edition. London. Ridgway, 1808.

WE are induced to notice this little pamphlet, more from the high character of the persons named in the title of it, than from any great value which we are disposed to set upon either the opinions contained in it, or the manner of delivering them. In fact, the letter consists pretty much of the bare *dictum* of the respectable and enlightened author. As a statement of his simple and unsupported opinion, it no doubt deserves the greatest attention from the country; and the different parties which divide the state, are very sure to bestow upon it as much notice as it deserves, each for its peculiar purpose. But our way happens not to lie through such paths; and the bare "*cogitavit*" of a man, however high in political estimation, can scarcely affect us, except in so far as it may be accompanied by a fair statement of grounds and reasonings. The subject of the "Letter" is nevertheless of such general importance, and the public are, in our humble apprehension, running so far out of the right course in their views of it, that we avail ourselves of this opportunity to say a few words upon it,—adding, we fear, one to the numberless instances in which we have attempted vainly to make the voice of reason heard in the storm of conflicting passions, and have met with the success which attends those unpleasant counsellors, who would fain prevent the pains of disappointment, by recommending a temperate indulgence in the pleasures of hope. We

shall be disposed to alter our course of practice, as soon as we find that we have been mistaken: hitherto the event has too fatally justified those ungrateful prospects which we have so often deemed it our duty to unfold.

It is necessary, however, here to premise, that we by no means intend to enter at large into the subject of Spanish affairs. Our object is to touch upon them only in their connexion with the doctrines so often delivered in this Journal upon continental politics—doctrines, in a recurrence to which, we are firmly persuaded, the salvation of England is to be found. Even if we had the information required for a full discussion of the questions, "Whether or not the Spaniards are likely to succeed?" and "How are they to seek success?"—even if the persons best qualified to treat of these matters had promulgated their sentiments upon them—if Lord Holland had written a long letter to Mr. Whitbread, instead of receiving a very short note upon the subject from his "*honourable friend*,"—still we should deem it inconsistent with our proper province to enter into those questions of present and passing politics, and to deliver arguments upon the probabilities of events so very near at hand, that in all likelihood they will happen before our speculations can reach the public. We purpose, therefore, to keep as much as possible to the most general views of those questions, and rather to consider the whole subject in its relation to the political conduct of England, and the different positions which have been maintained respecting it by the various reasoners who have of late years guided men's opinions.

Mr. Whitbread begins his letter with defending his conduct in the House of Commons, when Mr. Sheridan brought the situation of Spain under the consideration of Parliament. At that time it was altogether uncertain what part it would be most advisable for the Spanish leaders to take; and, ignorant as everybody, except the Government, of necessity was, respecting the real state of affairs in the Peninsula, Mr. Whitbread very properly thought that Government should be left free and unbiassed in its deliberations upon this weighty subject. Subsequent

events, however, he remarks, have wholly changed the appearance of the case. It has been ascertained, that all over Spain an unexampled spirit of resistance to the enemy has burst forth. The Spaniards are suddenly and of themselves committed. What then remains, he asks, but that we should assist them with all the means in our power? Having dilated upon this topic with great earnestness, and in a manner quite demonstrative, both of his participation in the universal good wishes towards the cause of Spanish liberty, and of his entertaining almost the same sanguine expectations of its success which the people of England are now fondly indulging,—Mr. Whitbread passes to another topic, which he just touches, but in a temper of moderation and impartiality which cannot be too highly commended, —the choice of leaders for such an armament as it may be deemed expedient to send into Spain. Here, too, he joins in what we trust is the universal wish, that no generals should be chosen for their rank in the state, or their connexion with the royal family, but that the choice should fall on the men whom merit and past services point out. We may remark by the way, that the *truly British* public seem wholly to have forgotten, upon this question, their usual predilection for the taste and feelings of the Sovereign. Highly as we rejoice in the circumstance, we cannot help pointing out its inconsistency with former and very recent popular clamours; and we may be permitted to marvel, that, where the Spaniards are concerned, scarcely a voice should be raised for the paternal feelings and amiable family prejudices of the Monarch in 1808, among a people which, one little year before, was loud, and almost sanguinary, in denouncing those upright and enlightened statesmen who dared to thwart the King's prejudices against four millions of his Irish subjects!

Mr. Whitbread concludes with a few words upon a topic always dear to him, and most honourably supported by his powerful talents, at a time when the Whigs themselves deserted their ancient tenets, and, betrayed by false hopes of Continental victories, or seduced by the enjoyment of power, adopted the language and views of their ancient adversaries—we mean the subject of peace. He

scruples not to affirm, that the present is a fit moment for thinking of negotiation; and as this part of his pamphlet, like the rest of his manly and virtuous conduct upon the question of peace, has been made a subject of the most base and wilful misrepresentation, we shall quote his own words;—the rather, because we have the misfortune, for the first time, and in the way we shall afterwards state, to differ from him in one particular of his sentiments on this important matter.

"At the conclusion of my speech on the Act of Appropriation, I declared that I still adhered to the opinions I laid down on the 29th of February last, when I moved as a resolution in the House of Commons, 'That there is nothing in the present state of the war which ought to preclude his Majesty from embracing any fair opportunity of acceding to, or commencing a negotiation with the enemy, on a footing of equality, for the termination of hostilities on terms of equality and honour.' I maintain that proposition now; and because I re-asserted it in the House of Commons on the day I alluded to, it has been falsely and basely stated that I advised the purchase of peace by the abandonment of the heroic Spaniards to their fate. God forbid! A notion so detestable never entered my imagination. Perish the man who could entertain it! Perish this country, rather than its safety should be owing to a compromise so horribly iniquitous! My feelings, at the time I spoke, ran in a direction totally opposite to anything so disgusting and abominable.

"I am not, however, afraid to say that the present is a moment in which I think negotiation might be proposed to the Emperor of the French by Great Britain;—with the certainty of this great advantage, that if the negotiation should be refused, we should be at least sure of being *right* in the eyes of God and man; an advantage which, in my opinion, we have never yet possessed, from the commencement of the contest to the present hour; and the value of which is far beyond all calculation.

"If the emancipation of Spain, the enthronement of Ferdinand VII., and the amelioration of the government of that country, through the means of the legitimate organ of their Cortes, or any other of their own choosing, could be effected without bloodshed, is there a man existing who would not prefer the accomplishment of these objects by the means of negotiation, rather than by the sword? If Mr. Fox were happily alive, and had power commensurate with his ability, I see a bare possibility that his genius might turn this crisis to such great account. Nothing should be done but in concert with the Spaniards; and the complete evacuation of Spain by the French armies, the abstinence from all interference in her internal arrangements, the freedom of the royal family, might be the conditions of the negotiation. There is no humiliation in such a proposal. What a grateful opportunity would at the same time present itself of making a voluntary proffer of

restitutions, which, when demanded, it might perhaps be difficult to accede to! What a moment to attempt the salvation of Sweden, and the re-establishment of the tranquillity of the North!

"All this I had in contemplation at the time I said I should not think it improper now to offer a negotiation for peace. I should be desirous of conveying these terms to the court at Bayonne, and of proclaiming them to the world. If they should be accepted, is there a statesman who could doubt of their propriety, of their justice, of their honour? If rejected, is there a free spirit in the universe that would not join in applauding the justice and moderation of Great Britain, in condemning the violence, the injustice, and ambition of the Emperor of the French?"—pp. 11–14.

Having extracted this statement, we believe no one who is not resolved wilfully to misapprehend the author's views, will accuse him of insinuating a wish at variance with the highest tone of honour and good faith towards Spain, or the most determined spirit of patriotism towards the interests of his own country. We shall afterwards state the grounds of our wishing that he had shaped his opinion somewhat differently.

The contest which is now carrying on in Spain against the French differs, in many most important points of view, from any of the wars which have been waged with France since the Revolution; and those diversities are so great, as to render it perfectly consistent in persons who have always both disapproved of the policy pursued on the Continent, and despaired of its success,—nay, in persons who, at the beginning, blamed the principle of resisting the French revolution—to wish well to the cause of the Spaniards; to recommend vigorous measures for their assistance; to entertain very sanguine hopes of the final event; and to modify their desires of peace, in order to make it subservient to the cause of Spain.

In the *first* place, France was never before so plainly and entirely in the wrong as she is in the present struggle. Formerly, she was not always the aggressor, in any point of view. For example, the first coalition against the Revolution was a manifest war of aggression on the part of the Allies; and, even when she might be said to have given just cause of hostility, as previous to the third coalition, still she contrived to let the other party strike the first blow; and, always throwing upon her adversaries the odium

of disturbing the peace of the Continent, she managed to maintain, in the eyes of men, the reputation of only moving in self-defence. Whoever was ultimately the cause of war, the blame which men always attach to the party who first breaks the peace, fell constantly upon the enemies of France: and it did so happen, that her conduct, at the treaties which generally followed those disastrous campaigns, was sufficiently moderate, considering her enormous victories, to keep up the same impression. Everything bore the appearance of France having been forced into hostilities by the jealousy, the fears, or the restlessness of her neighbours, acting under the influence of England; of having been compelled to beat them from one end of Europe to the other; and then taking as little as she well could of their territory, as a punishment for their past aggressions, and a security for their keeping the peace in future. But now she has unequivocally adopted a different line of conduct. She has at once, and suddenly, thrown off the mask, and, without the shadow of a pretext, attacked her most inoffensive neighbour, her submissive ally,—whose force and treasure she had for years been permitted to use as her own,—whose whole resources were always at her service,—and whose dominions she only in name did not hold as a province of her vast empire. Without a pretence of ground for quarrelling—without a single high word having passed between them—she marches her armies into the Peninsula, dethrones the royal family, and takes possession of the crown. Here, therefore, France cannot even pretend that she is not the sole aggressor; and, as such, she is viewed by her neighbours, by the Spaniards, and even by her own subjects.

Secondly. In former wars between France and her neighbours, the courts and the regular armies on both sides were alone engaged. After one game had been played in the cabinet, of intrigue, solicitation, trick and bribery, another game was the consequence of it in the field,—a game of tactics, stratagems, regular murder, and legalized plunder. Superior skill in a few persons who had the management of these games was sure to carry the stake; and the people, whom the result of the contest transferred from the loser

to the winner, stood by pretty much unconcerned how it might end, and caring mighty little whether they paid tribute to Cæsar or to Pompey. But now, for the first time, a whole people is at war with a foreign court and its armies. They have a large and defensible territory to act in; they carry on, at their own doors, a most just and purely defensive war; they have drawn their swords (to use the memorable words of Washington,[1] would that they had such a man to lead them!) "for the only cause which can justify this extremity;" and they are altogether invincible if they follow up the dying counsels of the same great patriot; "and having once drawn them, resolve never again to sheathe the same until they conquer, but rather prefer falling with them in their hands to the relinquishment thereof." If such a spirit pervades the Peninsula,—if it proves as lasting and steady as it is keen in the outset,—we may be well assured that France will never occupy more of Spain than the ground her military posts shall cover, nor reckon among her vassals any Castilians but those whom she locks up in her prisons. We by no means intend to say that this perseverance is certain of being exhibited; but we assert, that the resistance has now, for the first time, begun well, and in the right quarter,—and that now, if ever, there are some grounds for hope.

In the *third* place, the fatal errors which prepared for the French armies the way to Berlin and Vienna, are much less likely to be committed by the Spanish; nor is the contest now carried on by the talents and spirit of a great people against the sloth and feebleness of a corrupted court. In truth, the court of Madrid is at an end; it basely fled from the country; and, having left the people to fight their own battle,—having, in fact, taken part with the enemy against them,—it cannot expect either that its views should be thought of, or that it should ever regain its power, even if the struggle proves successful. This, indeed, is the best item in the whole account of the Spaniards. They are set free from their old, hereditary, corrupt rulers

[1] Last will of General Washington, bequeathing his sword, which he had borne in the war, to his nephews.

—from personages who governed by rote—from the creatures of intrigue, or, at best, the creatures of form and precedent—from the feeble beings who will only suffer men to serve the country according to their pedigrees—contemners of merit and personal acquirements—scoffers at all genius—to whom, melancholy reflection! the fate of Europe has been entrusted for the last twenty years, and in whose hands the cause of regular government and national independence has been placed, at a moment when all the bad passions of man's nature were let loose against them, and had armed all the talents of a mighty people for their destruction. Accordingly, those governments have, one after another, fallen, we speak literally, before the *genius* of France; but Spain is, in some sort, about to fight her with her own weapons; and to oppose, what we greatly fear can alone afford a barrier to one revolution,—another revolution. If anything can check the progress of the French armies, it is this; and we deeply lament that the experiment was not tried sooner, when, instead of a chance, Europe might, in such measures, have found a certainty of salvation.

Having thus far stated, in general, what we conceive to be the circumstances peculiarly distinguishing the present struggle against France, and admitted, to so large an extent, that they open very favourable prospects of success, we must now shortly advert to the other side of the question, which, unhappily, is never looked at by the people of this country, because it is not so flattering to their wishes. What, it may be asked, makes us retain any fears of the result, after the very favourable circumstances which have been enumerated? What have we to oppose, on the side of France, to all that has now been reckoned up in favour of Spain? To all this we must unhappily oppose the French Army, directed by the French Cabinet. Greatly as we think of the Spaniards, their enemy is at the head of half a million of the best soldiers in the world; and, so abundant a stock of generals has he,—so large a provision of the stuff of which generals are made, that every officer above the rank of a captain might be slain, and nine in ten of all the rest of his officers,—and on the morrow he would have

at his command a greater number of men fitted to carry on his war, an army better officered and better disciplined for his purposes, than ever took the field before the year 1796. This tremendous engine it is which we own does appal us. If we could but see any of the vices or follies of old governments creeping into the French military system—could we only hear of some kept-mistress giving away a command—or of some stripling of quality rising into high place—or of squabblings between some silly prince and some booby dignitary of the French empire about the management of an expedition—or of some division in the councils of Bonaparte, respecting his policy towards Spain, and a delay in marching his armies thither, were it but of one little week—or could we even learn that an unknown officer, of long standing and high military rank, was likely to be entrusted with the command—or be it only, that a distinguished veteran, too ancient to be active and alert at his post, had been named to carry on the Spanish campaign;—we should be infinitely comforted and cheered in our views of this momentous affair, and should begin to be sanguine about the deliverance of Europe. But, alas! the dynasty of Bonaparte is yet too fresh for such blunders as these; it cannot afford to indulge in those *dulcia vitia* of old established governments; and the sad truth really is, that, at the present moment, he has a system of policy and of military power which unites in itself almost every benefit of a revolutionary government, with a far greater degree of order and regularity than ever before presided over the affairs of the most ancient monarchies.

Therefore it is that we dread the issue. And admitting everything that can be urged in favour of the Spaniards—granting that they are much better off than the Austrians or Prussians, and a thousand times more advantageously circumstanced than those famous allies of ours the Muscovites—allowing that they are possessed of many of the benefits of a revolutionary system—that, for example, they are in somewhat the same relative situation with the French at the treaty of Pilnitz;—still we cannot help remarking that the odds are turned against them, by the un-

fortunate circumstance of their enemy having the same advantages in a still higher degree, together with the inestimable benefit of ample preparation and systematic arrangement. If the Spaniards stand now where the French did in 1792, unhappily the French are a very different enemy from the Prussians and Austrians; and we greatly fear, that had the Duke of Brunswick entered Champagne with the sort of armies which are at this moment crossing the Pyrenees, we should have heard very little more of the revolution, and less still of the universal empire of France.

We may likewise be perfectly certain, that the Spaniards have to do with an enemy, who does not act either tardily or scrupulously—who will do nothing by halves—and be restrained by no considerations of humanity from making his very utmost efforts to put down this first symptom that has yet appeared of popular resistance to his authority. He is too deeply interested in the matter, his power is too much committed in the contest to allow room for half measures, even were those according to his taste at any time. In what manner he may set about his work,—whether by entering Spain himself at the head of a mighty army,—or by sending numberless detachments successively to support each other, and scour the country, while more are always kept behind the Pyrenees, in case of necessity, —or by first occupying the capital and those champaign districts, which must always be the property of the regular army in a contest with undisciplined natives, and then turning his force by degrees into light troops, and pushing his way into the more difficult country;—whether he will trust more to the effect of prompt and rapid measures, of overwhelming successes, accompanied with severe examples of vengeance, or to the consequences of such delay as may give the popular spirit time to cool, and his emissaries an opportunity of intriguing to divide the natives, and conciliate some portion of them; or whether he will put part of all these plans into motion,—it belongs not to us even to conjecture, placed as we are at a distance from the scene, almost wholly ignorant of the facts, and acquainted with the relative situation of the parties only by the evidence of

one side. But it is not presuming too much on past experience to conclude, that whatever military and political resources can effect—that all the efforts of artifice and of force—that the utmost powers of the finest armies and most subtle intriguers in Europe, will be exhausted in the one remorseless, unprincipled effort to crush the Spanish revolution. Can any man of sense—does any plain, unaffected man, above the level of a drivelling courtier, or a feeble fanatic, dare to say he can look at this impending contest, without trembling, every inch of him, for the result?

The question, then, seems in a great measure to reduce itself to this—What probability is there that the popular spirit, now so gloriously prevalent all over Spain, will last, for one or two years, unimpaired by time,—undivided by the enemy's arts—unchecked by the inevitable defeats which must attend the opening of the campaign—unwearied by the constant hardships, the changes of life, the numberless privations of every sort which must ever fall to the lot of those who resist the powers that be, until their victory over oppression is finally secured? This is the only question; for, should the public ardour against France continue a considerable time in its present universality and violence, we would willingly take it against all the resources of the enemy just now enumerated. In an extensive and difficult country like Spain—full of passes—scarce of provisions in most of the mountainous districts—not well known of course to the invaders—so situated that one position does not command any other;—we conceive it to be impossible for a numerous people to be conquered by any human means, so long as they are animated by the same spirit of resistance, and resolved to preserve their independence. The only question is, whether this spirit be not in its nature transient,—whether multitudes of men are not apt to be either excessively sanguine or irrecoverably depressed,—to pass from the extreme of hope to that of despondency,—and to be dispersed, by time and weariness, in a cause good enough, and sufficiently adored, to have made them invincible while kept together.

This consideration, we confess, it is that alarms us, and damps our expectations, greatly as we desire to believe

every thing credible in favour of the Spaniards. Nor are we much disposed to confide in the hopes so universally expressed, that because this gallant people are committed, they cannot retract,—that, reduced to misery by the cruelties already practised upon them, they are in a state of desperation. For, in truth, it is a figure of speech to talk of a nation being desperate, or so far committed, as of necessity to go all lengths. Individuals may be so, and will act accordingly; but, in a community, one man is committed, and another, when called to go all lengths in consequence, so far from feeling inclined to act desperately, will very probably take warning by the fate of his neighbours. One family loses two or three children, and becomes, we will admit, quite desperate; but another, which has not yet been equally unfortunate, will probably be warned by this example, and prefer the private to the public feelings. This, indeed, is the great risk which awaits all such popular feelings as are now excited in Spain. The father of a family—the individual—is apt to weigh down the citizen and the patriot; while, to the opposite party, delay creates no danger at all; and thus it becomes much to be apprehended, that the efforts which are requisite to oppose the refinements of art and system on the one side, are more than nature can long sustain upon the other.

We are very far from saying that skill and wisdom can do nothing to prevent disunion, and to prolong the duration of zeal on the part of the Spaniards. It is no doubt possible, that they will be wise enough to adopt the only measure which can greatly help them in these important points—that they will, in the outset, assemble a Cortes, and thus give an unanimity and consistency to their proceedings, as well as lead them further towards a total and radical change in their government, and in their whole domestic policy. Much may certainly be expected from so wise a measure; and, if we saw it adopted, our fears for their success would be somewhat diminished. But, placed as we are at the threshold, and uncertain both of the course they are to pursue, and of the relative position of their dreadful adversary, we are compelled to admit, that, upon the whole, our apprehensions predominate. In

a word, upon the case as it is at present before this country, the sounder opinion seems to be that which is unhappily too melancholy to contemplate with calmness,—that the Spaniards will be defeated, after a gallant and most sanguinary struggle; and, that, if any measures can save them from this fate, they will be those which are in their nature decidedly revolutionary; although, for the reasons formerly urged, it seems very doubtful, whether the power of France, growing out of the revolution, and since consolidated into a system, will now permit any change of government and policy, however violent, to secure the independence of Spain.

Here we must, once for all, deny the imputation of adopting this desponding view of things from any foolish propensity to oppose the popular and fashionable opinions, or from the vain notion, that it looks like the wiser judgment. We do not take up this theme, lest we should be suspected of being romantic in the cause of liberty (which we have been frequently accused of too keenly favouring), as some natives of the sister kingdom are said at once to betray and disclaim their country, by suspecting blunders where there are none,—or as countrymen of our own frequently find out a joke in very serious positions, in order to escape the common national imputation of not knowing when to laugh. Far from all this. We would eagerly cling to the favourable view of the Spanish cause; and can only be torn from the prospects so flattering to those sentiments of freedom,—of active resistance to all sorts of oppression, which we openly avow and glory in,—by the conviction that we should be but feeding our own minds and those of our readers with an empty picture. It is not unwise, however unpleasant it may be, to examine the chances of failure with a curiosity proportioned to the vast importance of success;—nor is even an excess of incredulity altogether inexcusable in those who have drunk deeply of disappointment.

It remains, that we should apply the present topics to the doctrines formerly maintained by us, and those respecting peace pointed out by Mr. Whitbread in the passage above extracted. We certainly do see no reason whatever for

wishing that the Continental Powers should seize the present opportunity of breaking with France; or for changing the opinion so frequently expressed by us in favour of pacific measures. Both of these points will require a very little illustration.

First, It seems quite manifest, that the situation of the German and Northern Powers is, for the purpose of resistance to France, as desperate as it was after the battle of Friedland, in every circumstance relating merely to their own resources. There seems as much reason as ever to dread a rupture on the part of one state without the concurrence of the rest,—to despair of the possibility of such a general movement,—and to apprehend the most ruinous consequences from its result, were it possible to produce one. What is there, then, in the situation of Spain, to make us alter an opinion dictated by the circumstances of those states, if viewed by themselves? Is there any thing so very favourable in our prospects from that quarter, as to counterbalance all the dangers which we so reasonably apprehend elsewhere, and to supply all the deficiencies of the other powers? Had the Spaniards bowed submissively to their invaders, would any man in his senses have harboured a wish to see Austria and Russia seeking their destruction by a new war? Every thing, then, hinges upon Spain; and, unless it can be made to appear that Spain alone turns the scale against France,—unless it can be supposed, that the enemy is so completely occupied beyond the Pyrenees as to disarm him on every other side,—unless it is maintained that, he despairs of success in Spain, and still is so far committed that he cannot draw back,—nay, unless it is maintained, that even on the most favourable supposition, of his total failure, he will then be pursued into his own territory, and conquered by Spaniards on one side, while Germans assail him on the other—it is utterly absurd to desire a rupture in the North at the present moment.

Now, we will make the most favourable of these suppositions at once, in order to try the question shortly and fairly. We will admit that Bonaparte fails, and retires from Spain. He will then, in all likelihood, send back to

them the Spanish royal family, with their princes, and courtiers, and intriguers of all descriptions. It is probable that intestine disputes will speedily begin to play his game for him, and prepare his success at a future time, when experience shall have taught him the evils of that most unaccountable step of his life,—the removal of the Spanish court. It is certain that the presence of those exalted personages will hamper any offensive measures which the victorious patriots might attempt against him. But, putting this entirely out of the question, can there be folly and inconsistency more lamentable than theirs, who expect to see the French armies beaten by Spanish peasants, fighting for their own country,—and yet suppose that human nature will change when the French repass the Pyrenees, and that French armies, backed by the whole population of France, and fighting for France, and in France, will be conquered by Spanish peasants fighting abroad for the balance of Europe! Is there not something monstrous in such sanguine, unthinking folly as this? Then, if the enemy is only to be left, at the end of the contest with Spain, in the situation he would have occupied had he never entered that country, what safety is there for those German states which shall have gone to war with him in his necessity? Admitting that he keeps on the frontier of the Pyrenees as many men as his complete conquest of Spain would have compelled him to keep beyond it, is he less able to take terrible vengeance on those neighbours who may have provoked him at a critical moment, than he was when Prussia, in similar circumstances, provoked him last year? And is it very unlikely that he may seek compensation on the Danube for his loss of kingdoms on the Ebro and the Tagus? It signifies nothing to say, that Austria and Russia, by attacking him at this time, would make a formidable diversion in favour of the Spanish cause. Certainly they would; but our argument proceeds on the admission that the Spaniards succeed at any rate; and if the ruin of Austria and Russia is not to be prevented by the utmost successes of the Spanish arms, then what will those powers have done but sacrifice themselves to save Spain? And what will Europe have gained by their movement,

but the independence of one country at the expense of all the rest? These are considerations so obvious, that they must prevent all those follies on the part of the Continental Powers, which our English politicians have been so anxious to see practised. A combination, formed on such principles of self-devotion and love of Spain, cannot be expected; and, if tried, could not hang together for six weeks. We do acknowledge it to be our wish, therefore, that no fifth coalition should be attempted in the present crisis; and see no reason whatever to vary in any one particular, the sentiments so often delivered by us on this subject.

In what we have now said, we have purposely abstained from all allusion to the chance of any discontent or insurrection manifesting itself in France, in consequence of the ambitious and endless wars of its ruler. The experience of the last ten years might convince us how forlorn a hope this now is. The conscription, no doubt, is unpopular; but the existing army is always far more than sufficient to enforce it without the chance of resistance; and that army is so constituted, as almost necessarily to delight in war, both as a source of emolument, and as holding out the occasions by which enterprising talents may certainly attain to the very highest distinction. Besides, who is there now in France to head or plan an insurrection? Or what attainable or conceivable object could be aimed at by such a measure? Almost every individual who has any reputation, influence, or notoriety in the country, owes it to the existing government, and must stand or fall with it. Among all his generals and ministers, there is none possessed of fame, popularity, or power, to rival Bonaparte. The generation of republicans is extinct already among that light and versatile people: and the cause of the Bourbons may fairly be regarded as desperate. If the exiled monarch is to be restored to his throne, his exiled nobles must be restored to their estates and privileges; but the thousands and tens of thousands who now hold those properties, will submit to many oppressions and many conscriptions rather than give them up. Besides, the government of the Bourbons was bad; and very few Frenchmen, we suppose, would give even a vote for re-

placing them on the throne of Bonaparte. A generation indeed has grown up which has been taught to look on their pretensions as ridiculous; and there has been nothing heroic or captivating in the conduct of any existing branch of the family, to win men's hearts to their cause, or to prevent the total suppression of their party in the country by which they have been rejected. If there were no insurrections in France, in short, when Bonaparte marched its armies across the Vistula and the Niemen, we do not perceive any likelihood of such an event from his carrying them across the Pyrenees. The French people, we apprehend, care as little for the rights of the Spanish patriots, as for those of the citizens of Hamburgh; and, at any rate, are not very likely to feel much admiration for the champions of such a sovereign as Ferdinand the VII. From France itself, therefore, we hold it altogether extravagant and unreasonable to look for any co-operation.

Secondly, With respect to peace, Mr. Whitbread says merely, Send a negotiator to Bayonne to treat for peace to yourselves; but do not give up, in any the smallest particular, the interests of your Spanish allies. We cannot approve of such a proposition; because no man could persuade the Spaniards, and surely our own conduct on former occasions would but little countenance the belief that we were not giving them up, and making for ourselves a peace which should leave them at the mercy of France. If, indeed, we could suppose a manifesto issued by royal authority, proclaiming our willingness to treat upon the basis of France withdrawing all her forces from Spain, and making it known to all the world, that, for the independence and safety of that country, we were willing to give up our own quarrel with France,—this indeed could lead to no mistake, and leave nothing obscure to serve as the ground of suspicion. And no man surely can deny, that if we could gain such terms, and could put an end to the present war, stopping the conquests of the enemy, and leaving Europe as it now is, —with Spain revolutionized, independent, and hostilely disposed towards France,—it would be a blessing to ourselves and to the whole world, abundantly more valuable

than anything which could result from the greatest successes that any reasonable man can expect from the prolongation of hostilities. On the other hand, it is, to be sure, most likely that the enemy will reject such an offer, and refuse to treat. He never treats when he is in the way of being worsted; he is a skilful gamester, and leaves his play only when he is winning. Then we shall gain nothing, it may be said, for ourselves and our allies by having made the proposal. At all events we shall lose nothing. But it is not clear that this will be all. Will the people of the Continent not begin to think us in the right—for the first time? Will the French themselves not begin to murmur against their leader, or at least to follow him with less ardour in his conquests? Above all, will the Spaniards, for whom we shall have offered to yield everything,—will they not stand by us with increased steadiness, and fight their own battle with new spirit? These things, it appears to us, are worth the consideration even of the most sanguine speculators in Spanish victories. But we are aware, at the same time, that they are unhappily almost as chimerical as some of the expectations which we have described in the course of the present discussion. They are little suited to the feelings of the English multitude; or the corresponding views and policy of the present race of English statesmen. Nor can we help feeling a melancholy presentiment, that, in a few months, the fortunes of France will have prevailed over the most righteous cause that ever fixed the attention of mankind; that the armies of Bonaparte will carry rapine and carnage into every corner of Spain; and that the fleets of our unhappy allies will, somehow or other, find their way into an English port.

Before concluding, we may be permitted to add one sentence in explanation of such parts of the preceding observations as may seem tinctured with utter and incurable despondency. If Germany and the North, combined against France, with Spain and England, would only provoke repetition of defeat, what hope, it may be said, can Europe *ever* entertain of deliverance; since her *whole* force is thus supposed to be ineffectually exerted against

her oppressors? Now, to this we answer,—That though we can indeed anticipate no other result from any exertions that can *at present* be made by those powers, or from any combination into which they are now likely to enter, we are at the same time persuaded, that there is in Europe a fund both of power and of spirit, far more than sufficient to repress the usurpations of France, if guided by better counsels, and husbanded in the mean time with economy and caution. All the great Continental Powers have recently received a tremendous blow,—from the shock of which they are yet far from being recovered; and the truth is, that while their old governments are administered on the principles by which they have hitherto been guided, and while their coalitions are directed to such objects as have hitherto been aimed at,—there does appear to us to be *no chance* of their making any effectual resistance to the solid power and energetic policy of the enemy. The fatal experience, however, which they have all had of the fruits of their old policy, joined to the improving intelligence of the great body of the people, and the mingled contempt and indignation with which they must regard the infatuation of their rulers, will, we have no doubt, produce an improvement of all these governments, and gradually develope the powers and resources of those great and enlightened nations which in this crisis have been administered with less wisdom and vigour than might have been expected in a confederacy of barbarians. A certain period of peace and tranquillity is necessary, however, to effect this change; and will, at the same time, infallibly tend to relax the energy of the French administration, and to surround it with all those sources of weakness which ultimately disarm despotic governments of their power to injure. To provoke the combat prematurely, is to insure defeat and irremediable ruin. To force the old governments,—while they are still clinging to the policy they have ceased to confide in,—to try their strength once more, against an enemy, who has not yet yielded to the corruptions which are daily assailing him,—is to make sure of the final overthrow of the former, and, by consolidating all Europe into one tyrannical and military

despotism, to cut off, for ages yet to come, the great improvements which time itself would otherwise work among mankind. Let the Continent, therefore, preserve what it has left of independence, by peace; since, at present, it would be utterly ruined by war; and let us be persuaded, that if, by any exertions on our part, we could procure the same blessing for Spain in the present state of its tendencies and feelings, we should do more for the cause of liberty and national independence, than if we could once more array the courts of Vienna, and Petersburgh, and Berlin, in a jealous and unwieldy coalition.[1]

[1] Nothing that has since happened can be said materially to affect the views in this and other papers on Spanish affairs. But for the second great error of Napoleon, his Russian campaign (his Spanish invasion being the first), there can be no doubt whatever that he would have been able to obtain possession, though not an undisturbed possession, of the Peninsula.

SPAIN AND THE WAR.

(October, 1808.)

Exposition of the Practices and Machinations which led to the Usurpation of the Crown of Spain, and the Means adopted by the Emperor of the French to carry it into execution. By Don Pedro Cevallos, First Secretary of State and Despatches to his Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII. Translated from the original Spanish. London, 1808.

We gladly avail ourselves of the appearance of this interesting document, in order to enter somewhat at large into several points, either omitted, or too slightly touched upon, in our former observations on Spanish affairs. But we must premise a few things respecting the state-paper now before us, and its author.

Don Pedro Cevallos, after more than the Pythagorean period of silence on every discussion which concerned the interests of his country, and particularly the two grand subjects, of the French alliance, and the Prince of the Peace, has now happily recovered his speech, and talks like a most patriotic Spaniard and a bold politician. In truth, to hear him, one is tempted to think it some other Don Pedro than the illustrious person who, for so many years, acted as the tool of the reigning favourite, and helped him out with all his submissions to France. His new principles are no doubt much better than his old; but we cannot avoid just noting the change as we pass along.

After observing that it is the duty of one who has been placed in circumstances like his, to develope the various machinations of his country's enemies (and who, indeed, so fit to make such an exposition as he whose lot has been cast successively with all parties?), he proceeds to sketch, very hastily, the political conduct of the Spanish cabinet

during the interval between the peace of Basle and the late convulsions. This he characterizes with some asperity. "To maintain, at all hazards, the ruinous alliance concluded in 1796," he says, "there is no sacrifice which Spain has not made.—Fleets, armies, treasure—everything was sacrificed to France;—humiliations—submissions—everything was suffered—everything was done to satisfy, as far as possible, the insatiable demands of the French government." The reader of these invectives would scarcely suspect that he has them from the pen of the man who was minister for foreign affairs in Spain, during the period of all those *submissions* and *humiliations*, who presided over that department when the *fleets* of Spain were *sacrificed* at Trafalgar, her *armies* drafted off to Germany, and her *treasure* offered up at the feet of France, until England chose to make war with her for the purpose of sharing in the plunder, after a negotiation conducted by this very Don Pedro in his capacity of foreign minister. After serving Charles IV. under the Prince of the Peace he went into Ferdinand's employ when Bonaparte declared for that young sovereign. He accompanied his new master to Bayonne, when, contrary to every suggestion of prudence, he undertook that ill-fated journey. He was there appointed to negotiate with the French agent, when Ferdinand was desired to resign his crown on certain conditions. But, according to his own statement, he was found too inflexible a counsellor, and was displaced, after repeated and gross bad treatment from the French government. Nevertheless, when Joseph was named king, so completely were all those offences against France forgotten, that, at the new monarch's special and most earnest request, he went with him to Madrid as his minister. Then, finding the insurrection pretty general, and Joseph likely to have the worst of it, he left his service, and immediately starts up again as prime minister to Ferdinand VII.—"our beloved sovereign"—in which last capacity he now addresses his countrymen upon the nefarious, perfidious, and shuffling conduct of the French government.

It is scarcely necessary for us to lay before our readers any abstract of the tale unfolded by Don Pedro in this

extraordinary memorial, because it has already been circulated so very widely, that we could not hope to find a single reader to whom such an abstract would have the recommendation of novelty. Before proceeding, however, to express any of the reflections which its perusal is so well calculated to suggest, we may just observe that there are two points in which we conceive Don Pedro to have completely failed, and one only, though that is of by far the greatest consequence, in which we think he has succeeded. He has failed, we think, completely, 1st, in his attempt to vindicate his own honour and consistency; and, 2ndly, in his attempt to show that the original resignation of Charles IV. in favour of Ferdinand was a free and unconstrained resignation. But he has suceeeded in showing to all Europe that the proceedings of France have been marked, throughout, with the greatest perfidy, and the most signal injustice.

With regard to himself, it is enough to say, that, after all his pretended protestations against the unprincipled violence and insulting usurpation of the French court, he *was asked* to accept the place of first minister to King Joseph Napoleon, and that *he accepted* of that offer. It is useless, after this, to attend to his humiliating equivocations, or to enter into any discussion of his previous apostasy from the cause of Charles to that of Ferdinand. There is no honest man to whom his own statement of the two leading facts we have now mentioned will not be quite satisfactory, and perfectly conclusive, indeed, as to the personal character of Don Pedro Cevallos.

With regard to the abdication of King Charles, and the dark and disgraceful intrigues by which his unfortunate family dissensions appear to have been consummated, we will venture to assert, that no light whatever is thrown on the subject by the extraordinary narrative of this heirloom of the Escurial,—this fixture in the seat of Spanish royalty. In what degree ministerial perfidy or filial ambition,—foreign intrigue or popular discontent,—contributed to this miserable catastrophe, it seems, as yet, too early to determine. But we have no more doubt that the resignation of Charles was produced by the threats and the cabals of

Ferdinand, than we have that the resignation of the latter was extorted by the violence and the menaces of Bonaparte. There is something not only incredible, but ludicrous, in the story which Don Pedro tells, of the free and affectionate resignation of this unfortunate monarch,—whom he represents, like some sentimental old gentleman in a German comedy, taking his elderly consort by the hand, and addressing her in these touching words—"Maria Louisa, we will retire to one of the provinces, where we will pass our days in tranquillity; and Ferdinand, who is a young man, will take upon himself the burden of the government." The innocence of the galleries might perhaps tolerate this trait of Bucolic sublimity; but there is no pit in Europe that would endure it even in a play.

Questionable, however, as we conceive the testimony of Don Pedro to be, we cannot withhold our belief from the story which he tells of the insolence and the outrageous usurpations of Napoleon. It bears, we think, the intrinsic character of truth; and it corresponds exactly, not only with the general character of the persons represented, but with the visible exterior of the transaction which it professes to detail.

In an earlier age of European history it might have been worth while to have chronicled the steps of this most profligate usurpation; and to have noted the shameful alternations of flattering promises, and ambiguous menaces,—of barefaced and unblushing falsehood, and open ferocious violence,—by which this bold, cunning, and unrelenting conqueror accomplished the first part of his ambitious project. Like the lion-hunters of old, he drew his victims on in the course which he had prepared for them,—by cajoling and by irritation,—by soothing their appetites and exciting their spirit,—till at last, by trick and by open violence combined, the royal beasts were driven into his toils, and placed completely at the disposal of their stern and artful pursuer. These things, however, are now familiar; and it is among the most melancholy and depressing of the reflections suggested by the tale before us, that it has revealed nothing which all its readers were not prepared to expect; and that, atrocious as it is,

it harmonizes exactly with the rest of the policy by which Europe has for some time been governed. We turn gladly from this scene of imperial robbery, royal weakness, and ministerial perfidy, to contemplate, though with a fearful and unassured eye, the animating spectacle of that popular and patriotic struggle for independence, to which the crisis has so unexpectedly given rise.

In treating of the affairs of Spain, in our last number, we found ourselves obliged to express an opinion respecting the probable issue of the contest, far less sanguine than that with which the bulk of the people in this country have been fondly flattering themselves; and it is painful now to add, that we can, as yet, discover no good reason for changing that opinion. The glorious efforts of the Spaniards have, indeed, in more instances than could have been expected, obtained the success which their zeal and valour so amply merited. The surrender of Dupont's army, the general retreat of the enemy towards the Pyrenees, and the flight of Joseph from Madrid, have all happened since we last touched upon this subject; and as no one was sanguine enough to think the Spaniards could triumph without many severe losses in the outset of the contest, so, almost every one appears now to view the struggle as already decided in their favour. Because the expectation of beginning with disasters has been agreeably disappointed, men seem to have become much more sanguine than they were at first, and to consider disaster as out of the question. It is not our purpose to examine minutely the probabilities on which this question turns; but we must state a few observations, sufficiently plain, one should think, to have damped the romantic hopes even of the English nation.

Let us reflect what the army is which the Spaniards have repulsed, in order to find out whether they have as yet come to close quarters with Bonaparte. That consummate statesman appears for once to have erred in his calculation, when he expected to take possession of Spain by the mere force of a treaty. Unaccustomed to meet with any resistance on the part of the people, he thought that his business was completed as soon as he had got the

royal family into his power. He thought he had made sure of his purchase when he had made them execute the deed of conveyance; and only sent such a force as might be necessary for taking quiet possession. When this force, however, arrived in Spain, it appeared that the whole work remained to be done; and the army which was sent to keep the crown, soon found that they had yet to fight for it. This is the only French force which has hitherto been engaged with the patriots. The whole force of Spain has been opposed, not to an enemy sent by France to conquer her, but to a detachment sent for a perfectly different purpose—to do the mere parade duty of the new monarchy. That this was a large detachment we do not deny; and still less would we dispute the claims of those who conquered it to their own immortal renown. We only contend that it was not the army with which France intended to subdue Spain. Suppose that France were at this moment to declare war against Prussia;—no human being can affect to doubt (except, perhaps, those drivellers who conduct the French emigrant press in London) that the fragments which remain of that monarchy would instantly crumble into Bonaparte's hand. And why do we so surely form this expectation? Because we know, that immediately upon the commencement of hostilities he would send a sufficient force to annihilate everything that might dare to resist. But if, by any unaccountable error in his calculation, he should only send one half of the requisite force;—if, for example, the Prussian army being fifty thousand strong, Bonaparte were to send only thirty thousand men across the Rhine, or wherever Prussia is now to be found, and to leave them without reinforcements; or if, by any other blunder, he were to leave such a force exposed, having sent it on some different service; they would probably be entirely defeated: yet would any man say that Prussia was restored by this sort of victory? Nevertheless, it would be quite true that a large French army had been beaten by the Prussians. And the only reason why this victory would signify nothing is, that Bonaparte would most certainly pour a hundred thousand men into Brandenburgh the week after.

In like manner, the Spaniards have not yet tried their strength against their formidable adversary. They have attacked him unawares, and beaten him by surprise. He has not even girded himself for the fight, and they have only overpowered him unarmed. He will rally and renew the combat. The whole battle is still to begin. We have seen, in reality, nothing of it. Army after army will be poured through the Pyrenees, and all Spain must become a field of blood. The zeal of the Spaniards has now to withstand the skill of the French captains and the discipline of their veteran soldiers. The councils of the different kingdoms of which the Spanish monarchy is composed, are matched against the vigour and unity of a single, practised, absolute, remorseless man. The enthusiasm of the patriots has to contend against the regular, habitual, animal courage of professional soldiers; and the question is, which of those two feelings is likely to prevail in the long run;—to bear up against difficulties and privations,—to survive disasters,—and to endure the inactivity of protracted operations. Such is the contest which is now beginning in Spain, and such are the grounds of our melancholy forebodings, that it will lead to the subjugation of the most gallant people in the world.

It is, indeed, melancholy to reflect on these things, when we consider how glorious would be the effects of the liberation of Spain. There is no occasion for describing in this place the more obvious consequences of such a triumph, in permanently weakening the power of France, overcoming the terror of her name, and extending both the political and commercial influence of England. We are rather disposed at present to view another less exposed part of the picture, and to contemplate the effects of the struggle upon the cause of civil liberty; and we do so the rather that a part of those consequences may not improbably ensue from the glorious efforts already made, although it should terminate unsuccessfully.

The resistance to France has been entirely begun and carried on by the people in Spain. Their kings betrayed them—fled, and rushed, with the whole of their base courtiers, into the arms of the enemy. Their nobles

followed; and it is painful to reflect, that some of the most distinguished of this body, after attending Ferdinand to Bayonne, returned in the train of Joseph, and only quitted his service when the universal insurrection of the common people drove him from his usurped throne. The people, then, and of the people, the middle, and above all, the lower orders, have alone the merit of raising this glorious opposition to the common enemy of national independence. Those who had so little of what is commonly termed *interest* in the country, those who had *no stake* in the community (to speak the technical language of the aristocracy),—the persons of *no consideration* in the state,—they who could not pledge *their fortunes*, having only lives and liberties to lose,—the bulk—the mass of the people,—nay, the very odious, many-headed beast, the multitude—the mob itself—alone, uncalled, unaided by the higher classes,—in spite of those higher classes, and in direct opposition to them, as well as to the enemy whom they so vilely joined,—raised up the standard of insurrection,—bore it through massacre and through victory, until it had chased the usurper away, and waved over his deserted courts. Happen what will in the sequel, here is a grand and permanent success,—a lesson to all governments,—a warning to all oligarchies,—a cheering example to every people. Not a name of note in Spain was to be seen in the records of the patriotic proceedings, until the cause began to flourish; and then the higher orders came round for their share in the success. The Spaniards, then, owe their victory, whether it unhappily stops short at its present point or ends in the expulsion of the invaders, wholly to the efforts of the people.

Suppose for a moment that they succeed; that France gives way before she tries the issue of the impending contest; or is finally defeated, and Spain freed;—Will the gallant people, after performing such wonders, quietly open the doors of the Escurial to the same herd of crowned or titled intriguers, who, first by misruling the monarchy, and then by deserting it in that utmost need into which their misrule had brought it, had rendered necessary all the effusion of blood, and had *almost* ren-

dered it vain? Having shed their best blood in rescuing their house from a banditti admitted by the cowardice or treachery of the watchmen, will the Spaniards be such fools as to restore those poltroons and traitors to their former posts, and renew a confidence so universally abused? No man can hesitate one instant in saying, that this thing neither ought to be, nor will be. Common justice demands such a change of government as will give the people who have saved the state—who have reconquered it, a fair salvage—a large share in its future management. Common sense requires an alteration in the political constitution of the monarchy, sufficiently radical to guard it against a recurrence of the late crisis. And if all considerations of justice and of prudence were out of the question, the Spanish court may be assured of this, that the feelings of our common nature,—the universal sentiments of right and of pride which must prevail among a people capable of such gallant deeds, will prevent the repetition of former abuses, and carry reform—change—revolution (we dread not the use of this word, so popular in England before the late reign of terror)—salutary, just, and necessary revolution—over all the departments of the state.

Such, we may be assured, will be the immediate consequence of the Spaniards ultimately triumphing over their enemies, and restoring the Peninsula to independence. Whether Ferdinand or Charles be the monarch, we care not; or whether a new stock be brought from Germany for a breed. That they should have a king, every one must admit, who believes that an hereditary monarch, well fettered by the constitution, is the best guardian of civil liberty. But who the monarch is, must be a matter of little moment, provided he is sufficiently controlled in the exercise of his delegated and responsible trust. And whatever may be the form of the checks imposed upon him, we shall be satisfied,—provided the basis of a free constitution is laid deep and steady in a popular representation. Many years must elapse before this can be corrupted, and betray the people to the Crown; for the general sentiments of liberty, of contempt of bad rulers, of

resistance to all enemies, foreign and domestic,—the universal feeling of their own powers, from the recollection of their great actions,—will long remain among the Spanish people, and shake to atoms every court-intrigue hostile to their rights.

Let us further recollect, that this system of liberty will grow up with the full assent, and, indeed, the active assistance of the English Government; and, what is of far greater importance, with the warm and unanimous approval of the English people. And who then shall ever more presume to cry down popular rights, or tell us that the people have nothing to do with the laws, but to obey them,—with the taxes, but to pay them,—and with the blunders of their rulers, but to suffer from them? What man will now dare to brand his political adversary with the name of a revolutionist,—or try to hunt those down, as enemies of order, who expose the follies and corruptions of an unprincipled and intriguing administration? These tricks have had their day,—a day immeasurably disastrous in its consequenses to England and to Europe. Their impudence has been at last exposed; they have ceased to blindfold the multitude; and we can once more utter the words of *liberty* and *people*, without starting at the echo of our own voices, or looking round the chamber for some spy or officer of the government. This much had been done for us by the lapse of time, and the universal and signal failure of all the policy which the English reign of terror gave a cloak to. But the *Spanish* revolution comes most opportunely to turn the tide quite into the opposite channel; to awaken in this country all those feelings of liberty and patriotism which many had supposed were extinguished since the *French* revolution; and to save our declining country, by the only remedy for its malady—a recurrence to those wholesome popular feelings, in which its greatness has ben planted and nursed up.

We anticipate, then, a most salutary change in public opinion, from the example of Spain, should her efforts prove successful, and from the part which this country so wisely and generously takes in her affairs. The measures of our government will be more freely canvassed; the

voice of the country will no longer be stifled; and when it is lifted up, it must be heard. Reforms in the administration of our affairs must be adopted, to prevent more violent changes; and some radical improvements in our constitution will no longer be viewed with horror; because they will be found essential to the permanence of any reformation in the management of the national concerns.

If any one doubts this, let him reflect on the state of things in England, previous to the bad times of the French revolution, when almost every voice was given in favour of the new-born liberty of our neighbours, and they had not yet forfeited their claim to our suffrages by violence and anarchy. What man in England but viewed the course of high Tory principle as nearly finished, and the hour of genuine constitutional freedom as about to strike? The intriguers of the court, indeed, saw their reign drawing towards a close; and yet they had no means of protracting its period, until the excesses of the French themselves furnished the materials of that alarm, which had well nigh extinguished for ever the liberties and prosperity of all Europe. This alarm, then, having spent itself, the Spanish revolution places the cause of freedom and reform on a much better footing than it had even at the beginning of the French revolution;—because the country, government, and people, are committed with the Spanish patriots, which they never were with those of France; because the example of the one revolution, will prevent a repetition of its enormities in the further progress of the other; because, happen what will, the trick of alarm can never succeed again to any thing like the same extent in this country; and because the good will of this nation towards the cause of Spain will not be crossed by any of those feelings of national rivalry which unavoidably operated against the popularity of the French revolution; while the very existence of France, in its present state of despotism and power, offers additional inducements to keep alive our enthusiasm for the new order of things in Spain. Therefore, we must admit that there is now a much better prospect of reform in England, than that which the French revolution for a moment held out to us, and then seemed to hide for ever.

If these happy effects may be thus confidently anticipated from the final success of the Spaniards, it gives us no small degree of consolation to reflect, that much good has been secured to the cause of liberal principles, and sound constitutional feeling, by the important events which have already taken place; and that, however the prospect may be darkened over,—however fatally the gloomy view which we are forced to entertain may be realized,—still enough has been performed by the Spanish people to raise the spirit of the middle and lower classes, both in this country and the rest of Europe.

The cause of the Spaniards is so obviously that of the people; the desertion of the court and nobles is so manifest; the connexion between the success of the patriots, and a radical change of the government, is so plainly necessary—that whoever has wished well to them, feels intimately persuaded, that he has been espousing the popular side of the greatest question of the present day; that he has been praying most fervently for the success of the people against their rulers; that he has, in plain terms, been as far as in him lay, a party to revolutionary measures. We do not deny, that the just dread of France, and the very natural antipathy to her present government, have had a large share in stirring up the spirit of the British nation in favour of the Spanish revolution. The cause of the universally prevailing feeling is immaterial. Every one must allow, that the fear of French invasion, and the hatred of the Jacobin tyrants, put down for a while the spirit of liberty, which is, we trust, natural to this country; and why should that spirit be the less powerful, though it has been raised up again by similar feelings? The plain and broad fact is this—that every Englishman who has, for the last six months, heartily wished that the Spaniards should succeed, has knowingly and wilfully wished for a radical reform of abuses in the regular monarchy of Spain, and for such a change of the government as might permanently secure a better administration of its affairs. He has, moreover, wished to see that change adopted by the Spanish people themselves, and has admitted, most amply, the right of

the people to call their rulers to account, and choose their own constitution.

Now, who are the persons thus committed to these most wholesome and truly English principles of civil government? Are they a few speculative men—a few seditious writers or demagogues—or a popular meeting here and there—or are they even a political party in the state? No such thing. Men of all descriptions—of all ranks in society—of every party—have joined, almost unanimously, in the same generous and patriotic sentiments, and have expressed them loudly and manfully. There may have existed a few wretched intriguers about the government—one or two feeble courtiers, or clerks in office, who brooded, in the corners of drawing-rooms and public boards, over gloomy anticipations of their comforts being disturbed by the progress of the Spanish principles. But if those persons, from such forebodings, were averse to the cause of the patriots, they never dared raise their voice against it to the country. They shuddered in secret at the overthrow of nearly the worst government in Christendom; in secret they offered up their prayers that the reform of abuses might be nipt in the bud by the success of the French arms; and, if that were impossible, that at least some excesses on the part of the people might render the Spanish revolution odious in the eyes of this country; and save our state from those horrid reforms which had well nigh purified and overwhelmed us eighteen years ago. A better proof of the universal prevalence of right feelings upon the subject of Spain cannot be fancied, than the profound silence in which all those generous wishes have been breathed—not one sigh, heaved about court, having ever mixed itself with the general exultation which has burst from the whole people at the progress of the revolution.

The result of these widely diffused principles, has been highly honourable to the country, and has reflected some credit also upon the leading men in the government. The nation has formally taken part in the cause of Spain, by various overt acts which happily cannot be retracted. After recognising, in a most solemn manner, the revolu-

tionary government, by concluding a treaty of peace with the Juntas, to terminate a war waged against the Catholic King,—and cheerfully assisting the Spaniards in their military operations against the common enemy, although that enemy was seconded by the hereditary monarch of Spain,—our most gracious Sovereign has been recently advised to send a minister, with full powers, as the representative of his august person, to *his brother* Ferdinand VII., the heir-apparent of the crown, who owes his title solely to the misgovernment of his father, and the choice of his people. This is indeed a proof of the force of those sound constitutional principles which we glory in thinking are once more prevalent amongst us. It is a signal triumph for those doctrines which are truly, and, till lately, have been exclusively English. Nor do those members of our own cabinet deserve little praise, who have made their courtly colleagues yield to the general impulse, and counselled their Sovereign once more to proclaim the principles which alone placed his illustrious house upon the throne.

If these happy effects have already flowed from the Spanish revolution, and are sure to spread far and wide over this great country the blessings of free discussion, watchful jealousy of the government, and unspairing reform of existing abuses; it is equally manifest, that the force of the example of Spain will not be spent here, but must reach the other states of the Continent. Admitting that no further successes should crown the Spanish arms, and that Bonaparte should, by overwhelming armies, beat down all opposition to his detestable projects,—he has lost much, and must lose more, before the struggle is at an end. He has learned, and France has been made to recollect, a lesson which she had of late years lost sight of,—the powers of popular enthusiasm, when roused by injustice and oppression. It is now to be apprehended, that similar acts of usurpation will be met by somewhat of the same resistance wherever they are attempted. There may now be other enemies to beat beside drill sergeants and imperial guards, before armies can march over the countries of unoffending allies. The feeling of power has

been communicated to the people in every part of Europe; and any such shameless aggressions as those which first roused up this feeling in Spain, will in all likelihood give rise to revolutionary movements elsewhere. It can scarcely be expected, that while things remain quiet, the Germans will change their government; but it is no small improvement of their condition, that the enemy should have reason to dread an intestine revolution (the only formidable antagonist he has ever met with), as often as he attempts to shake, by any extraordinary effort of usurpation, the existing order of things.

Nor will the Spaniards themselves fail to reap the fruits of their valour and patriotism, however sorely they may be discomforted in their present struggle. That Bonaparte will ultimately succeed, we apprehend is highly probable; that he will succeed without great efforts and losses, is absolutely impossible; and no man, beyond the precincts of a court, is frantic enough to suppose, that the utmost success of his arms can subdue the people of Spain into a nation of willing and peaceful slaves. This he knows as well as we do; and we may be assured that he will not only offer them good terms, after the tide of fortune has begun to turn in his favour, but will finally grant them such a capitulation as their gallant resistance at once deserves, and renders it necessary for the conqueror to allow. He will rule Spain with a very light rod, if he ever rules her at all; because he knows, that there is no chance of ruling her long. We ascribe here nothing to his virtue; we only give him credit for some of that prudence which never forsook him before the march into Spain, and of which, there is too much reason to dread, he has long ere now regained possession.

Having sketched out hastily and imperfectly, some of the consequences which we deem most likely to flow from the present state of affairs in Spain, whatever may be its ultimate issue, we shall now bring these remarks to a close, by turning our attention towards the policy which this country should adopt with respect to its new allies. And here it unhappily is, as upon every former occasion, our lot to complain against all that has been already done

for Spain, and to confine our commendations to the generosity of the intentions manifested by the British government. We shall state our objections plainly, at the risk of repeating the doctrines we formerly advanced, because their application to the present question is extremely obvious, and because it is now more important than ever to inculcate them.

When any operation of war is to be performed by our allies, whether they have to attack the common enemy, or to defend themselves against his invasion, we hold it to be self-evident, that England can assist the common cause only in one of three ways,—by subsidy, by direct co-operation, or by diversion. We might almost lay it down broadly, that having chosen one of these ways, none of the other two should be combined with it; and for this simple reason, that it is much better to exert our whole power in one way, first choosing, of course, the one most beneficial to the cause, than to fritter away and distract our force by attempting all at once. It is scarcely possible, in the present state of our finances, that we could safely afford large sums to an ally, and pay the expense also of large expeditions to assist him. Better employ the whole money either in helping him to draw forth his own resources as he best thinks he can (for without implicit confidence all confederacies are worse than nugatory), or wholly direct the said sums to fit out such expeditions as may *really* influence the fate of the general operations. In like manner, if it is deemed most advisable to aid the cause with troops of your own, choose well between the only two ways in which those forces can act. You have no chance of raising such armies as may suffice both to influence the fate of the campaign, in the quarter where the great effort is making, and to assist the operations of the allied arms by diversions in other quarters. Attempting both plans is sure to frustrate both, and spoil the whole effect. You will send the show of an army to be beaten with that of your allies, should it reach the field in time to partake of the common disaster; and your diversions will be on the mass of the enemy's force, only so many feeble punctures,—infinitely costly to you,—altogether harmless to

him,—hurtful only to your allies, by depriving them of more effectual support.

Having laid down these plain and incontestible principles, so obvious, indeed, that only the utter neglect of them which prevails in our councils could have justified us for stating them at any length, we need not examine which of the three modes of assisting our ally is the best adapted to the circumstances of this country. That is a question which can only be resolved by weighing the peculiarities of each case. And, although some general positions might be laid down applicable to every state of our foreign affairs;—as, for example, that the subsidy system is liable to the greatest risk of abuse, and, for the most part, gives the worst return in proportion to the expense;—that it is scarcely possible to apply it so exactly, as to escape at once the danger of bribing any ally to premature operations of hostility, and to avoid, on the other hand, the risk of delay:—that it requires, perhaps, too great a degree of submission to the plans and views of our ally;—that, of the other two modes of co-operating, the direct one is generally the most effectual;—that it gives our voice a greater weight in the common councils of the confederacy;—that it produces, in this way, the inestimable advantage of making that party, in some sort, an umpire among the allies whose views are necessarily the most free from all suspicion of sinister and selfish policy;—that it moreover tends, more than any other plan, to the radical improvement of our own military system, whilst it, above all modes of acting, raises our name, and increases our real influence in the affairs of Europe;—although these, and other maxims equally general, might be illustrated at length, in such a manner as to bear upon almost every case that could be supposed; yet we shall forbear pushing the statement further, and hasten to offer a few observations on the branch of the subject most immediately connected with the present crisis of affairs.

If, then, at any time it is deemed most expedient (as it must almost always be) to aid the allied cause with troops, what would any man of plain common sense conceive to be the most effectual way of doing it? He would ask

himself, Where are our allies in the greatest straits? Where does the pressure of the war fall heaviest?—because it is morally certain that in that quarter, wherever it be, the enemy is most anxious to succeed, and will be most injured by failure. It may indeed so happen, that he shall carry on a general system of attack, and make a great variety of smaller efforts in different places. In that case, however, the allies will naturally choose one of these points, and endeavour to overpower him, until in a short time the contest comes as it were nearly to an issue,—to a struggle at one important point, subordinate to, and dependent upon which main struggle, every other movement of the war must prove. The next question will be, Are our allies in this grand point quite secure? If they are not, it is there that we can best help them; and, that they never can be sufficiently strengthened there, without our assistance, is manifest from this consideration, that, were it so, the enemy would not there have made his push; and if our allies are equally strong in other points, then we have only got an extreme case, in which no assistance of ours is of any use.—But, in truth, no war was ever waged on the Continent in which the fate of the whole did not turn upon some grand operation in one quarter, carried on by the bulk of the contending forces. Upon the fate of the cause in that quarter, everything else hinges in the most distant scenes; and if we attend to the constant, steady, masterly, resistless policy of our enemy, from the attack of a post,[1] up to the combination of entire campaigns, we shall find it built upon this single view of the subject.

He means to gain several objects, we shall say, in different parts of his extensive dominions,—to drive the English out of Portugal, for example,—to reduce the King of Sweden to an amicable acknowledgment of his title,—to expel the Neapolitan family from the Continent,

[1] Examine the battles of Bonaparte, and indeed of all the great commanders of France, and you will find that the plan of each engagement is similar to the general system of their military policy. They direct a vast column to one well chosen point; break through the line in that quarter (as we do at sea); defeat the neighbouring parts of it; and then the rest falls before them.

or to defend his new kingdoms in Italy,—to take a province or two from the German princes,—and to punish, perhaps destroy, Prussia. Now, if Bonaparte's counsellors were taken from the English *political caste*, it is very plain what method he would adopt to gain all those points. He would, in the first place, take care to make war without the shadow of a pretence, and put himself clearly in the wrong before all Europe;—he would next delay doing anything until the season for operation was nearly gone by;—he would then probably treat a little, and be duped by his allies, and cavil and wrangle a good deal, and quarrel with some of them, and excite a hatred of all of them, and of himself, and a contempt of his plans, among his own subjects. But, all these preliminaries of failure being settled, he would at last come to his operations; and his policy would be, to get up a number of neat little expeditions, equal in number to the things he wants to take, just one for each thing. He would send an expedition towards Sweden; the sea not being his element, it would probably fail of itself. He would then send a tolerably large, and intolerably expensive expedition to some part of Germany,—another towards Italy,—a smaller expedition to Portugal,—a nice little one to take a slice off Bavaria,—beside a sort of by-expedition to plunder Hamburgh, and burn, for stage effect, some other capital in alliance with him, merely to astonish people, and look vigorous.

Instead of inquiring what would be the probable result of all this drivelling, which is indeed too plain to require any statement, let us remark rather, how Bonaparte *does act*, not having English politicians to advise him. He leaves Naples alone: If Joseph can support himself, well; if not, he will restore him after the campaign is won. He leaves Sicily alone, filled with English troops, who are just as usefully employed for him as if he had them in his depôt of prisoners,—filled too with the squabbles and intrigues of his faithful allies, the old royal sovereigns and courtiers of Europe. Portugal he leaves to the English army, there assembled for the precise purpose of doing all sort of nothings against him. He cares not if the English

are mad enough to make a descent upon Calabria in his absence; or childish enough, because it may have a partial success, to reward those who ventured on so useless an enterprise, instead of calling them to an instantaneous and severe account. All other objects of subordinate importance he leaves in like manner to themselves. The Swede is allowed to strut his little hour of squibs, manifestoes, and bulletins. The Turk is unmolested, except by his allies. Egypt is occupied by none but English forces. Eager for ships, colonies, and commerce, he defers all trading speculations till the season of victory and peace; nor envies us all the plunder and the rajahs of the east; nor once throws away a thought on all the sugars of the west. But his game is not the less sure for being more contracted in its sphere. He singles out the vital part of his whole adversary, and the point of it which is most exposed. In that vulnerable heart he plants his dagger; and he knows full well, that the remotest limb will quiver with the shock. He sends forth his host, in the plenitude of its array, to sweep over the interjacent regions, and to pour itself in one grand, deep, but contracted, and therefore irresistible torrent, into the centre of the strength of Europe. Here,—as near Berlin and Vienna as he can, he fights his battle; and, while you are menacing the western departments—or landing and reimbarking in Italy—or capitulating in Holland—or idling in Portugal and Egypt—or butchering your friends in the north—or burying your own men, and planting the slave trade in the West Indies—he is playing that great game which must place in his hands the sweep of all those small stakes for which you are pretending to throw. Do you doubt whether he shall win the game he plays for? If you do, why then don't you send your men there to meet him? Think you that *he* ever doubts of his success? It may be that he does;—but he knows that the only way to gain it is to think of nothing else than victory, and, at any rate, to think of no other contest than this. Above all, he feels the folly of being either victorious or vanquished in a little way. He knows, that if he conquers the imperial or the Prussian arms in the centre of the

empire, he shall find no difficulty in carrying all the other points—no trouble but in preventing the escape of your forces from the little posts which they have been senselessly occupying; and, if he should be overcome in Germany, he must make up his mind, not merely to the loss of those petty objects, but to *being overcome in Germany*—to the utter ruin of his foreign power. Plain and simple as this consideration is, and constantly as we have seen him act upon it, we have never yet been able to profit by his example, and by the sight of those victories which he has achieved, so as to alter, in the very least degree, our own fatal policy towards all our allies.

After so much experience of the errors of our way, and the uniform proofs of the enemy beating us by an opposite line of conduct, is it not lamentable to see the very same blunders committed, and, within the past three months, the very last chance of saving Europe from the grasp of France, in all human probability squandered away? The Spaniards were struggling against the French armies; and, from the latter being obviously unprepared to meet their resistance, great hopes of success might have been entertained, provided some important assistance could suddenly have been given to the common cause. Seeing the unprepared state of the French forces, and their inadequacy to the crisis, and aware that so unusual a state of things could only last for a moment, our business was, to have strained every nerve to pour a large force into Spain, as near as possible to the seat of the war. Had such a force as England could raise,—had an army of 60 or 70,000 men, the best equipped and best hearted in the world, been ready to land in Spain at the moment when Dupont surrendered, and Joseph fled in confusion from Madrid,—who shall say that the whole remains of the French army in Spain would not most probably have been overpowered, and the peninsula swept clean of its invaders? But no such thing. The *truly British* policy was steadily persevered in. A fine army of 35,000 men was sent to Portugal,—as far as possible from the scene of real action. It happens, unfortunately, that this army has been brought to shame by the conduct, say the friends

of Government, of its commanders;—by the unskilful arrangement of the expedition, and choice of those commanders, say their enemies. But it signifies little, what has become of the enterprise, or to what its fate is owing, in our view of the subject. The dishonour of the British arms, and the conveyance of a large army to fight against our allies, are no doubt dreadful aggravations of our loss; but we object to the expedition from the beginning. We demand the reason of locking up our army in the south-west corner of Portugal, when the great battle was fighting in the north-east extremity of Spain? We ask, why so silly a measure was thought of, as turning away our force to conquer an army necessarily in our power, should our allies be successful, and the conquest of which was worth nothing, should our allies be beaten? We ask, what justification can be offered of so dastardly a conduct, as avoiding the hazardous part of the contest—the struggle with the enemy's main body—for the poor temptation of attacking an inferior and insulated body of his men, and making sure of beating them, as a miserable kind of *hedge* in case our real and only game, the game of our allies, should be lost? The Spaniards are fighting the battle of Spain and of Portugal, as well as of all Europe, in the north: they are almost overwhelmed by their enemies: a reinforcement of their strength may decide the day for them.—But, unfortunately, there happens to be a detachment of the French cooped up in Portugal; cut off from all supplies; hemmed in on every side; and utterly unable to escape. If the Spaniards are successful, this little force *must* fall; if they are beaten, it weighs not as one grain of dust in the swiftly-mounting balance of their fate, what happens to the French in Portugal. Nevertheless, it is to this wretched outpost of the French power that all the efforts of England are pointed; and, instead of succouring our allies, or, as we term it, "*before* proceeding to succour them," we must be running away to seize hold of a few thousand soldiers—harmless prisoners in a hostile country! Suppose the utmost success had attended our folly, we should have taken those troops, delayed our march for three critical months of the Spanish

campaign, and left a large part of the army in Portugal, which was so much wanted in Spain. If we had wholly failed, we sacrificed the power of helping our allies, for the chance of doing ourselves some little good, gaining a little paltry *éclât*, without the remotest possibility of assisting the common cause by the attempt.

This folly is nothing new, to be sure, in our foreign policy; but it is now applied to cases infinitely more important than any that it ever before ruined. It is the very same blunder, or rather the same narrow, interested method of starving the common cause, for fear of being *greatly* defeated, and for the lucre of gaining a few *British objects*,—which, since the year 1793, has excluded England from all real share in the management of continental affairs, and left Europe a prey to the enemy,—which sent thousands of our finest forces after sugar islands and spice islands, and to hunt down nabobs, and find out and repair worn-out Moguls, while France was raging beyond the Alps and the Rhine,—which detached, to the most distant corners of Europe, to garrison old palaces, or make a show of defending allies never attacked, and, if attacked, utterly indefensible, those troops that might have saved Austria and Italy,—which paraded an army in the north of Holland, to make head against the myriads pouring along the Danube,—which filled Naples with British soldiers, while the Archduke Charles was struggling for Vienna on the Gulf of Trieste,—which amused the people of London with a senseless skirmish[1] in Calabria, and a procession of stolen silver, on the eve of the annihilation of the Prussian monarchy,—and, leaguing at last its selfish folly with open, unprincipled violence, raised up the clamours of the whole world against the English name, by the massacre and pillage of a defenceless friend, while the air of Europe yet rung with the crash of all its most ancient and illustrious thrones. Let us not deceive ourselves; we have done all that lies in our power for the ruin of our allies. With the phrases of justice and generosity on our lips, our hearts have been

[1] To say that the affair of Maida did infinite honour to the English army, is only to record that English troops fought there. It is the unprofitable lavishing of such valour that excites indignation.

filled with coldness and selfishness. With the cry of helping to put out the fire on the Continent, we have been caught in the act of pilfering for ourselves; and the consolation which we now have, is to reflect, that, beside being detected, we have been stopped in our petty thefts, and are now, perhaps, about to be soundly beaten for them. It is lamentable to think, that this last opportunity of saving Europe, which, if improved, would have even covered all our past misdeeds, has been thrown away like the rest; and that our *policy* has proved consistent to the latter end.

We are now, it is said, about to assist the Spaniards in good earnest; that is to say, by sending a great force into Spain. Something we would fain hope, may be done, even yet, to delay if not to avert the defeat of that great and good cause, and to obtain better terms for the patriots, if they ultimately fail. Upon a cordial and disinterested union of councils between the two governments, and of operations between the commanders of the two armies, everything will depend in the prosecution of this attempt. Never were rulers or generals placed in so arduous a predicament; and never did more weighty interests depend on their right conduct. But is there no possibility of gaining even more than the utmost probable success can secure, by availing ourselves of the proposal lately made to open a negotiation? Would it be impossible to offer Spain, as we formerly suggested, a dereliction of every one *British object*, an oblivion of all our separate causes of quarrel with France, on condition that good terms should be granted to the patriots? Would not such an offer, if successful, be the salvation of Europe, and, though it failed, strengthen our union with Spain? The late communication from France affords an opening to such views; and we devoutly pray that it may not be presented to us in vain.

Before concluding these hasty and imperfect observations, we must once more repel the insinuations which have reached us, and which we anticipated in our last Number, — of coldness and unwillingness towards the cause of the patriots. Let one word suffice. We sincerely believe, that the success of that cause would not

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only save the rest of the Continent from France,—from the enemy of both national independence and civil liberty,—but would infallibly purify the internal constitution both of this and the other countries of Europe. Now, if any man thinks that we should not prodigiously rejoice in any conceivable event which must reform the constitution of England,—by reducing the overgrown influence of the Crown,—by curbing the pretensions of the privileged orders, in so far as this can be effected without strengthening the royal influence,—by raising up the power of real talents and worth, the true nobility of a country,—by exalting the mass of the community, and giving them, under the guidance of that natural or virtual aristocracy, to direct the councils of England, according to the spirit, as well as the form, of our invaluable constitution;—whoever believes, that an event, leading to such glorious consequences as these, would not give us the most heartfelt joy, must have read but few of the pages of this Journal, or profited but little by what he has read.[1]

[1] As we are here correcting a misrepresentation, it may be as well to guard against a misconstruction, to which, we apprehend, some of our remarks in last number (Review of Mr. Whitbread's Letter to Lord Holland) have been exposed. When we stated it as a possible case, that the late ministers had become less pacific, in consequence of the enjoyment of power, we never could mean to accuse them of sacrificing former principles for the paltry objects of place, or personal ambition. Our words obviously meant, that one reason for what we deemed an unfortunate variation of opinion upon this most important of all questions might be, their growing more sanguine in the hopes of saving Europe by a warlike policy, since they had acquired the management of the resources of this great empire. Our remark applied to the whole of that party, and included, most unquestionably, Mr. Fox, as well as his surviving colleagues; for the whole of the ministry stood in the very same predicament respecting the great question of peace. To name the names of Mr. Fox and Lord Grey (would that the management of the Spanish affair were now in such hands!) is a sufficient refutation of any charge pointing towards little, selfish, and ordinary errors. These things are by no means unimportant, or merely personal to one set of men. If Europe can yet be saved, it must look for its safety to the only class of statesmen who have ever showed that great talents and acquirements are not incompatible with pure and virtuous principles; and having uniformly attacked what we conceived to be their errors while in power, we may bear this testimony to their high merits while in retirement, without the possibility of our motives being misconstrued.

SARAGOSSA—SPANISH AFFAIRS.

(APRIL, 1809.)

Narrative of the Siege of Zaragoza. By CHARLES RICHARD VAUGHAN, M.B. Fellow of All-Souls College, Oxford, and one of Dr. Radcliffe's Travelling Fellows from that University. Fifth Edition; with corrections and additions. Pp. 38. London. Ridgeway. 1809.

MR. VAUGHAN having made an extensive tour in Spain last summer, and visited Saragossa (or, as he calls it, Zaragoza), where he lived with the celebrated Palafox, has given, in the little work now before us, a very simple and well-written narrative of what passed there a short time before his arrival. The profits of the sale, he informs us, are to be transmitted for the relief of the brave and unfortunate inhabitants. We shall, therefore, abstain from making such extracts as might interfere with so praiseworthy an object; and shall only give a specimen of the unaffected and interesting manner in which the pamphlet is written.

"One side of the street Cozo, the breadth of which is about equal to that of Pall Mall, was now occupied by the French; in the centre of which General Verdier was seen giving his orders from the Franciscan convent. The Arragonese maintained their positions on the opposite side, throwing up batteries at the openings of the streets, within a few paces of similar batteries of the French. The intervening space was soon heaped up with dead, either thrown from the windows of the houses in which they had been slain, or killed in the conflicts below.

"Nothing, in the whole course of the siege, more embarrassed Don Joseph Palafox than this enormous accumulation of the dead, and the apprehension of the contagious disorders which must infallibly result from it. To an Arragonese, it was almost certain death to appear in the middle of the street; and the expedient resorted to was, to push forward French prisoners, with a rope attached to them, amidst the dead and dying, to remove the bodies of their countrymen, and bring them in for burial. The office in which they were employed, and the pity of their own soldiers, secured

them in general from any annoyance; and, by this expedient, the evils arising from the horrible corruption of the dead was in some degree diminished. The principal season for attack, in this singular species of warfare, was the night. The French and the Arragonese, under the cover of darkness, frequently dashed across the street, and attacked each other's batteries with the most undaunted courage. The struggle, begun at the batteries, was often carried into the houses beyond; and the author of this narrative has often seen, in every story of a house in the Calle de Cozo, unequivocal marks of the madness and desperation with which such sort of contests must have been carried on. The batteries of the contending parties were so close to each other, that, in one instance, a Spaniard crept from his own side, and insinuating himself under the intermediate bodies of the dead, attached a rope to one of the French cannon. In the struggle which ensued, the rope broke, and the Arragonese were deprived of their prize, at the very moment when they thought themselves secure of it."—pp. 23–25.

It is not at all unnatural for Mr. Vaughan, in this and perhaps in some other passages, to have been betrayed, by his laudable enthusiasm for the Spanish cause, and his partiality for his Saragossan friends, into an easy belief of whatever was told him. Making every allowance, however, for the very pardonable exaggerations of men so recently engaged in such a service, enough remains, in the conduct of this memorable defence, to command the admiration of all ages; nor should we ever have hinted at Mr. Vaughan's partialities, had we not found him appealed to by Lord Castlereagh, in a despatch to Sir John Moore, dated 16*th December*, 1808, as bearing testimony to the important fact of "the southern and eastern provinces being full of ardour and enthusiasm."[1] With this qualification, we earnestly recommend the perusal of Mr. Vaughan's tract to all our readers; and regret that he has not favoured the public with larger communications upon the incidents of his tour, and the anecdotes which he must have collected

[1] House of Commons Papers on Spain, p. 84.—It is worthy of notice, that Mr. Vaughan's authority is here urged to General Moore, after Lord Castlereagh had received despatches by the hands of that gentleman from the General, in which his name is mentioned; consequently, after the General must be supposed to have received from Mr. Vaughan himself whatever information he had to communicate. It is equally singular, that such statements should not have been given to the General, on the authority of the regular civil and military agents whom the Government had sent to various parts of Spain, for the express purpose of examining this matter.

in the course of it, respecting the events immediately preceding it.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity, to call the attention of our readers once more to the affairs of Spain. When we first brought this interesting subject under their consideration, the country was in such a tumult of hopes and expectations, that the small voice of reason had no chance of being heard. Afterwards, when the favourable events with which the Spanish campaign opened, had converted all those hopes into certainty, the desponding views exhibited in our pages scarcely arrested the eye of the deluded people; and it was not till the first reverses of the patriots had damped their heedless joy, that we began to attract notice and execration. The good sense of the nation, we would fain hope, has now triumphed over the tricks of a party, and left all those ardent wishes for the liberty of Spain, which did so much honour to the character of Englishmen, unmixed with that obstinate and intolerant determination to believe in the success of the cause, which could only be excused by reflecting on the means taken to propagate the delusion. Presuming, then, that the country is at length awakened, we would willingly contribute, as much as in us lies, to assist it in retracing the arts which were used to bring on the trance, and exposing the practices of designing and interested men while it lasted,—practices equally prejudicial to the interests of the country, and destructive of all the prospects they seemed to encourage, —alike hurtful to England and to Spain. This we are disposed to attempt, rather with the hope of preventing, if possible, such delusions in future, and of leading to sound views of the expectations now to be formed, and the line of policy fit to be adopted, than for the sake of blaming the Government for what is past and irremediable, or of defending our own former speculations. With respect to the Ministry, indeed, it is our desire to speak as gently as possible. The feelings and intentions which regulated all their proceedings towards Spain were so praiseworthy, that it is difficult to judge very harshly, however bitterly we may repent the train of errors by which those generous intentions were frustrated. For ourselves, we have unhap-

pily too good a defence in the events that verified our predictions; and the abuse with which we have been assailed from so many quarters, has been far too dull, and infinitely too unsuccessful, to merit any notice.

The fundamental position which we ventured to lay down respecting the Spanish question, was this—That the spirit of the people, however enthusiastic and universal, was in its nature more uncertain and shortlived—more likely to be extinguished by reverses—or to go out of itself amidst the delays of a protracted contest, than the steady, regular, moderate feeling, which calls out disciplined troops, and marshals them under known leaders, and supplies them by systematic arrangements;—a proposition so plain and obvious, that, if it escaped ridicule as a truism, it might have been reasonably expected to avoid the penalties of heresy or paradox. The event has indeed wofully proved its truth. With a great apparatus of juntas and public functionaries, the Spanish government has betrayed only the qualities which mark the undirected movements of popular bodies. There has been just sufficient control, to check the natural fervour of national enthusiasm—to prevent the people from acting for themselves, which, upon sudden emergencies, they have sometimes been known to do with happy effect. The vigour and the wisdom, which could at once develop and direct that enthusiasm—which could concentrate its impulse towards one point, without weakening its force—which could, by a happy mixture of compulsion, at a moment when it would not have been felt, insure the duration of the people's exertions: this from first to last has been wholly wanting. Since the retreat of Joseph from Madrid, Spain has exhibited only the faults of popular governments, combined with the failings of decrepit monarchies—the fickleness and confusion of revolutionary times—the feebleness, the abuses, of worn-out establishments.

It is quite impossible to deny, that a very great spirit of resistance to France prevailed over almost every province of Spain during the last summer. The upper classes of society, however, were but moderately imbued with this feeling. The considerable proprietors dreaded convulsions

and intestine war. Unaccustomed to active exertion—not peculiarly attached to the old government—disgusted indeed with the scenes which had preceded its downfall—although they might prefer the sway of a Spanish prince, and would have voted for a continuance of the Bourbon dynasty, had their voice alone been required to defend the throne, were yet but little disposed to risk their fortunes in its cause, or even to gratify, at the expense of almost certain confiscation and banishment, that hatred of Frenchmen which they shared with the inferior ranks of the people. In all probability, we should have seen nothing like exertion on their part, had not the lower orders, exasperated by the cruelties committed at Madrid, and excited by the religious orders, given full scope to their inveterate detestation of the French name and nation, and urged on persons of a higher description to a participation in the contest,—frequently, it must be confessed, by the direct application of force. The successes which attended these efforts at Cadiz and Andujar, and the glorious and romantic defence of Saragossa, notwithstanding the reverse at Rio Seco, spread the spirit of resistance widely over the Peninsula. Nothing was wanted but a few months of supineness, a little drivelling, on the part of the enemy, or a few men of commanding talents at Madrid, to give Spain a fair chance of securing her independence, assisted by her generous and powerful ally. Unhappily the supineness and the drivelling were divided in pretty equal portions between Madrid and London, while the talents entrenched themselves behind the Ebro.

To the flight of Joseph Bonaparte, succeeded the most inexcusable security and confidence. With the thoughtlessness common to popular councils, the Spaniards appear to have considered every point as already gained; and, we are afraid, it must be added, that the self-sufficiency, so prominent in their national character, and in which they are perhaps only exceeded by the Russian grandees, lulled them into a dream, that the Spanish name was as formidable to the rest of the world as it was dear and venerable to themselves. The idea of any reverse of fortune never entered the minds, either of the people or of their

rulers, as a bare possibility; and the belief that their arms were invincible, which, if confined to their armies, might have realized itself, was unhappily still more fondly cherished by the government: nay, what seems almost incredible, the necessity of any further struggle was not anticipated; and it was actually imagined, that the French either durst not, or would not, send any reinforcements across the Pyrenees. Accordingly, Lord William Bentinck describes the central government as having been "*thrown into a considerable degree of alarm,*" when, at the beginning of October, two months after Joseph left Madrid, a letter was intercepted, which mentioned that an army was about to enter Spain; and he adds, that in consequence of this tardy alarm, "their former supineness, confidence, and indifference to the existing danger, had been succeeded by a state of great activity." (*House of Commons' Papers, p.* 153.) We request the reader to keep this point in mind; for it is of very material consequence to a future part of the discussion. It is proved by various other documents in the printed papers; but we rest it upon the passage now quoted, as affording the most unexceptionable evidence. We need not inquire how the invaluable months, which thus elapsed, were wasted. Useless discussions of precedences and ceremonial, pernicious disputes between different assemblies and individuals of distinction, installations, and other exhibitions of pomp, which might have been harmless, and even beneficial, had they not interfered with higher offices;—these, and similar occupations, filled up the interval which the enemy of Spain and of Europe employed in securing the alliance of Russia,—sounding, probably intimidating Austria,—preparing his subjects for new wars,—and marching seventy thousand men to the Pyrenees.

Now, we apprehend it must appear evident, to any one who considers this subject, that the important period in question was peculiarly well adapted to the establishment of a vigorous government, and the introduction of a proper military system among the Spaniards. The popular enthusiasm, and the hatred of France were at their height; and both feelings had been recently carried to this pitch

by very unexpected successes. The horrors of war had scarcely been felt—its privations, perhaps still more trying to public spirit, were yet unknown—delay had not wearied the people, nor had a season of inactivity given them time to think of their civil privileges, or of anything but opposing the enemy. At this moment, there can be little doubt, they would have submitted to the only measure which could render their numbers available against such an enemy as France—a compulsory levy. It was by such means that the French Revolution enabled the Convention to call out the resources of the country, and to lay the foundations of a military system, which unhappily has been found far more powerful than its original destination required. It is only by such means that solidity and duration can ever be given to the efforts of popular spirit. We may flatter ourselves by talking of the enthusiasm of our allies—and turn sentences about their determination to die rather than yield; we may exult in the idea that a nation cannot be conquered unless it chooses—and fondly talk of invincible spirit until we have mistaken the figure for a reality. But the sad question recurs—how much spirit may a man have—how excellently well disposed may he be to the cause—how loyal and how loud in his curses upon the enemy, before he will come out with his pike, and make himself utterly a soldier? Get, however, a few such men once enrolled; and, while their goodwill and the zeal of the nation continues, you may enforce, by their means, the enrolment of many more, without any great risk of abating the prevalent enthusiasm, before its natural and appointed period. The Spanish government thought otherwise; and it happened, accordingly, that their armies were not only inferior to the French in discipline, in appointments and in commanders—(which was necessarily to be expected)—but were inferior to them also in numbers of fighting men—were deficient in that quality by which alone they had any chance of balancing their unavoidable defects—were beaten, not only at the enemy's weapons, but at their own too. Even before the French were reinforced, we find the British resident at Madrid complaining that none of the armies in Spain was equally

numerous with the troops opposed to them. And it has been stated in Parliament, and not contradicted, that at the opening of the campaign in November, the whole amount of the Spanish forces, in all parts, did not exceed 80,000 men; while the French, at the lowest calculation, had above 180,000 in one part of the Peninsula.

If nothing was done to embody and direct the spirit of which so much has been said, just as little pains were taken to foment it and keep it alive. No attempts were made to improve the condition of the people—to correct the manifold abuses of the government—to remove those most galling oppressions under which the lower orders more especially laboured—and which are felt, not as political evils, but as interfering daily and hourly with the comforts of each individual. If the fancy of man had been required to form a combination of circumstances favourable to the excitement of popular spirit, it would have failed in going beyond the reality then existing in Spain—where the people were animated with the most bitter hatred of the enemy—and, in comparison with a foreign yoke, heartily loved their own government, notwithstanding all its defects—whilst the only person interested in perpetuating those defects was deprived of all real power—and their removal, being accomplished by a stroke of the pen, would have sensibly augmented the comforts of all whom the actual rulers had any occasion to reward or to conciliate. At that moment everything which could relieve the people, might have been given as a boon for their gratification, with all the value which it derived from their necessities, and with the grace, too, which adorns a free gift. When the events of these strange times shall be meditated by the men of future ages, in no one passage will their credulity be more startled than in this—when they shall contrast the decrees of Buonaparte with the proceedings of the Central Junta—and shall find him eagerly attempting to win over the Spanish people by concessions much more naturally to be expected from their own chosen rulers, who upon such subjects preserve a dignified and important silence, while they are contriving some foolish procession, or seeking to

encourage and conciliate the nation by devising restraints upon political discussion.

It was a wretched substitute for the reforms which the government might so well have granted, and which would have so greatly promoted the real happiness of the people, to delight them from day to day with false accounts of victories, and to keep them in a pleasing ignorance of their dangers and losses. Such deceptions, practised by all the Juntas, might keep up the national spirit for a season, and render the task of government somewhat more easy. But in a short time they were sure to be detected; and their effect must then be to propagate alarm and distrust—alarm, greater than the occasion justified—distrust, equal to what the authors of the flattering statements deserved. But here, as in all their other proceedings, the Spanish government lost sight of the wise maxims which had been laid down by some of their number early in the contest; they forgot that the struggle in which they had engaged was, if it succeeded at all, to be one of long duration; their measures showed as little of foresight or system as if they had been planned in the cabinet of their allies. It might, for example, have been expected, that a government embarked in a great popular cause, and depending upon the exertions of the country at large for every sinew of the war, should have taken some steps to secure the speedy diffusion of intelligence,—the communication of sentiments and principles from point to point of their dominions. It was reasonable to suppose, that no efforts would be spared to remove whatever obstructions there might be to the intercourse between the provinces.

But, we are afraid, symptoms rather appear of some attempts to raise such obstacles where they did not previously exist. How else are we to account for the scarcely credible fact, that the capture of Madrid was only known at Lisbon, a distance of not quite four hundred miles, one calendar month after the event happened?

The want of energy and system on the part of Government, and the unfortunate, but surely not unexpected, successes of the French, accelerated the decay of the

popular spirit, at all events not likely to last long in its original strength. Of this, and indeed of all the positions which we have ever maintained on the subject of Spain, the late discussions in Parliament furnish the most ample evidence. The official papers, both by what they tell, and by their still more eloquent silence, incontestably prove, either, that there never was any effective spirit of resistance in Spain,—a position quite untenable in the face of the known facts, and indeed so fatal to the credit of the British Government, that no man can believe it without the strongest evidence; or that this spirit was on the decline almost as soon as any British agents arrived to examine it, and had nearly perished before our armies landed to take advantage of it.

"I hope," says Sir John Moore (8th *December*, 1808, *Salamanca*), "a better spirit exists in the southern provinces. Here no one stirs; and yet they are well inclined." An expression in an intercepted letter from a French officer commanding at Vittoria, to the Chief of the Staff with the army, paints the people in this part exactly —"L'Esprit public est toujours mauvais, toujours de l'incrédulité sur nos avantages. Quant à la tranquillité du pays elle est parfaite."[1]—"In the provinces," says our commanding officer, in another letter from the same place, "no armed force whatever exists, either for immediate protection, or to reinforce the armies. The French cavalry from Burgos, in small detachments, are overrunning the province of Leon, raising contributions, to which the inhabitants submit without the least resistance. The enthusiasm, of which we have heard so much, nowhere appears: whatever goodwill there is (*and I believe amongst the lower orders there is a great deal*), is taken no advantage of."[2] From Toro he writes in the same strain; and after having advanced quite through the kingdom of Leon, and retreated to Astorga, he complains, on the 31st December, that he had risked the loss of the army to no purpose, as there was nothing in the country to take advantage of the diversion. "The people," he adds, "run away; the villages are deserted."[3] Sir David Baird, who

[1] House of Commons Papers, 158. [2] Ibid., 155. [3] Ibid., 164.

had marched through Gallicia to Astorga, thus writes, November 22. "No efforts are making for arming the people, or reinforcing the armies, in the country through which we have passed; and Major Stewart of the 95th, who was despatched in front of this place to obtain information, reports, that the inhabitants appear perfectly depressed by their losses; and seem to abandon all hope of making a successful resistance."[1] In his letter from Corunna, January 13, 1809, Sir John Moore delivers it as his opinion, that the people of Spain "had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves." This he states, after having traversed Leon and Gallicia; and not only corresponded with Mr. Frere, but lived some weeks in the society of General Hope, who had marched through Estremadura and Castile; and of Colonel Graham, who had visited both the capital, the eastern provinces, and we believe the south also, and had been attached to Castanos during the whole of his campaign. The British Government have published no contradiction from those two respected officers upon this point; and we are not very apprehensive of falling into an error when we suspect. that this is owing to their having none to publish, and not to any tenderness towards Sir John Moore's memory.

But all these witnesses, we shall be told, are military men, whose authority upon such subjects is questionable, because their prejudices are strong against the efforts of any people, or of irregular troops. Were there no civil agents, then, sent to Spain? Many. But from none, except Mr. Frere, to whose judgment on the present subject no great deference is due, has one single line of a despatch been made public. Mr. Frere himself admits, that no popular enthusiasm existed in Leon, nor in any part of the Castiles, except Madrid and La Mancha;[2] and of the other provinces he speaks from report. How short-lived the enthusiasm was, even at Madrid, may be col-

[1] House of Commons Papers, 146.

[2] This was stated in Parliament to be the real substance of Mr. Frere's despatch to Sir John Moore, November 30, and published in a most mutilated state; and no contradiction was given to the assertion.

lected from an intercepted despatch of Berthier to Soult, dated 10th December, 1808. "The city of Madrid," says he, "is very tranquil; the shops are open; the theatrical amusements have been resumed; and you would not suppose that the first conferences had been accompanied by 4,000 discharges of cannon."[1] Sir John Moore vouches for the general accuracy of the description of Spain given in this letter;[2] and no one can doubt the truth of the particular facts just now quoted, without believing that the French Government intentionally deceives its own agents in its secret and confidential communications with them. Nor is it only the reports of our diplomatic agents on the state of Spain, that the Ministers have suppressed. Whatever information upon this subject the papers contain, seems to be made public only because it could not be separated from other matters. The passages above cited, from the despatches of Generals Moore and Baird, form parts of the detail of military operations. No reports are given from the multitude of excellent officers sent purposely to inquire into the state of things; and instructed more especially to examine how far the spirit of the people could be relied upon. The despatches of the greater number of them are wholly suppressed. The few which appear, relate to military operations; and if we may judge from the accidental notices in some of those few, the officers, on their first arrival in July and August, seem to have been satisfied with the prevailing enthusiasm in the North. Too much praise cannot be given to the fulness and accuracy of their instructions. Long lists of queries are furnished to each, embracing almost every point of doctrine, civil and military, which could in any way touch the great business in hand. The misfortune is, that none of the answers to those queries are laid before the public; and we regret this the more, that several of them are directed to the very subject with which we have been occupied, the dispositions of people of rank and property towards the cause of the patriots.[3] Upon this important topic, not one chance word escapes,

[1] House of Commons Papers, 161. [2] Ibid., 160.
[3] See particularly House of Commons Papers, p. 35.

in the whole mass of despatches presented to Parliament; except, indeed, the passage from Sir John Moore's letter, cited above. Can any unbiassed person believe, that there exists a reason for suppressing such information, other than its tendency to show that the upper classes were lukewarm in the cause?[1] The satisfaction, too, which is occasionally expressed at first with the popular feeling, gradually wears out of these papers; and we are left in the painful necessity of concluding, that this feeling had, all over the North, been reduced to the state described by Generals Moore and Baird, even long before our armies entered Spain.

It was nearly thus in Portugal also. The letters of Colonels Brown and Grant from Oporto and Figuera, paint the enthusiasm of the people as at its height. These are written early in July. When the campaign commenced there a month later, we may remember how miserably our expectations of co-operation were disappointed. If any one should conclude, from these facts, that there existed at no time any spirit in the Peninsula dangerous to the French power, we desire him to read the intercepted letter of Junôt to Murât and Loison. He is speaking only of the comparatively trifling insurrection at Badajos; but he is speaking at the beginning of June, and he mentions it with no small respect. "I have detailed to your Imperial Highness," says he, "the insurrection at Badajos; and I take it for granted you will have taken steps to oppose the insurgents. I have sent to General Kellerman at Elvas, the brigade which was destined for Cadiz. If your Highness has sent troops to Badajos, and if they combine their movements with General Kellerman, the insurgents will speedily be reduced; but I cannot be of any great service to the plan at present, the Spanish troops under my command requiring to be guarded, instead of contributing to my strength." In another part of

[1] It is worthy of notice, that when the Spanish prisoners were to be sent home from this country, the persons whom Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle was desired to take with him for his assistants in persuading the rest to join the patriots, and in conducting their return to Spain, were two *serjeants*. House of Commons Papers, 15.

the letter he says, that it will be impossible for General Caraffa to resume the command of Estremadura, and to return thither with the cavalry. To Loison, he says, "the insurrection of Badajos deserves your most anxious attention, and you must use your utmost efforts to prevent it from spreading. Treat the Portuguese well, and endeavour to reclaim all deserters," &c.[1] If any man doubts whether the spirit in question might, by vigorous measures taken at the proper season, have been turned against the usurper with a fair chance of success, we bid him look to Cadiz, Andujar, and Saragossa; to the flight of Joseph; to the memorable pause in the enemy's operations, when he retired behind the Ebro, and awaited for two months the arrival of new armies. Unfortunately, he is a formidable enemy who knows so well how to appreciate his danger. Without this it would avail him little to possess the means of facing it. The letters of Junôt, just now quoted, are as much to be dreaded by a blind and confident adversary, as his master's message to the senate.

Let us next cast our eye over the part which England took in these momentous affairs, and compare it with the line of conduct pointed out by the circumstances of the case. Our opinion upon this matter is already before the public; and we are willing that its justness should be tried by the event, and by the evidence now produced on the part of the British Government, — evidence of all others the most unexceptionable. We ventured to maintain that, instead of wasting the invaluable months of July and August in an expedition to Portugal, our forces should have been collected in July, and prepared for whatever expedition to Spain the events should render advisable; that, as it happened, the nearer the force was sent to the Pyrenees, so much the better; and that, during the months of August and September, an opportunity was afforded of driving the French out of the Peninsula. But even if the Portuguese expedition were admitted to have been advisable, we conceive it is clear, that after its object was accomplished, time remained for attacking the enemy in the North.

[1] House of Commons Papers, 31.

It has been objected to this speculation, in the first place, that the Spaniards did not wish for our assistance; and that in one instance they positively declined it. Now even if this fact were clearly proved, we should not allow it to be at all decisive of the question; and this leads us to a consideration, of infinite moment in the whole of the present discussion. We have already seen the grievous errors into which the Juntas fell; above all, we have had occasion to deplore the blind confidence, and the supineness, which probably arose from that feeling. The delay in choosing a central government was one of the worst consequences of this fatal security. The supposed refusal of our assistance has been by some ascribed to the want of a central government, and by others, more directly, to the confidence of the Spaniards in their own strength. Mediately, or immediately, however, it was owing, the advocates of the Government must allow, to that state of confidence and security. We contend that the duty of this country was to break down such an obstacle at once; to tear the film from the eyes of our ally; to awaken him from his slumbers. Is it doubted that we had the power? We have already shown, from the evidence of Lord William Bentinck, that a single intercepted letter had the effect of rousing the Supreme Government, and putting its powers in action, though unhappily it was then too late. An intimate and entire union of councils should at first have been established. A decisive influence should have been obtained over the views of our ally, as soon as the errors already pointed out were seen to stand in his way. Instead of sending out a pompous embassy under a person certainly of great talents, and of very great representation, when little more than the ceremonial of a condolence remains to be performed, we should have despatched the same, or some other able man, when a close union of the countries could yet effect something towards repelling the common enemy, by skill and valour; not to beat him in gaudiness and parade, and in the trappings of the East. It is impossible to suppose, that the intentions of Buonaparte to reinforce his armies, and continue the war in Spain, could have been a matter of surprise at Madrid in

October, if the English Government had been in close correspondence with its ally. It is equally inconceivable, that the Spaniards, as soon as they were convinced of their perilous situation, could have refused the advice and co-operation which they afterwards so thankfully received. But it has been the constant error of our Government to rest satisfied with furnishing the means of war to its allies, and never to have a voice on the plan of operations. Our envoy is always excluded, when the ministers of those, whose armies we are to pay, are consulting. When their plan is settled, and money is wanted, he is graciously allowed to enter, and to draw his bills upon London. The scenes which were heretofore enacted at Vienna and St. Petersburgh, have been repeated at Madrid and Seville, without even the shadow of the excuse that might formerly have been offered for them, and with an infinitely more fatal result.

The want of this concert, however, and of the influence which was due to our voice in the Spanish councils, appears to have been more detrimental in many other respects, than in occasioning a refusal of military co-operation. We can find no proofs that our assistance was refused. On the 18th of June, the Junta of Asturias, acting in concert with the kingdoms of Leon and Old Castile, and the Montana, earnestly entreated that 10,000 British troops should be sent to their assistance.[1] On the 4th of August, the Asturian Deputies in London made a still more urgent requisition of "some thousands, some artillery and artillerymen," as the succour of which their armies stood most in need.[2] On the 6th of August, the Gallician Deputy requests, on the part of his constituents, "that one of the expeditions should be sent to Corunna or Vigo, although it may consist of 12 or 15,000 men, with 5 or 6000 cavalry;" and suggests that the cavalry should be landed at Gijon.[3] When Sir A. Wellesley touched at Corunna, although the Junta of Gallicia then approved of the Portuguese expedition, evidently from a

[1] Mr. Hunter to Mr. Canning, Gijon, June 19, 1808.
[2] Viscount Matteroza's Note to Mr. Canning.
[3] Don Sangros's Note to Mr. Canning.

dislike of our landing in their town, and from a most ill-founded confidence in the sufficiency of their own forces, he received a communication through Sir T. Dyer from the Junta of Asturias, urging him to disembark at St. Andero.[1] Previously to the 4th of July, General Spencer was repeatedly entreated by the Junta of Seville to join Castanos, and march upon Cordova.[2] About the 18th of September, Lord W. Bentinck arrived at Cadiz; and, from that moment, his despatches are uniform in the recommendation of a British army entering Spain, and of our exerting the influence necessary to destroy intrigues, and give activity and unity to the operations of the Spaniards. Mr. Stuart's communications from Madrid are of the same nature.[3] In case the opinion of Morla on this subject should be doubted, we shall only cite that of Castanos and Florida Blanca. "To the first question I had to ask" (says Lord W. Bentinck, Sept. 26), *viz.* "whether the Spanish government did, or did not, wish to have the assistance of a British force?—the Count *at once, and in the strongest terms*, expressed the great satisfaction with which such assistance would be received. General Castanos stated exactly the same opinion; and added, that besides the military advantages, the presence of a large British force would insure union in their own councils and operations. *They both seemed surprised at the existence of a doubt in regard to the willingness of the Spaniards upon this point.*"[4] These expressions are quite inconsistent with the notion, that an unwillingness to receive our armies existed at any time generally in Spain. The mere formal objection of there being no supreme government to treat for alliance, and for the reception of foreign troops, could speedily have been removed by men anxious to co-operate with cordiality, and capable of acting in new and difficult emergencies. Even the unwillingness to receive us into their arsenals—for we fear there did exist such a feeling—and can the captors of the Spanish frigates, and of Copenhagen, greatly marvel at it?—even this natural distrust might have been got over by men in

[1] Cintra Papers, p. 34.
[2] Ibid., p. 152.
[3] House of Commons Papers in Spain, p. 104.
[4] Ibid., 106.

whose integrity the Spaniards could confide—or, if the intervention of such were impossible under the existing circumstances, our armies might have been suffered to land, should they not be allowed those fortresses for points of retreat. No doubt, the difficulty of all that we are describing, will be talked of. We shall hear, that such plans, or projects, as they will be termed, required infinite combination, and were opposed by various obstacles. But we never said, that it was an easy thing to beat Buonaparte, and free Spain and Europe from the yoke of France. Indeed, we know no other reason, except its *difficulty*, for the British ministry not having done this long ago.

We are next told, that there was no time for preparing the expedition in question. But a reference to the dates completely answers this objection. The insurrection of Madrid was known in London on the 21st of May. Admitting that this event, when added to the previous intelligence, was not sufficient to raise some expectation of an opening for our exertions in Spain, it must be allowed, that when the Asturian Deputies arrived on the 8th of June, and when, on the 10th, the Government yielded to their request, and liberated the prisoners, there was good reason to look for events that might require our more active interference. From that moment, the eye of the Government should have been fixed upon Spain. Every other object should now have yielded to the grand one which had been opened to their view. No Sicily—no Ceuta—no Sugar islands—no cruizes in the Cattegat.[1] All the efforts of all our departments should have been directed to assembling an armament ready for whatever opening might have been afforded. If no such opportunity offered, the troops made a few more marches, and a little more money was sunk in the transport service, than was altogether necessary,—but not one march more, nor one pound more, than we were throwing away at any rate in useless expeditions. If an opportunity should be afforded, then we were entitled to reckon upon the rewards due to

[1] Sir J. Moore's expedition did not reach Portsmouth, until six weeks had elapsed from the arrival of the Deputies.

foresight and discretion. On the 1st of July, the insurrection at Cadiz was announced officially to the Lord Mayor; and, on the eleventh of that month, the surrender of the fleet. It became now absolutely certain, that our co-operation should be wanted; and we wish to know why an armament might not have been sent forthwith to threaten the French and Spanish coasts in the bottom of the Bay of Biscay? We are not here talking of transports at all. Our men of war might have been fitted up for the accommodation of troops; and fifty or sixty thousand men afloat, would speedily have drawn towards the North as many of the French troops as could escape from the attacks of the Spaniards. It happened that, at any rate, this retreat had become inevitable;—then, by landing on the nearest point at which a sufficient number could disembark together, a most equal chance of coping with the enemy was afforded. No doubt, a number of ships of war must be new-fitted, and in a great hurry;—vast bustle must prevail at the Admiralty and the Victualling-Board;—many nights' rest of many a lord and many a clerk must be broken. What is still worse, an innovation—dangerous as such on every account, but peculiarly awful to the shipping interest, and hateful to the Transport Board—must be attempted; and the hair of several officers of distinction may probably stand on end, at hearing of an expedition without transports. The armament, too, must be exposed to the storms of the Bay of Biscay, in the *boisterous* months of July and August; and its landing may be attended with difficulty, and even a little danger, from surf; and it is even possible that the enemy may annoy us during the operation. Nor is it certain that so agreeable and so secure a beach can be found in the province of Biscay, as the ardent volunteer loves when he practises the art of invasion upon the silver Thames. All this is exceedingly probable; and, unhappily, real war is full of such difficulties and of dangers, exposes you to certain troubles, and to high risks; and the worst of it is, that you may gain nothing by it after all. But if such a miserable and selfish wisdom had always prevailed as that which looks only at the risk and the cost, without considering the prize, and

will attempt nothing against which a single plausible argument may be used to raise a difficulty, then should we never have gloried in recollecting the heights of Abram, and the beach of Aboukir; and the names of Chatham, and Wolfe, and Abercromby, and Nelson, which make us the proudest nation on earth, would have been enrolled at St. Luke's, or have adorned the academy of some new Laputa.

Let us only attempt to grapple with these objections, and we find them elude our touch. They are dissipated by the very facts which the campaign discloses, in spite of all the caution and hesitation that prevailed over it, and frustrated all its objects.—"The season was unfavourable." Admitting that the expedition could not have arrived before September; Romana's army sailed down Channel on the 24th of September, touched at Corunna, and then disembarked safely in the Montana; and General Baird's army did not land in Gallicia till the middle of October.—"There was no safe landing-place for troops near the Ebro." Romana, however, landed nearly 10,000 men at Santander; and it is allowed that Santona is a much more favourable point.—"It was impossible to secure their reimbarkation in case of any disaster." At all events, they were no worse off than General Moore's army, which had to retreat upon Corunna,—a port described by Sir David Baird and Admiral De Courcy, as peculiarly well adapted for the "reimbarkation of troops."[1] If they landed near the enemy, and had to march upon a distant point of retreat, they were at least much better off, than if they had both advanced from and retired to that distant point.—"The means of transport were wanting for provisions and stores." Admitting that it is impossible to establish a depôt at Santona, which could be supplied from the sea, and that it would be imprudent to trust to naval supplies without such place of strength; there seems to have been no difficulty in procuring mules from the north of Portugal and Gallicia; and a great cattle fair is mentioned as held at Burgos on the 1st of November, after the country had been well drained. If an active commissariat, previously sent, could

[1] House of Commons Papers, p. 149.

not, with the assistance of all the English money, and all the Spanish good will, collect those animals, it would be wise perhaps never to think of expeditions,—at any rate, to send none into the territory of our Spanish friends.—"But after we should have landed in the North, and beat the French behind the Ebro, there were fortresses in our way which would have prevented us from driving them out of the Peninsula." And did these fortresses oppose such an attempt the less, because we landed in Portugal and Gallicia,—met the enemy in Leon instead of Navarre,—and allowed him full time to reinforce himself, before we so much as looked at him? Which of all the plans that have been devised, annihilated Pampeluna and Figueras at the outset? Which of them all could have been executed without meeting, or passing these obstacles in the end? Those who conducted the defence of Spain had this difficulty staring them in the face, whatever might be their views; and it behoved them to weigh well at the first, whether it ever could be surmounted. If it was insuperable,—if no hope remained of driving the enemy beyond the Pyrenees, the success of the Spanish cause must necessarily be temporary. There was a moment, we think, when some prospect presented itself of effecting it by the assistance of England. In August and September, the whole country was disposed to rise. The English army might then have been sufficient, with their co-operation, both to watch Pampeluna, and to secure the western passes of the Pyrenees. After all, the place was less important than the time, provided the North of Spain was our object; and the same army which landed at Corunna and Mondego, might have reached the Ebro before the enemy had received any reinforcements, and might have decided the fate of Spain while the popular enthusiasm was at its height, had it not been detained by the Convention, and by the singularly impolitic plan of taking the government of Portugal upon our hands.

Before leaving this part of the subject, we must say a few words upon our operations in Portugal, because that point enters into the discussion of the present state of affairs It seems clear, that whoever is master of Spain, holds Por

tugal as an appanage to his crown. To what purpose then begin by taking a possession which cannot be kept if you lose Spain, and which the salvation of Spain secures of itself? We are told that it is a point of retreat, in case of disaster. But when the disaster befel our armies in the North, they fell back on Gallicia, and not on Portugal; and any disaster in the South would drive them more naturally towards Cadiz or Gibraltar, than Lisbon. It is also termed a rallying place for the spirit of the Spaniards. But if this means anything (which we greatly question), it applies much better to Andalusia than to Portugal. Lastly, it is said that the trade of Portugal deserves our attention, and that the occupation of the country secured it at least in the mean time. But it is fit that rulers should make up their minds in such cases, and abide either by one principle or another. We blockade the enemy's coasts, and go to war with him; professing thereby to sacrifice the profits of trade to our political views. We at the same time send an expedition to Portugal which might be better employed elsewhere,—and give, as a reason, that it will enable us to push a little trade. It cannot be wise, any more than it is consistent, at one moment to sacrifice our interests as traders to the concerns of the war; and the next to sacrifice the war to trade. It is, however a contradiction by no means peculiar to our Spanish policy; it is only a variety of the old principle of "*British Objects*;" and belongs to the very same class with our Sugar campaigns.

It is scarcely necessary for us, after the remarks which we have so often before made, and which we have in the present article confirmed by evidence, to repeat the melancholy truth, that but little hope remains of Spain being liberated from the yoke of her savage invader. He has nearly annihilated every Spanish army that has been opposed to him, and, we are afraid, is in possession of almost the whole country to the north of the Sierra Morena,—in quiet possession of the greater part of it,—and without anything fit to meet him in the places least disposed to submit. We apprehend it is now too late to expect any general risings of the people. Those fears and interests must be operating which keep all nations in order,

even under the most detested rulers. There are some who still hope, that, though they cannot meet the French in the field, which it is said they never should have attempted, they may still cut off their troops in detail. But this is a vague and unprofitable way of speaking. The French have now all the towns and roads and passes. They have the implements of government in their hands. The organization of the Juntas is destroyed; and as for individual and combined exertion,—in order to fight, the patriots must eat,—they must work many days in the week;—their zeal will cool,—their feelings as private men will, by no very slow degrees, undermine their political animosities, and prepare them at least for a state of inaction. Now it is that we dread the policy of France, aided by the effects of all the exaggerations and deceptions heretofore practised. The hatred of the name of a Frenchman in Spain has been such as the reality will by no means justify; and the detestation of the French government has, among the inferior orders, been carried to a pitch wholly unauthorised by its proceedings towards them. It is greatly to be feared, that the security afforded to property, and the excellent police introduced by the French,—that the abolition of the Inquisition, the restriction of the monastic orders, and the encouragement of the secular clergy,—that the reforms already introduced into the collection of the revenues, and the abolition of the most galling monopolies, which the Spanish government blindly suffered to remain, but which, being equally useless to the state and oppressive to the people, Buonaparte will most likely part with—it is to be feared that these and similar changes are already beginning to work in the tyrant's favour; and that their immediate and sensible effects on the individual interests of men, will tend, if not to conciliate his new subjects, at least to make them regret, much less bitterly, the government of the Bourbons and the Juntas. A few days after the inhabitants of Madrid had sworn to bury themselves under its ruins, we find them —hating the French no doubt, but hating them in secret —working in their shops, and crowding the theatres.

The question in respect to the south of Spain, is there-

fore reduced to a very narrow compass. Have we any fair grounds for expecting, that the remains of the Spanish forces collected there, will resist the French armies more effectually than they did, when their numbers were much greater, and their confidence more entire? The ancient practice of ascribing all the disasters of our allies to treachery, has no doubt been resorted to, in order to explain what was sufficiently intelligible, the defeat of raw troops under inexperienced leaders, by an enemy perfect in discipline and skill, and superior even in numbers. But, granting that the Spaniards did wisely in butchering their generals when they were beaten—that St. Juan, so highly praised by Lord W. Bentinck, was a traitor as well as Socorro, Filangieri, and others—have we any right to expect that all this disloyalty shall stop short at the Sierra Morena? And admitting, what is much more likely, that Castanos was defeated from his want of capacity—that the battle of Rio Seco was lost by the jealousies of Cuesta and Blake—is there anything in the air of Andalusia to brighten the intellects, or sweeten the tempers of those captains? Why should every prospect to the north of the Sierra be blasted by treachery and cowardice—or chilled by feebleness and distraction—while the happy plains on the south of that ridge, enjoy a perpetual sunshine of loyalty, genius, and vigour?

We are afraid, then, that as often as the armies of the two nations meet, the patriots will continue to be worsted; and that their numbers will fluctuate with the approach or the delay of active operations; increasing a little if the enemy defers his attack; falling off as the season of fighting draws near; dispersing after the blow is struck. Ignorant as we are of the amount of the French force in Spain, it is difficult for us to conjecture what will be the course of the enemy. But one of two things they most probably will do;—either they will push on from the north and from Estremadura, compelling us to evacuate Portugal; and at nearly the same time enter the south of Spain from Valencia;—or, if they are not strong enough at present for that purpose (which is by no means impossible), they will rest where they are, and wait until the

too probable issue of the campaign in Germany shall enable them to receive fresh supplies. In the mean time, our army is, as usual, locked up in a place where it cannot be of the smallest use. If we attempt to attack the French, all their force is drawn to that point, at the risk of some Juntas rising again in its rear; and, if they do not make an effort to drive us out of Portugal, it is only because we are better there than anywhere else. We fear they will not leave us on the Tagus many days longer than suits their own purposes. Here, then, is just the old blunder over again. Our operations in Spain or in Portugal can make no diversion in favour of Austria, unless we are strong enough not only to maintain ourselves, but to advance against the enemy. If we remain on the defensive, whether in Lisbon or in Andalusia, the defeat of Austria will enable the enemy to advance against both the Spaniards and ourselves; to overpower them by fighting; and to overwhelm us with numbers. The defeat of France by Austria will indeed cause her to evacuate Spain, whether we are there or not. The policy which we ought to pursue, follows most clearly from this simple view of the subject. If there is such a force of tolerably good troops in Andalusia (say fifteen or twenty thousand men), as, being united with our army from Sicily, could enable us to defeat the French in Valencia, while our army from Lisbon advanced into Estremadura;—if, in short we can still advance against the French armies, and attack them with regular troops, we shall, for some months, be fighting a definite number of the enemy; and he cannot be reinforced, in case of defeat, without drawing supplies from the war in Germany. But, as the utmost success that can be expected from this attempt, would only create a diversion after the most critical part of the German campaign is over, it appears more reasonable to think that a concentration of our whole disposable force might be made subservient to the operations of the Austrians, with better effects both to their cause and the cause of the Spaniards, always supposing that there is such a fair prospect of Austria making a stand in the present war, as renders it possible for any aid to save her. If, how-

ever, as seems but too probable, the war is of the enemy's choosing—if he has pursued his usual policy of anticipating a blow which he saw preparing—if he has fallen upon Austria with the full concurrence of Russia—or even if he has attacked her, from some apprehension of a change in the politics of St. Petersburgh, which change will best be prevented by the suddenness of the attack—we may rest assured, that no effort of ours can *now* ward off the fate of our ancient ally, and that the completion of the Spanish campaign will only be interrupted for a season by a series of victories on the Danube.

In this hopeless state of affairs, the result of our rupture with Spain, and our alliance with Russia, in 1805; the legimate consequences of the dollar war, and the third coalition; what remains for England to do? She has sacrificed largely—generously if not wisely, to the defence of others. It is time to think in good earnest of her own; not, indeed, by making war upon trade, or by taking West India islands, but by drawing closer and closer the bonds of natural union which knit her with every people whom the sea divides from France; and by attacking, while the war in Germany and Spain has drawn off all the troops from the French coast, every arsenal in the enemy's hands which the combined operations of our fleets and armies can destroy. In accomplishing these right British objects, we shall be also doing all that remains in our power to assist our Spanish allies. We shall save their South American empire for their place of refuge; and cherish for them the means of maritime power; of becoming members of that naval confederacy, of which England is the natural head; and which, until happier times arise on the Continent, is the only obstacle between France and universal empire.[1]

[1] The topics here lightly touched, must be the subject of a future discussion. We rejoice that the abolition of the Orders in Council has paved the way for a cordial reconciliation with America, and thus facilitated the formation of a great maritime alliance: and severely as we have been compelled to blame the conduct of our Spanish campaign, we are proud to think, as Britons, both that it has shown the valour and discipline of our troops in a favourable point of view to all Europe, and afforded, to so large and efficient a part of our army, a series of practical lessons, of which the value must be incalculable.

POLAND.

(JANUARY, 1814.)

An Appeal to the Allies, and the English Nation, in behalf of Poland. 8vo. Pp. 66. Harding, London. 1814.

THE publication of this tract gives us an opportunity, of which we are anxious to take advantage, of calling the attention of our readers to the important subject of Poland. Were this merely a topic of party politics, involving matters of a transient interest, we should allow it to pass with the other themes of the day, and leave it to the care of those who in their various walks drive a traffic of political discussion. It is precisely because the subject is not at all likely to suit their purposes that we wish to canvass it. We fear it will be found to present no facilities for party attacks, or for mutual recriminations among public men. Those who exhaust the whole force of a very limited talent in abuse of the enemy, in all probability will turn away from an inquiry that leads them to contemplate public crimes committed by persons not connected with France. And they who are only solicitous for peace at all events, without thinking of securities, are likely to disregard a subject which may seem to throw difficulties in the way of negotiation, by calling our attention to the only real principles of national independence. Nevertheless, as we are deeply impressed with the general and permanent importance of the question, and consider its interest to be temporary only in as far as the present time offers peculiar reasons for canvassing it, we shall urge no further apology for the discussion upon which we are about to enter.

Whence comes it to pass, that the feelings of the English nation are so easily roused upon some subjects, and upon

others precisely similar, are so obstinately torpid? Are we liable to the imputation which foreigners have frequently brought against our national character, of being a strange mixture full of inconsistency, at once refractory and capricious, and chiefly distinguishable from others by having no marked and general characteristic? Or does the charge alluded to, when well examined, happen to be unfounded in fact, and the inconsistency only apparent? The wrongs of Africa, the oppressions of Spain, the sufferings and subsequent liberation of Holland, occupy every tongue; while not a whisper is heard in behalf of Poland. —Whence this extraordinary diversity?

It will not be sufficient to say, that in those cases which have excited most interest, our own concerns were involved. There is no doubt that when the slave trade was denounced, a crime was held up to detestation, which we ourselves committed,—and this might awaken some feelings of a peculiar nature. But the sensation chiefly excited by a disclosure of the horrid details of that subject, was pure compassion for the Africans; and we may safely assert, to the honour of the nation, that no feeling ever pervaded a country more thoroughly, or with less interested motives. The general anxiety for the success of the Spanish cause, was a sentiment not quite so extensive, nor founded upon so accurate a knowledge of the facts. In truth, however iniquitous the conduct of France may have been, the spirit of resistance shown by the Spaniards was the principal ground of the sympathy excited in this country; for had the people submitted to the usurpation, it would not have made their lot worse, and we should only have felt shocked at a new instance of the enemy's perfidy in his transactions with his neighbours. But the gallant resolution displayed by the Spanish nation, not to be transferred, like herds of cattle, by the craft or violence of one court operating on the weakness or perfidy of another; their determination to be an independent people, and have a government of their own, without any calculation of the precise value of this object, indeed without reference at all to what is vulgarly termed their interest; gave their cause an importance in the eyes of the English

public, which, though ultimately connected with just views of policy, was certainly in the first instance only ascertained by feelings of sympathy. Even the counter-revolution in Holland, though undoubtedly much more nearly related to the ideas of gain, was in all probability hailed at first with a joy wholly free from calculation, and only recognised as really advantageous some time after it had ceased to be highly interesting. Whence, then, the almost complete indifference with which we have always regarded the sufferings and the exertions of the Poles?

We shall in vain endeavour to answer this question by attempting to discover any difference in the degree either of those sufferings or of those exertions;—the difference is in their favour. Poland was first partitioned in a moment of profound peace, without any more pretence of right than Buonaparte had when he attacked Spain, nay without even that shadow of a title which he pretended to derive from the cession of the Court; for Stanislaus, though the creature of Catherine II., protested solemnly against the dismemberment, in the face of all Europe; and the factious diet suspended its animosities, to join him in his appeal.* The subsequent acts of 1793 and 1794 were done without the slender colour of a pretext afforded by the anarchy of 1772; and the struggles made in both cases, but especially in the last, were far greater than any of which our Spanish allies can boast, beside being wholly unassisted, and in circumstances almost desperate. The miseries endured by this brave people almost defy description; while in reality the evils inflicted by France upon the Spaniards lie within a narrower compass—for these two reasons, among others, because she has never had sufficient possession of their country, to introduce among them her worst plague, the conscription,—and because no man of a calm and unbiassed judgment can suppose that a district overrun by Cossacks fares as well as one conquered by French troops. Is it then that the Spaniards have succeeded, while the Poles were overwhelmed? This would indeed be a strange reason for withholding commiseration; but surely the day is past when any one can pretend to believe that the French have been expelled

from Spain by any resistance, except that of the British armies, backed by the allies in Germany, and by a Russian winter,—although they were seconded, no doubt, in several important particulars by the spirit of the people in the Peninsula, and more especially by the excellent troops drawn from Portugal. Was there something romantic in the captivity and sufferings of the Spanish princes, and in the attachment and the adventures of their subjects? But can any one compare these with the sufferings of Stanislaus, and the gallantry of the confederates of Barr, and the chiefs who led on the last resistance in 1794? It is not by any means intended to lessen the great merits of the Spaniards, or to chide the enthusiasm excited by them in this country; but the difference between their case and that of the Poles, is assuredly all in favour of the latter.

If the cause of the apathy in question cannot be found in any quality belonging to the subject, perhaps we must seek it in something relating to ourselves. We are willing to throw it upon the ignorance generally prevailing, of every-thing regarding Poland; and to contribute, as far as in us lies, toward removing this, is the chief purpose of the present article. Some other ingredients are, however, mixed up along with ignorance, in composing the soporific mixture which has so strangely lulled the feelings of Englishmen. It is to be feared, that we too often refuse our attention to any tale of a public distress, in producing which the French have had little or no share; and are averse to hearing the truth spoken, when it arraigns the conduct, not of our enemies but our Allies. One part of this feeling we need not be ashamed of—tenderness towards Allies, to whom all Europe owes so great a debt of gratitude. But it is quite absurd, that any such feelings should shut us out from a discussion essential to the interest of every nation. It is a discussion which presses forward upon us from all quarters; and, without an abandonment of all claim to consistency and to principle, the Allies themselves cannot repudiate it. They are about to negotiate a peace. —What shall be the basis?—Must France keep all that she possesses? No one pretends to believe it.—Shall Austria

regain what she has lost? Every one will answer, as far as may be.—Is this only because she has fought so efficiently against France?—Then must Switzerland be excluded from the benefits of the treaty, and Buonaparte continue Mediator of the Cantons;—then, too, must the whole German States, except those of the Allies, be swallowed up in the fund of equivalents and indemnities.—Nay, upon this principle, Holland could not have been restored to independence, had she made no movement in her own behalf, let what would have happened on the Upper Rhine; and no successes of the allied arms could have given independence to Spain, unless the fortune of war had made the Peninsula the scene of the victory. But the question is still more urgently forced upon us, by the state of the Dutchy of Warsaw.—How is it to be disposed of? It consists of almost all the Prussian, and half the Austrian share of Poland—and is now the anomalous state of a vast province, in which the Code Napoleon is the law—Prussians and Poles the civil administrators—and Russians the absolute rulers, and military occupants. Is this country to be restored to its former proprietors, or retained by Russia, or subjected to some new scheme of partition? Restored to its former owners will probably be the answer—because restoration is the grand principle of the good cause; everything is carried on with the view of reinstating things in their ancient condition; the Bourbons are to be replaced, at least in Spain; the Orange family in Holland; the Austrians in Italy; and Savoy is to be separated from France.—Therefore, it will be said, the Dutchy must of course revert, partly to Prussia, and partly to Austria. Now, all this at first sight, looks mighty plausible, and even has some semblance of consistency; but it is only a thin varnish, which a breath will melt: For we should like to hear any one answer this single question—By what right Prussia and Austria are the *owners* of Poland, and must have their *shares* of it restored as a matter of course, when those two powers are busily engaged in restoring Holland to independence, and its former sovereigns? But they have had longer possession of Poland.—Of a small part of it, certainly—but not of

the bulk; for it does so happen, that their last partition was effected the very month that Holland was overrun by French troops seconded by a powerful faction in the country.

Here, then, we find ourselves in the very midst of the question, at the outset of any negotiation which can be undertaken for a settlement of Europe;—and we might almost stop here, and be satisfied with the conclusion to which we have already been brought, that there is but one ground upon which a distinction can be raised in favour of Holland or Spain, and against Poland;—the ground, not of principle, but interest—not of right, but might;—the ground, that the Allies have in their hands the power of keeping Poland in subjection, and are resolved to preach up restoration at other people's expense, but to practise none of their doctrine themselves.

If such is the language of the day; if all the professions of the last twelve months are dissipated by the successes to which they contributed so largely, and Europe is once more to be plunged in a chaos of intrigue, profligacy, and violence,—we have nothing more to offer; we at least understand what we are about;—and it is our own fault if we are disappointed, let what will happen either now or hereafter. But let the proper words be used for all this, so that we may not be made grateful for nothing, and be at once deceived in our hopes, and cheated out of our thanks. Let our ears be spared the insulting titles—of *restorer*, *liberator*, *avenger*, lavished upon, or even claimed by those, who, having got the upper hand by means of the people of Europe, use their power in perpetuating slavery and oppression; and, having driven out the French armies, only think of dividing the spoils among themselves, without ever wasting a thought upon the rightful owners, to whose assistance they had affected to come.—But, most of all, let us be spared hearing the ridiculous name of *pacificator*, given to those who are destroying every chance of lasting tranquillity; and employing a moment of unexampled success, never likely to recur, in laying the foundation of new wars;—when they might, by recurring to sound principles, by only keeping the faith which they

had vowed, re-establish the system of European independence upon an immovable basis, and give to the world a real and lasting peace.

We cannot, however, for a moment, allow such thoughts to cross our minds. After the delightful expectations which have been raised so high by the victories and the dignified moderation of the Allies, it would be a grievous disappointment indeed to find them resorting to such principles for a proof of their consistency. It may well be permitted us to speculate upon their persevering in the right course which they have so steadily pursued; and, in this belief, we conceive, that the line of policy which shall appear to be most conducive to the general interests and permanent tranquillity of the Continent, will be followed in their arrangements for the distribution of territory. The object of the '*Appeal*' is, to prove that the restoration of Polish independence, in some shape or other, is a most material part of this policy; and we cannot better perform the task we have now undertaken, of calling the attention of our readers to this important subject, than by laying before them an outline of the argument, and arranging, under the different heads of it, such further information respecting Polish affairs, as we are possessed of.

The '*Appeal*' opens with removing some preliminary objections which might startle the bulk of readers, and disincline them to any discussion of the subject at the present moment. Poland is, among the Allies, rather a delicate topic; it resembles some of those personal questions, touching the merits of individuals, the gains of near and dear relations, or the delinquencies of persons highly connected, which are frequently brought forward in the discussions of our domestic politics, and generally create considerable uneasiness among all parties. Upon the subject of Poland there seems pretty much the same shyness among the old established powers of Europe, that we observe among ourselves, when any matter is broached, on which each party in its turn has had something to regrét. No one loves to handle it; the person who mentions it is deemed officious, and intrusive, and indelicate; by common consent the less that is said, and the sooner the

subject is dropt, the better. Nay, you shall see the company for a while quite ignorant of what is meant, when the topic is started, staring about, and looking as innocent as possible; and only by a kind of force awakened, and made to listen. Perhaps the reader may have chanced to be in a company of persons of character and station, among whom one is *awkwardly* connected with some half-forgotten judicial proceeding; the topic of halters is here proverbially so irksome, that everybody is apt to fall into it from the general anxiety to avoid it; and when by accident the fatal word is out, the meeting must either disperse (which we recommend in such case) or remain in the fear of encountering one another's looks. But the case of the partitioning powers is by many supposed to resemble that of some companies in America, or other settlements where the delicate subject is much, and almost equally to be eschewed by every person present. Now, we are fully aware of the delicacy of the topic; and if, by holding our peace we could keep it at rest, perhaps the best way would be to do a great violence to all natural feeling, and bury it for ever in profound silence. We shall even grant that, if it were possible, it would be advisable to let all principles of justice and humany sleep, and forget Poland, for fear of hurting the feelings of the Allies upon a point presumed to be so tender. But unhappily this is wholly impossible; depending upon persons and things altogether beyond our control,—upon no less a personage indeed, and one of no greater delicacy than the Emperor Napoleon, — who, whether in peace or war, whether negotiating or intriguing, never fails to bring up the ugly subject, as in truth he must be utterly ignorant of his greatest advantage if he for a moment lost sight of it. The Allies may be as silent as the grave upon it, and may affect not to understand the broad hints of the 'Moniteur,' and the French proclamations; but the bystanders, and their own subjects, must judge; and one part of their subjects, the Poles, devour with insatiable avidity every allusion of the sort, and are fully more ready to act than to reason upon it. Is it not far better to remove the weakness to which their cause is subject, than to pretend that they have forgotten it?

Would they not do a wiser as well as a better thing, if, instead of avoiding the discussion altogether, till their enemy forced it upon them either in the shape of set-off in a treaty, or rebellion in a campaign, they manfully got rid of the flaw in their title to regenerate Europe and resist French usurpation, and secured to themselves a more tranquil dominion, with an unimpeachable character?

But is there no reason to think that this notion of delicacy is overstated?—Why should the Allies dread the subject?—None of them had any share whatever in the first partition: each of them is removed from that crime by two descents. In the last, which undoubtedly was by far the most important, except that it was not the beginning of the fatal system, neither the Emperor of Russia nor the King of Prussia had any part; and the Emperor of Austria may fairly be supposed to have been merely passive; for the treaty was half finished before his accession, and he was engaged at the moment in a most critical war with France. Why then should we hesitate to discuss the subject from delicacy towards them, any more than we suffer a similar delicacy towards our own Government to hamper us in reprobating the American war, or the enormities committed by our rulers in the East and West Indies? The writers and statesmen on the Continent canvass very freely our conduct in those particulars; and in reality all the praise which they bestow upon one of the finest passages in our history—the victory gained for humanity in 1807—is an admission that seven years ago our present rulers and statesmen encouraged the traffic in human flesh —with this additional circumstance, that the very heads of the Royal Family were uniformly strenuous in resisting its abolition. In fact, the present appeal is made not against any living individuals, but against a system begun by princes long since dead, and entailing lamentable consequences, as well on their descendants whom it was designed to benefit, as on those whose interests were from the beginning meant to be sacrificed. But there is certainly a magnanimity in the whole conduct of the Allied Sovereigns, which would render it a safe duty to speak

the truth to them, even if the errors to be pointed out existed in their own individual conduct, and were not the practical effects of the policy handed down to them from their illustrious progenitors.

But, it may be said, this question is no longer open to negotiation; it is one of domestic, and not of foreign policy; we have no right to interpose our good offices between the Allied Princes and their subjects. The force of this objection had better be tried by the excellent and unerring rule of making the case our own; and we have no occasion to do so in fancy; we need only to tax our memory for an instance wherein the very thing occurred to ourselves, our enemy having exactly made the objection here presumed to be raised by the Allies. When we required the evacuation of Spain, then wholly overrun by his troops, as a *sine quâ non* in our negotiation for peace, he said Spain was no business of ours, and added, that he might as well require the emancipation of the Irish Catholics. Now, this must be deemed to have been a perfectly satisfactory answer by every one who can for a moment listen to the present objection against our interfering in behalf of Poland. If the Allies have a right to say, the Poles are ours, and we may as well ask you to emancipate the Irish Catholics; Buonaparte had the same right to say, Spain is mine, as Ireland is yours. Yet we doubt if any one individual in the whole world was duped by his absurd argument. But then indeed it came from France, and was used against Spain—while the topic in question, though precisely the same, is supposed to come from Russia, and to be used against Poland:—this is the diversity. The difference, in the length of possession, we are immediately to consider.

There remains to be noticed the repugnance felt towards the Poles, because they have been found ranged on the side of the enemy, that is, of our enemy the French. For, it is quite plain that none of our Allies can say a word upon a charge equally applicable to them all. Austria joined Buonaparte in his Russian invasion, and only left him during the armistice last summer. Prussia was wholly devoted to him until his disastrous retreat enabled

her to escape. And Russia, having joined him at Tilsit, by a treaty too which gave her two new slices of Poland, one at the expense of Austria, the other at the cost of her Prussian Ally, was found backing him two years after in the invasion of Austria. It would be reckoning too much on the powers of princely inconsistency, or the proverbially short memories known at Court, to pretend, in the presence of those great potentates, that the mere fact of having taken part with France is a sufficient answer to everything that may be urged for Poland. Yet, it must be admitted, that some pretty bold attempts at such an excess of flattery have lately been made. We have been told of the three Allied Monarchs turning away their heads when the King of Saxony saluted them at Leipsic; and have heard much of the dignified contempt with which one of their Majesties received a message from that unhappy prince. Did the injudicious parasites who invented such fables, forget, or could they fancy, that Alexander had forgotten the unfortunate course of events which so lately made even the sovereign of all the Russias league with the enemy of Europe, and gain by the union an extension of territory at the expense of his own Allies? How dared they insult his Imperial Majesty by insinuating that he would maltreat the petty Elector for yielding to overwhelming force, a compliance which the apprehension only of a doubtful struggle had extorted from his own immense and almost unbroken power? Such topics then, as the Polish alliance with France, cannot be used on the Continent—Have they any more weight with ourselves?

Thus much to remove the objections which incumber the question at the threshold, and if not first of all eradicated from our minds, will disturb the whole discussion. But this appeal is asserted to be made, not on the ground of compassion for the Poles—it is stated on the score simply of the common interests of the European nations; and nothing is demanded for Poland beyond what those interests require us to allow. This general good may be viewed in two senses, the one more enlarged than the other, and comprehending a reference to consistency and principle; the other more limited, and

confined to what is vulgarly termed, national benefit. A sound and enlightened policy can never separate these two views for any purpose, except to examine the subject-matter by each of them successively, with the greatest distinctness.

1. It is impossible to look forward, without some alarm, to the moment which seems fast approaching, when the results of all the late victories, and the pending negotiations are to be disclosed, and mankind shall learn the value of the professions with which the war has hitherto been conducted. The doubts upon this most interesting subject, stated in the '*Appeal*,' have certainly been partly removed since it was published. Swedish objects having turned the Crown Prince aside from his progress towards the Rhine, we have seen him obtain Norway in exchange for Pomerania (the value of which may be somewhere about one-twentieth of the former). But it is not so generally known, that this distinguished personage smoothed the way to his elevation by the most distinct promises to obtain the restoration of Finland: and that, whether well or ill-founded, the wish of the Swedish people for such an event, can only be exceeded by their extreme indifference to the acquisition of Norway. Probably the next Diet will have all the papers laid before them, which may chance to contain evidence of the reiterated and earnest efforts made to get back Finland, with the grounds upon which Alexander the Restorer declined it, and the Swedish patriot acquiesced.

It is assumed, however, and we sincerely hope with truth, that the Allies will continue true to their principles, and only show themselves anxious to re-establish the independence of Europe upon a lasting foundation. How then is this to be accomplished?—By recurring to those principles, which in former times secured national independence, and made the neighbourhood of the greatest state safe to the most insignificant. These principles have been so often detailed in the pages of this Journal, that we shall not enlarge upon them, further than to observe, that they consist in the universal persuasion among statesmen, constantly in view, and acted on, that every aggression by one

power affects all; and that not an acre of territory may be taken with impunity from any member of the European commonwealth. If any superficial reasoner, from ignorance, should deride such doctrine as speculative, or as old-fashioned and ill-suited to the spirit of the times, we beg him to observe, that the consequences of disregarding it have been sufficiently practical, and that all the security of old times has been banished from the world by this very heresy. But we may stop a little, to put the matter in a light, which even a clerk in office, we should think, will admit to be practical and plain.

We shall suppose that success continues to attend the Allies, and that they compel Buonaparte to make a peace upon their own terms. They have told us themselves that those terms will leave France possessed of more territory than she had before the Revolution; but suppose that she only has her own limits—a result not very probable—however we shall take it so;—no man can doubt that the whole attention of her Government will be turned towards regaining the ascendant which she has recently lost; that the personal character of her ruler, as well as the national feelings, will direct her whole efforts to this object. We say nothing of the large army of prisoners which must be sent back; but there is already a larger army within France, arising no doubt partly from the invasion. In one way or another, then, Buonaparte will have a prodigious force on foot; and it would be singular if peace did not augment his pecuniary resources. Can any man doubt that he will be a most formidable neighbour?—Who is there so confident as to view, without apprehension, the probable event of a contest between him and any one of the Allies single-handed? We speak not merely of the risks of a war between him and Holland, or the German principalities—but of a war between him and any one of the greater powers. We might perhaps go farther, but we are aware of the singular inconsistency of those whom we are now addressing, and know full well, that although they can see nothing but dangers from France when peace is proposed, they ridicule every one who adverts to such a topic for any other purpose. Supposing it then only to be stated, that

Buonaparte is more than a match for the third and fourth rate-powers in his neighbourhood, and for any one of the greater powers, we desire to know wherein the security of the Continent shall consist after a peace has recruited him? What chance is there of his not being desirous once more to cross the Rhine? Then, what reasonable prospect have we of his being restrained within his limits? Assuredly one only.—If the rest of Europe, recollecting the sufferings of late years, shall be wise enough to be perpetually upon the watch and resolute enough to make common cause with the first prince or state whom he may attack—then there will be no chance of his prevailing as he has heretofore done; for their armies are in every respect improved; his forces no longer fight with superior enthusiasm; and the feeling of the people all over Germany is decidedly against him. The security of the Continent then must rest, first, upon the recurrence of the governments to ancient principles, and, after that, upon the improvement of its military system, and the diffusion of right popular feelings. Now, it cannot be for a moment contended, that the terms upon which a treaty is made, are indifferent in respect of the disposition to keep it either on the part of the government or the people. If those terms are consistent with justice and sound principles, it is infinitely easier to unite both governments and their subjects against the infringement of them. If a settlement of Europe is made upon the profligate scheme of each party taking as much as he can get by force or intrigue; if a few powerful states lay their heads together and despoil all the rest; if the interests and the feelings of the people go for nothing in the arrangement; who can expect that either the different cabinets will be ready at a moment's warning, to unite against any one which may violate the arrangements thus foully made; or that the popular feelings, which it wholly disregarded, will rise up to defend it? What confidence can the parties to such a scheme have in each other? What answer can they give to the first among them who betrays the common cause, by joining the enemy in breaking the bargain? What answer can they make to the enemy when he proposes some new plot

of the same kind, and quotes to the world their own authority in the very last precedent on record?—If men were mere machines in the hands of courts, and all governments were carried on upon the Turkish plan, it might signify little what are the grounds of war, or how inconsistent the professions were with the practice of statesmen. There would then be no question of popular opinion; but even then it would be impossible for mutual confidence to prevail among allies. A single government might go on; a confederacy of more than one could not exist—and accordingly, among states of this description, no man ever thought of a balance of power. We take it to be very manifest, that a treaty founded upon disregard of principle, upon the revolutionary and not the older and sounder doctrines of modern Europe, would speedily share the fate of those other compacts which each successive war, since 1792, has forced upon the vanquished, and each new aggression of the common enemy has broken, without uniting either allied courts, or popular feeling in their behalf.

There are many very urgent reasons for exhibiting the return of public principles and honour, more peculiarly in the case of Poland. It is universally agreed, that they were here first grossly violated. The partition of 1772, to use the language of Mr. Burke, was "the first very great breach in the modern political system of Europe. It was not sapping by degrees the constitution of our great western republic; it was laying the axe at once to the root, in such a manner as threatened the overthrow of the whole." If these were his forebodings at the time, he unhappily lived to see them exceeded by the event; his declining years witnessed the completion of the crime in Poland; and its cruel effects over every part of the Continent. He again foretold, with his accustomed sagacity, that its perpetrators would be the first to repent, and to suffer by it. We have the authority of M. Ségur, one well acquainted with foreign politics, more especially those of France, for asserting that the last partitions in 1793 and 1794, animated the Jacobins with fresh courage and resources. He closes a striking parallel of the conduct

pursued by the partitioning powers, and the proceedings of the Revolutionary Committee, with the remark, that if the republicans failed in establishing freedom and justice at home, they at least secured their independence from a foreign yoke; and that the fate of Poland made all Frenchmen, of all parties, swear to die rather than submit to receive the law from the Allies.[1] This was written in 1802. Twelve years have elapsed since then, and twenty since the events it relates to. The same Allies are once more leagued against France, and occupy her frontier provinces. It is observable that Buonaparte has recourse to the very same topic which had so greatly aided his Jacobin predecessors; his state papers are full of Poland. "See there!" he exclaims, "the conduct of your invaders, who now come speaking to you of peace, and freedom, and national independence, while they hold in their hands the sword that reeks with the blood of Polish patriots." We do not mean to lay much stress on the coincidence; but unquestionably the French people have now, as formerly, turned a deaf ear to all the protestations and promises of the Allies. It is, however, of the people of Europe generally that we are now speaking; and we submit it to even the most practical politician, whether they will not be disposed to obey the next call to rise in their own defence against any aggressor, and to believe that the propositions are made for their own good, the more, because the Allies have kept faith with them on the present occasion?—whether it would not be a great advantage, in any future struggle with France, that the Allies could look her in the face, and complain of injustice without fear of retort;—that they could look at Poland, not only without shame, but with the proud recollection of principles carried into practice at the cost of what is commonly termed interest?—whether the general recurrence to those strict and sound political maxims which used to form the strength of coalitions, would not be most essentially promoted, by undoing the odious act which first relaxed, and then almost entirely extirpated them?

The length of time which has elapsed since the first

[1] Ségur, Tableau de l'Europe, iii., 180.

partition, is the most ready answer to these suggestions. Nor are we disposed to deny, that, in matters of public as well as private right, long and fixed possession should have great weight. But we are now speaking rather of the last, than of the first dismemberment; and against undoing this no such objection can be offered. The lamentable events of 1772 left Poland a great and powerful state. It still had a population of above ten millions; and the partition had produced a most important change;—there was an end of all the former anarchy and faction, in so much that the Diet of 1788 exhibited an unprecedented scene of unanimity. The leaders of the nation seemed anxious only for the firm establishment of a regular and free constitution, which should secure the external independence, and promote the domestic improvement of their country. The deliberative wisdom displayed by some of those eminent men was still more striking than the eloquence of their debates. The speech of Count Potocki, upon the sale of the Starosties, has been preserved; and assuredly it exhibits as sober and sagacious a disposition of mind as might be expected in assemblies meeting in the quietest times.—He warns his brethren of the Diet, against following the example of the French revolution, in its exceptionable parts; for he was aware of these, although it was long before the public opinion in Europe had turned against the revolutionary proceedings. "The faults which France has committed" (says he) "originate in a single error; she has only considered men in the mass; she has lost sight of the individual. Eager to do justice towards the whole, she has injured the parts; she has dealt with the members of civil society as if they were ideal beings, or geometrical figures, on which she might reason abstractly and systematically, without ever regarding them as in fact they exist." The labours of these enlightened and temperate reformers terminated in giving to Poland that celebrated Constitution of the Third of May, which she was fated to possess but for a moment of passing tranquillity and freedom. To say that it has been universally admired, is a general and unavailing praise. But in the ferment of the French revolution, while the invidious enemies of the

Poles were busy representing them as Jacobins; at a moment when even the abolition of the Slave Trade was held to be a French crime, and Mr. Burke half giving into the mistake, abandoned that cause—we find Mr. Burke himself, proclaiming to the world his high admiration of the Polish patriots, and their new constitution, His eloquent panegyric thus concludes—"Happy people. if they knew how to proceed as they have begun! Happy Prince, worthy to begin with splendour, or to close with glory, a race of Patriots and of Kings!—To finish all—this great good, as in the instant it is, contains in it the seeds of all future improvement, and may be considered as in a regular progress, because founded on similar principles, towards the stable excellence of a British constitution.[1]

It is not our intention to detail the provisions of his admirable code; remarkable alike for the salutary changes which it boldly introduced, where the evil would bear no temporizing; and for the moderation and skill with which it paved the way towards more gradual improvement, where a sudden alteration was not required, and might have proved hazardous. But a few of its leading features deserve notice in this discussion. It distinctly recognised the principle "that all power in civil society should be derived from the will of the people; its end and object being the preservation and integrity of the state, the civil liberty and good order of society, on an equal scale and lasting foundation."—(*Art.* V.) The legislative, executive, and judicial powers were separated from each other;[2] the duration of the legislature was limited to two years, but its constant existence was provided for; and the *liberum veto* was wholly abolished. The crown was declared no longer to be elective, except upon the extinction of the family in which it was made hereditary. The person of the king was declared inviolable; but he could do no act whatever without a responsible minister. He was entrusted with the command of the armies, and the disposal of a revenue raised by the legislature; but, fearful of

[1] Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs.

[2] This was carried perhaps too far, as with us after the Revolution—for no minister could sit in the Diet.—*Art.* VI.

anything resembling the *veto*, the constitution gave him no other voice in legislation, except as president of the senate. Various wholesome regulations were established for preserving freedom and order in elections, and for securing the communication between the representative and constituent. Important reforms in the administration of justice were begun, by abolishing private and seignorial jurisdictions, both lay and clerical, in the towns; and appointing a commission to revise the civil and criminal code. In the mean time, an explicit recognition was made of "that cardinal law, *neminem captivabimus nisi jure victum*" (§ 2.); and the maxim was distinctly enacted, "that every man is free the moment he touches Polish ground."—(*Art.* IV.) The wisdom of this system was equally shown in the modest anticipations of its defects; and provisions were carefully made for a revision of it at stated periods, as well as for partial corrections and improvements. To support this constitution, the army was immediately raised from twenty to a hundred thousand men, by the unanimous voice of the Diet, and with the loudest acclamations of the people; contributions of money were poured in from all quarters; and when the zeal of the contributors outstript the circulating powers of the currency, the more cumbrous wealth of the nobles might be seen moving towards the Treasury, while their domains were alive with armed peasantry ready to secure its expenditure.

To feel an interest in the fate of the Polish constitution is natural for Englishmen, and it is not new. Some feelings of this kind were formerly excited among us, and steps were even taken to succour the patriots. Why should not the returning peace and liberty of Europe be marked by a revival of those feelings, at once kindly and salutary, among ourselves? See how the Poles have been treated. —By a treaty solemnly concluded with Poland in 1790, a few months before the constitution was promulgated, the King of Prussia had bound himself to prevent by all the means in his power, "any interference in the internal affairs of the republic, or its dependencies, at any time, or in any manner whatsoever, or upon whatever pretence

of former transactions or stipulations, or any construction of the same;"—and if other endeavours failed, he bound himself to make common cause with Poland against the aggressor. When Russia marched her armies thither in 1792, Frederick William declined to interfere, upon the pretence that the "constitution of the 3rd of May altered the matter; that he never had approved of it; and had always foreseen its evil consequences."[1] The Royal memory is short indeed. Only two years before, on receiving the account of the constitution being proclaimed, he had written, with his own hand, the warmest congratulations to the authors of it—commanding his ambassador to "declare in the most formal manner, his sincere felicitations to the King, the Marshals of the Diet, and all those who had contributed to so important a work;" praising the change "as essential to the happiness of the nation," and "likely to confirm for ever the harmony and close connexion subsisting between them;"—and professing that his ardent desire was "to assist in consolidating the new constitution, and promoting the happiness of the republic."[2] The Empress Catherine, too, had a singular anxiety for the "happiness of the republic;" and accordingly she no sooner heard of the new constitution, than she pretended to listen to a wretched Junto of some five or six factious nobles (only one of whom had any weight), the last remains of party, and the only objectors to the change. She sent an order to Warsaw that the constitution should be abolished, and the old anarchy "whereof she was guarrantee," restored; announcing that her armies were on their march for effecting this purpose. They marched accordingly, and the King of Prussia took the opportunity of "seizing provisionally Thorn, Dantzic, and part of Great Poland, to secure his states against the contagion of French principles, and to protect the well-disposed inhabitants."[3] The Poles in those parts being wholly taken by surprise (as was indeed not unnatural after the treaties and

[1] Answer of the King of Prussia to the King of Poland, 8 *June* 1792.
[2] Letter of the King of Prussia, May 1791.
[3] Manifesto, March 25, 1793.

letters so lately signed by the same royal hand) could make little resistance. But when the handful of Russian partizans at Targowitz, beginning to open their eyes, asked the Empress what all this meant? her Minister was pleased to reply, that "they should have a blind confidence in the generous protection of her Imperial Majesty, and not imprudently defend themselves against Prussia, without first consulting her." At length, in concert with Frederick William, she threw off the mask. The principle confederates of Targowitz, finding how they had been duped, joined the rest of their countrymen; and it is difficult to avoid rejoicing that their unparalleled folly was soon punished in Siberia by the perfidy of the Court which had seduced them. The two powers assembled, in a remote town, a Diet of such persons as they thought would answer their purposes: but even these, being Polanders, it was necessary to compel them by military force. The place where they met was surrounded by musketry and artillery. The only effect was to produce a dead silence. The creatures of Russia interpreting this into consent, several persons were bold enough to protest aloud, and they instantly found themselves in the hands of the Cossacks. Terror is the appointed punishment of despots; it follows close upon violence, and touches the criminal whom conscience cannot reach. Having thus extorted a new share of Poland, on the shameless pretext "that it was tainted with French principles"—because it had just exchanged the anarchy of an elective for the stability of an hereditary monarchy—the spoilers required that the army should be reduced to 12,000. Many regiments, refusing to lay down their arms, reinforcements of Russian troops were poured in. The chief patriots of 1791 had been forced to fly the country; but the whole population furnished materials for insurrection; and one or two individuals in the capital prepared the means of it, although the country was still overrun with the troops of Russia and Prussia.

In every part of the country, this unfortunate people flew to arms; and Kosciusko, and their other leaders, having secretly returned, after proclaiming war and in-

ternal emancipation in the same manifesto, led them on against the enemy — in circumstances all but desperate. History will record, to the consolation of freemen in future ages, that the invincible ardour of troops, half-armed, and newly raised, and scarcely at all disciplined, beat the veteran forces of Catherine and Frederick, never less than thrice their numbers, in many fierce engagements. Madalinsky, with 800 horse, made his way through the Prussian troops, and traversed the whole of the country occupied by them. At Wraclavicz, Kosciusko, with 4000 men, principally peasants, defeated 12,000, with the loss of 3,000, and 12 pieces of cannon: one battery in this engagement was actually taken by a corps armed with pitchforks. Jasinski took Wilna with 600 men, and drove away the Russians, with the loss of 1500 prisoners. In Warsaw, the people rose on the garrison; and notwithstanding the dreadful fire which it kept up with artillery, after forty-eight hours' hard fighting, drove them out with a loss of 6000 killed, 3000 prisoners, and 50 pieces of cannon. Such a discomfiture seemed to require an explanation; and the Russians have accounted for it, in a detailed memorial, which ascribes it chiefly to the pillaging and drunkenness of the troops, of whom it says 60 were killed in a state of intoxication in one cellar.[1] Frederick William marched against the capital with 40,000; and Kosciusko, advancing to meet him with 12,000, repulsed him with loss. The Prussians took Cracow; and the people of Warsaw, as happens in such cases, showed signs of violence against their persons; but, unlike the encouragers of the Parisian Septemberizers, their leader instantly checked this spirit, by making some examples. The united forces of the Allies now bore upon Warsaw, and laid siege to it with all the resources of war and of intrigue.—They were kept at bay for two months, and sustained several defeats; and the Prussians raised the siege, in order to check a formidable insurrection of the Poles in Southern Prussia. At length, Kosciusko, after a long and obstinate engagement with Ferzen, in which an overpowering superiority of numbers would have

[1] Memoirs, p. 148.

been of no avail, had not a treacherous coadjutor[1] deserted him in a critical moment, covered with wounds—was defeated, and taken. His virtues and misfortunes are said to have melted the rude nature of the Cossacks, who were about to comply with his entreaties, and to kill him, when some one recognised him. He was carried to Petersburgh, and flung into a dungeon, where he languished during the remainder of Catherine's iniquitous reign. Even this dreadful reverse, and the defeats that followed in nowise diminished the enthusiasm of the Poles. They showed neither the listlessness nor the cruelty of despair; —no commander was persecuted for his losses—and no relaxation appeared in their preparations for defence. The whole strength of the Russians was required to take Warsaw, after a gallant resistance, and immense loss on either side. Of the unfortunate Poles, 9000 perished in the fight.—After the place was carried, it was in cold blood given up to pillage and massacre;—30,000 persons of all ages, and either sex, are supposed to have suffered death, in every horrid form of torture and indignity;—30,000 more, who still refused to submit, were suffered to leave the place, and afterwards hunted down by the soldiery on every side, so that few reached the frontiers.—The *amnesty* (as it was phrased) promised by the commander, was not ratified by his Imperial Mistress—and the most distinguished chiefs were sent to distant prisons. The wretched monarch was carried away to Russia, where he soon after died, not without suspicious circumstances; the remainder of the country was partitioned; and Catherine, as she describes herself in her proclamation, "*with the solicitude of a tender mother, who only wishes for the happiness of her children,*" concluded the scene by ordering a solemn "*thanksgiving to God in all the churches for the blessings conferred upon the Poles;*" and commanded that each of them should "*swear fidelity and loyalty to her, and to shed in her defence the last drop of their blood, as they should answer for it to God, and his terrible judgment, kissing the holy word and cross of their Saviour.*"

[1] Poninski—not Poniatowski, as is absurdly stated in some accounts, *e. g.*, Annual Register.

All this, however, we must admit, was performed, not by French but Russian authority, which makes a great difference; moreover it was done towards Poles, and not Spaniards. We doubt, also, if it was not somewhat exceeded by several of the proceedings at the time of the first partition—at any rate, it had its equal among those; so that if the Russians had not positively improved, they had at least a precedent in their own history for their conduct. The afflicting, but romantic story of the Confederates of Barr, abounding on the part of the Poles with actions of gallantry and skill scarcely to be equalled, is terribly disfigured by the systematic cruelty with which the Russians sought to supply the want of enthusiasm and of genius. "For the honour of human nature" (says the Appeal), "it is to be hoped, that a monster like Drewitz, may never again be born of woman." But details are avoided, as leading to irritation. This man was the leader against the Confederates; and one of the most interesting and sagacious of modern histories, thus relates his proceedings.[1]—"Persons of rank, who had capitulated as prisoners, were butchered by him in cold blood, with the tortures invented in Russia for the punishment of slaves. Sometimes he bound them to trees, and made them serve as marks for the soldiers to shoot at; sometimes their heads were dexterously carried off by lancers, as at a tournament."—"Whole companies were turned out, with their hands cut off, and allowed to wander up and down the country; and, with a ferocity wholly inconceivable, joining mockery to unheard of cruelty, he flayed those miserable victims alive; cutting the skin, so as to represent, with the flesh, the national dress of the Poles."[2] Such was

[1] Rulhiere, tom. iii., p. 139.

[2] The adventures of the Polish chiefs—the two Pulawskis, Zaremba, &c., form a most interesting contrast to these atrocities. The surprise, and subsequent siege of Czenstokow—the singular march of Kosakowski—the campaigns of the partizans, almost invible, except at the moment when they fell on their prey—the activity and address of Dumourier—the firm and sustained wisdom of the council of Eperis;—form altogether a history, certainly not to be easily surpassed in point of brilliancy and interest. It would be highly desirable that the most remarkable passages could be collected and published;—the whole history of Poland abounds with

the precedent of 1772. The details of the massacres of 1794 are not minute enough to show how far it was followed.

If cruelty of this description produces a more acute degree of misery, it is neither so wide-spreading nor so lasting in its consequences as the impoverishment by confiscation. The assertion in the Appeal, that Poland was "parcelled out, confiscated, jobbed, turned into money," is most strictly and literally true. Each time that a Russian army enters Poland, whether for the purpose of partition, or of driving out an enemy, *Commission* of *Confiscation* is assembled as a matter of course. There has been, for instance, one sitting at Wilna, since December 1812, composed of five Russians, pretty well known before in Poland. All offences against the state are punished with confiscation; and there is consequently no lack of such accusations. Everything becomes a state offence in times of change; and the information of a spy, a private enemy, a turned-off lackey, a swindling Jew, a conscious malefactor, aware that he has been detected, is quite sufficient to put the emissaries, whether military or civil, of the extraordinary police in movement. The false accuser, too, runs no risk; for the first step is to send away the accused seven or eight hundred miles on his road to Siberia, at which distance, if at all, the examination of the charge is gone into. In the mean time his whole property is put in sequestration, and handed over to interim managers appointed by the police, — frequently the informers or their friends,—frequently the agents of those who are expected to have the estates finally given to them. We may easily picture to ourselves the change which such a proceeding must make in the lot of the whole peasantry on the property: They have lost their protector and parent; and, instead of his managers, chosen for their knowledge of the people and their kind dispositions, there are now to be seen and felt a set of harpies selected for their power of plundering, or in consideration

such, from the most ancient times.—A concise series of Polish adventures would furnish a work, equally important and entertaining.

of their wants. The Commission proceeds against the property, and keeps it in sequestration, or declares it confiscated, according to circumstances. When confiscated, it is granted out to some favourite, and irrevocably lost to the proprietor. The favourite is a Russian; and, in all probability, never intends to come near it, but means to squander as much as can be squeezed out of it at Petersburgh. If the accused proprietor, in spite of every disadvantage, as want of money, distance from his proofs, prejudice of his judge, is lucky enough to escape and return, he may very possibly find his estates confiscated by the Commission, which does not always await the event of the examination, knowing probably how rarely any such ceremony is performed; but should he be happy enough to return before decree of confiscation has passed, and obtain a restitution of the property, he finds it damaged to the amount of half its value, in every shape that dilapidation can assume. If the proprietor happen to be absent from the country at the time of partition or invasion, confiscation follows of course; he is presumed to be with the enemy, although (as happened very frequently last summer) he may have gone abroad with regular passports, for health, business, or pleasure. Still more certainly are the estates seized and the families ruined of those who, actually serving with the enemy, have been unable to get away; as was the case with subjects of the Austrian and Prussian parts, whose rulers sent them into Buonaparte's service one year, and who the next were ruined by the Allies for not deserting. We are, however, chiefly considering the effects of such measures on the body of the inhabitants. Many estates have above twenty thousand; some have above a hundred; but it is no very rich lordship which numbers four or five thousand. The wretchedness of these, under such changes, may perhaps be estimated by those who are acquainted with the proceedings of middlemen and tithe-proctors in Ireland, or rapacious attorneys, and needy mortgagees in the West Indies. The latter case is the more exact parallel.

It is of no consequence that the Prince at the head of the Empire may be the mirror of justice and goodness; the

fault is in the system; and he cannot, all-powerful as he is, make men act right under a vicious order of things, or superintend the enforcement of his own benevolent views: He must trust it to agents, to his Œrtels, his Rosens, and their inferior harpies, at an immense distance from his residence. It is in vain that he issues his manifestoes, and confirms them by ukases; that upon entering the country he proclaims peace and restoration; promises amnesty, and complete security of person and property; and pledges himself to show the difference between a French and a Russian administration. (*Manifesto, January* 1813.) Things proceed in their accustomed course; and the Emperor is at Frankfort while his agents are scattered over Poland. The exact history of the present confiscations is not yet known. That they are most numerous cannot be doubted; the 'Petersburgh Gazette' has already published very long lists of them; and it appears that certain refinements have now for the first time been introduced into the scheme. Formerly the debts due upon the property, the sums for which it was mortgaged, the claims of widows and children, were lost as against the estate, which the crown or its grantee took freed from all incumbrance; and if a favourite of the Government chanced to be the creditor, and, at some subsequent change, another estate of the same owner came under the dominion of Russia, it was seized to pay the debt due on the confiscated estate. Upon the present occasion a further advance has been made towards the perfection of public justice, the *beau-idéal* of imperial conveyancing. All debts due *to* the estate or its owner, are confiscated; and not only debts but expectancies, as reversions and remainders; nay, even mere *spes successionis*—as the portion of a parent's effects which the child would have at his decease. But the new creditor, reversioner, or remainderman, is of an impatient disposition, and cannot await the term of payment, or the determination of the particular estate;—accordingly all debts must be immediately paid, and possession must be forthwith given—and this without regard to the contingent nature of the reversionary interest; for if one of two sons is confiscated, the

parent being alive and likely to have a third child, the Government takes immediate possession of the half share, as if the parent were dead; and where there is but one son, the parent's whole effects are seized, by a species of visitation the very reverse of divine.

On the other hand, there was one financial arrangement in 1792 to which we believe the recent occupation of Poland has furnished no parallel. We allude to the measure of ruining public credit, by reducing all the banks to a state of insolvency, and then wasting their funds by a special commission. The business of the country used, from time immemorial, to be transacted at two stated meetings in the year; one at Warsaw, the other at Lemberg. At these, all contracts, whether respecting land or money, were made; and all settlements of accounts adjusted. The meetings were thence denominated the "*Contracts.*" They were attended by bankers of good credit, through whom balances were transferred, and who received new deposits, for which they paid interest. Of these great houses there were six or seven known and esteemed all over Poland. The chief was Tepper's; founded by Ferguson, a Scotchman. The Russian court cajoled him with honours, and the promise of a large estate, ("with a nice discrimination," says the Appeal, "of the national character"), until he was persuaded to lend them an enormous sum, which was punctually to be paid at the next "*Contracts.*" Instead of that, before the time, a Russian army was marched into the country; the proprietors brought little money to the meeting; and hearing of the loan, made a run on the house, which, thus disappointed of new deposits, and drained of the old, became bankrupt; and the others all followed. A commission to distribute the effects among the creditors was soon assembled; it consisted of ten agents from Russia, Prussia, and Austria;—the Russian being five in number. After sitting ten years, dividing somewhat more than eighteen pence in the pound among the creditors; after subsisting, as such functionaries love to do, out of the funds at their disposal, they separated, and returned to their respective homes. Several of them were greatly enriched; and one

of them, speaking of his gains, was pleased to observe upon this touching subject—"In this pocket I have got 100,000 ducats;[1] and what I have in the other I won't tell you."

The unfortunate Tepper, it is needless to observe, never received his promised estate; but a Russian officer had the mercy to assassinate him, after he had been reduced from the highest wealth to the most extreme misery.

The operation of banishment is intimately connected with that of confiscation; and is the constant work of the police and of individuals in authority, during times of change. It affects all ranks,—from the Prince-bishop of Cracow, who was carried away to Siberia, and died deranged in consequence after his return,—down to the peasantry, who are carried off by thousands to serve in the army, or to be sold in Russia, or to people some district in Asia. Pallas, the celebrated traveller, found in that remote wilderness, a tribe, the remains of a vast number carried thither on a scheme of this description. They were living in wretchedness; and, no longer hoping to see their country, had only one request to make, that their land might not, as heretofore, be seized by the government, as soon as they had brought it into cultivation. In Warsaw, above a hundred persons of eminent wealth or rank have been carried off in a season. The sex exempts not from this common lot of Poles. Matrons of the highest dignity, and most fascinating accomplishments, are exposed to the same risks with their husbands and sons. Persons in authority have been known to carry off some hundreds of peasants at a sweep, under pretence of recruiting, and then sell them in the Russian provinces.

The general ill-treatment experienced by the people wherever Russian troops are stationed, must not be passed over; for it is a perpetual misery, and affects those who have escaped exile and confiscation; nor can any care of the government materially amend it. While the Poles feel the ardent attachment to their country which distinguishes them, they can never be expected to regard the Russian troops as anything but oppressors. The Russians, on their part, view them as discontented, and almost rebellious

[1] 50,000*l.*

subjects;—their principle being that every Pole is an object of suspicion. No care of the ruler can reconcile such discordant classes of subjects, or make them live in harmony. A Polish village, where troops have been for some days, is said to resemble a place taken by storm. We insert an extract of a letter from a mercantile gentleman of undoubted respectability, who travelled over this country in the month of March and April. It is a literal translation from the German original.

"After having passed through burned and plundered villages, where contagion and injurious treatment have left only a few wretched peasants, who, pale, distracted, cause fear and pity to the traveller, you arrive in a city. The suburbs are usually burned completely; and so sometimes is a part of the city. The streets are empty; many houses are shut up and abandoned as during the plague. If you enter one of those which are inhabited, to ask after persons of your acquaintance, you learn, that they are in exile, or have concealed themselves to escape some disaster. People are everywhere packing up their effects, and preparing to set out. The whole nation is seized with terror. If you ask the reason, the answer is—Ertel is to be here in a few days; or, Rosen has arrived, or has sent secret orders. None are to be seen in the streets, unless when wretches are led to punishment, or prisoners conducted to Siberia. These are often well-known characters; gentlemen, persons in holy orders, who are seen chained on a cart, surrounded by Cossacks, or Baschkirs, with sabres in their hands.

"I travelled through Poland in the month of March last, and a second time in returning; each time I grew sick at the continual spectacle of death engraven on every countenance."

A circumstance remains to be noted of the greatest importance, especially at the present moment, when changes are again but too probable. Each partition, each change of dominion, has been of necessity accompanied by a change of frontier; and this entails upon the districts in which it takes place, as well as on others more remote, consequences extremely serious. A proprietor's estate is

cut in two; one part becomes Russian, the other Prussian; or he has different estates lying in two, or in all the three monarchies. This happens to almost every one of the great landholders. How does this affect them? First, every war between the three powers becomes a civil war to them; and their numerous relatives and connexions are fighting on different sides. Next, hold what conduct they may, it is impossible they can escape offending one or other of their masters; and their property and relatives are at hand to answer for the offence. Again, they cannot go from one estate to another, or it may be from one part of the same farm to another, in time of war; and, even in peace, not without a passport, which must be had from the capital in the Russian parts, and may take about eight months to procure. Moreover, though a passport were out of the question, a frontier never fails to create delay and vexations of every kind; planted, as it ever is, with custom-houses and officers of every description, whose duty is to stop and examine, but who make their duty a cover for their trade, which is to annoy and extort. Lastly, frontier provinces are naturally more dissolute, from the facilities of eluding the police.

We have now traced, with a feeble certainly, but a faithful pencil, the outlines of a picture of national injustice and suffering, not easily matched in modern times. By far the greater part of those evils belong to the period of the French Revolution. The question, at present, is how Europe may best be restored to its former state; all statesmen are occupied with this inquiry, which the victories of the Allies have at length made a practical one. We profess to be wholly unable to comprehend why Poland alone should be left out of view, and no man ever think of terminating the sad scenes which we have just been surveying. It will not now do to say, as Mr. Gentz and others have said, The partition has become a matter of history—it is part of the settled state of European affairs. When did they say so? After the peace of Luneville; that is, seven years after the worst of the partitions. Then the same argument now applies more strongly to all the changes effected by the peace of Presburgh in 1805, and

of Tilsit in 1807, which the Allies are at this moment engaged in undoing upon the principle of Restoration. Nay, the same argument, if urged at present, applies with equal force to the case of Holland, overrun in the same month in which Poland was blotted out of the map. Indeed, there is this material difference to be observed in favour of Poland, that England and France never recognised the partition; whereas all the powers of Europe have by solemn treaties acknowledged the Dutch republic, and the whole changes prior to 1803. But the Dutch freed themselves:—Admit it to be so; would the Restoration of their independence have been the less a matter of negotiation, if it had either not been effected at all previous to a cessation of hostilities, or if it had been brought about by the progress of the Allied arms on the Upper Rhine?

We shall, however, now take another view of the question, which may have some weight with those who will not listen to the argument from principle and consistency. The statements already given, coupled with the facts generally known, lead to conclusions quite irresistible with respect to the *advantages*, in the most ordinary and limited sense of the word, which would result to the Allies from restoring the independence of Poland. These are stated in the Appeal under two heads, Economical, and Military; of which the former, though less striking than the latter, are, we conceive, equally undeniable. Let any man reflect on the condition of the Polish provinces during the last forty, but especially the last twenty years, and say whether their possessors can have derived the benefits from them, in a commercial point of view, which a peaceable intercourse between their other dominions, and those fertile districts, would have secured. The whole commerce of Poland, by its position, must enrich the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian dominions, which surround it on every side. To keep its inhabitants in the state in which they have so long been held, is in truth sacrificing as much of the benefits of such a neighbourhood, as human impolicy warring with natural riches, can destroy. But sovereigns seldom listen to such an argument; they look to extent of

territory, increase of revenue, and augmentation of forces. Is it conceivable, that the undisputed mistress of continents scarcely explored, should desire a comparatively trifling addition of land, with a vicious title, and a contested, insecure possession?—Does Austria stand in need of territory?—Surely such a motive is only intelligible at Berlin. As for the revenue and the recruits derived from Poland, they must suffer a large deduction when we come to set off against them the cost, both in men and money, at which that country has been half conquered, and is uneasily retained. But let us look more particularly to the insecurity of the possession, and the benefits in a defensive view, derivable from a change of system. This consideration will at once, we believe, settle the question.

Except as a matter of curiosity, it is useless to inquire whence arises that singular affection for their country, by which the Poles are distinguished. Some persons may ascribe it perhaps to the natural vivacity of their character, and their imperfect state of refinement; the state of anarchy to which they have so long been accustomed, by calling forth, in one way or another, almost every man's exertions, has undoubtedly contributed much to it; and the dreadful sufferings which, of late, have united them in a wish for restoration, and an antipathy towards their masters, have naturally operated in the same direction. But the fact is certain, whatever be its explanation; and we might safely appeal to any one who has had intercourse with them, to say whether he has ever met a single Pole who appeared to feel like the common run of men, in questions regarding his country. These sentiments are, with this people, not occasional, but constant and habitual; they never cease to prey upon their minds; they are perpetually present with persons of every age, and both sexes; and he who should fancy, that the lower orders cannot share in them, "*because they are slaves*," would commit an egregious blunder. As well might it be alleged, that the Spaniards cannot hate the French, because they have not a representative government, and are subject to the Inquisition; or that the people of Scotland are regardless of the British constitution, because not one

in a thousand has any political rights. The Polish peasantry, moreover, have never been in the same condition with the Russian. Long before they were free by law, the progress of manners, and the interests of their lords, had rendered their bondage extremely gentle, and they were not, even by law, liable to be separated from the soil.[1] That this body of people have suffered severely by the changes that immediately affected the landholders, as well as by the proceedings of the foreign troops, we have already seen. That they have felt and acted for their country, is equally true; although unquestionably it is among the higher orders that we are to look for the greatest force of national spirit. It is easy to say that these are but a handful, and that the Polish people, are a few great lords with some millions of slaves. The answer is, that the fact is otherwise. A distant view of all institutions is deceitful;—we should see how they work in practice, before we decide on their effects. We shall give the reader a riddle by way of proving this. What country is that, in which the judges being most grave, virtuous, and learned, they are not allowed to decide on the greater number of judicial questions without the assistance of some ignorant tradesmen, chosen at random, whose characters are wholly unknown,—where there are appeals from a judge to himself,—where the court of ultimate appeal is composed of hereditary judges, not one in fifty of whom pretend to know anything of the law,—where a man is not allowed the assistance of professional lawyers when he is accused of the heavier offences, but only in the extreme cases of the lightest and the heaviest of all?—Not only is this our own country, but the description given refers to

[1] The Emperor Alexander, with his usual regard for the happiness of his people, published an ukase, about ten years ago, abolishing villenage in gross. But the law is almost inoperative; for the masters sell the peasants as before, only they do it under the name of *hiring*. Thus this beneficent measure has only varied the style in the public advertisements; and instead of announcing so many men or women, with such and such qualifications, for sale, the papers are filled with notices of men fit for such work, or women of such an age and description (sometimes with child) *to be let*. The same price as formerly is paid, and the property substantially changed. In Russian Poland, the peasants are as before the 3rd of May.

by far the most perfect of its institutions. When viewed more nearly, the Polish peasantry are not found to be materially different from those of other countries; and the higher classes are not a handful of nobles, but a vast multitude of persons in every state of employment, rank, and fortune, practically speaking. This class comprises all the landholders, amounting to perhaps 100,000 families; all those, far more numerous, who have the name and privileges of nobility, without any property in land, and who may be in any employment; and all those who are nominally peasants, but on different titles possessed of land,—and those settled in towns as tradesmen and artificers.—Substantially, then, this is a nation constituted as others are; and the feelings which we have described, pervade them as they would others, if they had the same character and sufferings to excite them.

Again, look to the fact.—The men raised by the Allies in Poland can never be trusted, except perhaps in their wars with each other; for they immediately desert. It is believed that, at the present moment, there are not one hundred Poles in all the combined armies. The ranks of any power at war with the three Courts, are constantly filled with them. Since 1794, France has never been without multitudes of them. But since 1807, when she held out hopes of restoration, they have been almost equal to the whole of her foreign levies together. In 1812, they are reckoned at 100,000, under the most gallant and unfortunate of men, Prince Poniatowski.

How many of these have deserted? Even in unparalleled defeats, how constantly have they clung to France, because she still battled with Russia! Saxons, Bavarians, Dutch, Rhinlanders, Prussians, and Italians—all have by thousands deserted her standards, quivering with fearful disasters;—of the Poles not one! And yet Buonaparte deceived their hopes, and had at best promised but little to gain them over. He was hampered with his alliances each time he went into Poland, and probably not very willing to begin the work of restoration.

But the facts speak still more loudly, when we look at the actual state of the country during these changes. No

sooner had Prussia lost the battle of Jena, than the Poles compelled the Prussian troops to evacuate the Prussian provinces, as rapidly as the French left Holland after the battle of Leipsig. The partial prospects of restoration then held out by Buonaparte (who was in alliance with Austria, and perhaps unwilling to break with Russia beyond all chance of reconciliation), were sufficient to call forth incredible exertions. In a few days, whole regiments were raised by a few individuals—some brought battalions—or only companies—and all poured in their wealth of every kind. Nothing probably contributed more than the ferment in Poland to keep Anstria quiet at that moment; and it certainly enabled the enemy to maintain himself during the winter, after severe losses, and in the following campaign to dictate a peace upon the Niemen. In the next war, 1809, the Poles made similar efforts, and their army overran Austrian Poland with ease, meeting in these provinces only friends wherever they came. Buonaparte was now in alliance wiih Russia, and could promise little to the Poles; but they felt grateful for the shadow of independence given to the Dutchy of Warsaw; and by the peace of Vienna he added half of Gallicia to that state. In 1812, new offers were held out; but the Austrian Alliance controlled them; nevertheless, the people still hoped, and they surpassed their former exertions. He obtained nearly twelve millions sterling within a few months, including the ordinary revenue, from the Dutchy alone; and his ranks were filled from all parts of Poland. It is not to be questioned, that if he had fairly offered the restoration of the country, with its own laws, instead of the Code Napoleon—and had waited for six months in order to avail himself of its entire co-operation, a very different result would have attended his advance upon Russia. That Poland was for ever gone from her, no one can doubt.

Now, the question is, whether all this may not be once more tried, with fuller effect, and according to the lessons taught by experience? Is it hazarding too much to assert, that as long as the dreadful state of things continues, which we have above endeavoured to describe, France, or

whoever is at war with the three partitioning powers, has a steady ally in the heart of their dominions? Is it wise in them to neglect the lesson which they as well as she have learnt, that no appeal to Poland has ever been made in vain? What inference can be drawn from this lesson, except that they should in wisdom now listen to the appeal in her behalf? If *they* restore her independence, they at once raise an impregnable bulwark against France in all time coming, and get rid of the greatest weakness in their own position—they take a vast weight out of their enemy's scale, and transfer it to their own.

An objection will be started against this expectation, which may immediately be remedied. The Poles, it will be said, have shown a rooted aversion to the Allied powers, particularly the Russians, and a preference for the French. Now this has been entirely owing to the circumstances. There is no natural antipathy between Russians and Poles; on the contrary, they have everything to unite them; a common origin, a language almost the same, and manners not dissimilar. Accordingly, in ordinary circumstances, they live together; and it is only where Russian soldiers occupy their country, that the mutual hatred begins to show itself. If the Poles are really as ardent in their wish of restoration, as every fact proves them to be,—the removal of foreign troops, and the grant of independence, will both remove all cause of hatred, and change the aversion now felt into gratitude;—for it will come with all the grace of a free gift. This, too, is the moment, when France, having for the third time deceived them, they will be the more reclaimed from their connection with her, by obtaining from their neighbours the blessing of a separate existence.

There are other arrangements, however, short of absolute independence—all of which would confer the most substantial benefits upon Poland, and contribute in the same proportion to the advancement and security of the Allies. A separate state may be formed, under a constitution as nearly as possible resembling that of the Third of May, but annexed to Russia, as Hungary is to Austria. The objection to this undoubtedly is a grave one, that

Prussia and Austria would suffer by it, and Russia alone gain; and this of itself ought to weigh against it, and make Russia, on an enlarged view of her interest, and in order to keep her two neighbours for ever separate from French connections—prefer the entire independence of Poland. It may be remarked, however, that such a plan would not increase the preponderance of Russia, more than she might at any time augment it herself;—for if she engages in a war with her neighbours, she may easily, to use the common expression of the continental politicians—"*Leur faire sauter la Pologne.*" Another plan, much less beneficial in every view, but still far preferable to the duration of the present arrangement, would be to incorporate all Poland at once with Russia. The numerous evils arising from the division of the country would be greatly alleviated; and the Poles would be secured against that calamity which they now have most reason to dread the increase of those sufferings, by new changes and new partitions.

It was not possible for us to avoid referring to these intermediate arrangements; because it is difficult to carry on this discussion, without a reference to the Poles themselves, as well as the interests of their masters; and nothing is more clear, than that there are degrees between the opposite extremes of complete restoration and new partitions—the choice of which is a matter infinitely important to the happiness of the people. We have too long devoted our humble efforts in this Journal to the best interests of humanity;—and are too sincerely happy in the reflection, that they may not have been unavailing, to leave such considerations out of view. We belong not to the number of those who can feel no indignation at injustice, unless committed by our enemies;—nor pity for public misfortunes, unless suffered by Africans or Spaniards. But the interests of the Polish people are, however important, only a subordinate part of the present question. The restoration of European independence is the object of every Statesman's anxious hopes;—the revival of sound and consistent principle alone can effect it;—and this cannot

be thought possible, by any reflecting mind, without the complete re-establishment of Poland as an independent State.[1]

[1] It became the more necessary to state the case on behalf of the Poles, because in other articles we had possibly over-estimated the oppressions of the body of the people under their own nobles, indeed their owners. The Appeal probably underrates these quite as much. But that under their Russian masters there has been a great aggravation of their sufferings is unquestionable. In the Prussian and Austrian parts, on the other hand, the partition has greatly mitigated the thraldom of the peasantry.

CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

(October, 1809.)

A Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army in Spain, commanded by his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, K.B., &c. &c. &c. Authenticated by Official Papers and Original Letters. By James Moore, Esq. 4to. Pp. 336. Johnson. London, 1809.

A few Remarks explanatory of the Motives which guided the Operations of the British Army during the late short Campaign in Spain. By Brigadier-General Henry Clinton, Adjutant-General to the Army under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, K.B. 8vo. Pp. 30. Egerton. London, 1809.

Observations on the Movements of the British Army in Spain, in Reply to the Statement lately published by Brigadier-General Henry Clinton. By a British Officer. 8vo. Pp. 44. Murray. London, 1809.

Letters from Portugal and Spain, comprising an Account of the Operations of the Armies under their Excellencies Sir Arthur Wellesley and Sir John Moore, from the landing of the Troops in Mondego Bay to the Battle at Corunna. Illustrated with Engravings by Heath, Fittler, Warren, &c., from Drawings made on the Spot. By Adam Neale, M.D., F.L.S., Member of the Royal College of Physicians, and Physician to His Majesty's Forces. 4to. Pp. 480. Phillips. London, 1809.

An Account of the Operations of the British Army, and of the State and Sentiments of the People of Portugal and Spain, during the Campaigns of the Years 1808 *and* 1809; *in a Series of Letters.* By the Rev. James Wilmot Ormsby, A.M., Chaplain to the Staff, &c. 2 vols. 8vo. Pp. 526. Carpenter. London, 1809.

The great importance of the subject handled in these works, both to the interests and the honour of this country, would

have been a sufficient motive for bestowing upon it a greater share of attention than recent portions of history usually claim from a literary Journal. But the questions involved in this discussion are of a very general and permanent nature, and are still more powerfully recommended to our attention by their intimate connexion with the most momentous considerations that can occupy the minds of men in the present unparalleled crisis. The whole vices of our policy towards foreign states, have been fatally exemplified in the management of the Spanish alliance; and the worst corruptions in the practice of our constitution have been displayed, with most pernicious effect, in the progress of this melancholy story. The excellence of our national character never, at any former period, shone more conspicuously; and the faults which obscure it were never more eminently hurtful. The resources of the empire were strained, during this period, to a pitch scarcely conceivable by the most sanguine calculator; and the failure of every effort surpassed the apprehensions of the most desponding. So vast a scene of great incongruities,—such a strange series of things the most opposite, yet arising out of each other;—power and submission—strength and discomfiture;—matchless valour crowned with success, producing only calamity and disgrace;—flight become the constant result of victory, and all the resources of courage and skill exhausted to secure the escape of the conquerors!—such a discordant assemblage of events was never before crowded into one age, as fills up the year which elapsed between the battle of Vimeira and the retreat from Talavera. Add to this, that almost every public man of any note,—all the persons upon whose talents, in every department, the safety of the empire must depend in that single combat which now awaits it,—have been tried by the transactions relative to Spain; and we shall be prepared to admit the unprecedented interest of this subject at the present moment, whether as a matter of curious speculation, or a source of practical improvement.

We stated, on a former occasion, our opinion, that the gravest concerns of this country must continue to be neglected; its whole resources—its wealth, its blood, its

valour—to be squandered in the purchase of defeat and disgrace; its choicest blessings, whether of solid comfort or of pride and honour, wasted, only to bring its very existence into jeopardy, until the people shall be roused from the apathy in which they have been sunk—not without the help of their rulers—and shall become accustomed to watch constantly and jealously over the conduct of their most important affairs, whether in the hands of war ministers and foreign secretaries at home, or of ambassadors and commanders abroad. It appears to us, that we cannot contribute our aid towards introducing this salutary habit, more effectually at the present moment, than by examining the conduct of the Spanish campaign, and by explaining the more general conclusions to which a review of it naturally leads. The government at home, and the officers entrusted with the execution of their plans, are at issue upon this subject, as indeed always happens when affairs are in the hands of dishonest or incapable rulers. But we freely confess, that, however important it may be to determine such a point, and to examine how far the memory of a great and most lamented soldier has been undeservedly blackened, we should scarcely have entered so fully into the inquiry, had we not felt it to be most intimately connected with the future safety of the country. The personal friends of the disputants, with the help of the parties in Parliament, might, for us, have settled these matters among themselves; but the plain truth is, that we have some hopes of living thirty or forty years longer in the world, and, if possible, in Europe. We have no sort of wish, highly as we value the friendship and custom of the Americans, to be forced into a near enjoyment of their society, after being first taxed by English rulers, and then pillaged by French ones. We cannot, therefore, afford to let the follies and intrigues of a few courtiers pave the way to the individual misery of every thinking man in the country; and we are compelled to vote for such a change of system, as shall preserve the only spot now left in the world where the blessings of civilized society can still be enjoyed.

From the large mass of matter through which we have

been obliged to wade, in order to sift the question now under consideration, we have selected the publications mentioned in the title, as a fit groundwork for the present article. They are, indeed, representatives of all the opinions that have hitherto been delivered upon the subject of the late campaign. The work of Mr. Moore contains a statement of the General's case, from his official and private correspondence, and from the journal which he kept of his proceedings. His friend and coadjutor, General Clinton, furnishes material evidence and explanations in support of the same statement, but with some concessions, admitted, we are disposed to think, through inadvertency, which transfer, from the British envoy, a considerable share of the responsibility under which he lies for the event of the campaign. The person calling himself a British Officer, attacks, somewhat intemperately, the candid and distinct narrative of General Clinton; and with a preposterous assurance, of which there is perhaps no example in the history of controversy, challenges our assent to statements of *fact*, upon his bare assertion, unauthenticated by the disclosure of his name and situation, and in direct contradiction to the testimony of known and ostensible witnesses. Nay, this writer even claims the privilege of setting up his own *opinion*, and appealing to it as an authority, in opposition to the decisions of the responsible and respected leaders of the expedition, and the officers in whose judgment they reposed unlimited confidence, from long experience of their talents. The works of Dr. Neale and Mr. Ormsby contain a faithful transcript of the murmurs of the retreating army, and the discontents propagated at home by the insidious detractors of General Moore. We respect these gentlemen for at least giving their names and stations to the world. Had they ushered in their opinions and narratives of a complicated series of military operations, as the statements of "*British Officers*," (which they were perhaps entitled to do without any breach of truth,) the public might have been biassed by something like military authority, while, in fact, they were only perusing collections of vague rumours and crude remarks by a doctor and a chaplain. These authors have acted more fairly: they

have enabled us to appreciate their claims to credit; and although, to be sure, it required no great share of boldness to come forward as the avowed critics of their commanding officer after his death, and affix their names to statements which chime in with all the attacks of the existing ministry upon his memory, we nevertheless are willing to allow them whatever praise this kind of frankness deserves. Beside the works which we have now enumerated, we have perused several others on the different views of the subject; but we are unwilling to encumber our pages with any further notice of them. For the case of Mr. Frere, we have waited anxiously, and in vain.—Attacked, as he has been, first in Parliament, where his political auxiliaries and personal friends all abandoned him, and, next, by the publication of Mr. Moore, to which an answer has been attempted in a periodical publication, only to the extent of loading the General with fresh obloquy, we are at a loss to fancy that any reason, excepting the want of a defence, can have prevented Mr. Frere from stepping forward in his own vindication. It is somewhat remarkable, too, that no officer has been found willing to espouse the side of the question adverse to Sir John Moore; although both the medical gentleman and the reverend one above alluded to, freely quote the "general conversation of the army," "the opinion of many officers," and "the judgment of most men of military talents," in support of their allegations. We cannot help viewing it as a testimony equally honourable to the British army, and to him who was among its brightest ornaments, that all the influence of the Treasury, and all the patronage of the War-office, have been unable to obtain, from a single one of General Moore's companions in arms, a word disrespectful to his memory, published with the sanction of a name.

Of the literary merits of the works now before us, we purpose to say but little. Although we may probably take another opportunity of making our readers acquainted with the letters of Drs. Neale and Ormsby as books of Travels, we at present only view them as connected with the military questions arising out of the campaign. They are hastily and superficially compiled, especially those of Dr.

Neale, which are, moreover, accompanied by some of the worst poetry, and the very worst drawings, we ever yet saw published. But even with this haste we should have had no quarrel, if it only affected style and arrangement. It has, unfortunately for the authors, given rise to mistakes, which a little further attention must have corrected. We say, unfortunately for the authors. They alone can feel hurt (as we are persuaded they do now feel) at seeing their rash statements made the foundation of sarcasms against their late gallant commander, by those who dare not openly arraign his conduct, and are yet unwilling to forfeit some paltry object of a party, by holding his memory sacred.

The publication of Mr. Moore is peculiarly interesting, from the important original documents which it contains. To the graces of style, or, indeed, to the critical excellencies of historical composition in general, it lays no claim; but it challenges our respect, from the undoubted authenticity of its materials, and from the feelings which gave rise to its compilation. We lament that Mr. Moore did not enter into more detail as to some of the facts relating to the campaign; and particularly, that he did not give his brother's journal entire. There are some parts of his private correspondence, which we should also have wished to see more fully given; and although we can readily excuse the partiality which is so natural to his situation, we regret that he should have condescended to insert the anecdote of Buonaparte having said, "*Moore is the only General now fit to contend with me*" (p. 166); because it is at best equivocal, and, if taken in the most complimentary sense, liable to great suspicion as to its authenticity. Perhaps, too, our author would have better consulted the dignity of his subject, had he left to his reader (as he safely might have done) the inferences from his statements unfavourable to Mr. Frere, instead of stooping to treat the conduct of that gentleman with considerable acrimony. We, moreover, object to the care with which his remarks are always pointed away from the British Government. Though by no means unsparing of censure, either upon Mr. Frere, the Spaniards, or the British troops, he never hazards an observation unfavourable to the chief authors of the calami-

ties which he is recounting. Not that he suppresses those proofs which point out clearly where the blame lies; but, considering that Mr. Frere has been himself, in a great measure, given up by his employers, and that they were in office when Mr. Moore wrote,—actively occupied, too, though covertly, in shifting the blame from themselves upon his brother's shoulders, we confess we could have excused some diversion, towards the Cabinet, of the constant attack upon the envoy. This volume is inscribed, in an address of great feeling and propriety, to the venerable matron who, having given the hero of Corunna to the world, now only lingers in it to assuage her affliction for his loss, by the tender remembrance of his virtues.[1]

We have entered so fully, upon former occasions, into the merits of the expedition to Portugal, that we do not think it necessary to repeat any part of this discussion at present. We believe, the opinion of the world is now pretty nearly unanimous upon that subject; and that few men can be found to maintain, that, in the outset of her operations, England chose the best means to assist her Spanish allies. It is the conviction of many persons, whose judgment commands peculiar respect, and the more so because later events appear to support it, that there was at no time any reasonable chance of driving the French out of the Peninsula; and that, consequently, no British army should ever have been sent there at all. Some, on the other hand, agreeing with the popular opinion, that our assistance was likely to secure this desirable object, affirm, that it ought to have been afforded in the southern extremity of Spain; a position which, we confess, has always struck us as untenable; while the persuasion expressed in this Journal seems now the most prevalent, that our troops, if sent at all, should have landed as near as possible to the Ebro, on the north, and been aided by a force from Sicily in the bay of Rosas. But the plan which was selected, of

[1] Several tracts have been published by the friends and admirers of General Moore, beside that of his brother. See *Cursory Remarks on the late Administration*, which contains several very acute and important observations on the military movements in Spain; *Letters from Spain and Portugal, by a British Officer*; and Mr. Milburne's *Narrative of the Retreat.*

landing in Portugal, seems, by all descriptions of reasoners, to be entirely given up. For an ample exposition of this subject, we refer to the statements contained in our article of October 1808;[1] supported by reference to the official documents, in a subsequent article, April 1809.[2] Neither is it our intention, at present, to discuss the merits of the short and most unsatisfactory campaign to which the Portuguese expedition gave rise. Upon this subject, also, the public mind seems at last to be made up; and, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to the judgment and the disinterestedness which prescribed the commencement of operations before the arrival of Generals Burrard and Moore; the precise extent of the victory at Vimeira; and the practicability of pursuing that success; all men are now agreed, that the result of the campaign not only frustrated whatever object its projectors might have proposed to themselves, but brought discredit upon the British arms from no fault whatever of the most distinguished of our commanders. Nor is the conviction less universal, that this signal failure was an inevitable consequence of the arrangements (shall we call them ?) which our Government had made with respect to the command of the expedition. Leaving, therefore, these points, most of which may be considered as now settled, and the remainder as of subordinate importance, we shall begin at the commencement of the second effort which England made for the Spanish cause—the expedition under Sir John Moore; and in pursuing this inquiry, we shall be guided entirely by the official documents laid before Parliament, the authentic letters and other papers published in Mr. Moore's collection, and the testimonies of such witnesses as are the least liable to suspicion of partiality. This is the only use we purpose to make of Mr. Moore's work, or of the other tracts published upon the subject.

It was a necessary consequence of the operations in Portugal, that a considerable time elapsed, after the retreat of the French behind the Ebro, before any measures for attacking them could be even thought of in this country.

[1] Cevallos—French Usurpations in Spain.
[2] Saragossa—Spanish Affairs.

In fact, it was known in London, on the 8th of August, that Dupont had surrendered on the 21st of July, and that Joseph Buonaparte had left Madrid on the 29th; and a few days afterwards it was ascertained, that the French forces were concentrating themselves in Navarre and Catalonia. At this time, however, the campaign in Portugal had commenced; and it was only closed on the 30th of August, by the memorable Convention of Cintra. On the 4th of September, that event was officially known in London; and on the 26th, orders were despatched to Lisbon for the preparation of a detachment which might enter Spain, under Sir John Moore, and there be joined by another force from this country. These orders were received on the 6th of October; and Sir David Baird sailed for Corunna on the 9th. The British Government, therefore, was aware, that before a single British soldier could set his foot on Spanish ground, the French army must have remained *above ten weeks* behind the Ebro, quietly waiting for reinforcements.

Sir David Baird arrived at Corunna on the 13th of October; but, in consequence of some unaccountable blunders on the part of the Government, or its agents,[1] he was not allowed to land until the 22nd; and his army was not on shore before the 4th of November. On the 8th, he was joined by Lord Paget's division of the horse artillery; and the whole force had not landed before the 13th. Sir David himself did not reach Astorga till the 22nd. In the mean time, Sir John Moore was indefatigably employed in accelerating the departure of the main body of his army from Lisbon. No imputation of dilatoriness has, indeed, ever been cast upon this part of his conduct; yet the last corps could not leave Lisbon before the 29th of October;

[1] We have heard it asserted, that the notice of Sir David Baird's actual arrival, and the notice that he was to sail thither, reached our envoy at the same time. We can scarcely credit this. But the fact is certain, that no permission to land was ever asked of the Spanish Government, until Sir David Baird's arrival in Corunna was made known at Madrid. Lord William Bentinck, it may be remarked, received the first notice of Corunna being the point of destination on the 14th of October. House of Commons Papers, p. 114.

nor had the whole of the infantry reached Salamanca on the 24th of November, although the march was most successfully performed. Astorga is 100 English miles from Toro; and Salamanca is above 150 from Burgos. It was impossible, therefore, for the two armies to effect a junction at all before the first week in December; or to effect a junction at the point which was most desirable, before the middle of that month. The British Government, then, was aware, that before the army could possibly be assembled in any part of Spain, the enemy must have had *four months* to reinforce his army, and that a fortnight more must elapse, before the British forces could be united in the enemy's neighbourhood, even supposing no opposition whatever should be offered to them until they were ready to meet it.

Between the day on which the Cintra Convention was known in London, and that on which orders were sent to march the army into Spain, viz. on the 16th of September, a copy of Buonaparte's message to the Senate was received in this country. It appeared from thence, that, on the 8th, he had proclaimed his intimate alliance with Russia; his confidence that, for some time at least, he had nothing to apprehend from Austria; and his determination immediately to march an immense army into Spain. In a few days afterwards, it was known that troops had begun to move towards Bayonne. Lord W. Bentinck informed Sir J. Moore, on the 8th of October, that a letter had been intercepted from the Governor of Bayonne to Marshal Jourdan, in which it was stated, that, between the 16th of October and the 16th of November, one army, of 72 or 73,000 men, would enter Spain; and that this intelligence was believed both by himself and the Supreme Junta.[1] The same statement must therefore have been received by the British Government within a week after Sir D. Baird's army sailed. It is now known, that French troops began to enter Spain about the 1st of October; that, in five weeks from thence, above 57,000 had arrived; and that, in the beginning of November, Buonaparte himself was at their head.[2] It would be in the highest degree disrespectful to the British Government, to suppose it possible that all this

[1] House of Commons Papers, p. 153. [2] Ibid., p. 118.

should happen without their knowing anything of the matter. But if, after reading Buonaparte's message to his Senate, and reflecting for one moment on the recent checks he had met with in Spain—the quiet state of affairs in Germany—the resources of his empire, and the character of the man—they could harbour a thought that his threats were empty words, or that his movements were as tardy as their own, we must at least allow that they were utterly incapable of contending with him, even if every advantage had been in their favour. It is not, however, very material to fix the Government with the knowledge of these reinforcements. They knew, at least, that the French army behind the Ebro, never was reduced below 60,000;[1] that the communications with France were entirely open; and that the time which must necessarily elapse before Sir J. Moore's army could reach the confines of Navarre, was sufficient to allow of more troops being sent for after the commencement of his march should be known at the French head-quarters. And surely there was *one* reinforcement hastening at that moment to the enemy, of which the planners of the Portuguese campaign could not be ignorant. They could not so soon have forgotten the fruits of their victories. They must have been aware, that, in consequence of having repeatedly defeated the enemy, and by collecting, after those victories, a force greatly superior to his, we had been enabled—to convey his troops to the point where he chiefly wanted them. They must have been aware, that, at the moment they were ordering Sir J. Moore's army to advance towards Navarre by land, they were themselves sending in British ships a well-appointed French army, *of the same force*, to a port of France, from whence they were sure to reach Navarre in time to meet our gallant troops.

The whole troops destined to act under Sir John Moore amounted, in fact, to no more than 28,000 men;[2] between 11 or 12,000 having been left most unaccountably to garrison Portugal; in other words, to support the feeble and unpopular government of that country against its own sub-

[1] House of Commons Papers, p. 113.
[2] Adjutant-General's Returns, Moore's Appendix.

jects.[1] The plan, therefore, was, to send our army through Spain to dislodge from strong positions, and from at least two complete fortresses, a French force, consisting of above double their numbers, to the certain knowledge of our Government at the time the plan was conceived; a force which, our Government must have known, was daily receiving large additions, and would be above four times more numerous than ours, before we could pass the Spanish frontier; a force which, it was perfectly manifest, would cross the Ebro and begin active operations against our allies as soon as we could begin the assembling of our different detachments; a force which, thus augmented, and having thus the start of us, must necessarily be enabled, after beating our ally's corps in detail, to meet our little army in whatever part of the north might be most disadvantageous for us; and which, if by some miracle it were defeated, could always retreat upon its resources, and be indefinitely recruited.

Such was THE PLAN of the expedition; and to encounter such odds was Sir J. Moore sent from Lisbon. It is therefore perfectly manifest, that no man in his senses could have entertained the idea of this project leading to anything but ruin and disgrace, unless he was under the influence of very sanguine expectations of assistance from the Spaniards themselves. The only conceivable justification of the plan must consist in a belief having been entertained, that the Spaniards were able to keep the French in check until an army arrived to turn the scale against them. Let us now see what grounds there were for such an expectation.

That a very general spirit of resistance to France, arising from a strong national antipathy, much more than from any liking for their own government, prevailed at one time among the Spaniards, we have always been the first to maintain. Of this favourable disposition there was sufficient proof at an early period to justify this country in resolving to assist it. But, previous to taking any active steps for this purpose, more minute information was essentially necessary; and the chief points to be ascertained evidently were, whether the enthusiasm extended to the

[1] Cintra Papers, p. 232.

upper and middle classes of the people; whether it was likely to last or pass away, like other popular feelings; whether it was leading to such definite measures, such actual exertions of military strength, as alone could warrant a belief of its ultimate triumph. A great number of agents, both civil and military, were sent into different parts of Spain for the purpose of making these inquiries, and of aiding the popular ferment. In the papers laid before Parliament, *not one line is given from any of their reports;* although their appointment, and the queries addressed to them, are elaborately detailed. A despatch of Mr. Frere has indeed been made public; and the opinions of Generals Moore and Baird appear in the course of their military correspondence; but the envoy, while he distinctly admits that there is no enthusiasm in Leon and the Castiles[1] (with the exception of La Mancha and Madrid), ascribes this disposition to the southern provinces, merely from report and speculative reasonings; and the generals flatly and uniformly deny the existence of it in those provinces which they traversed, and in those of which they had received any authentic accounts.[2] The testimonies of Dr. Neale and Mr. Ormsby are clear and explicit upon this point; and it is one to which they may speak.

It is quite impossible to conceive any reason but one for our Government having suppressed the reports of their various agents, viz., that they were unfavourable to the Spaniards; that those persons had found the popular spirit upon the decline; and the Juntas taking no steps to revive it. But if that spirit had been ever so strong, there was another question to be answered before the British Government could be justified in sending an army of 30,000 men into Spain, where a French army of 120,000 was already prepared to meet it. Between such an enemy and our men, it was necessary that some other shield should be interposed than the mere good will—the favourable disposi-

[1] Letter to Sir J. Moore, November 30. In the Parliamentary Papers, this document was shamefully mutilated, so as to pervert the sense completely. It is given at length in Mr. Moore's work, p. 80.

[2] House of Commons Papers, pp. 146, 155, 158, 164.

tions of an ally—or even his hatred of the French, and his popular commotions against their usurpation—or even risings of armed peasantry in different parts of his territory. The question was, what force could he speedily bring into the field;—and, not only that, but what measures had been adopted to call it out;—nay, how many serviceable men had he actually embodied at the moment when instructions were sent to Sir J. Moore? This was the question: for, at that moment, the enemy's reinforcements were beginning to pour in. No attempt was making to disturb him: and, before those instructions could be obeyed, he must be in a condition to take the field and overwhelm the British army as soon as it appeared, unless opposed by a large and soldier-like army of Spaniards. Let us next see, then, how this question was examined by the planners of the expedition.

We are firmly persuaded that *it was not examined at all.* We see no other way of accounting for the utter want of conformity between the statements given to Sir John Moore, and the facts as he found them, and as all the other British agents found them.

Lord Castlereagh, in his despatch of September 30th to Lord William Bentinck,[1] communicated on the same day to Sir J. Moore,[2] states, that the assembling of our army in the north of Spain will be covered by a Spanish force of "between 60 and 70,000 men, exclusive of the armies operating towards the front and left of the enemy's line;" that is to say, exclusive of the armies of Castanos and Palafox. The amount of those armies is not even guessed at in any part of Sir J. Moore's instructions; but Mr. Moore asserts that they were conceived to be the most numerous of any;[3] and he is to a certain degree borne out by the statement of Lord Castlereagh, in his despatch to Lord W. Bentinck, of October 1st, that the armies of Castanos and Romana contain the greatest proportion of regulars; and that the former has more cavalry than any other.[4] The despatches of Lord W. Bentinck,[5] of October 2nd, transmitted both to London and Lisbon, contain an

[1] House of Commons Papers, p. 60.
[2] Ib., p. 54.
[3] Ib., p. 11.
[4] Ib., p. 62
[5] Ib., p. 113.

enumeration of the Spanish forces in the north, founded apparently on the statements of the Supreme Junta; a most suspicious authority upon which to build plans of a campaign. In this document, the army of Castanos is stated to be 65,000; that of Palafox 16,000; the army of Catalonia 20,000; and 20,000 more are said to be on their march.

We may judge of the pains bestowed on the examination of these estimates by the fact, only credible because we have it under Lord Castlereagh's own hand, that it was not till the 27th of October that instructions were sent from London to Lord W. Bentinck at Madrid, to send an officer from *Corunna into Catalonia*, for the purpose of examining the state of that province and its armies.[1] It is the same unquestionable authority alone that could make us suppose, that, on the 25th of September, Romana's army was estimated at 30,000, and on the 30th of the same month at 20,000 men.[2] But, in whatever manner these numbers were obtained, the planners of the expedition instructed Sir John Moore to expect that his junction with Sir D. Baird would be covered by an army of 60,000 or 70,000 men, under Romana and Blake; and that about double the number were ready to act on the centre and left of the enemy, under Castanos and Palafox. Nay, so little apprehension was entertained of the Spanish armies being weak or unserviceable, and such were the frantic hopes of the British cabinet, that, in the month of September, the Spaniards alone were expected to drive the French across the Pyrenees; and, at the end of that month, or the beginning of October, Lord W. Bentinck was directed to concert measures with the Junta for an invasion of *the south of France*, to be performed by the combined armies of England and Spain.[3]

[1] House of Commons Papers, p. 66. [2] Ib., pp. 48, 60.

[3] Moore, p. 12. It is to be regretted that the particulars of these portentous instructions have not been given by Mr. Moore from his brother's papers. They would have gone far to open the eyes of the country to the nature of the men whom they have entrusted with the care of their purse. The date of the directions, too, is material. It must have been as late as September 30th at least; for Lord Castlereagh, then for the first time, wrote to Lord W. Bentinck.—House of Commons Papers, p. 60.

Now, let us see how the fact stood, and how near these fancies were found to approach the real truth. Sir J. Moore says, that Blake *never* had more than 37,000 men with him; and that, excepting Romana's corps, these were for the most part mere peasantry.[1] At the battle of Sornosa, however, he could only bring 17,000 men against the enemy, *including* Romana's corps; and at Valmaseda he was compelled to retreat, after gaining some advantage, although his whole force was opposed to only 7000 or 8000 of the enemy. These are the statements of General Broderick and Captain Carrol.[2] In a week from this day the *covering army* of the North was completely routed and dispersed; and Sir D. Baird, far from having his junction with Sir J. Moore protected by it, was prevailed upon to halt for a short time, in order to assist Romana in collecting a few of its scattered remains.[3] The army of Estremadura, 18,000 in number, was routed near Burgos, about the same time. The armies of the centre and left, according to Sir J. Moore's information, did not exceed 40,000 men;[4] and General Graham, who was with Castanos at that time, reported the combined forces of that General and Palafox at only 30,000.[5] Nor was the quality of the Spanish armies at all calculated to make up for their deficiency in numbers. General Brodrick, speaking of Blake's army, says, "he has more faith in the good will than in the manœuvres even of the troops of the line;[6] and at the very beginning of the campaign, he complains that it "suffers a good deal from desertion."[7] General Leith says, that the Asturian division of the same army, "on the 10th of

[1] House of Commons Papers, p. 155.

[2] Ib., p. 127, 129, and 179. The *despatches* of Captain Carrol are strange specimens of ranting and confusion. It may, indeed, be observed, in general, of the multitude of officers who were sent into Spain as agents, that they were either originally ill qualified for their situations, or were soon spoilt by the attentions they met with, and the empty honours and nominal rank conferred upon them. They all began to play the grand functionary—the ambassador—the commander. The only one, to be sure, who had any right to this, forms a most honourable exception to the remark;—we mean Lord W. Bentinck.

[3] Ib., pp. 147, 148. [4] Ib., p. 155. [5] Ib., p. 146.

[6] Ib., p. 122. [7] Ib., p. 126.

November, fought very bravely; and on the 11th gave way, without resistance."[1] The opinions of Generals Moore and Baird, upon the composition of this army, need not be repeated in this place. But we may remark, that Colonel Symes, who was sent to examine the corps formed out of its remains after the battles of the North, gives a report altogether inconsistent with the supposition of that army ever having been fit to oppose French troops. "A striking instance of this (he observes) is given by the Marquis himself, who assured me that the Spaniards did not lose above 1000 men in their late actions with the French; a proof, not of the weakness of the French, but of the incapacity of the Spaniards to resist them. In fact, the French light troops decided the contest; the Spaniards fled before a desultory fire; they saved themselves, and now claim merit for having escaped."[2] As to the army of the centre, we may take the report either of its commander, or of the English officer who was sent to inspect it. Castanos describes it in his despatch to the secretary of the Junta, as "immoveable from its few resources, and the greatest part composed of new levies, badly clothed, and badly provisioned."[3] Captain Whittingham says, in his letter to Lord W. Bentinck, from its head-quarters,—"To form any idea of its composition, it is absolutely necessary to have seen it. It is a complete mass of miserable peasantry, without clothing, without organization, and with few officers that deserve the name. The General and principal officers have not the least confidence in their troops; and, what is yet worse, the men have no confidence in themselves. This is not an exaggerated picture; it is a true portrait."[4] To sum up the whole of this melancholy recital, we find a council of war held by the Spanish Generals, at the opening of the campaign, in which it is agreed that, "considering the actual state of penury and want which the army of the centre, destitute of the most necessary means, is suffering; considering also that their effective

[1] House of Commons Papers, p. 181.

[2] Moore, p. 131. The letters of Colonel Symes are among the best in the whole mass of correspondence.

[3] Moore, p. 15.

[4] Ibid.

force is much less than had been supposed, it cannot be of assistance to the army of the left, notwithstanding the urgency of such assistance." [1]

It appears clear, then, from the most unexceptionable evidence,—from evidence indeed of the highest description, the documents unwillingly produced by the British Government and its agents, and the official papers found in the repositories of Sir J. Moore,—that he was ordered to march his army into Spain, at a time when the French had four times its number ready to receive him; when the Spaniards, in the immediate neighbourhood of the common enemy, could, at no one point, muster 30,000 men; and when even this inconsiderable force was so composed, that it must be dispersed by half its numbers of regular troops. The British Government, however, calculated both upon the sufficiency of the force sent, and upon an adequate time being allowed for it to act. The plan was (as appears by Lord Castlereagh's despatch to Lord William Bentinck, October 1[2]), that the army should, after the junction of its different corps, advance through Leon and Castile towards the enemy, its flanks being covered by the Spanish forces, who had all the while been covering its collection.

Even if all this had been practicable, the enemy would, on its arrival at the Ebro, have been far more than a match. There would then have been no more than 90,000 of the allies, of whom not one half were regular troops, to oppose at least 120,000, but more probably 150,000 of the finest soldiers in the world. The plan, then, was absolutely impracticable, giving its authors everything their own way. But the enemy could not quite consent to this. He had completed his reinforcements at least four weeks before our army could possibly be assembled. So he began to destroy the allied armies one by one, after his manner,—the "covering corps," and the "flanking corps,"—and the "Spanish reserve," and the "forces of the patriots which we went to second,"—and in short the whole body of the "Spanish army" which our ministers had proposed should first drive the French out of Spain, and then with our help pursue them across the Pyrenees, God knows how far, but

[1] Moore, App., p. 252. [2] House of Commons Papers, p. 62.

probably to Paris. We were unluckily beaten and dispersed piecemeal, by the relentless, unaccommodating, and most intractable enemy, who, it seems, never will learn from our example, notwithstanding all the pains we have been taking to teach him for the last twenty years, to waver and delay a little, and to suit his plans to ours. It was thus that he occupied himself during the first three weeks in November, when we were expecting him to remain quiet as he had done for three months; and indeed what right had he, all of a sudden, to begin fighting, when we were not ready? Everything was doing that man could do to assemble our forces:—the *departments* in Downing-street and at Whitehall were all in a bustle,—the *boards* could scarcely get out of town of a Saturday,—the life of a cabinet minister was become worse than that of a dray-horse;—then above three dozen of emissaries, brigaded under ministers and major-generals, had been sent, ay, and were actually arrived in Spain,—some fourscore letters had been despatched by the secretaries of state,—our army, too, almost one-fourth part as strong as the enemy's, was landed in sundry remote parts of the Peninsula, and was uniting as fast as legs could carry it,—the gazette-writer was ready to record its deeds,—and the newspapers had already announced them. What cruelty in that inexorable enemy of ours to spoil so much triumph and exultation,—to mar so very beautiful a plan, and all quite ripe for exhibition, if not for execution—to begin with our allies a whole month sooner than we had bargained for;—and, not content with that, to advance, after driving them all over the country, so as almost to serve our detachments in the same way, before they could unite!—But it is his constant way, and there is now no hope of his ever becoming more mannerly.

We have now seen precisely the nature of the service upon which Sir J. Moore was sent, and how utterly impossible it was for any kind of good to arise out of such a scheme, unless by means of a positive miracle. This seems, indeed, very early to have been his own conviction. At first, he trusted a little to the stories which the ministers told him; but he had scarcely crossed the frontiers of Portugal, when his eyes were opened to the real state of things. Even

before he entered Spain, he had a specimen of the credit which was due to the information to be obtained from our allies. The question, whether the roads towards the north-east of Portugal were unfit for the transport of artillery and cavalry, was apparently one which the regency of that country might be expected to answer accurately. The General therefore trusted to their positive assurances, and sent that part of his army round by the Badajos road. He found, however, when he accompanied the rest of his troops towards Almeida, that the whole might easily have come in the same direction. He was thus needlessly separated from a most essential part of his force;—but it was the last time he ever trusted the information of "native authorities."

The history of his progress in Spain now becomes the history of his disappointments in every one expectation which he had been led to form, by his instructions, of efforts on the part of the Spaniards, or even of the British Government. He is scarcely arrived at Salamanca, when we find him obliged to complain of the reluctance with which the constituted authorities afford him support. "They are not (says he) like those of a country who wish our assistance."[1] He has constant occasion to renew this complaint in the subsequent course of the campaign. The British commissariat is likewise found to be extremely deficient; and its difficulties are increased by some injudicious appointments from home. Want of money is a perpetual source of the most serious inconvenience; and we find Lord Castlereagh, after the despatch of a very moderate supply, fairly telling the General, that he must expect no more for some months, as silver is not to be had in England.[2] The enthusiasm of

[1] Letter to Lord William Bentinck, Nov. 13. Moore, p. 22.

[2] Letter to Mr. Frere, Nov. 19. Ib., p. 38. This passage is very striking; and, when coupled with the similar difficulty of procuring specie, in the late expeditions to Portugal and the Scheldt, forcibly reminds us, that Mr. Baring predicted this very consequence from the Orders in Council. See his celebrated pamphlet on that subject, p. 157. Thus wonderful is the connexion between all the measures of our rulers! Nor is the conduct of a wise and vigorous government more distinguished by the mutual support which its various proceedings afford one another, than the plans of a rash and feeble administration are remarkable for proving subversive of each other.

the people, he soon perceived, had been grossly exaggerated; and he could discover no symptoms of vigour in the councils of the Government, nor anything satisfactory and intelligible in the movements of their armies. The French, on the other hand, he saw every reason to suspect, were ready to begin the campaign: indeed, before he arrived at Salamanca, he learnt the defeat of the Spaniards at Burgos, the very point where he had been directed to assemble his troops. Such were the impressions under which his letter to Lord William Bentinck was written on the 13th of November; and after stating, distinctly, that four times his force would be outnumbered and beaten, unless the mass of the Spanish people could resist the enemy themselves, he concludes with this remarkable passage—"I am therefore much more anxious to see exertion and energy in the Government, and enthusiasm in their armies, than to have my force augmented. The moment is a critical one. My own situation is particularly so.—I have never seen it otherwise;—but I have pushed into Spain at all hazards. This was the order of my Government; and it was the will of the people of England. I shall endeavour to do my best; hoping, that all the bad that may happen will not happen, but that, with a share of the bad, we shall also have a portion of good fortune."[1]

He now received intelligence that the French had pushed a corps as far as Valladolid, on the 13th of November; that they had indeed retired; but that their progress had produced no sensation whatever among the Spaniards; and four days after this he learnt, by a letter from Mr. Stuart, at Madrid, the total defeat of Blake, and the prolonged imbecility of the Supreme Junta; from which indeed that gentleman[2] very judiciously infers, that there was room for the most desponding views. About the same time, the reports of General Graham presented such a picture of the central army, as prepared Sir John Moore for the most disastrous events.

It was now evident that the French had it in their power, either to prevent the junction of his three divisions, or to march upon their left and attack Castanos. By a

[1] Moore, p. 25. [2] Ib., p. 37.

letter from Blake, dated "Leon, November 23rd," information was communicated to Sir David Baird, that the French were advancing by Rio Seco; and Romana further apprised him, that they had an army of 18,000 collected there on the 24th. Sir David, therefore, prepared to retreat upon Corunna. Sir John Moore, however, discovered that this alarm was a false one, originating in the corps of cavalry which had been sent to scour the country. He therefore directed Sir David Baird to continue his advance, being resolved to attempt the junction (notwithstanding the delay thus occasioned by Blake and Romana), unless the enemy should advance with his main body, in which case it would be necessary to retreat upon Portugal. "I see my situation," he observes in his Journal, "as clearly as any one, that nothing can be worse; for I have no Spanish army to give me the least assistance—only, the Marquis Romana is endeavouring to assemble the fugitives from Blake's army at Leon. Yet I am determined to form the junction of this army, and to try our fortune. *We have no business here, as things are;* but, being here, it would never do to abandon the Spaniards without a struggle."[1]

While these measures were in agitation,—while every day brought intelligence of fresh disasters,—and every observation of his own more and more convinced the General that the dispositions and resources of Spain had been magnified out of all resemblance to the truth, the first despatches were received from Mr. Frere, who talked lightly of the defeat at Burgos,—gave a decided opinion on the whole state of the country where he had just arrived,—and insisted with perfect confidence upon the evils of retreating under any circumstances, and the necessity of pushing forward to the capital. This was the opinion also of Morla, who recommended that Sir John should advance with part of his army, if he could not immediately bring the whole of it up.[2] But on the 28th of November, he received intelligence of Castanos's army having been defeated and dispersed. It was to be apprehended, therefore, that as no

[1] Moore, p. 50.

[2] Mr. Frere's Letters and General Hope's. Moore, pp. 31, 52, 53.

force remained in the North to resist the enemy, the junction with Sir David Baird would be opposed; that it might be difficult even to join General Hope; and, at all events, the army, when united, could not undertake anything against an enemy so greatly superior in numbers. These considerations, so satisfactory to any person who calmly reviews the state of the question as we have already exhibited it from the official documents, determined the General to retreat deliberately to Portugal, to order Sir David Baird back to Corunna, and to hasten the junction of General Hope, if possible, by forced marches. Nothing could now be expected but the chance of assisting the Spaniards by assembling the army in the South, where, indeed, Sir John Moore was always of opinion, that a correct knowledge of the state of the country would originally have led the Government to employ it.[1] This determination was fully approved of by Generals Baird and Hope; and, we will venture to say, there is not one man of common understanding now alive, who does not deeply lament that it was afterwards changed; yet it is remarkable, that it gave as great dissatisfaction to the army as any part of the subsequent operations which have been so bitterly attacked, upon no better authority than the murmurs of the troops.

We are now approaching towards that point of Sir John Moore's operations, at which for the first, and for the only time in the whole course of this arduous service, we are disposed to hesitate whether his conduct be not liable to a certain degree of censure. He had from the beginning clearly perceived, what no man can at present for an instant doubt, that his army had been ordered to enter Spain without any conceivable object,—without even the chance of effecting, by human means, any one valuable purpose. The dispersion of the different Spanish armies, which he had very confidently predicted, had followed in rapid succession. It was now the 1st of December; and the enemy had, above a week before, routed Castanos on the Ebro. It was still longer since he had a force in Burgos, and had

[1] Despatch of Lord Castlereagh, Nov. 24. House of Commons Papers, p. 155.

even pushed on detachments of his cavalry to Valladolid. A large reinforcement (according to the General's intelligence, above 30,000) were on their march through Biscay; and it was manifest, that even if no such addition was made to the army in our front, it might be supported by a detachment from the force which had defeated Castanos. In truth, that force could now only have one or two destinations; either to march directly against our army, or to proceed towards Madrid. In either case, the junction of our three corps was endangered; but admitting that a rapid and lucky movement, favoured by a moment of supineness on the enemy's part, could have secured their union,—admitting that the whole British army was brought safely together, and as soon as possible;—while the enemy was pouring in from the north, and advancing to Madrid from the north-east—it was self-evident that we could not have turned our fortunate junction to any account whatever, and that a speedy retreat was the best that awaited us. It was further manifest, that the delay necessarily occasioned by such a junction, and by the advance of our army, must increase the difficulties of the retreat; and that every hour which the British army spent, and every league which they advanced after the battle of Tudela, augmented the hardships and dangers necessarily to be encountered before they could hope to leave Spain, without affording the smallest chance of assisting the Spaniards. Of all this Sir John Moore was fully aware at the beginning of December; and when he called together his Generals to communicate his plan of retreating, he told them, with that manly spirit which so eminently marked all his proceedings, "that he had not assembled them to request their counsel, or to make them commit themselves by giving any opinion." He said, "he took the responsibility entirely upon himself, and only required them to prepare immediately for carrying his orders into effect." From what new occurrences, or by what efforts of other men, he was soon after induced to change this wise and spirited determination, we are now to see. It is the only part of his whole conduct about which any doubts can now remain; and we must confess, that our opinion, originally unfavourable to the General, has been

materially altered by the scenes disclosed in the correspondence before us.

When Mr. Frere was sent to Madrid at the beginning of November, with the latest instructions from the British Cabinet, and an intimate knowledge of their plans and wishes respecting Spain, he also carried with him the peculiar confidence of Mr. Canning, then at the head of the foreign department. Although we are decidedly of opinion, that he was disqualified for this post, by the accidental circumstance of his having filled it at the time when Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville, with even more than the usual impolicy and rapacity of their councils, declared the Dollar-war of 1805, we yet are willing to allow, that it would have been difficult to find a gentleman of higher honour, more liberal accomplishments, greater enthusiasm in the cause of the patriots, or warmer zeal for the King's service. Possessed of these qualities, and receiving unlimited credit for the still more ministerial virtues of a sober judgment and discreet temper, it was natural that his opinions should be recommended to the peculiar attention of the military department by his employers, who had given him their entire confidence, and apprised him fully of their sentiments and inclinations. A slight hint, too, of this kind would certainly be implicitly attended to by Sir John Moore. The hint, indeed, was not easily to be mistaken. "Although" (says Lord Castlereagh, in his final instructions) "communications either from the Spanish Government or the British Minister are not to be considered by you as in the nature of orders, you will nevertheless receive such requisitions or representations, upon all occasions, with the utmost deference and attention."[1] In the same despatch, he is directed to communicate with the Spanish Government only through the British Minister; "to keep up a constant and intimate correspondence with him, and to co-operate in the most cordial manner with him in carrying on the public service."[2] If a Spanish commander-in-chief is appointed, Sir John Moore is directed to obey him implicitly; and if he feels it necessary, on any occasion, to make representations, he is desired, in the first instance, to obey, and then to make

[1] House of Commons Papers, p. 71. [2] Id., ibid.

this sort of appeal through the British Minister to the Spanish Government.[1] These instructions amount, we think it must be allowed, to a command, that the General should consider the wishes of the Spanish Government and the British envoy as having everything short of the force of positive orders.

On the 2nd of December, the General received a letter from Mr. Frere, dated November 30th, strongly urging him to advance to Madrid; expatiating on the enthusiasm of the Spaniards; and describing the delays and difficulties which attended the reinforcement of the French. "Of the people," says Mr. Frere, "I have no doubt."—"The Government," he adds, "are resolute, and every man of them determined to perish with the country: they will not, at least, set the example which the ruling powers and higher orders of other countries have exhibited, of weakness and timidity."[2] He informs Sir John Moore, that there is a Spanish army of 20,000 in New Castile, on which Castanos is falling back, and that reinforcements from the provinces are daily passing through Madrid, which, when joined to the British army, would "give a force very much superior to anything which the French could assemble." He concludes, that "considerations both of policy and generosity call for an immediate effort," which he explained to be, an advance on Madrid. And he adds, that "this step, he is well convinced, would meet with the approbation of his Majesty's Government.[3]" Mr. Frere had written this letter before he was apprised of the General's determination to retreat; and he sends it with a short, and, to all appearance, an angry note, "that he does not know that he can, in any way, express with less offence the entire difference of their opinions."[4] At the same time that he received this communication, Sir John Moore was informed, by a letter from Mr. Stuart, that St. Juan had repulsed the enemy; that there were great hopes of Castanos joining him; and that there were no such detachments as to prevent the

[1] House of Commons Papers, p. 71.

[2] Moore, p. 82.—This despatch is to be found, in a very garbled state, in the House of Commons Papers.

[3] Moore, p. 83.

[4] Ibid., p. 77.

junction of the British corps. The greater part of this intelligence Mr. Stuart had from Morla; but he adds his own opinion, that the retreat of our army would produce a very serious impression at Madrid, and probably overturn the Government.[1] Together with these letters arrived two Spanish generals, sent by the Junta to prevail on Sir John Moore to advance. They confirmed Mr. Frere's statements; and added, that St. Juan, with 20,000 men, had fortified the pass of Samosierra, and rendered the approach to Madrid impracticable. General Graham, however, had also arrived at head-quarters: he had supped with St. Juan the night before; and had found that his corps had been completely routed, and that the French were marching towards the capital. Sir John Moore, therefore, persevered in his determination to retreat, notwithstanding all the hopes and the facts of Mr. Frere, and the urgent entreaties of the Junta. We think it will be universally admitted that he did right; but we confess we are not quite prepared to allow, that what followed should have altered his resolution, although we do not deny that it greatly extenuates his error.

On the 5th of December, a messenger arrived with a paper, signed by the Prince of Castelfranco and Morla, the governors of Madrid, in the name of the Supreme Junta, and dated the 2nd. They affirm, that Castanos is rapidly falling back on Madrid, with 25,000 men; that St. Juan is on his way with 10,000; that there are 40,000 in the town; that they are under no immediate apprehensions for its safety; and they urge him to advance to their assistance with all possible rapidity, by throwing himself either into Madrid, or into the rear of the enemy. At the same time, the General received a letter from Mr. Frere, dated December 3rd, Talavera, whither that Minister had retired with the Junta. After extolling, in the highest terms, the spirit of the people of Madrid, he "presses upon Sir John Moore, *in the strongest manner*, the propriety, not to say the *necessity*, of supporting the determination of the Spanish people, by all the means which have been entrusted to him for that purpose."[2] He concludes in these words—

[1] Moore, p. 78.

[2] Ibid., p. 83, and House of Commons Papers, 11th April, p. 5.

"I have no hesitation in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach itself to this advice, as I consider the fate of Spain as depending absolutely, for the present, upon the decision which you may adopt. I say, *for the present;* for such is the spirit and character of the country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of their ultimate success."[1] This important letter was delivered by a Colonel Charmilly, a French emigrant, of whom Sir John Moore, at that time, knew nothing further. The information which it contained respecting Madrid, was given upon the authority of this person, who had been left there on the 2nd of December. Sir John Moore, therefore, yielded to his pressing demand of an interview, and heard him expatiate, in the most lofty terms, on the scenes of enthusiasm and resolute courage which he had so recently witnessed. "The whole inhabitants of the city," he said, "were in arms, and had united with the troops; the streets were barricaded; batteries were erecting all round; and the peasants were flocking to the capital."—"The accounts," he added, "of the rising ardour of the North of Spain, were most favourable.[2] By these requisitions from the Spanish Government and the British envoy, and by the representations which accompanied them of the state of things in the capital,[3] the General was in-

[1] Moore, p. 88, and House of Commons Papers, 11th April, p. 5. The Government, in the copies of these letters which they laid before Parliament, suppressed Colonel Charmilly's name.

[2] Moore, p. 89.

[3] We purposely avoid entering into the question, whether Morla and Charmilly acted *treacherously* towards the British army, in their attempts to draw them on. It is supposed by most persons, that the former despatched his letter while he was engaged in surrendering the city; while some consider it as more probable, that he only began his treachery when he found that Madrid must surrender; and even they who adopt the worst alternative, are divided with respect to the knowledge which Charmilly had of his designs. The transaction is certainly highly suspicious; but we do not view the precise character of it as necessarily connected with the present discussion. Respecting Mr. Frere's choice of an agent, in this instance, we apprehend, there is no diversity of opinion. With M. Charmilly's personal character we have nothing to do; though, if any part of what was positively stated in Parliament by Lord Grenville, Lord Grey, and Mr. Whitbread, be well founded, it is impossible to

duced to suspend his retreat, and to attempt a forward movement. He ordered Sir David Baird to advance, put himself into communication with the Marquis Romana, who had collected a few thousand men of Blake's army, and despatched General Graham to obtain more accurate intelligence. That excellent and indefatigable officer returned, on the 9th, from Talavera, where he had learned that Madrid capitulated on the 3rd; but had been assured, by the deputies of the Supreme Junta, that the inhabitants continued resolute, with arms in their hands; that the French had not dared to enter, and were receiving no reinforcements; that the army of Castanos, at Guadalaxara, amounted to 30,000 men; the remains of St. Juan's, at Talavera, to 12,000; and the French in the Retiro, at Madrid, to between 20 and 30,000 only.[1] This information, together with the material circumstances of his junction with General Hope, which had now taken place, and the security with which he could also join Sir David Baird, seems to have determined Sir John Moore to persist in that resolution of advancing, which he had formed under a belief that Madrid was holding out; although he now saw, in part at least, the fallacy of Mr. Frere and the Junta's representations on that subject; and although General Graham, at the same time that he reported the above very doubtful pieces of intelligence, added, that St. Juan had been sacrificed to the popular fury, a few hours before, by his own troops; and that Romana's force was stated by the Junta at 30,000, which was notoriously an unpardonable exaggeration.

While, however, we enumerate the circumstances which ought, in our very humble opinion, to have arrested the General's progress, even after the 5th December, when he had resolved to advance, it is but fair to observe, that he

imagine a person more unworthy of confidence. As to the paltry retort that has been attempted, by saying that this person had dined at the General's table, it is hardly necessary to observe, that all commanders are obliged to keep a sort of public table, to which every person, who comes to head-quarters with a certain rank, is invited, for once, as a matter of course. We repeat again, however, that the character of Charmilly, or even of Morla, does not enter at all into our view of the question.

[1] Letter from Colonel Graham. Moore, p. 113.

was encouraged in his perseverance by the unremitting efforts of the Spanish Government and the British envoy, to whose wishes he had been commanded, "upon all occasions, to pay the utmost deference and attention."[1] The morning after he had taken his unfortunate determination, Colonel Charmilly appeared again at head-quarters, and presented that famous note from his employer, of which it is not easy to decide whether we ought most to admire the audacity or the folly. It was written at the same time with the letter which had been delivered the day before, and which, as we have seen, so powerfully assisted in urging Sir John Moore forward. But it was delivered to the French emigrant, with instructions only to deliver it in case the first should prove ineffectual. This emissary, ignorant of the fatal success which had attended his former interview, and apprehensive that the retreat was still in contemplation, advanced into the presence of the Commander-in-Chief, surrounded by his Generals and his Staff, at the head of his forces, almost within view of the enemy, and exhibited the formal requisition of the British envoy, that, if he did not think fit to suspend his retreat, he should forthwith examine the bearer before a Council of War.[2] With whatever indignation Sir John Moore might read this message—this scarcely credible message; how deeply soever this high-spirited man might be afflicted, at having lived to see the day, when a representative of his Sovereign should send a French adventurer into the heart of his camp, to denounce him for want of courage or of zeal, and to control him, by an appeal to his own inferior officers,—he yet recollected the station which Mr. Frere filled, and, contenting himself with the instant dismissal of Charmilly, whom he did not condescend to notice any further, he wrote an answer to his friend, so calm and dignified, that, considering all the circumstances of his situation, we really think no person can read it without being sensibly affected by the picture which it presents.[3]

[1] Lord Castlereagh's Despatches, November 14. House of Commons Papers, p. 71.

[2] House of Commons Papers, 11th April, p. 5.

[3] Moore, p. 99. The passage to which we particularly allude is carefully omitted in the copy presented to Parliament. After alluding to the feelings naturally excited by the letter, and on a

But Mr. Frere was not satisfied with thus sending a friend of his own to upbraid Sir J. Moore, and almost by force control his proceedings. He soon after despatched Mr. Stuart, a friend of the General's, with instructions to use his personal influence in order to prevent the retreat, and with a letter, the contents of which, as appears by his journal, had not been communicated to him. In this letter, for which we should in vain seek a precedent, except in the other productions of the same master, Sir John Moore is solemnly warned of the "*immense responsibility* with which he is charging himself, by adopting, upon a *supposed* military necessity, a measure which must be followed by immediate, if not final *ruin to our ally*, and by *indelible disgrace to the country* with whose resources he is entrusted." He is further told, that his measures are exactly such as he would have adopted, "had he been sent for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops."[1] And Mr. Frere observes, whether seriously or not we are at some loss to determine, that "he is *unwilling* to enlarge on a subject in which he must either *stifle his feelings*, or express them at the risk of *giving offence*."[2] To this Sir John Moore, again recollecting what Mr. Frere seemed to have forgotten, that he was corresponding with the representative of the King, only returned for answer, that the letter was in the style of the two former;—that he had in substance answered it previously;—and that he hoped the subject was now at

verbal message which it should seem the Frenchman carried with him, the General adds, "Those feelings are at an end; and I dare say, they never will be excited towards you again. If Mr. Charmilly is your friend, it was, perhaps, natural for you to employ him," &c. He says, in another part of the letter, "I wish anxiously, as the King's Minister, to continue upon the most confidential footing with you; and I hope, as we have but one interest—the public welfare, though we may occasionally see it in different aspects, that this will not disturb the harmony that should subsist between us. Fully impressed as I am with these sentiments, I shall abstain from any remark upon the two letters," &c. See Moore, p. 99, and House of Commons Papers, 11th April, p. 7.

[1] House of Commons Papers, 11th April, p. 7.

[2] Id., ibid.

rest.[1] Along with Mr. Stuart, a member of the Supreme Junta arrived, and delivered a long letter from that body, strongly urging the advance of the army, and filled with very sanguine accounts of the strength of the Spaniards, the weakness of the enemy, and the increasing enthusiasm of the people.[2]

We have now stated, with that fulness which the importance of the subject demanded, the causes of the advance of the British army from Salamanca. It is manifest from this narrative, even if we had not his own direct assurance in his last despatch,[3] that he was forced into this fatal step, contrary to his judgment and inclinations, by the remonstrances of the Spanish Government and the English envoy, —by the unfounded stories of popular spirit, and exaggerated accounts of their forces which reached him from those respectable quarters in rapid succession,—and by the still more imposing testimonies to the same points, which were transmitted from the constituted authorities in the capital. Influenced by these communications, Sir J. Moore believed, not indeed that there was any great probability of saving Spain, but that there was such a chance of causing a diversion, and thus enabling the Spaniards to rally in the South, as, under all the circumstances of the case, he would not

[1] Moore, p. 160. This letter does Sir J. Moore so much honour, that we find no traces of it whatever in the Parliamentary Papers.

[2] Moore, p. 134. This letter, too, is suppressed by the Government. Mr. Frere and the Junta were at this time on their retreat to Seville; and, from every stage, they seem to have despatched after Sir J. Moore the most fascinating sketches of the state of things, which, whithersoever they went, appear to have been, not merely going on well (as Dr. Pangloss says), but going on in the best of possible ways. As those romantic epistles, however, did not reach the General until the conclusion of his movement in advance, we have not stopped to take notice of them. They are to be found at length in Mr. Moore's publication; and we shall only, as illustrative of Mr. Frere's accurate intelligence, mention, that he announces the capitulation of Madrid, for the first time, to the General, in a letter, dated December 14th (Moore, p. 149), in which he also asserts, that the French have only 26,000 in that quarter. Buonaparte, in his 20th Bulletin, says, that he reviewed 60,000, and 150 pieces of artillery, on the 18th.

[3] Dated Corunna, January 13th. House of Commons Papers, 29th March, p. 2.

be justified in throwing away, more especially when the urgent demands of the Junta and the envoy were duly considered. The question, then, resolves itself into this—Was Sir J. Moore justified in believing the statements sent to him subsequent to the 4th of December? and, if these were not entitled to his implicit belief, was he justified in believing enough of them to make it proper that he should yield to the requisitions of Mr. Frere and the Junta? In determining these points, we must recollect, that statements, almost as flattering, were received before the 5th of December;—that he had found almost every part of the information originally given him from the Cabinet, utterly false;—that he had met with nothing but disappointments from the time he quitted Lisbon;—that he was quite convinced, to use his own language, that he had been sent there for no conceivable purpose. But it is still more material to remember, that, after he had resolved to retreat, for reasons altogether irresistible,—and for none more convincing than the daily proofs he was receiving of the misinformation under which he had been sent into the country, he received representations from Morla through Mr. Stuart,—from the Junta through the two generals whom they sent for this purpose,—and from Mr. Frere, in the elaborate despatch of November 30th,—all expressly intended to prevent him from persisting in the retreat; and yet he persevered in that wise resolution, because he had, in the person of General Graham, a witness who destroyed the credit of all those flattering tales, and entitled him to turn a deaf ear, even upon the authority of the British Government, which Mr. Frere freely quoted in support of his remonstrances.

Again, we may recollect, that, after he had resolved to advance, but while there was yet time to change his plan, he learnt the capitulation of Madrid, and might well have suspected the whole intelligence upon which he was about to proceed. Warm as is our admiration of Sir John Moore, and piously as we cherish his memory, we are compelled to acknowledge, that we do not recognise, in this one part of his conduct, the bold and decided tone of mind which appears in all his other measures; and that our veneration

for this great captain would have led us to expect the same manly resistance to all interference with his deliberate resolutions, on the eve of their execution, which he at first displayed in forming them, and in communicating them to his fellow-soldiers. We are well aware how much we are now demanding. He would have led back in safety a murmuring and almost mutinous army; he would have excited among the Spaniards loud complaints of being deserted in a struggle, which they were unable, perhaps not very willing to maintain; he would have furnished them with a pretext for suspending efforts which they never meant to make; and for refusing to defend themselves in the only point where England could really assist them; he would have been persecuted by Mr. Frere and by the fanatical multitude in this country, for ruining the patriotic cause, extinguishing the "godlike enthusiasm,"—"damping the hopes of Europe,"—"daring to despair of Spain,"—and sacrificing the character of England and the English army; —while the Government, too happy to shift the blame from themselves, would infallibly have accused him of preventing the execution of their impossible projects, by neglecting to follow the letter of his instructions. For saving the army from the destruction into which the blind fury of the Ministers and their agents was hurrying it;—for rescuing the flower of our troops from a post, not of danger, but of certain ruin, where valour could only ensure disaster, and victory itself must be followed by surrender or flight;—for preserving the honour of his gallant followers, and leading them to fields where it might again be the strength and the ornament of England;—this brave man would have been loaded with every species of obloquy, and pursued with imputations of which the correspondence now before us contains but a foretaste. For a season, at least, his life would have been embittered by the unrestrained efforts of that mean and interested malignity, which the glories of his death have not been able to extinguish,—nor the acclamations of his weeping country to stifle,—nor the emulous applause of her enemies to shame. But this season would have passed away; the nation, instead of being undeceived somewhat sooner, at an immense cost, would have opened

its eyes somewhat later to the follies of its rulers, and saved his irreparable loss; and we might now have been employed in weaving an humble wreath for his brow, instead of sorrowfully defending the approach to his tomb.

When the remonstrances of the Supreme Junta and Mr. Frere had produced the desired effect, and all murmurs at home and abroad were silenced, the army advanced with new alacrity, amidst the acclamations of the multitude in London, and of their faithful representatives in the Cabinet. The despatches to Sir John Moore now changed the guarded language of mere sufferance, or ordinary official approbation,[1] for expressions "of the highest satisfaction," and confident predictions of the "best effects from so *seasonable* and *vigorous* a demonstration."[2] It was evidently not without ample grounds that the British envoy had spoken in the name of his employers; and they indeed could not fail to applaud the commander's submission to the Minister and the Junta, who had originally directed that he should be guided by them; and who even, while he was afterwards endeavouring to escape from the difficulties in which his compliance had involved him, once more desired him to follow "their wishes and determination."[3] The history of this "seasonable and vigorous" operation is all that now remains of our task; and it does not require such minuteness of detail as was essential in the discussion of the plan.

The main body of the army having been joined by General Hope's division, advanced towards Valladolid, where they would have General Baird in their rear. But they had not proceeded above a day's march when an intercepted despatch was received, by which it appeared that

[1] House of Commons Papers, pp. 77, 81, 82.

[2] Ibid., p. 88.

[3] Ibid., p. 92. Lord Castlereagh's Despatch, January 11th. This most incredible instruction was sent to General Moore, when it was known that he was in full retreat; his last despatch having been dated from Astorga, December 31st. After all the experience which our Ministry had then had of Spanish councils, they did not scruple to order that the British army should follow the "wishes of the Spanish Government, communicated through Mr. Frere;" and that the General should only use his own discretion, in case "no distinct communication had been received."

Buonaparte was advancing towards Lisbon, on the supposition (so natural to any military man) of General Moore having retreated from Salamanca, and that Soult was at Saldanna with a corps of about 18,000 men. The General instantly perceived an opening, of which some advantage might be taken. He might possibly defeat Soult before he could be reinforced; he might draw the French armies once more towards the North, and might thus turn to good account the mistake into which the first military genius of the age had fallen, from not having divined the tactics of Mr. Frere and the Junta. Instead of marching upon Valladolid, therefore, he speedily effected his junction with Sir D. Baird by a movement to the left; and directing Romana, with the shattered remains of his force, to support him, he advanced by rapid marches to the Carrion. The advanced posts of the two armies had met; the usual superiority of British valour and strength had been displayed in a brilliant affair of cavalry; the main body of the troops was under orders to attack, when authentic intelligence was received from a variety of quarters, that Buonaparte had suddenly suspended his operations in the South, and ordered the army at Talavera to move forward to Salamanca; that he was himself marching from Madrid with his accustomed rapidity to throw himself into the rear of the British; and that strong reinforcements had arrived to Soult, whose position was so advantageous, as to give him the option of either fighting or drawing us on by a retreat, while he pushed a detachment upon our flank. There was now not a moment to lose; a retreat was instantly resolved upon, and executed with that consummate skill and courage by which alone the army could have been saved from the numerous bodies that threatened to envelop it.

The General's plan was, if possible, to defend Gallicia, as well as to extricate his army from the hazard in which it was necessarily placed, by the diversion it had just succeeded in making. But this was found to be utterly impracticable, from the superiority of the enemy, the want of provisions, and the ease with which their positions might be turned. Nevertheless, it is for this reason, and because

great losses inevitably happened in so rapid a movement as the army was compelled to make, amongst mountains covered with snow, in the depth of winter, ill supplied from home; opposed, not assisted, by the people whom they came to succour; almost mutinous from the hardships they encountered; and their mistaken, though honourable indignation, at having lost the opportunity of fighting. It is upon this ground that so many insidious attacks have been made upon the memory of their commander; and that men have been found (not certainly soldiers), who have dared to represent him as flying from the enemy, without stopping to count his numbers, or try his strength. It is fit, therefore, that we should briefly state what force was following him, and what means he had of making a stand against it.

The corps of Soult, originally 18,000 strong, had been considerably reinforced, and was of itself superior in numbers to the British army. Junot had advanced on the right flank to Palencia. Buonaparte had left Madrid with 40,000 men, and his advanced guard passed through Tordesillas on the same day that General Moore began his retreat from Sahagun, both marching upon Benevente, which was distant from the English about forty, and from the French about seventy miles.[1] The French troops at Talavera had likewise begun to move northward, and a corps had been halted on its route to Saragossa. But the divisions under Soult and Buonaparte alone, amounted, according to every authentic statement, to 70,000 men.[2] Sir J. Moore had about 27,000 British; and there were

[1] General Clinton has clearly proved the necessity of marching round by Benevente from the floods of the Esla. The direct road to Astorga was only three days' march, which would have given the army a considerable start of the enemy.—*Observations*, p. 14.

[2] Mr. Moore (from his brother's papers) gives this number, p. 184. The General, in his despatch from Benevente, says, "they cannot be less than 50,000"—*House of Commons Papers*, p. 163; but he afterwards found them more numerous. Dr. Neale (an unquestionable authority on this point) says, that Soult had 20,000 before he was reinforced, and that there are 120,000 on that side of Spain—pp. 252–264. And Mr. Ormsby, from the statements of the prisoners, gives 50,000 as the *main body*, in which was included Davoust at Astorga, besides Junot's corps of 15,000.—vol. ii., p. 131.

7000 Spaniards under Romana, who acknowledged that "his army was in effect no army."[1] Soult's corps pushed on to Leon, which, after the usual promises of resistance, opened its gates to him at his first appearance. Buonaparte's cavalry, and part of his artillery, actually came up with the rear of the British at Benevente, and were repulsed by the skill and gallantry of Lord Paget. But the main body was following with increasing activity; and having failed in his plan of reaching Benevente before us, Buonaparte was confident that Soult would arrive at Astorga, and cut off our retreat. Happily he was foiled in this attempt, also, by the able dispositions of Sir John Moore, who, although he found Romana's army in that town contrary to his express directions, succeeded in drawing off his whole forces from it, before the enemy could come up with him. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the General was under the necessity of retreating at least to Astorga; because, had he attempted to stand before he reached that point, he must have been surrounded by Buonaparte, or by Soult, according as he chose the direct or the Benevente road, admitting that he had such a choice. Had he attempted to resist Soult on the former route, Buonaparte would have reached Astorga before him;—had he made head against Buonaparte on the latter road, Soult would have reached Astorga before him.

The next question then is, ought he to have given battle at Astorga? He was so closely followed that he had no time to prepare his position; for the enemy's advanced guard had well nigh overtaken him at Benevente, and marched into Astorga the day after he left it. Moreover, the country in the neighbourhood was eaten up by Romana's army, which could not subsist itself there for two days longer; and the enemy's superiority in cavalry cut them off from any more distant supplies. But, independent of these important difficulties, his position at Astorga could have been turned with the greatest ease. There is a road from La Baneza to Vigo by Orense, which was taken by General Crawfurd with 3000 men, for the purpose of

[1] See the deplorable account of it in Colonel Symes's Letter. Moore, pp. 171, 128.

easing the retreat, and preventing any corps from getting the start of us at Vigo, and the intermediate positions. No one can doubt, then, that the enemy might have marched a detachment by this route, either to Vigo, or as far as Orense, from whence a road leads to St. Jago and Corunna, fit for the passage of any force. Nor was this the only means of turning the position of Astorga; the great road from Madrid to St. Jago runs through Orense and Benevente; so that Buonaparte might have turned off at the latter place from his pursuit of the General, and marched any proportion of his army to St. Jago. From Benevente to Corunna by this road, he would only have had a march of twenty-three English miles further than the road which the British army took.[1] Therefore, it is clear, that had the latter stopped at Astorga, and there completely defeated Soult, they would have found Buonaparte safely arrived at Corunna, and would have had to defeat him also before they could embark. But as Soult very certainly would in this case have refused battle, it is manifest, that, by halting at Astorga, the British army would have been surrounded and taken, even although they could have subsisted themselves on the supplies of the exhausted country during the halt, or upon the carcases of their horses, according to the prescription of that distinguished officer, Dr. Adam Neale.

[1] See Laborde's View of Spain, vol. ii., pp. 427, 438, 447, 448, and 450, and the itineraries there referred to. General Clinton asserts, that "he knows the possibility of corps of the enemy marching by roads on their right and left was repeatedly and strongly urged to Sir John Moore at Astorga."—*Remarks*, p. 22. Sir John Moore himself states this as consistent with his own knowledge.—Despatch of 30th December, House of Commons Papers, p. 164. Mr. Moore gives (p. 202) an extract of a report to the General from an engineer officer of great merit, whom he had sent by the Orense road to reconnoitre; it is dated *Jan.* 1, *Puebla de Senabria*. It complains of the want of artillery there,—a proof that he conceived the French artillery could reach the town; mentions a corps of 700 Spaniards as passing through to join Romana; and alludes to the neighbouring passes as capable of being forced. But what are all these authorities,—Laborde, the first topographical work on Spain,—Generals Clinton and Moore, and the engineers in their confidence,—when put into the scale against the anonymous pamphleteers, and those faithful reporters of the murmurs among the troops, Drs. Ormsby and Neale?

The doctrine of stopping to fight, for the purpose of being surrounded and destroyed, was not taught in the school where General Moore learnt the art of war; nor would he, in all probability, have been extolled and rewarded, as others have since been, had he exemplified it at Astorga. He pursued his retreat, and deferred the moment of resistance, until he should reach a position not liable to be turned.

Buonaparte now formed his junction at Astorga with the army of Soult; and finding that he could no longer hope to cut off the retreat of his skilful adversary, resolved to stop there, and detach such a force after him as should bring him to an engagement before he embarked. General Moore could not venture to halt until he arrived at Lugo; and even there his stay was much limited. Beside the roads already mentioned, by which Buonaparte might now, with increased facility, detach part of the troops whom he kept with him, there was another which led from Combarros to Pontferrada, turning all the positions between Astorga and Villafranca; and a continuation of the same route led towards Orense, turning Villafranca, and Lugo itself. Of this there could be no doubt; for the two flank brigades of the English army took the route in question. The possibility of remaining long at Lugo was still further limited by want of provisions,—the utmost efforts of the commissariat having proved inadequate to procure above two days' subsistence. Even the famous resource of Dr. Neale here failed; for such horses as were not indispensably necessary had been long ago abandoned; and the remainder were, from the unhappy ignorance of his profession, which Sir John Moore probably owed to his want of a medical education, supposed to be more profitably employed in transporting stores and guns to cover the embarkation, than in regaling the men at Lugo,—until Bessieres, with his live cavalry, should get between them and their ships, while Soult cut them off in the midst of their Calmuk revels. It was thus that the General, after offering battle to the enemy in vain during a halt of two days, found himself compelled to fall back from Lugo also. The bulletins of the enemy bear honourable testimony to the skilful dis-

positions of his whole march, and especially to those which he made in occupying this position. Corunna was preferred to Vigo, on account both of the roads and the distance. No possibility of stopping before he reached the coast was now afforded him, as there were roads from Lugo to Corunna, both on the right and left, a little more circuitous, but quite practicable;[1] and he reached that port in safety, after a retreat of unexampled difficulty and dangers, conducted through an exhausted and unfriendly country, by marches unparalleled for rapidity, with a harassed and mutinous army, and in the face of an enemy almost three times its superior in numbers.

The battle which he fought at the end of this memorable retreat, and which closed the sufferings of his followers, and his own career of glory, will live for ever in the recollection of his grateful country. But it is not this last scene of his triumph alone that will claim the lasting regards of England. She will proudly remember, that his judgment and skill were only surpassed by his unconquerable valour; she will fondly dwell upon that matchless self-denial which subjected all his interests to her weal, as it devoted all his faculties to her service; she will hold him up to her most famous warriors in after-times, when the envious clamours of the hour are hushed, and the minions of present power are forgotten, as a bright example of that entire forbearance,—that utter extinction of every selfish feeling,—that high and manly sacrifice even of the highest and manliest of passions,—that severe mortification of ambition itself, which she has a paramount right to require from him to whom she yields the guidance of her armies; and, while she records that the hero of Corunna fought no vain battles, —courted no vulgar applause in rash and senseless marches,

[1] The road from Lugo to Corunna, by St. Jago, is about 32 English miles further than the direct road: that it is perfectly passable, is certain from its having been taken by part of Sir David Baird's army in the advance. The road by Mondonedo is not so good; but, that it is practicable as far as Mondonedo, we are entitled to affirm, —at least if we may venture to credit that officer upon such a question, where he is opposed by such authorities as the two Doctors and the anonymous pamphleteer.—See Despatch, 22nd November, House of Commons Papers, p. 145.

—lost no trophies,—abandoned no hospitals to the enemy, and yielded no post of danger to feeble allies;—she will pronounce the name of Moore, to blight those unhallowed laurels which are won by the wasted blood of her children, and the tarnished honour of her arms.

Melancholy as is the picture which we have just been viewing, of all the varieties of impolicy crowded into the short space of three months, it is nevertheless rich in useful lessons, if the people of this country are still disposed to learn, and to save the state, before their rulers have consummated its destruction. We do not now allude to the information respecting Spain, which the history of the campaign affords, or the conclusions to which every page of it drives us, touching the policy that remains to be pursued in that unfortunate country. We do not even stop to enumerate the new and convincing illustrations which it affords of those doctrines so often maintained by us upon the general conduct of the war. But we desire any man of common understanding, however warped it may be by party prejudices, to contemplate the gross mismanagement of the affairs of this nation which the foregoing narrative displays. We entreat him to consider, that, untaught by the events of the Portuguese campaign,—fully aware that the whole force of Spain had never ventured to disturb the remains of the French army behind the Ebro, knowing that this army was receiving immense reinforcements, while the Spaniards were languishing under a feeble, perverse, and unpopular government, our rulers sent a British army into the heart of the Peninsula, without any one earthly object, except to march so many leagues towards certain destruction, and to furnish a few empty boasts about ministerial activity and vigour. We request him to reflect, that this case is made out against them by the documents which they have themselves laid before Parliament; and that, in no one instance, have they or their advocates attempted to justify their conduct—confining their defence entirely to a criticism of the measures pursued by officers of their own choosing, and an assertion, (how groundless we have already shown,) that somewhat of the loss was owing to those measures. We implore him to bear in mind, that while a

small but gallant force was thus miserably sacrificed, in an enterprise of which no one has ever yet divined the object, these masters in the art of misgovernment had at their disposal an army above three times more numerous, which, if marched in due season, and to proper points, might have rescued Spain, and which, at whatever time, and in whatever place it might have taken the field, would at least have been secure from discomfiture and flight. With these lamentable and admitted truths before his eyes, we challenge any man to tell us that he can fancy a possibility of such blunders being prevented for the future, except by the exemplary punishment of those who have in fact pleaded guilty to the charge.

The Parliament of England, however, judged otherwise. The subject was brought before them by the Earl Grey, with an ability which they alone can fully appreciate who have gone through all its complicated details, and with a degree of temper which, while it suited well with the dignity of the occasion, was admirably calculated to win the favour of the Senate in that day of plebeian violence. But the "mute eloquence of numbers" prevailed; and it was decided, that whatever might have been their past conduct, and whatever the actual state of the empire, the projectors of the late campaign deserved the confidence of the country, and should still be entrusted with the management of its affairs. A new vigour was thus communicated to their operations; and the result has, in as far as was possible, surpassed their former achievements. As if to convince even the Parliament, which acquitted them in spite of their confession,—as if to mock that illustrious body for their implicit confidence,—as if to let them feel the real force of the vote which had been passed, and to demonstrate how speedily a parliamentary proceeding can carry ruin into every branch of public affairs;—*another corps*, as insufficient as Sir John Moore's to cope with the French force, was sent into the heart of Spain, when that country was overrun with victorious armies,—when the distractions and weakness of its government had increased,—when the most fanatical of our prophets foreboded the extinction of popular enthusiasm, and the native troops had given new proofs of

their utter inability to stand before the legions of France. This gallant body of men, after being weakened, as before, by detachments and skirmishes in Portugal,—after being delayed, as before, for want of money and supplies, entered Spain, as before, immediately after three armies of Spaniards had been totally defeated by the enemy, and moved towards the centre of the Peninsula, exactly as before, without one earthly object in view, but to take a look at the country, and get near the French.

The parallel indeed ends here; for it was only in the *planning* that the campaign of the North was copied. The British General was attacked in front by a superior force. A rare mistake of the French general, his own firmness and skill, and the extreme gallantry of English soldiers, not only saved him from destruction, but enabled him to repulse the enemy. A large army, however, the very same that he had somewhat whimsically boasted of having *destroyed* a few weeks before, came down upon his rear; and he was compelled to fall back upon Portugal with the utmost rapidity. Scarcely hoping to carry off the victorious English, he left the "invincible Spaniards" to get one more beating; and was in this plight driven out of the country which he came to save, by one army which he had completely beaten, and another which he had entirely destroyed!

The folly of our Government only now admitted of one increase. After the sanction which a confiding Parliament had given to their former measures, it was fit that they should repeat their operations at all events in Spain. But it was desirable, also, that they should present the same design upon an enlarged scale elsewhere, both for the purpose of showing that their forte was not confined to Spanish campaigns, and to exhibit a specimen of the art, where the merit was entirely their own, and could not be divided with their allies. It was further proper, that after the approbation expressed by Parliament, of the system of frittering down our immense resources, and attempting many unattainable things at once, the whole power of England should be drawn forth and employed at once in three distinct and simultaneous failures. To demonstrate, therefore, that, if

the new Spanish campaign was undertaken with inadequate forces, it was not owing to the want of a sufficient army,—they sent, at the same moment, an expedition of a few thousand men against the body of the French power in Italy; and despatched another armament to invade France in the Netherlands;—thus contriving, with that superior talent which is ever aiming at combined operations, that comprehension of mind which makes all its movements mutually dependent, and forms of the whole line of its operations one vast and solid plan;—contriving, in a word, with that last reach of genius, which they had caught from their enemy, to make Sir J. Stuart's failure support Sir A. Wellesley's, and to combine both those movements with the failure of Lord Chatham, to cover and give effect to the whole.

The diversion at Procida and Ischia is now finished; but trophies still remain from the other parts of the plan. We retain an unhealthy marsh in Estremadura, and keep a pestilential island in Holland, because the whole of the West Indies do not furnish a sufficient number of useless spots, where our army may be divided, and our hospitals filled. There wanted but one circumstance to make the history of these events complete; and that too has been added by the combined force of genius and fortune. The balance of force between Austria and France was, for the first time since 1800, almost equal; and half the disposable resources of England would, if seasonably and judiciously directed, not, indeed, in the beautiful Bay of Naples, or against the iron wall of the Netherlands, but in the Gulph of Trieste, have sufficed to turn it in favour of our ancient ally, and of European independence.

The Parliament of England is about to assemble once more; and the authors of our calamities cannot prevent their conduct from being at least brought before that illustrious tribunal. Hitherto they have not made any defence; nor have they even hinted that they had any to make. They have admitted all their failures to be complete and fatal; they have confessed, that the opportunities which they have lost will in all likelihood never return. After a few wretched attempts to divide the blame among

themselves, in shares different from those in which the country is disposed to apportion it, they have been compelled to allow that among themselves it must all be divided, and upon them alone must the responsibility rest. They have not dared to deny, that the prospects of the Continent are become more dismal than ever; that its confidence in England is gone; that the map of Europe, from Moscow to Paris, and from Lapland to Calabria, offers to the eye only a collection of states, aggrandized by her hostility, or ruined by the perilous bounty of her alliance. Abroad and at home—which way soever the eye can turn—our rulers have amply admitted, that our affairs are only not desperate, and have themselves come forward to declare, that the empire is reduced to a state of difficulty, from which there can be at least no precedent of its ever having escaped in former times.—And after all these confessions, their only excuse, the only attempt they make to regain the confidence of the people, is to tell us, "*that the King has reigned fifty years.*" They have ruined our Allies; they have failed in every plan; they have brought us through slaughter and disgrace, loaded with ignominy, and weighed down with almost intolerable burthens—to the very brink of destruction;—"but the King is very old," and "he has reigned half a century."

It now remains to be seen, whether that Parliament, which stands in no need of reformation—which is a fair representative of the people of England—which speaks the sentiments of the country—will be satisfied with this set-off; and once more acquit the Ministers of all blame for their recent mismanagement at a time when no one can even whisper any blame against our commanders in Spain. Holding, in common with the Parliament itself, the doctrine of its purity and of its sufficiency to save the state, we cannot anticipate such a decision. But if, unhappily, we should find ourselves mistaken; if, again, every measure and every minister be covered over with its approbation—then we will venture to predict, not that the Government is acquitted, but that the Parliament stands condemned; and we shall most unwillingly be compelled to appear in the foremost rank of those who must acknowledge that they

are convinced and converted.—For it is needless to disguise the matter. A refusal to punish the authors of our misfortunes can only mean one of two things—either that there has been no blame incurred—or that it is inexpedient to declare it, because such a resolution would drive the guilty persons from the Government. In the one case, the Parliament will show that it is not the representative of the country; in the other, we shall have a conclusive proof that the Ministers of the Crown are irremovable. The responsibility of our rulers, that fairest feature in the theory of the Constitution, will be no longer even a name, wherewithal to round parliamentary periods; and the people will thenceforward recognise, in the great council of the nation, not the guardian of their interests, and the champion of their rights, but a well-contrived instrument of taxation.

The consequences of such a decision, therefore, will be productive of incalculable mischief; it will complete the alienation of the country from the Government, and shame away the boldest defenders of the present system. In the mean time, the pressure of the war, and of the public burthens, will rapidly increase. The scene of hostilities will approach to our own shores; and the taxes, which, like the war, have as yet only been felt at a distance, will at length come home to every man.[1] This truth will then break upon the minds of all, even of the most confiding and inconsiderate,—the truth with which we opened the present discussion—that there is an intimate and necessary connexion between the foreign policy of the state, and the happiness of each individual within its boundaries; that every man who pays taxes—every man who values the security of his property, or his own future safety from foreign dominion, is immediately affected by the mismanagement of the war; that not a plan falls to the ground, not a bad appointment of commander or ambassador is

[1] We do not mean to blame the additional rigour with which the taxes, especially that on property, are now levied; because it is undoubtedly fair that defaulters should be made, as far as possible, to contribute; and we only fear, the utmost ingenuity of the collectors will still be eluded by the mercantile classes. But we simply state the fact, that the country as yet scarcely knows the weight of those taxes.

made at Court, not an opportunity of beating the enemy in councils, or in arms, is lost, without our being, a little sooner, or a little later, individually sensible of it. What will then remain for the people to do, we need scarcely point out. If they value their personal happiness and national independence, they will watch over their rulers with redoubled jealousy, and never rest satisfied until their efforts shall have restored the indispensable connexion between misrule and retribution.

V.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

(FEBRUARY, 1811.)

Speech of the Right Hon. William Windham, in the House of Commons, May 26, 1809, *on Mr. Curwen's Bill "for better securing the Independence and Purity of Parliament, by preventing the procuring or obtaining of Seats by corrupt Practices."* 8vo. Pp. 43. London, 1810.

WE do not often detain our readers with an examination of speeches delivered in Parliament; as, even where there seems ground to rely on their authenticity, the occasional, the popular, and the controversial tone which they naturally assume, seems to render them unfit vehicles for general and comprehensive discussion, and even unfair exponents of the genuine sentiments of their authors. There are various considerations, however, which induce us to make an exception of the little tract now before us.

The subject is the great and perpetually interesting one of REFORM—in the broadest and most comprehensive sense which that term can politically bear:—not parliamentary reform only, but every species of change, innovation or attempt at improvement, in our political system, that can be brought about intentionally, and by legislative authority. It is nothing less than the general policy of all such attempts that is discussed in the work before us; and discussed, not upon the narrow ground of the bill immediately in question, or of any limited or temporary consideration whatever, but upon general, and often even on abstract principles of moral and political science.

Such are the attractions of the subject;—and, second only to them, are those which are held out by the name and the character of the author. The little piece before

us, is not only the work of one of the finest geniuses and most honourable men that the world ever saw, but it is almost the latest memorial by which his splendid talents and manly virtues have left themselves to be remembered. The age which has witnessed the eclipse of the ancient splendour and independence of Europe, seems also to be that in which the heroic race of England is doomed to become extinct and to perish. The mighty minds of Burke and Fox, and Pitt and Nelson, have been withdrawn in our own times from the degraded scene of our affairs; and almost the last star in that great constellation set at the death of Mr. Windham;—a death which has deprived his country of its most perfect model of a gentleman, and left friends and enemies to deplore that generous and romantic gallantry of feeling, which gave a certain chivalrous elevation to all his views and actions;—those beautiful accomplishments which embellished the whole society in which he lived,—that fine and graceful wit, which fascinated those who were most adverse to his principles, and bound, as with a spell, the very men who were most aware of its seductions,—that high-tempered honour and unsullied purity which was never questioned even by the calumniating zealots of reform, and emerged unspotted even from its monstrous alliance with the creatures of corruption. A better opportunity, we hope, will soon arise, for attempting to delineate the intellectual character of this extraordinary person. But it is not without its use, even at present, to dwell a little upon some of its most singular features;—on the strange opposition which seemed occasionally to subsist between his genius and his opinions—his principles and his prejudices. It is an act, indeed, of essential justice to the public, to endeavour to counteract any errors that may have been spread abroad under the sanction of that respected name; to prescribe bounds to an admiration, which can only be carried to excess when it confounds his character and his accomplishments with his tenets; and, above all, to unmask the mean arts of those priests of corruption, who would trick out their idol in his mantle, and shield themselves behind the authority of one, who was not their

bitterest enemy only because he could not be persuaded to believe in their iniquities,—who, of all the men that ever lived in the world of politics, viewed public profligacy, and every sort of baseness, with the greatest loathing and abhorrence.

Such are the grounds on which we venture to discuss the tract now before us; containing, we have every reason to believe, from internal evidence, as well as from the various accounts that have reached us, a very accurate report of one of Mr. Windham's latest and most celebrated speeches. Indeed, we apprehend there cannot be any doubt that he corrected it, or, in other words, wrote it almost entirely himself, from recent recollection, assisted by the very scanty notes of the newspaper reporters; a circumstance most fortunate in every respect,—both because we have thereby obtained an authentic specimen of the oratory of so great a speaker, on a subject every way worthy of his powers,—and because we are likewise furnished with a full statement, in the words chosen by himself, of the arguments which the most powerful enemy of reform could urge against it, in the most general form of that important question.

Although it is by no means our intention to discuss at large the bill of Mr. Curwen, it is yet necessary, in order to understand this speech, that we should give some little account of the origin and destiny of that celebrated measure. The sale of seats in Parliament, which had long been a matter of universal notoriety, which Mr. Pitt, in the reforming period of his life, had denounced, both in speeches and resolutions, in the most unmeasured terms, which petitions, from all parts of the empire, had compared to the ordinary transactions of traffic,—had been forced upon public observation, in a more specific form, in the course of some discussions in the House of Commons during the session before the last; for it was then distinctly admitted and avowed, by different parliamentary leaders, and by persons actually in the highest offices, as well as by others who had formerly filled them. Two cabinet ministers were indeed proved to have engaged in some bargains of this description; and neither they nor their

friends made any attempts to deny the charge. The matter was treated as if they had been accused of occasionally drinking to excess, or of using certain profane expletives in their conversation,—acts, in themselves, no doubt reprehensible, and one of them even forbidden by the Divine law, as well as punishable by our own; but yet, so commonly practised by persons of a certain rank, and generally supposed to be so indifferent to the public welfare, that few men, when accused of them, would think it necessary to make any defence. The individuals in question, therefore, contented themselves with saying nothing; and the House of Commons, without exactly countenancing the practices, and indeed expressing, though very gently, a verbal and decent disapprobation, determined, by its vote, that no one could be punished, or even formally censured, for what everybody knew was constantly going on, and all who had the means, or the occasion, were understood to have practised.

This decision, however, gave offence to a great many persons of sound constitutional views; and while they regretted that such an apparent sanction should have been extended to acts highly improper in themselves,—and not the less dangerous for being so universal,—they considered the danger to be materially increased by the open and undisguised shape which it now assumed, and thought it clear, that the acts became infinitely more pernicious when thus avowed and defended. Some legislative provision, therefore, they imagined was called for, in order at once to declare the criminality of proceedings, upon the precise character of which the recent decision had thrown, or seemed to throw, so much doubt; and to protect or restore the purity of our representation, in so far as it was impaired by transactions of that nature. Mr. Curwen's bill, accordingly, was introduced with these views, and met at first with the general support of the persons alluded to; for it went directly to the evil complained of, prohibiting the purchase and sale of seats under severe penalities;—rendering it no easy matter to elude the prohibition;—and superadding the oath of the representative, with respect to the mode of his introduction into

Parliament, accompanied by the usual guards against perjury.

The Ministers perceived the general favour which this bill was gaining; and were likewise, it may be presumed, alarmed, in no small degree, by the manly and constitutional language which the occasion called forth from the speaker. It was difficult, however, directly to justify the practice in question, when actually brought into discussion; and as it was by no means their intention seriously to declare war against it, they seem to have thought it the most skilful policy merely not to defend, or, at the utmost, to "hint a blame,"—to discountenance, or rather to show that Parliament did not countenance the sale of seats,—to leave the matter, in short, as if no one had brought it forward,—to do away the unpleasant recollections of the Session, as connected with this subject, and, by a kind of act of oblivion, to restore things to the state in which they would have remained, had the question never been agitated, and the conduct of the two ministers, much as it might have been known, had never been formally mentioned. Upon this principle, accordingly, those experienced tacticians proceeded. They yielded, at first, to the sense of the House and of the country, and allowed Mr. Curwen's bill to proceed. But they did more; they took rather too kind a part in its progress, and altered it so completely by "*amendments*," that it was absolutely changed at nursing; and all men marvelled how the real parent continued to own it. Indeed, it was so very a changeling, that he could not find a feature whereby to recognise it; and there were not wanting those who observed, that he seemed so resolved to have a bill of some kind, as not to be very anxious what it was like,—just as ancient husbands, who long for heirs, are oftentimes not very curious in ascertaining the pedigree of their children. Be this as it may, the bill, *as amended*, was opposed by almost all its original supporters, and pushed through by Mr. Curwen, with the strenuous assistance of its fosterfathers of the treasury.

On the merits of this law as it finally stood, it is not our intention to make any general observation; but there

is one objection, which enters too deeply into the principle of all such prohibitory enactments, not to be entitled to some share of attention, even in a general and argumentative discussion; and this is, that, unless very cautiously framed, they run the risk of aggravating, instead of removing, the disorder, and making the King's ministers the sole agents of corruption, and the court party the sole gainers by it, instead of adding strength to the country by putting down corruption altogether. To perceive the extent of this hazard, it is only necessary to consider a little how the fact stands. At present seats are exchanged for various equivalents;—some for money, others for preferment, others for titles. Take away the currency of money in this market, and the seats must either be given away for nothing, or be exchanged for the other equivalents—places, honours, &c.; and as these are all in the hands of the ministers, to the ministers must all the seats be sold, which shall not be given away out of mere love and favour. Nor is it possible to prevent this traffic; for it will be forced, by the operation of the law itself, into a shape that must elude all the laws in the statute-book. A nobleman, having the disposal of a borough, can no longer either give his seats to rich men of independent principles who pay a price, or to the treasury for a certain stipulated reward in jobs, titles, or places; but he can always put in creatures of the court, or creatures of his own, who will vote as the minister directs; and the minister, having his eyes and ears about him, must perceive how much he owes this noble friend; so that he will probably give him what he asks, or rather a part of what he is always asking; and if he does not a significant hint may refresh his memory. No statute can reach such an understanding; and thus the rigorous prevention of sale will only throw so many more votes into the hands of government. A few seats, hitherto sold to opposition members, may be given to the same persons for nothing; but, whoever used to derive a revenue from this traffic, which he cannot, or will not, be content to sacrifice, must either go to the treasury with his wares; or, if he is too independent to do such a thing, he must dispose of his borough-interest (which,

arising from property, must be saleable, in spite of any law that can be made touching elections), and the purchaser will then drive the bargain with government. In short, government will be the only merchant, none other having any of the coin which is current in this market; and, of course, it will enjoy a monopoly.

We confess, that this view of the subject appears to deserve great attention. Indeed, we are not aware how the original measure can be defended against such an argument. It was repeatedly urged, and with much ability, even when the bill had received so many alterations that its inefficacy was more to be apprehended than any mischief it could create; and a motion was archly made, and even pressed to a division, for altering the title of the bill, and calling it "An Act for the better securing the power of the Crown in the Commons House of Parliament, by vesting in the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury the Monopoly of Seats in the said House." Nor were the worthy persons, who introduced the bill, insensible to the force of such considerations. They admitted the measure to be exceptionable, if it was to stand single; but they offered it as part of a system of laws for restoring the purity of elections: and having, in the first instance, prohibited the sale of seats by borough-patrons, they proposed afterwards to take steps for more effectually preventing the sale of votes at elections, and even to limit the numbers of rotten boroughs, by a general parliamentary reform. To us, we will own, such an explanation is by no means a satisfactory answer. For we desire to see the Parliament reformed, chiefly, if not entirely, that a barrier may be raised against the overgrown power of the Crown; and, to begin a set of measures leading to such a reform, with one which goes directly to increase the power of the Crown, seems altogether absurd and preposterous. Nay, though it may be intended to follow it up with other measures of an opposite complexion, still the evil done by the first step is certain, while the remedy may never be administered. The measure for increasing the power of the Crown is sure to be carried,—the subsequent plans are very likely to be

rejected; so that the reformer, caught in a trap as it were, will probably find himself in rather a whimsical situation; and not the less whimsical, that the trap had been of his own making, though his enemies may have helped him to lay the bait.

Such seems to have been the more rational view of the measure introduced by Mr. Curwen, and new modelled, in an unprecedented manner, by the King's ministers. But it was by no means upon grounds like this that Mr Windham, its most powerful antagonist in all its stages, opposed it. He boldly denied the whole assumptions, whether in point of fact or of principle, on which its advocates proceeded. Without stopping for a moment to inquire, whether the bill would augment or restrain the power of the Crown,—without throwing away one thought upon the question of its efficacy or futility,—he denied that its objects were justifiable, maintained that the practices which it struck at were neither criminal nor improper, and then urged his general and unqualified objections against everything which related to parliamentary reform. To him, it would have been no reason for rejecting the bill, to show that it was nugatory; for the more wide it went of its mark, it was in his eyes the more harmless. Neither was it any argument in its favour to prove that seats were sold "like stalls in a cattle-market," to use the language of the reformers; for he held that there was no earthly reason why they should not. Nor, in arguing whether they ought or ought not to be so disposed of, would he listen to such topics as we have been touching, and weigh the effects of that traffic upon the independence of Parliament; for he could see nothing corrupt in such bargains. He found no reason for excluding public trusts in general from the market. Men might discharge the duties of them, after obtaining them by purchase, as faithfully, if not quite so ably, as if they took them by a higher title; and at any rate other trusts, of as pure a nature as that of popular representation, being notoriously matter of commerce, he could not discover any pretence for drawing the line here. The patronage of seats, being an influence arising from property, he was for allowing it to be disposed

of like the other fruits of property; and then came the sweeping argument, that the constitution is good enough—the House of Commons sufficiently well adapted to its objects; and that, as there is little or no temptation to change its structure, so, there is a positive risk in seeking unknown results, by trying new experiments upon it. Such were the grounds on which Mr. Windham, in perfect consistency, it must be admitted, with his whole political creed, opposed the measure in question; and such, in a few words, is the substance of the speech with which we are about to make our readers more minutely acquainted. Even from the preceding short summary of the topics which it embraces, may be perceived how distinctly this speech is marked with his characteristic frankness and boldness, his fair open dealing towards his adversaries, his utter contempt of consequences, and, among others, of the dangers of misrepresentation, his carelessness about popular opinion, or rather his distrust, and even dislike of popularity.

Mr. Windham sets out with declaring his very decided opinion, that the law in question "is a measure ill-timed, injudicious, founded upon false views, false facts, and false assumptions; calculated to produce no good in the first instance, and liable and likely to lead to the most serious mischiefs in future." He then sets himself about examining the fundamental assumption upon which it rests, that the transactions meant to be prohibited are in themselves corrupt; and he says, "Let us open the pleadings[1] by stating the case." But, instead of doing this, he proceeds to something very different. He *puts a case;* and one so very favourable, that it proves little or nothing either way. He supposes a most respectable person to have acquired great influence in a borough from his property, his connexions there, and the money which he has spent lawfully and honourably,—as in his family expenses,—in purchases of land yielding a small revenue,—in contesting or securing the franchises of the electors; and he imagines this

[1] Where a technical allusion is intended, the speaker or writer should be somewhat more accurate. "Opening the pleadings," is certainly like anything rather than stating the case.

gentleman to offer the minister his influence, at the next election, in favour of a friend of that government, "with which he has always acted in and out of office," because he has "believed them, in his conscience," the fittest of ministers. He wants nothing for himself; but it is fair that he should receive a certain sum "towards replacing, in part," the heavy expenses to which he has been put in the fair and lawful ways above described. The minister, again, has most fortunately a young friend, "a man of most extraordinary promise, with his whole mind turned to public business, and likely to become, in time, one of the greatest ornaments and supports of the country." As such he proposes him to the borough patron; and ventures to engage that the young man's father will cheerfully "advance the sum" required. "All this," says Mr. Windham, "I am taught to understand is grossly corrupt, much in the same way as any act of peculation or embezzlement." And then he tries to find with which of the three parties the corrupt or criminal intention rests, whether with the minister, the seller, or the buyer. With the first, however, no blame can lie, except in as far as the others are guilty. He only acts as the go-between, and brings them together. He can only be criminal, in so far as they meet for some improper purpose: he, therefore, asks wherein *their* guilt consists?

Now, we do think that he has *put his case* with great skill no doubt, but with the skill of an advocate. He has chosen it so, and thrown in such a crowd of circumstances —some essentially varying it from the case in hand, all of them tending to mislead us in favour of the transaction— that it is pretty clear we cannot safely decide the question on his showing. He has taken an instance which may happen once in a hundred times; and the other ninety and nine may be so very bad, as to justify a general inference as to the class to which the whole hundred belong, and, of consequence, so very bad as to call for a general prohibition, without considering this one rare instance, or making any exception in its favour. With but a very small share of the ingenuity that distinguished that superior person, cases might be put so plausibly, as

to shake the very foundations of morality, and undermine the whole system of positive law, provided only that we agree to take those cases for the whole scaffolding, as it were, of our reasonings, and not go beyond their limits. Let us try.

A candidate meets one of his electors, who tells him that their political opinions coincide; that he believes him, in his conscience, to be the fittest man in the world to represent the borough; that he is, therefore, ready to give his voice for him. But, really, he has paid a high price for the house which gives him a vote; the expenses of repairs are heavy; and he has, at the moment, no less than three lawsuits arising out of the purchase; and so, towards in part replacing the sums thus expended, he requests the worthy candidate would assist him with so many pounds; to which he accedes. All this sounds very innocent; yet it is an *act of bribery*, subjecting both parties to severe penalties, and justly reprobated by right-thinking men, however frequently it may be practised. It belongs to the same class with another and more ordinary case, which every man of honour feels to be a disgraceful transaction, viz., the open sale of a vote for money to the highest bidder, whatever be his character, and however dangerous his principles in the voter's eyes.

There is scarcely a crime indeed, which might not be palliated by the invention of such cases as we have been considering: but the moralist and the legislator can look only to the general result, and to the majority of cases; and censure and punish, not only the most offending ones, but also the stray stork which chances to be found in evil company. We must, then, in the outset, recollect, that to the same class with the case put by Mr. Windham, belongs the other case of a base-born, sordid money-lender, devoid of all principle but that of seeking his own gains, who, having a somewhat longer head than his brethren, as he has acquired a heavier purse, disdains to confine himself to the petty gains of usury, or of clipping and sweating the currency of the realm, but launches out into wholesale borough speculations, and, by every species of corruption

to which money drawn from the lowest sources can lead the way, obtains an influence over so many elections, that he can, by selling half his seats, replace his cash with a handsome profit, and barter the rest for jobs, contracts, knighthood, or the peerage itself. The supporters of Mr. Curwen's bill had evidently as good a right to suppose such a case, as their adversaries had to put the one more creditable to human nature. We much fear, the fact bore them better out; but, if they were warranted in putting it, there is an end of the argument; and as all men must desire to see so vile a practice, and one so hurtful to the community, effectually checked, the only possible objection to the bill which is framed with this view, must be found in some such argument as we have formerly stated, to prove that mischiefs of a still worse nature than those complained of would arise from it, and that, until other reforms shall be effected, this would be a change for the worse.

Mr. Windham proceeds to defend the sale of public trusts; and this he does by instances. He mentions the seats in the parliaments of Paris, where, he contends, as many just and sound judgments were delivered, and as great a number of the best lawyers formed, as in the courts of this country, filled as they are with judges who never purchased their ermine. The church, the army, and certain law-offices in this country, are quoted with a similar view:—

"I am as well aware as another, that there is much influence which, though ultimately to be traced to property, is so remote from its primary source, has been so changed in the gradations which it has passed through, has been so improved by successive graftings, as to retain little or nothing of its original character,—of the harshness and acerbity of the parent stock. The case is the same as with that passion in our nature, which, though too gross to be named, is often the source of everything most delicate and sentimental; which, as the poet describes,

> —— *through some certain strainers well refin'd*
> *Is gentle love, and charms all womankind.*

All, in these instances, that property may have done, is to have given to virtue the means of acting, and the opportunity of displaying itself; to have furnished the instrument without which its energies must have been useless, and to have erected the stage

without which it would have remained unknown. I am under no apprehensions for the fate of influence of this sort. My honourable friend and others, notwithstanding the operation of this bill, will be at full liberty, I trust, to lay out their thousands in acts of beneficence and bounty, in building bridges, or endowing hospitals, in relieving the wants or advancing the fortunes of the indigent and meritorious. They may still enjoy, together with all the heartfelt satisfaction, all the influence which will naturally arise from property so employed—

Him portion'd maids, apprentic'd orphans blest,
The young who labour, and the old who rest.

" But is this the only way in which property exerts its powers? Is it always taken in this finer form of the extract or essence? is it never exhibited in the substance? It is here that the comparison will begin, and that the question will be asked; which the advocates of this bill, who do not mean it to extend to the abolition of the influence of property, will do well to be prepared to answer; how, if the sale of a seat or any commutation of services connected with such an object be gross corruption, can we tolerate the influence which property gives, in biassing the minds of those who are to give their votes? How a landlord, for instance, should have any more influence over his own tenants, than over those of another man? How a large manufacturer should be able to bring to the poll more of his own workmen, than of those employed in the service of his neighbour? How an opulent man of any description spending his fortune in a borough town, should be able to talk of his influence among the smaller tradesmen; or be at liberty to hint to his baker or his butcher, that, laying out every week such a sum with them, as he does, he expects that they should oblige him by giving a vote to his friend, Mr. Such-a-One, at the next election? If all this is not corrupt, upon the principles on which we are now arguing, I know not what is."

We have given this extract, both because it contains an admirable specimen of Mr. Windham's unrivalled style in speaking, and because it offers at once to our view the whole gist of his argument. Our answer is very short. We condemn the abuses which throw the nomination of seats into the hands of borough-patrons; and we think that the most important and beneficial of all reforms would be that which should prevent the exercise of this power. To us, therefore, and to those who think with us upon the question of reform, it is no sort of argument for the sale of seats, to contend that such a transfer is no worse than the possession of the property transferred; and to remind us, that he who objects to men selling their influence, must be against their having it to sell. We *are* against their

having it *to sell:* and, as to what is here considered as the *necessary* influence of property over elections, we should, for want of better language, refer to Mr. Windham's own statements for a description of the legitimate, harmless, nay, beneficial use of property, even as connected with elections; and for tracing the line which separates this from the employment of property, directly to purchase parliamentary influence. Some there are, no doubt, who would lament any influence which wealth may give in elections; and who would only desist from attempts to prevent it altogether, from knowing their impossibility. To them the arguments of Mr. Windham must come with still less weight: but almost all men will admit, that *some* line is to be drawn;—that the influence allowed to be conferred by property should be confined to that which is essential to its use and enjoyment;—and that penalties should be opposed, when it is directly applied to the purchase of votes, perhaps the only case in which the law can interfere vindictively, without introducing far greater evils than those which it seeks to remedy.

To those who are already familiar with the facts and the reasonings that bear upon this great question, these brief suggestions will probably be sufficient; but there are many to whom the subject will require a little more explanation; and for whose use, at all events, the argument must be a little more opened and expanded.

If men were perfectly wise and virtuous, they would stand in no need either of government or representatives; and, therefore, if they do need them, it is quite certain that their choice will not be influenced by considerations of duty or wisdom alone. We may assume it as an axiom, therefore, however the purists may be scandalized, that, even in political elections, some other feelings will necessarily have play; and that passions, and prejudices, and personal interests, will always interfere, to a greater or a less extent, with the higher dictates of patriotism and philanthropy. Of these sinister motives, individual interest, of course, is the strongest and most steady; and wealth, being its most common and appropriate object, it is natural to expect that the possession of property must

bestow some political influence. The question, therefore, is, whether this influence can ever be safe or tolerable—and whether it be possible to mark the limits at which it becomes so pernicious as to justify legislative coercion? Now, we are so far from thinking, with Mr. Windham, that there is no room for any distinction in this matter, that we are inclined, on the whole, to be of opinion, that what we would term the natural and inevitable influence of property in elections, is not only safe, but salutary; whilst its artificial and corrupt influence is among the most pernicious and reprehensible of all political abuses.

The natural influence of property is that which results spontaneously from its ordinary use and expenditure. That a man who spends a large income in the place of his residence—who subscribes handsomely for building bridges, hospitals, and assembly-rooms, and generally to all works of public charity or accommodation in the neighbourhood—and who, moreover, keeps the best table for the gentry, and has the largest accounts with the tradesmen—will, without thinking or caring about the matter, acquire more influence, and find more people ready to oblige him, than a poorer man, of equal virtue and talents—is a fact, which we are as little inclined to deplore, as to call in question. Neither does it cost us any pang to reflect, that, if such a man was desirous of representing the borough in which he resided, or of having it represented by his son or his brother, or some dear and intimate friend, his recommendation would go much farther with the electors than a respectable certificate of the extraordinary worth and abilities of the opposite candidate.

Such an influence as this, it would evidently be quite absurd for any legislature to think of interdicting, or even for any reformer to attempt putting down—in the *first* place, because it is founded in the very nature of men and of human affairs, and could not possibly be prevented, or considerably weakened, by anything short of an universal regeneration; *secondly*, because, though originating from property, it does by no means imply, either the baseness of venality, or the guilt of corruption; but rests infinitely

more upon feelings of vanity, and social instinctive sympathy, than upon any consciousness of dependence, or paltry expectation of personal emolument; and, *thirdly*, because, taking men as they actually are, this mixed feeling is, upon the whole, both a safer and a better feeling than the greater part of those, to the influence of which they would be abandoned, if this could be destroyed. If the question were always whether a man of wealth and family, or a man of sense and virtue, should have the greatest influence, it would no doubt be desirable that the preponderance should be given to merit. But this is by no means the true state of the contest: and, when the question is between the influence of property and the influence of intriguing ambition and turbulent popularity, we own that we are glad to find the former most frequently prevalent. In ordinary life, and in common affairs, this natural and indirect influence of property is vast and infallible; and nothing can conduce so surely to the stability and excellence of a political constitution, as to make it rest upon the general principles that regulate the conduct of the better part of the individuals who live under it, and to attach them to their government by the same feelings which ensure their affection or submission in their private capacity. There could be no security, in short, either for property, or for anything else, in a country where the possession of property did not bestow some political influence.

This, then, is the natural influence of property; which we would not only tolerate, but encourage. We must now endeavour to explain that corrupt or artificial influence, which we conceive it to be our duty by all means to resist and repress. Under this name, we would comprehend all wilful and direct employment of property to purchase or obtain political power, in whatever form the transaction might be embodied: but, with reference to the more common cases, we shall exemplify only in the instances of purchasing votes by bribery, or holding the property of these votes distinct from any other property, and selling and transferring them for a price, like any other marketable commodity. All such practices are stigma-

tized, in common language and common feelings, as corrupt and discreditable; and the slightest reflection upon their principles and their consequences, will show, that while they tend to debase the character of all who are concerned in them, they lead directly to the subversion of all that is valuable in a representative system of government. That they may, in some cases, be combined with that direct and legitimate influence of property of which we have just been speaking, and, in others, be insidiously engrafted upon it, it is impossible to deny; but that they are clearly distinguishable from the genuine fruits of that influence, both in their moral character and their political effects, we conceive to be equally indisputable. And, in answer to all Mr. Windham's ingenious sophistry, as to the identity of *principle* in all the cases in question, we shall only oppose his own sound observations, as to the extreme folly and unfairness of classing human actions under one *moral* denomination, because they may be brought under one verbal or metaphysical description.

"There are laws, I believe," says Mr. Windham, "to restrain the retail sale of spirits. Should we think that a man argued very wisely or conclusively, with much fairness of representation, or much knowledge of the principles of legislation, who should harangue at the door of an alehouse (the only place however fit for such a discourse) against the justice of laws, which could punish a publican for selling a dram to a poor wretch, who wanted it perhaps to solace him under the effects of cold and hunger, to whom it must stand in the place of food and raiment; while the same law did not scruple to permit the sale of these spirits by wholesale on the part of the rich merchant or still more opulent planter? and should take occasion from thence to ask (exactly in the style of my honourable friend) if such was the punishment for selling a dram or gill, what did they deserve who sold these spirits by whole puncheons and ship-loads? *The answer is*, that these acts do not stand to each other in the relation of more or less, but are perfectly disparate and dissimilar; are productive of different consequences; are to be regulated by different provisions; are so widely separated in character, as that the one may be an object of national encouragement, a source of public wealth and benefit, while the other can produce nothing but mischief, and is a practice requiring to be restrained by penal statute." *Speech*, pp. 12, 13.

Such is the most general and abstract view which, we think, needs be taken of this interesting question.—But, with a view to the particular points in discussion, it is

necessary that we should also consider it, for a moment, with reference to the actual state of the fact, and the practice in this country. Upon the subject of direct bribery to individual voters, it cannot be necessary to say anything; the law and the feeling of all mankind have marked that practice with reprobation: and even Mr. Windham, in the wantonness of his controversial scepticism, does not pretend to say, that the law or the feeling is erroneous, or that it would not be better that both should, if possible, be made still stronger than they are.

Setting this aside, however, the great practical evils that are suffered to result from the influence of property in the elections of this country, are, *first*, that the representation of certain boroughs is entirely, necessarily, and perpetually, at the disposal of certain families, so as to be familiarly considered as a part of their rightful property; and, *secondly*, that certain other boroughs are held and managed by corrupt agents and jobbers, for the express purpose of being sold at a price in ready money, either through the intervention of the treasury, or directly to the candidate. That both these are evils and deformities in our system of representation, we readily admit; though by no means to the same extent, or produced by the operation of the same causes.

With regard to the boroughs that are permanently in possession of certain great proprietors, these are, for the most part, such small or decayed boroughs, as have fallen, almost insensibly, under their control, in consequence of the extension of their possessions, and the decline of the population. Considered in this light, it does not appear that they can, with any propriety, be regarded either as scenes of criminal corruption, or as examples of the reprehensible influence of property. If a place which still retains the right of sending members to parliament, comes to be entirely depopulated, like Old Sarum, it is impossible to suppose that the nomination of its members should vest in any one, but the *proprietor* of the spot to which the right is attached: and, even where the decay is less complete than in this instance, still, if any great family has

gradually acquired the greater part of the property from which the right of voting is derived, it is equally impossible to hold that there is anything corrupt or reprehensible in its availing itself of this influence. Cases of this sort, therefore, we are inclined to consider as cases of the fair influence of property; and though we admit them to be both contradictory to the general scheme of the constitution, and subversive of some of its most important principles, we think they are to be regarded as flaws and irregularities brought on by time and the course of events, rather than as abuses introduced by the vices and corruptions of men. The remedy would be, to take the right of election from all places so small and insignificant as to have become, in a great measure, the property of an individual—not to rail at the individual who avails himself of the influence inseparable from such property—or to dream of restraining him in its exercise, by unjust penalties and impossible regulations.

The great evil, however, is in the other description of boroughs—those that are held by agents or jobbers, by a very different tenure from that of great proprietors and benefactors, and are regularly disposed of by them, at every election, for a price paid down, either through the mediation of the ministry, or without any such mediation. In the former case, they obtain the significant appellation of "Treasury boroughs;" in the latter, they are described merely as venal or rotten. For the sake of the more innocent part of our readers, it is necessary to explain, in one sentence, the mechanism and organization of this disgraceful traffic.

The scene of it is laid almost entirely in the smaller and more inconsiderable boroughs, containing from 150 to 400 or 500 voters,—places such as are scattered so plentifully over Cornwall and Devon—too large to have become the property of any family or individual—and far too small and insignificant to contain any available portion of popular spirit or opulent independence. In every place of this description, it has, for a considerable time back, been the practice for some judicious borough-agent to settle himself,—an animal, for the most part, of the attorney

genus, and of that class most remarkable for activity, and for a conscience singularly unsusceptible of scruples. By the judicious employment of a little capital, he soon acquires the control of a considerable number of votes; and, by heading and fomenting local jealousies and quarrels—by cajoling, soliciting, promising, and actually bribing—he finally gets the command of a very considerable part of the electors, along with a pretty accurate knowledge of the dispositions and vulnerable points of those who are not entirely at his devotion.

When things are in this train, he may proceed to open his negotiations with the treasury. This is done, in the first instance, as we understand, with much decency and decorum. The attorney represents, that, by long residence, and the expenditure of much money, he has acquired considerable influence in such and such a borough; that he and his friends are exceedingly well affected to his Majesty's government, and would be very happy to exert themselves in behalf of any candidate who was fortunate enough to possess the confidence of his servants: but that, in order to secure his election, two things are necessary; first, the instant payment of a small sum of money—from 3000*l.* to 4000*l.*—in order to indemnify him for the heavy expense incurred in establishing his influence; and secondly, the promise of making him the organ and distributor of all the local and petty patronage which the government may exercise in that district, and of listening favourably to his recommendations in behalf of their supporters in the burgh. The minister makes a gracious answer to this overture; pledges himself for the patronage; and soon finds a candidate who is willing to advance the money. When the matter is thus far managed, the agent returns to his borough, distributes a part of the money among the worser part of the electors, without the knowledge of the candidate, and secures a great many more by promises of little offices for themselves, and of appointments or promotion for their children and relations, in the excise, the church, the army, or the navy. A further sum is expended in importing and feeding electors; and the member is returned, untainted

with any act of direct bribery to his constituents; but entirely upon an interest that is, in all its stages, equally unworthy and corrupt.

What we have now represented, is a kind of theoretical sketch of the first transformation of a small borough into a treasury borough,—an occasion on which there is much less gain to the agent, and more direct bribery among the electors, than is likely to occur after it has once decidedly assumed this character. The skill and opportunities of the agent improve, of course, as his experience increases; and, if the minister keep his word tolerably as to the article of patronage, it is often found practicable to carry on matters by that means alone, and to dispose of the place by the help of this influence, joined to good management and old connexion, without any actual advance of money, except to a few who are unusually profligate, or unusually needy.

It thus appears, that Treasury boroughs are boroughs sold by usurping and intriguing agents, partly for money paid over by the candidate, and partly for offices and patronage corruptly promised and distributed by ministers. The gainers are—the ministers, who secure a seat to a creature of their own, by a moderate abuse of patronage—the member, who obtains his seat for a much smaller sum than if the whole price had been required in ready money—the agent, who pockets a part of the money actually paid, and becomes a person of consequence, as the local organ of ministerial influence—and the corrupt electors, who get cash or offices for their subserviency to the laudable views of these several persons:—the only losers being the honest electors, who are virtually deprived of their franchises,—and *the country* and *the constitution*, which suffer, to an alarming and incalculable extent, by the general debasement of political principle, and the enormous addition that is thus made to the enormous influence of the Crown.

We have stated the simplest and most elementary case of boroughmongering, both because almost all the others are founded upon the same basis, and because, in point of fact, by far the greater number of cases are very nearly of this

very description. The variations are, that the seat is sometimes sold to opposition candidates, who, having no patronage to offer, for the most part pay higher in ready money; and that the great wealth and consequence that results to the agent, have unfortunately redeemed a part of the disgrace that should attach to his vocation, and not only drawn persons, individually respectable, into the traffic, but have induced some of those, who held their influence by the fair tenure of property, to participate in his unlawful gains.

But, even without entering into these considerations, we think we may now venture to ask, whether it be possible for any man to shut his eyes upon the individual infamy and the public hazard that are involved in these proceedings, or for one moment to confound them, even in his imagination, with the innocent and salutary influence that is inseparable from the possession and expenditure of large property? The difference between them, is not less than between the influence which youth and manly beauty, aided by acts of generosity and proofs of honourable attachment, may attain over an object of affection, and the control that may be acquired by the arts of a hateful procuress, and by her transferred to an object of natural disgust and aversion. The one is founded upon principles which, if they are not the most lofty or infallible, are still among the most amiable that belong to our imperfect nature, and leads to consequences eminently favourable to the harmony and stability of our social institutions; while the other can only be obtained by working with the basest instruments on the basest of our passions, and tends directly to sap the foundations of private honour and public freedom, and to dissolve the kindly cement by which nature herself has knit society together in the bonds of human sympathy, and mutual dependence. To say that both sorts of influence are derived from property, and are therefore to be considered as identical, is a sophism scarcely more dignified or ingenious, than that which would confound the occupations of the highwayman and the honourable merchant, because the object of both was gain; and that which should assume the philosophical

principle, that all voluntary actions are dictated by a view to ultimate gratification, in order to prove that there was no distinction between vice and virtue; and that the felon, who was led to execution amidst the execrations of an indignant multitude, was truly as meritorious as the patriot, to whom his grateful country decreed unenvied honours for its deliverance from tyranny. The truth is, that there is nothing more dangerous than those metaphysical inquiries into the ultimate constituents of merit or delinquency; and that, in everything that is connected with practice, and especially with public conduct, no wise man will ever employ such an analytical process to counteract the plain intimations of conscience and common sense, unless for the purpose of confounding an antagonist, or perplexing a discussion, to the natural result of which he is unfriendly on other principles.

But if the practices to which we are alluding be clearly base and unworthy in the eyes of all upright and honourable men, and most pregnant with public danger in the eyes of all thinking and intelligent men, it must appear still more strange to find them defended on the score of their antiquity, than on that of their supposed affinity to practices that are held to be innocent. Yet the old cry of Innovation! has been raised, with more than usual vehemence, against those who offer the most cautious hints for their correction; and even Mr. Windham has not disdained to seek some aid to his argument from a misapplication of the sorry common-places about the antiquity and beauty of our constitution, and the hazard of meddling at all with that under which we have so long enjoyed so much glory and happiness. Of the many good answers that may be made to all arguments of this character, we shall content ourselves with one, which seems sufficiently conclusive and simple.

The abuses of which we complain are *not* old, but recent; and those who seek to correct them, are not innovating upon the constitution, but seeking to prevent innovation. The practice of jobbing in boroughs was scarcely known at all in the beginning of the last century; and was not systematized, nor carried to any formidable extent, till

within the last forty years. At all events, it most certainly was not in the contemplation of those by whom the frame of our constitution was laid; and it is confessedly a perversion and abuse of a system, devised and established for very opposite purposes. Let any man ask himself, whether such a scheme of representation, as is now actually in practice in this country, can be supposed to have been intended by those who laid the foundations of our free constitution, or reared upon them the proud fabric of our liberties? Or let him ask himself, whether, if we were now devising a system of representation for such a country as England, there is any human being who would recommend the adoption of the system that is practically established among us at this moment,—a system under which fifty or sixty members should be returned by twenty or thirty paltry and beggarly hamlets, dignified with the name of boroughs; while twenty or thirty great and opulent towns had no representation:—and where upwards of a hundred more publicly bought their seats, partly by a promise of indiscriminate support to the minister, and partly by a sum paid down to persons who had no natural influence over the electors, and controlled them notoriously, either by direct bribery, or as the agents of ministerial corruption? If it be clear, however, that such state of things is indefensible, it is still clearer that it is not the state of things which is required by the true principles of the constitution; that, in point of fact, it neither did nor could exist at the time when that constitution was established; and that its correction would be no innovation on that constitution, but a beneficial restoration of it, both in principle and in practice. If some of the main pillars of our mansion have been thrown down, is it a dangerous innovation to rear them up again? If the roof has become too heavy for the building by recent and injudicious superstructures, is it an innovation if we strengthen the supports upon which it depends? If the waste of time, and the elements, have crumbled away a part of the foundation, does it show a disregard to the safety of the whole pile, if we widen the basis upon which it rests, and endeavour to place it upon deeper and firmer materials? If

the rats have eaten a way into the stores and cellars; or if knavish servants have opened private and unauthorized communications in the lower parts of the fabric, does it indeed indicate a disposition to impair the comfort and security of the abode, that we are anxious to stop up these holes, and to build across those new and suspicious approaches?—Is it not obvious, in short, in all such cases, that the only true innovators are Guilt and Time; and that they who seek to repair what time has wasted, and to restore what guilt has destroyed, are still more unequivocally the enemies of innovation, than of abuse? Those who are most aware of the importance of reform, are also most aware of the hazards of any theoretical or untried change; and, while they strictly confine their efforts to the *restitution* of what all admit to have been in the original plan of our representation, and to have formed a most essential part of that plan, may reasonably hope, whatever other charges they may encounter, to escape that of a love of innovation.

But, though we differ thus radically from Mr. Windham in our estimate of the nature and magnitude of this evil, we have already said, that we are disposed to concur with him in disapproving of the measure which was lately proposed for its correction. The bill of Mr. Curwen, and all bills that aim only at repressing the ultimate traffic for seats, by pains and penalties to be imposed on those immediately concerned in the transaction, appear to us to begin at the wrong end, and to aim at repressing a result which may be regarded as necessary, so long as the causes which led to it are allowed to subsist in undiminished vigour. It is like trying to save a valley from being flooded, by building a paltry dam across the gathered torrents that flow into it. The only effect is, that they will make their way, by a more destructive channel, to worse devastation. The true policy would have been, to drain the feeding rills at their fountains, or to provide another vent for the stream, before it had reached the declivity by which the flat is commanded. While the spirit of corruption is unchecked, and even fostered in the bosom of the country, the interdiction of the common market will only throw the

trade into the hands of the more profligate and daring,—or give a monopoly to the privileged and protected dealings of administration; and the evil will in both ways be aggravated, instead of being relieved. To make our own system of cure intelligible, it is necessary for us to explain, in a very general way, in what we conceive the evils of this corruption chiefly to consist.

It would be easy to enumerate many, of a pretty formidable description; but, for our present purpose, they may be summed up under two main divisions. In the *first* place, the weakening and depravation of that public principle, and general concern for right and liberty, upon which political freedom must ultimately depend; and, *secondly*, the vast increase of the power of the Crown, by the means which this organized system of corruption affords, for bringing the whole weight of its enormous patronage to bear upon the body of the legislature.

We cannot bring even these preliminary observations to a close, without taking some notice of a topic which seems peculiarly in favour with the reasoning enemies of reform; and to which we cannot reply, without developing, in a more striking manner than we have yet done, the nature of our apprehensions from the influence of the Crown, and our expectations of good from the increased spirit and intelligence of the people.

The argument to which we allude, proceeds upon the concession, that the influence of the Crown has increased very greatly within the last fifty years; and consists almost entirely in the assertion, that this increase, great as it undoubtedly is, yet has not kept pace with the general increase which has taken place, in the same period, in the wealth, weight, and influence of the people; so that, in point of fact, the power of the Crown, although *absolutely* greater, is *proportionally* less than it was at the commencement of the present reign; and ought to be augmented, rather than diminished, if our object be to preserve the ancient balance of the constitution. We must do Mr. Windham the justice to say, that he does not make use of this argument; but it forms the grand reserve of Mr. Rose's battle; and, we think, is

more, frequently and triumphantly brought forward than any other, by those who affect to justify abuses by argumentation.

The first answer we make to it, consists in denying the fact upon which it proceeds, at least in the sense in which it must be asserted, in order to afford any shadow of colour to the conclusion. There is, undoubtedly, far more wealth in the country than there was fifty years ago; but there is not more independence;—there are not more men whose incomes exceed what they conceive to be their necessary expenditure;—not nearly so many who consider themselves as nearly rich enough, and who would therefore look on themselves as without apology for doing anything against their duty or their opinions, for the sake of profit to themselves: On the contrary, it is notorious, and not to be disputed, that our luxury, and habits of expense, have increased considerably faster than the riches by which they were suggested—that men, in general, have now far less to spare than they had when their incomes were smaller—and that, if our condition may, in one sense, be said to be a condition of opulence, it is, still more indisputably, a condition of needy opulence. It is perfectly plain, however, that it is not the absolute amount of wealth which exists in a nation, that can ever contribute to render it politically independent of patronage, or intractable to the persuasive voice of a munificent and discerning ruler, but the general state of content and satisfaction which results from its wealth being proportioned to its occasions of expense. It neither is, accordingly, nor ever was, among the poor, but among the expensive and extravagant, that corruption looks for her surest and most profitable game; nor can her influence ever be anywhere so great, as in a country where almost all those to whom she will think it most important to address herself, are straitened for money, and eager for preferment—dissatisfied with their condition as to fortune—and, whatever may be the amount of their possessions, practically needy, and impatient of their embarrassments. This is the case with the greater part even of those who actually possess the riches for which this country is so distinguished: but the effect of their

prosperity has been to draw a far greater proportion of the people within the sphere of ambition—to diffuse those habits of expense which give corruption her chief hold and purchase, among multitudes who are spectators only of the splendour in which they cannot participate, and are infected with the cravings and aspirations of the objects of their envy, even before they come to be placed in their circumstances. Such needy adventurers are constantly generated by the rapid progress of wealth and luxury; and are sure to seek and court that corruption which is obliged to seek and court, though with too great a probability of success, those whose condition they miscalculate, and labour to attain. Such a state of things, therefore, is far more favourable to the exercise of the corrupt influence of government, than a state of greater poverty and moderation; and the same limited means of seduction will go infinitely farther among a people in the one situation than in the other. The same temptations that were repelled by the simple poverty of Fabricius, would, in all probability, have bought half the golden satraps of the Persian monarch, or swayed the counsels of wealthy and venal Rome, in the splendid days of Catiline and Cæsar.

This, therefore, is our first answer; and it is so complete, we think, as not to require any other, for the mere purpose of confutation. But the argument is founded upon so strange and so dangerous a misapprehension of the true state of the case, that we think it our duty to unfold the whole fallacy upon which it proceeds, and to show what very opposite consequences are really to be drawn from the circumstances that have been so imperfectly conceived, or so perversely viewed, by those who contend for increasing the patronage of the sovereign as a balance to the increasing consequence of the people.

There is a foundation, in fact, for some part of this proposition; but a foundation that has been strangely misunderstood by those who have sought to build upon it so revolting a conclusion. The people *has* increased in consequence, in power, and in political importance.

Over all Europe, we verily believe, that they are everywhere growing too strong for their governments; and that, if these governments are to be preserved, *some* measures must be taken to accommodate them to this great change in the condition and interior structure of society. But this increase of consequence is not owing to their having grown richer; and still less is it to be provided against, by increasing the means of corruption in the hands of their rulers. This requires, and really deserves, a little more explanation.

All political societies may be considered as divided into three great classes or orders. In the first place, the governors, or those who are employed, or hope to be employed by the governors,—and who therefore either have, or expect to have, profit or advantage of some sort from the government. In the second place, those who are in opposition to the government, who feel the burdens and restraints which it imposes, are jealous of the honours and emoluments it enjoys or distributes, and grudge the expense and submission which it requires, under an apprehension, that the good it accomplishes is not worth so great a sacrifice. And, thirdly and finally, those who may be counted for nothing in all political arrangements—who are ignorant, indifferent, and quiescent—who submit to all things without grumbling or satisfaction—and are contented to consider the existing institutions as a part of the natural order to which it is their duty to accommodate themselves.

In rude and early ages, this last division includes by far the greater part of the people: but, as society advances, and intellect begins to develop itself, a greater and a greater proportion is withdrawn from it, and joined to the two other divisions. These drafts, however, are not made indiscriminately, or in equal numbers to the two remaining orders; but tend to throw a preponderating weight, either into the scale of the government, or into that of its opponents, according to the character of that government, and the nature of the circumstances by which they have been roused from their neutrality. The diffusion of knowledge, the improvements of education, and the

gradual descent and expansion of those maxims of individual or political wisdom that are successively established by reflection and experience, necessarily raise up more and more of the mass of the population from that state of brutish acquiescence and incurious ignorance in which they originally slumbered. They begin to feel their relation to the government under which they live; and, guided by those feelings, and the analogies of their private interests and affections, they begin to form, or to borrow, *opinions* upon the merit or demerit of the institutions and administration, to the effects of which they are subjected; and to conceive *sentiments* either hostile or friendly to such institutions and administration. If the government be mild and equitable—if its undertakings are prosperous, its impositions easy, and its patronage impartial—the greater part of those who are thus successively awakened into a state of rational and political capacity, will be enrolled among its supporters, and strengthen it against the factious, ambitious, and disappointed persons, who alone will be found in opposition to it. But if, on the other hand, this disclosure of intellectual and political sensibility occur at a period when the government is capricious or oppressive—when its plans are disastrous—its exactions burdensome—its tone repulsive—and its distribution of favours most corrupt and unjust;—it will infallibly happen, that the greater part of those who are thus called into political existence, will take part against it, and be disposed to exert themselves for its correction, or utter subversion.

The last supposition, we think, is that which has been realized in the history of Europe for the last thirty years: and when we say that the people has almost everywhere grown too strong for their rulers, we mean only to say, that, in that period, there has been a prodigious development in the understanding and intelligence of the great mass of the population; and that this makes them much less willing to submit to the folly and corruption of most of their ancient governments. The old instinctive feelings of loyalty and implicit obedience, have pretty generally given way to shrewd calculations as to their own interests,

their own powers, and the rights which arise out of these powers. They see now, pretty quickly, both the weaknesses and the vices of their rulers; and, having learned to refer their own sufferings or privations, with considerable sagacity, to their blunders and injustice, they begin tacitly to inquire, what right have they to a sovereignty, of which they make so bad a use,—and how they would protect themselves, if all who hate and despise them were to unite to take it from them. Sentiments of this sort, we are well assured, have been prevalent over all the enlightened parts of Europe for the last thirty years, and are every day gaining strength and popularity. Kings and nobles, and ministers and agents of government, are no longer looked upon with veneration and awe,—but rather with a mixture of contempt and jealousy. Their errors and vices are canvassed, among all ranks of persons, with extreme freedom and severity. The corruptions by which they seek to fortify themselves, are regarded with indignation and vindictive abhorrence; and the excuses, with which they palliate them, with disgust and derision. Their deceptions are almost universally seen through; and their incapacity detected and despised by an unprecedented portion of the whole population which they govern.

It is in this sense, as we conceive it, that the people throughout civilized Europe have grown too strong for their rulers; and that *some* alteration in the balance or administration of their governments, has become necessary for their preservation. They have become too strong,—not in wealth,—but in *intellect*, activity, and available numbers; and the tranquillity of their governments has been endangered, not from their want of pecuniary influence, but from their want of moral respectability and intellectual vigour.

Such is the true state of the evil; and the cure, according to the English opponents of reform, is to increase the patronage of the Crown! The remote and original cause of the danger is the improved intelligence, and more perfect intercourse of the people,—a cause which it is not lawful to wish removed, and which, at any rate, the pro-

posed remedy has no tendency to remove. The immediate and proximate cause, is the corruption of the government; and the cure that is seriously recommended, is to increase that corruption!—to add to the weight of the burdens under which the people is sinking,—and to multiply the examples of partiality, profusion, and profligacy, by which they are revolted!

An absurdity so extravagant, however, could not have suggested itself, even to the persons by whom it has been so triumphantly recommended, unless it had been palliated by some colour of plausibility; and their error (which really does not seem very unnatural for men of their description) seems to have consisted merely in supposing that *all* those who were discontented in the country, were disappointed candidates for place and profit; and that the whole clamour which had been raised against the misgovernment of the modern world, originated in a violent desire to participate in the emoluments of that misgovernment. Upon this supposition, it will immediately be seen, that their remedy was most judiciously devised.—All the discontent was among those who wanted to be bribed—all the clamour among those who were impatient for preferment. Increase the patronage of the Crown therefore—make more sinecures, more jobs, more nominal and real posts of emolument and honour,—and you will allay the discontent, and still the clamour, which are now "frighting our isle from her propriety!"

This, to be sure, is very plausible and ingenious—as well as highly creditable to the honour of the nation, and the moral *experience* of its contrivers. But the fact unfortunately is quite different. There are *two* sets of persons to be managed and appeased; and the misfortune is, that what would gratify the one, will only exasperate the discontents of the other. The one wants unmerited honours, and unearned emoluments—a further abuse of patronage—a more shameful misapplication of the means of the nation. The other wants a correction of abuses—an abridgement of patronage—a diminution of the public burdens—a more just distribution of its trusts, dignities, and rewards. This last party is by far the strongest, and

the most formidable; for it is daily recruited out of the mass of the population, over which reason is daily extending her dominion; and depends, for its ultimate success, upon nothing less than the irresistible progress of intelligence—of a true and enlightened sense of interest—and a feeling of inherent right to undoubted power. It is difficult, then, to doubt of its ultimate triumph; and it must appear to be infinitely foolish to think of opposing its progress by measures which are directly calculated to add to its strength. By increasing the patronage or influence of the crown, a few more venal spirits may be attracted, by the precarious tie of a dishonest interest, to withstand all attempts at reform, and to clamour in behalf of all existing practices and institutions. But, for every worthless auxiliary that is thus recruited to the service of established abuses, is it not evident that there will be a thousand new enemies called forth by the additional abuse exemplified in the new patronage that is created, and the new scene of corruption that is exhibited, in exchanging this patronage for this dishonourable support?—For a nation to endeavour to strengthen itself against the attempts of reformers by a deliberate augmentation of its corruptions, is not more politic, than for a spendthrift to think of relieving himself of his debts by borrowing at usurious interest to pay what is demanded, and thus increasing the burden which he affects to be throwing off.

The only formidable discontent, in short, that now subsists in the country, is that of those who are *reasonably discontented*; and the only part of the people whose growing strength really looks menacingly on the government, is the body of those who have been alienated by its corruptions, and enabled, by their own improving intelligence, to unmask its deceptions, and to discover the secret of its selfishness and incapacity. The great object of their jealousy, is the enormous influence of the Crown, and the monstrous abuses of patronage to which that influence gives occasion. It is, therefore, of all infatuations the wildest, to hold out that the progress of this discontent makes it proper to give the Crown more influence, and

that it can only be effectually conciliated, by putting more patronage in the way of abuse.

In stating the evils and dangers of corruption and profligacy in a government, we must always keep it in view, that such a system can never be *universally* palatable, even among the basest and most depraved people of which history has preserved any memorial. If this were otherwise indeed—if a whole nation were utterly venal and corrupt, and every one willing to wait his time of dishonourable promotion, things might go on with sufficient smoothness at least; and as such a nation would not be worth mending, on the one hand, so there would, in fact, be much less need, on the other, for that untoward operation. The supposition, however, is obviously impossible; and, in such a country at least as England, it may perhaps be truly stated, as the most alarming consequence of corruption, that, if allowed to go on without any effectual check, it will infallibly generate such a spirit of discontent, as necessarily to bring on some dreadful convulsion, and overturn the very foundations of the constitution. It is thus fraught with a *double* evil to a country enjoying a free government. In the first place, it gradually corrodes and destroys almost all that is free or valuable in its constitution; and, secondly, it ensures its ultimate subversion by the tremendous crash of an insurrection or revolution. It first makes the government oppressive and intolerable; and then it oversets it altogether by a necessary, but dreadful calamity.

These two evils may appear as if opposite to each other; and it is certain, that, though brought on by the same course of conduct, they cannot be inflicted by the same set of persons. Those who are the slaves and the ministers of corruption, cannot be those who crush it, with a visiting vengeance, under the ruins of the social order; and it is in forgetting that there are two sets of persons to be conciliated in all such questions, that the portentous fallacy which we are considering mainly consists. The government may be very corrupt, and a very considerable part of the nation may be debased and venal, while there is

still spirit and virtue enough left, when the measure of provocation is full, to inflict a signal and sanguinary vengeance, and utterly to overthrow the fabric which has been defiled by this traffic of iniquity. And there may be great spirit, and strength, and capacity of heroic resentment in a nation, which will yet allow its institutions to be perverted, its legislature to be polluted, and the leading part of its population to be corrupted, before it be roused to that desperate effort, in which its peace and happiness are sure to suffer along with the guilt which brings down the thunder. In such an age of the world as the present, however, it may be looked upon as absolutely certain, that if the guilt be persisted in, the vengeance will follow; and that all *reasonable* discontent will accumulate and gain strength, as reason and experience advance; till, at the last, it works its own reparation, and sweeps the offence from the earth with the force and the fury of a whirlwind.

In such a view of the moral destiny of nations, there is something elevating as well as terrible. Yet, the terror preponderates, for those who are to witness the catastrophe: and all reason, as well as all humanity, urges us to use every effort to avoid the crisis and the shock, by a timely reformation, and an earnest and sincere attempt to conciliate the hostile elements of our society, by mutual concession and indulgence.—It is for this reason, chiefly, that we feel such extreme solicitude for a legislative reform of our system of representation,—in some degree as a pledge of the willingness of the government to admit of reform where it is requisite; but chiefly, no doubt, as in itself most likely to stay the flood of venality and corruption,—to reclaim a part of those who had begun to yield to its seductions,—and to reconcile those to the government and constitution of their country, who had begun to look upon it with a mingled feeling of contempt, hostility, and despair. That such a reform as we have contemplated, in the earlier part of these observations, would go far to produce those happy effects, we think must appear evident to all who agree with us as to the nature and origin of the evils from which we now suffer.

One of its chief advantages, however, will consist in its relieving and abating the spirit of discontent which is generated by the spectacle of our present corruptions, both by giving it scope and vent, and by the vast facilities it must afford to its labours of regeneration. By the extension of the elective franchise, many of those who are most hostile to the existing system, because, under it, they are excluded from all share of power or political importance, will have a part assigned them, both more safe and more active, than murmuring, or meditating vengeance against such a scheme of exclusion. The influence of such men will be usefully exerted in exciting a popular spirit, and in exposing the base and dishonest practices that may still interfere with the freedom of election. By some alteration in the borough qualifications, the body of electors in general will be invested with a more respectable character, and feel a greater jealousy of everything that may tend to degrade or dishonour them: but, above all, the exclusion of a great body of placemen from the legislature, by cutting off a great part of the minister's most profitable harvest of corruption, will force his party also to have recourse to more honourable means of popularity, and to appeal to principles that must ultimately promote the cause of independence.

By the introduction, in short, of a system of reform, even more moderate and cautious than that which we have ventured to indicate, we think that a wholesome and legitimate play will be given to those principles of opposition to corruption, monopoly and abuse, which, by the denial of all reform, are in danger of being fomented into a decided spirit of hostility to the government and the institutions of the country. Instead of brooding, in sullen and helpless silence, over the vices and errors which are ripening into intolerable evil, and seeing, with a stern and vindictive joy, wrong accumulated to wrong, and corruption heaped upon corruption, it will be continually interfering, with active and successful zeal, to correct, restrain, and deter. Instead of being the avenger of our murdered liberties, it will be their living protector; and the censor, not the executioner, of the constitution. It will not descend, only

at long intervals, like the Avator of the Indian mythology, to expiate, with terrible vengeance, a long series of consummated crimes; but, like the Providence of a better faith, will keep watch perpetually over the actions of corrigible men, and bring them back from their aberrations, by merciful chastisement, timely admonition, and the blessed experience of purer principles of action.

We have not left ourselves room to enter more at large into this interesting question; but we feel perfectly assured, and ready to maintain, that, as the institution of a limited, hereditary monarchy, must always appear the wisest and most reasonable of all human institutions, and that to which increasing reflection and experience will infallibly attach men more and more as the world advances; so, the prerogatives of such a monarch will always be safer and more inviolate, the more the sentiment of liberty, and the love of their political rights, are diffused and encouraged among his people. A legitimate sovereign, in short, who reigns by the fair exercise of his prerogative, can have no enemies among the lovers of regulated freedom; and the hostility of such men—by far the most terrible of all internal hostility—can only be directed towards him, when his throne is enveloped, by treacherous advisers, with the hosts of corruption; and disguised, for their ends, in the borrowed colours of tyranny.

QUEEN CONSORT.

(SEPTEMBER, 1814.)

Some Inquiry into the Constitutional Character of the Queen Consort of England. pp. 51. 8vo. London. Ridgway. 1814.

THE subject of this tract is one of considerable curiosity, in a speculative point of view, to the constitutional antiquary. In its legal bearings, it is of prominent importance; but it rises to a very exalted rank among questions of practical influence upon the wellbeing of the community, when contemplated in its relations to the peaceable and undisputed succession of the monarchy. Devoutly as all good men must desire never to see any occasion for discussing these high matters, otherwise than in a general and theoretical view, it is mere childishness to abstain from inquiries which, if successfully conducted, may so far fix the limits of the question as to prevent all necessity, happen what will, of entering hereafter into any other kind of disquisition. They are the worst enemies of good order, the true patrons of discord and confusion, who, from affected delicacy and squeamishness, or from a base submission to the caprices of present power, avoid looking such important discussions boldly in the face; and, where material doubts exist upon questions of constitutional right, seek to humour the follies of the existing Court, by putting off the inquiry which alone can settle such doubts, until it becomes no longer speculation, but rushes upon us accompanied by the actual emergency that makes everything like calm, or even peaceful discussion, hopeless. Impressed with these sentiments, we have thankfully received the little work now before us,—apparently the production of a lawyer, but certainly of one who has well studied the constitution of his country in its

best school, and who combines a practical apprehension of legal questions with an enlarged and accurate knowledge of the history of our free government, and the common interests of prince and people. Although he seems to have been directed towards the inquiry by some recent events, and to keep the possibility (a remote one we trust) of its becoming practically interesting pretty constantly in his eye, yet he very laudably abstains from all personal or party topics. Indeed, the argument is purely one of constitutional law, and can in no respect be charged with a factious tendency. Accordingly, it is managed with perfect calmness and propriety; frequently learned, almost always close, and sometimes exceedingly ingenious. For a production apparently compiled without any great research, and quite simple and unpretending, we have not often met with anything more satisfactory. Its merits, as well as the importance of the subject, and of some points connected with it, induce us to enter upon the contents of it, and upon the question generally, without further preface.

The author begins by remarking, that there hangs a peculiar degree of uncertainty and obscurity over the limits of the high office in question, because the occasions have been exceedingly few in which it was necessary to consider the Queen as separate from the King; and these having arisen out of the violence or perfidy of the reigning monarch, may easily be supposed to furnish precedents little worthy of respect; at least where they make against the rights of the weaker party. The subserviency of the Parliament and the country to the caprices of such princes as Henry VII. and Henry VIII., deserves almost as much reprobation as the conduct of those cruel and faithless tyrants; and thus it happens that we have (to use the author's words) scarce "any guides to a knowledge of this part of the constitution, but the most outrageous and absurd violations of it."

Some branches of the subject are, however, pretty familiar to lawyers. In respect of all private rights, the Queen is indisputably a separate and distinct person from her husband; she is capable of suing and being sued alone, and in her own name; she can take, directly by grant, to her

separate use, without any intervention of trustees; she can take by grant from her husband; and she can herself grant, without his interposition, such estate as is in her; of which capacity Lord Coke has preserved a curious instance, in a charter made by Ethelswitha, Queen of Burgred, the King of Mercia, conveying lands to one of her household, and only signed by the King as an attesting witness. In short, the Queen, with respect to her *private* capacity, is considered by the law as a single woman. It is evident that we are justified in enunciating the proposition with this restriction, if we consider the grounds upon which alone the peculiarity rests, which distinguishes the Queen from all other married women. She is so distinguished, according to Lord Coke, on the King's account only, to prevent him from being disturbed by domestic cares; "the wisdom of the common law intending that his continual care and study should be for the publike, *et circa ardua regni.*" But wherever her interests, rights, or duties, are of a public nature, or where she is called upon to perform any functions in which the realm is concerned, the reason for considering her as an exempt and several person from the King wholly ceases; for, in all such matters, he, above everybody, has a near and a deep interest. Nor is there any public functionary, after the Sovereign himself, whose importance in the state is more evident, and whose existence as a branch of the government is more distinctly recognised by law.

Our author makes a very judicious remark upon the right of the Queen to a trial by the peers of the realm. It is mentioned by Lord Coke, under the head of *Magna Charta* and the general right of the subject to a trial *per pares*, as derived from thence;—and that great lawyer seems to deduce her right also from the same source. Now, our author clearly shows that it is a mode of trial pointed out by the necessity of the case, and at common law—and that it is in no respect of the nature of a trial *by her peers.* First, it is not communicated to her by Magna Charta. This appears clearly from the terms of the statute made in 20th Henry VI.[1] to remove some doubts that had arisen as to the words "*Nullus liber homo,*" in the great charter,

[1] Cap. 9.

comprehending females, so as to include peeresses: and it declares that "dutchesses, countesses or baronesses shall be judged before such judges and peers of the realm, as peers of the realm should be." It has always been held that these three ranks of peeresses (by a familiar rule of construction) are put for all peeresses: indeed, at the time of making the statute, the title of Marquis was in disuse, and that of Viscount, created only three years before, had not become a parliamentary honour. But why should all mention of the Queen be omitted, if the statute was meant to reach her case? It was a title as well known then as at this day, and worn by as high-spirited a princess. If then, the provisions of the great charter had been deemed to comprehend her situation, the declaratory act would have said so. Again, if it be contended that the right of all subjects to trial by their peers, is a common-law right, independent of, and antecedent to the Great Charter, or the declaratory acts of later times, (which we have no doubt of, nor does this author appear to deny it,) the Queen's right to be tried by the peers of Parliament, must be founded upon this, that they are her peers. But this can with no sort of correctness be maintained. The privileges, as well as the rank of the Queen, differ widely from those of peerage; she so far partakes of her husband's dignities, as not merely to precede the peers, but to receive a sort of homage from them and their wives: her life is protected in a peculiar manner; she is in rank all but equal to the Sovereign. Then, as his wife, she can still less be deemed a peeress, he being in no one respect a peer, nor amenable to the jurisdiction of the peers, or of any other court; nor having, in contemplation of law, any peers. In one respect, indeed, she resembles a peeress in her own right. Upon a marriage with a subject after her husband's death, she does not degrade like peeresses by marriage, but preserves her rank, name, and style as a peeress in her own right; and may maintain suits by such name and style. Yet proceed another step, and her resemblance to this species of peeress also fails; for she does not transmit these honours, or indeed any title of her own by descent; her issue by the King taking everything as his children, and her issue by any

subsequent marriage taking in like manner from the father merely. We concur then with the author in the position that the trial of the Queen by the peers of Parliament, arises merely from the necessity of the case; from her having no peers, and yet being entitled to a tribunal as high and dignified—as near her own exalted station as possible. Perhaps it is founded on no other grounds than the general and admitted rule, that high state offences, not punishable by common course of law, are triable by way of impeachment in Parliament. We allude of course to those cases not expressly referred by statute to the cognizance of this tribunal, and in which, regard being had rather to the high nature of the offence, and of the duties whereof it is a violation, than to the exact station of the offender, the common law of Parliament and the Constitution have prescribed a mode of inquiry, without either grand or petty jury, or the intervention of any process that can in most cases be called "*judicium parium suorum.*"

The ancient privileges or perquisites of the Queen, in respect of revenue, are now of little importance. Some of them have fallen into disuse, probably during the long period when there was no Queen Consort, namely from the death of Henry VIII. to the accession of James I.; and from the Revolution of 1688, to the accession of George II.; the former an interval of above fifty years, the latter of about forty. Indeed, all those branches of revenue, though anciently the bulk of the royal income both for the King and Queen, have, in the progress of time, become extremely trifling. The immunities of the Queen are, that she shall pay no toll, nor find pledges. Her revenues were formerly certain rents issuing out of the demesne lands of the Crown, and appropriated to her separate use, together with the *aurum reginæ* or Queen-gold, a proportional part of every voluntary offering or fine to the King, above ten marks in value for every royal favour conferred. She had also a right to the tail of certain royal fish, as whales (but not sturgeons), of which the King has the head; and lawyers, who are generally eulogists of the law, and delight in finding reasons for all its provisions, give, as the ground of this division, that it furnishes whalebone for her Majesty's

wardrobe; a singularly unhappy observation, as the whalebone is well known to come from the head of the fish only. Beside these pecuniary perquisites, she has the undoubted right of appointing her own household and other officers.

But the point of view in which it is most important to regard the Royal Consort, is as the person through whom the royal race is to be continued, and the crown demised to a successor. The law considers her as the mother of the royal issue; and almost all its provisions respecting her, are framed with the view of keeping this race pure, and ascertaining the royal offspring beyond the possibility of doubt. The chief precaution adopted for this purpose (one of the most important, certainly, to the peace of the realm), is, the highly-penal enactments by which it guards the approaches to the royal bed. To hold any adulterous intercourse with the Queen Consort, is the highest crime known in the law,—belonging to the same description with the compassing the King's death. The most complicated acts of adultery between subjects are, by the secular code, not punishable at all. Any such connexion with the Queen, is High Treason in both parties. Moreover, as if to diminish the chances of a failure of issue, at the same time that it adopted such precautions against the imposition of a spurious race, the life of the Queen, as well as her chastity, is protected by extraordinary enactments. To compass her death, is as criminal as to compass the King's. It must, however, be admitted, that the protection thus given to the Queen's life, may possibly be only on account of her high dignity, and nearness in connexion to the King; for the Statute of Treasons, as we shall presently see, is not very consistent in its provisions with any one principle.

The life of the eldest son and heir of the King, and the chastity, but not the life, of his wife, are defended by the same enactments. No mention whatever is made of any other son; nor of the grandson, although he may be heir apparent; of which, however, Lord Hale doubts, seeming to think such grandson within the meaning of the act, although he allows it is a fit case to be referred to Parliament, according to the wise and sound directions at the

end of the statute. Any collateral heir apparent is said by Mr. East (1, *Crown Law*, 64) to be clearly not within the act; but we do not comprehend how there can be a collateral heir apparent, except indeed in the new limitation of the crown in special tail. The chastity of the eldest daughter, unmarried, is protected in like manner with the Queen's and the eldest son's wife's. Upon this, Mr. Justice Blackstone,[1] and, after him, and in his words, Mr. East, have observed, that the plain intention of the law was to guard the "blood-royal from any suspicion of bastardy, whereby the succession of the crown might be rendered dubious; therefore, when the reason ceases, the law ceases with it;"—and they instance the leaving unprotected the chastity of a Queen or Princess Dowager. But, with great submission to these authorities, we venture to suggest, that the reason ceases somewhat short of the law—for why is the Princess Royal protected, and not the wives of the younger sons, all of whom, by their adultery, would endanger the succession a great deal more? Further, it has been remarked, that the words in the section respecting the Princess Royal, is another inconsistency, because her issue cannot lay claim until she is married, they being before her coverture illegitimate (*East, Cr. Law*, 65). It may further be remarked, that the phraseology of the act is strange. The Queen is twice mentioned, but by different names: when the question is respecting her life, she is termed "*our lady his Queen*"—when of her chastity, she is called "*the King's companion*"—and when the consort of the eldest son and heir is mentioned, she is called "*the wife*" of such son or heir. From this diversity, it is inferred by the author of the Inquiry, that the law does not at all regard the Queen in the light of wife to the King,—wife implying coverture, a relationship quite unknown between the King and his consort; and he adds, that, although the Saxon etymology of Queen is wife, yet the meaning of the root does by no means regulate the use of the derivative; and in this view of the subject we are disposed to coincide. The distinction in the term employed is very marked. *Companion*

[1] 4, Crown Law, 81.—1, Crown Law, 65.

can evidently mean nobody but the Queen,—while it is a phrase so unusual in expressing such relation, that it must be taken to have been advisedly employed. From the whole, however, we may conclude, that in whichever capacity we view the Queen Consort, whether as mother of the royal issue inheritable to the crown, or as consort; companion, or wife under peculiar limitations, of the Sovereign, she is a high dignitary in the monarchy; a public person—bearing important relations to the constitution, and performing functions of a public nature, and of great moment to the commonwealth. Another inference is equally obvious, that the law watches with especial solicitude over the purity of the succession; and guards, by every precaution possible, against whatever may taint or make it doubtful.

Now it is comparatively of little moment to inquire what may be the grounds of this solicitude. Those who praise the whole institutions of our ancestors as the perfection of wisdom, and framed with views far more refined than could by possibility be entertained in those early times, ascribe it to the desire of avoiding all disputes about the succession, and preventing the peace of the kingdom from being disturbed. It is more probable, that the high-prerogative notions of royal right, and the value set upon the real blood of the Sovereign, had at least an equal share in the provisions for keeping the channel of its transmission pure. But, at all events, the object in view is unquestionable; no doubt can exist as to the object and spirit of the law; and the high and paramount purpose to which its arrangements are in fact subservient can no more be doubted,—the establishment of public tranquillity upon a secure basis, in the point most essential of all to its preservation. It can scarcely then be questioned, that whatever tends to promote this most desirable object, is peculiarly consonant to the spirit of the law, as well as subservient to the public safety; and that in construing legal rights, or customary ones, which are the same thing, we shall adopt the soundest, as well as safest doctrine, if, in any matter of doubt, we lean towards the side which favours the removal of all uncertainty from the course

of the royal succession. This is in truth only giving a fair construction to the law, according to its manifest spirit.

Various usages have grown up, connected with the subject; and all, though not creatures of positive enactment, fit to be regarded as parts of the constitutional common law of the realm. Their object apparently is to give additional safeguards either to the purity or to the certainty of the succession; some of them multiplying the checks upon any fraudulent contrivances which might actually taint the royal line—others affording the means of convincing mankind that it has been kept pure. In order to prevent a supposititious issue from being imposed upon the country, the Queen, and the Heir-apparent's wife, are carefully watched during the latter stages of pregnancy, and are even delivered in the presence of many witnesses of eminence, including the great Officers of State. All marriages in the family are celebrated with extraordinary publicity and splendour. The baptisms of the issue are in like manner occasions of high solemnity and festival. To the same source we may trace the extraordinary powers given to the reigning Sovereign by the common law, in regulating the residence, education, occupations, and marriages of the younger branches of the Royal family while under age, not merely his children, but his nephews, grandchildren, &c., during the lives of their own parents. The publicity of the King's own marriage, equally merits notice. It is made a public act, an act of state; and in no respect resembles a matrimonial union contracted between common persons.

Although these things are generally understood to be as we have now stated, yet we deem it necessary to bring them somewhat more in detail before the reader, more especially after the strange doctrines recently broached respecting the *privacy*, if we may so speak, of the Royal family. It is also fit to notice these matters, because the author of this tract has omitted to avail himself of the aid which his argument derives from them.

When his present Majesty resolved to contract a marriage for the sake of having heirs to his crown, as we

should say; but, as the reasoners to whom we refer would have it, when the King, being of the proper age, and wishing to settle in the world, bethought him of looking out for a wife,—he set about it in a way that must prove somewhat startling to those good gentlemen, who doubtless would expect to see him go quietly to routs and balls, or rather watering-places, to suit himself. He suddenly published, in a well-known paper (The Gazette), a statement, that "having nothing so much at heart as the welfare of his people, and rendering the same permanent to posterity, he had, ever since his accession, turned his thoughts towards the choice of a princess for his consort;" and he adds, "After the fullest information and mature deliberation, I am come to a resolution to demand in marriage the Princess Charlotte of Mecklenburg Strelitz; a Princess distinguished by every eminent virtue and amiable endowment, whose illustrious line has constantly shown the firmest zeal for the Protestant succession," &c. It appears from the same paper, that his Majesty had first communicated this delicate affair (his resolution to *propose* for the Princess) to certain confidants, viz., the Archbishops, Chancellor and others, to the number of fifty-four, —and that they, very unlike other confidants, instead of promising secrecy, and then telling it to fifty-four other persons who might help them to keep the secret, very frankly said it was too good a thing to be concealed; and "made it" (says the proclamation) "their request to his Majesty, that this his Majesty's most gracious declaration to them might be made public;" which was the reason of its appearing in the Gazette. The whole country being now in the secret, must have been in anxious suspense, till the news arrived of the success of a courtship thus confided to them in its very infancy; and we may imagine the sleepless nights of many loyal subjects, in the fears lest his Majesty should be refused. However, Lord Harcourt is despatched to make the proposal; and, with him, three ladies, "to take care of the Princess's person," and Lord Anson to bring her over—evidently on the maxim, that "faint heart never won fair lady." The offer, accordingly, was accepted; the fair and amiable Princess ar-

rived; was well, though publicly received,—married, and in due time confined. Here, again, our advocates of *privacy* are a little put out; for we find, in the same repository, so curious in recording all the little gossiping of this worthy country gentleman's family, that no sooner was the lady taken in labour, about two o'clock in the morning of the memorable 12th of August 1762, than a great assembly of gossips took place in the bed-room, viz. His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Duke of Devonshire, and eight other Lords;—that the Most Reverend Prelate was in the room while her Majesty was delivered, and the other nine in the next adjoining room, with the door open; and that a dozen or two of ladies were present also. The birth of the young gentleman was made known by the Tower guns; and a form of prayer instantly composed for him and his mother, to be used in all the churches. Before he was a week old, he showed signs of rising in the world; for he was, on the 17th, made an English Earl, and soon after christened with much solemnity. Addresses poured in (so deluded were the people as to the point of *privacy*, and so resolved to believe it was all a matter of state); and, among others, the city of London expressed its devout wishes that the father might, "by his instructions and example, form the mind of his Royal son to the government of a free, brave, and generous people; and that the son might, in the fulness of time, succeed to the virtues, as well as to the throne, of his father."[1] Divers other ceremonies have since that time taken place, though not connected with the succession; as the public provision for the royal babe, the payment of debts, the settlement of his household, and so forth; all indicating a great disposition to intermeddle with the money matters of this worthy family, and no kind of shyness or disinclination on their part, nor any impatience of such prying and interference. But we pass these topics over as superfluous.

[1] There is something peculiarly unfortunate in the turn of the expression—which plainly intimates an apprehension that the Royal issue might only succeed to the virtues when he obtained the crown, in the fulness of time.

The august ceremony of the Coronation is unquestionably most closely connected with our present inquiry: it bears an immediate relation to the security of the succession, as well as to the recognition of the reigning Sovereign for the person to whom allegiance is due. The author of the tract before us, as far as we know, is the first who has placed this point in a clear light. He considers, as we have already seen, the royalty of the Queen to be in the nature of an independent dignity, rather created for the security of the succession, than derived from marriage. From hence it follows, naturally, that her coronation is a recognition of her constitutional character, as essential as that of the Monarch: The one is crowned, as a public and solemn recognition of his authority; the other, as an equally solemn recognition of the channel through which this authority is to be transmitted in succession to the next generation. The coronation of neither, it is true, confers any new right or title: Before that ceremony, and independent of it, the King is entitled to the allegiance of his subjects; and the Queen is the stock from whom his heirs are to spring. The times are very remote in which any actual consent of the people was asked, even as a part of the ceremony; and so entirely was it held to be a recognitory act, in all respects, that they were, in troublesome times, crowned more than once, from a desire to have the acknowledgments of allegiance repeated, after each unsuccessful attempt to shake their authority. But the ceremony is an important one, nevertheless, to the security of the monarchy; and the directory part of the statute of William III., prescribing a certain oath to be administered at the coronation, seems to preclude all attempts at regarding this as a ceremony that may be dispensed with. The author infers, from the terms of the ancient oath of allegiance (which used formerly, and might still be administered at courts leet), that the allegiance acknowledged at a coronation, is "to the Sovereign *and his heirs*."[1] The recognition of his own authority is, at all events, a solemn part of the ceremony, and has been regu-

[1] It is set forth at length in Calvin's Case, in the Report; and partially, with much praise, by Blackstone.

larly performed at each coronation since the reigns before the Conquest. It consists in the Archbishop presenting the King to the people, as the undoubted "King of this realm;" and asking them "if they are willing to do their homage to him?". They answer with loud acclamations. The ceremony of crowning the Queen is equally solemn, and in all respects resembles that of crowning the King; except that no allegiance is sworn to her, and she does not take the oath. We believe, too, her oblation differs, and she has no orb put into her hand: and there may be some further trifling variations. But she is solemnly crowned, and anointed;—she has a sceptre put into her hand;—she takes the sacrament with the King;—and although a Queen Regnant's husband does his wife homage[1] with the rest of the subjects on this occasion, no such ceremony forms part of a Queen Consort's inauguration.

The important part borne by the Queen Consort, and her constitutional right to be crowned with the King, is still further attested by the remarkable fact, that many persons enjoy by immemorial usage, the privilege of performing certain offices about her person at the ceremony, and receiving certain perquisites therewith connected. Nay, some manors and lands are holden by the tenure of rendering such services to the Queen's person on this occasion. Among the claims of this kind, preferred at James II.'s coronation in 1684 (and again on subsequent occasions), we find that of the Lord Mayor and citizens of London, to serve the Queen after dinner with wine, and to have the gold cup in which they served it. The liberties of the city being then seized into the King's hands, this claim was on that account alone rejected, or rather not discussed. The Lord of the Manor of Fyngirth in Essex, claimed to serve the Queen as Chamberlain for the day, and to have certain perquisites; his claim was not allowed, but he was left to prosecute it at law: Nor was the answer made, which must have been decisive, had the Queen's place in the solemnity been immaterial, that she formed no such part of it as to be the ground of the tenure in question. We believe it also to be a part of the right, or the duty of

[1] Chamberlayne's "Life of Anne."

the Barons of the Cinque Ports, to carry a canopy over the Queen as well as the King; at least there are two canopies in the ceremonial, and both supported by these Barons.

"Why is this coronation of the Queen necessary?" demands our author—

"It is necessary as a public recognition of that, for which alone the dignity of Queen exists in the realm, the constitutional order of succession to the crown. She assumes the crown as a symbol of the right of her offspring to the monarchy; and the people (swearing allegiance to the King and his heirs, and at the same time assenting to the coronation of the Queen) acknowledge her children to be those heirs to whom they swear allegiance.

"The coronation of the monarch alone would not satisfy the intent of the ceremony as to both; because the Queen being uniformly considered a single woman in the constitution (enjoying her revenue, the control of her household, her state, and her dignities as such), her right to give heirs to the realm is not so much derived from him, as from the people's recognition of her as their Queen.

"The acknowledgment of the title of the heirs to the crown, is as necessary to the peace of the realm, as of that of the monarch on the throne. The possession of the crown has not at all times of our history been considered as decisive of the right of the issue of the possessor to succeed him. Instances of the contrary doctrines are numerous. There is in early times, the curious instance of divided allegiance, which took place after the treaty between King Stephen and Henry Fitz-Empress, afterwards Henry the Second: By virtue of this treaty the whole kingdom acknowledged Stephen as sovereign; but at the same time the barons did formal homage to Henry as his successor, and Stephen's son William was living at the time. A treaty very similar to this had before been made between Henry the First and his eldest brother, the amiable and ill-fated Robert, Duke of Normandy. The stipulation however there was, 'that if either of these princes died without issue, the other should succeed to his dominions.' Still the necessity of stipulating at all for the rights of the issue in the treaty, is as strong to prove that such rights were not deemed a necessary result from the possession of the crown, as if their title had been expressly set aside. It is nothing to the question, that both these sovereigns were usurpers entering into agreements with the lawful successor; they still establish the plain principle, that the mere assumption of the crown, though it draws with it many legal consequences, such as the allegiance due to a King *de facto*, and the instant purging of all attainders, as in the case of the Earl of Richmond; still does not, of itself, without such extent of allegiance expressed by the people, make a lawful title transmissible to issue.

"If these instances are thought to lack authority, from having taken place in rude and arbitrary times, still the same principle of the power of the people to limit their allegiance, must have been acted upon by the supporters of the Bill for the exclusion of James

the Second; and again, in the best times of our history, at the Revolution. The Act of Settlement, which established William and Mary sovereigns, regulated the descent first to the heirs of the Queen, then to the Princess Anne and her heirs; and not till after default of both these successions, to the heirs of William the joint possessor of the crown and actual King. Mary was certainly not in the usual situation of a Queen Consort: the instance nevertheless is highly important, as evincing that the heirs of the King may claim by a title distinct from the heirs of the Queen, and in this case *vice versâ*: the coronation of either cannot therefore as of course confirm a right in the common heirs of both.

"Of old, a practice sometimes prevailed of proclaiming and installing the successor during the life of the reigning monarch. King Stephen, previous to the above treaty, required the archbishop to anoint his son Eustace as successor to the realm. This ceremony has long been disused; but the principle of it exists in the acknowledgment of the Queen by her coronation to be the person from whom the successor to the crown and heir to the monarch is to spring. Thus the lawful descent is still designated and proclaimed; and the contingent right of assuming the government, conditional upon answering the qualifications and fulfilling the obligations prescribed by the constitution, is vested and limited in the heir either living or to be born."—pp. 36–40.

We may add to this example of Stephen, the more remarkable one of Henry II. and the controversy with the Court of Rome, to which his desire of crowning Prince Edward in his own lifetime, gave rise. The regularity with which Queens have been crowned either with their husbands, if married at the time of their coronation, or if not, immediately after, and with the concurrence of the husband in the ceremony, is a circumstance strongly favouring the course of this argument. The author justly observes, that such a case as Henry VIIth's, who carefully deferred his marriage with Elizabeth until after his coronation, and then still further delayed having her crowned, proves nothing against the general rule. In truth, the preponderating faction of the House of York forced the marriage as well as her coronation upon him: And to have had his own sovereignty solemnly and exclusively acknowledged at the same time that she was crowned, would, in his delicate situation, have cast a doubt on his title, as well as alarmed the Lancastrians, she being almost as much a Queen Regnant as Consort. But still, with every inducement from the circumstances in which he stood, and many

facilities from his recent victories and great services against the usurper, he did not venture to delay the ceremony for more than two years. The history of both England and Scotland, if searched with a view to this point, shows the uniform practice of crowning both King and Queen together, if they are both within the realm, and of taking every precaution for having the ceremony, if possible, performed as to both at the same time.[1] Sometimes the coronation is delayed; sometimes the nuptials are forced on; and, in the last example in England, so anxious was our gracious Sovereign to have this material coincidence take place, that having appointed the coronation by the same proclamation in which he announced his intended marriage, and some delay taking place in the Queen's sailing from Germany, orders were despatched to the Admiral, to sail at all events, and make for any port the wind might render possible,—an example of eagerness which perhaps the advocates of *privacy* will find it difficult to ascribe to a lover's impatience. In a word, the joint coronation of the two royal personages, is symbolical of the Queen's being the real channel of the succession: To exclude her, is to cast a slur upon her, fatal to the security of that succession: And the following remarks of this judicious author, can never be too strongly recommended, as illustrative of the point.

"Whenever disunion, as between Charles the Second and his Queen, has taken place, it becomes imperiously necessary that no jot of ceremony, no recognised symbol of dignity should be disused. The regular succession to the crown is of such high importance to the state, that it should be so confirmed and acknowledged, as to place it far above the slightest taint of rumour or suspicion. Had Charles the Second (if opportunity had been allowed to him) denied to his Queen a coronation jointly with himself; and given for it the only reason he could have stated, namely, a personal dislike to her, would this have been satisfactory to the world? Would it not have given very probable ground for suspicions, that deeper reasons existed disgraceful to his consort? Would it not have emboldened the mischievous and disaffected to give free way to any insinuations and rumours they could frame, for the purpose of disquieting the realm and interrupting the peaceful succession of the reigning

[1] See *Pinkerton's Hist.*, i., 432—& passim—also *Buchanan, Foredun Scotichronicon*, &c.—The English authorities are familiar.

family?—The coronation of the Queen recognises her right of giving heirs to the throne; her coronation jointly with the monarch places the right of those heirs (especially of pre-existent ones) above all slur or suspicion. If, therefore, unhappy discord has arisen between the possessors of the throne, or it has ever been attempted to fix a taint on the chaste allegiance of the Queen, and consequently on the succession, such a public recognition by the monarch and by the people, of her as Queen, and of the right of her issue, of those living especially, is doubly necessary for the future tranquillity of the realm. In fact, a distinct refusal of a coronation, either by monarch or people, would be a public declaration that the party refusing does not acknowledge her as Queen; and proclaims a belief and intent, which may reasonably be thought to have views far beyond the mere mortification of a hated female."—pp. 44-46.

This, in truth, brings us to the view of the subject in which it strikes our minds the most forcibly. The coronation is a high solemnity: It may have originally borne the peculiar character here described; it may be the symbol which the author represents it to be. It is certainly a very ingenious suggestion, and we see no reason to question it being sound also, that the public crowning of the Queen was intended as a solemn recognition of the inheritable rights of her issue by the King; while the crowning of the King records the subjects' allegiance to him and his heirs. But the view which every man will concur in, is that which merely takes the coronation as an accustomed proceeding of a public nature, and the Queen's share in it as her accustomed privilege; from whence it follows, that to withhold this share, to refuse this privilege, is to make an exception, not merely invidious towards her, but derogatory to her character, and by necessary consequence full of danger to the rights of her issue, and the stability of the succession. No Queen in this country was ever so treated, without good cause; no Queen was ever singled out for so remarkable an insult, unless in the design of disputing her own continence, and her issue's legitimacy. "No royal ornament," says our author, "was ever in England locked up from one entitled to it, but with a sinister motive. A coronation was never refused but to young Edward, by the ambitious and designing Richard III." This is the ground of our firm and clear opinion respecting the high importance of the right in question. It is not a matter of civility

—not a point of court etiquette—not at all a piece of respect or justice or humanity to an individual. The making of such an exception, proclaims to the world the existence of suspicions, where no suspicion ought ever to alight that is not instantly followed up by rigid investigation; where no suspicion ought for an instant to lie after that investigation has proved it groundless. The peace of the country imperiously demands this sacrifice of private caprice; even if common justice and the calls of the most ordinary humanity had not of themselves prescribed it.

These principles, too obvious to require illustration, extend beyond the mere question of a coronation. They embrace every instance of disrespectful treatment in its nature public and notorious. We may lay it down as undeniable, that no one of the usual privileges of the Queen's high station can safely be trenched upon; nor any of the ordinary courtesies of royal life be withheld from her. "There must be some reason for it," says the world, as often as it remarks those invidious distinctions. Now no reason is at all likely to be assigned, that does not cast a doubt upon the succession. If experience be resorted to, where have we any examples of Queens treated as guilty, unless when there was a design of impeaching their honour and loyalty? and when was such a design ever entertained, without the project lurking behind it, of attacking the rights of the issue? In former times, the caprice of the monarch, a desire of other espousals, a mere dislike of his present wife, a fretful impatience of his children, and a jealousy of their growing popularity and influence, may have given rise to the unnatural project. Sometimes the interests of evil counsellors near the throne—of females desirous of a crown, and willing, for its vain possession, to be the sport of the same unprincipled caprice to which they owed it—of male relatives, whose prospects of succession were intercepted by the children—have added to the prince's fancies, or perhaps conspired to create them. In our days it is scarcely possible, (thanks to the publicity which all such matters obtain through the press), that plots of this description should succeed against rights unquestionable, title unimpeachable, and interests so high and

general, that if we were to call them sacred, the epithet would not be profaned. Yet this is manifest, that wisdom requires watchfulness in all matters of this vital importance; that over-anxiety here is the safe side on which to err; that only by supine confidence in the unlikelihood of the danger, can it ever be brought near; and that he is the basest of slaves, or the most contemptible of drivellers, who presumes to call himself a statesman, and yet fears to touch these subjects, lest he should give offence to the persons actually possessed of power. Some such vile sycophants have recently been heard to raise their cry: And, expressing a squeamishness forsooth about interfering with "*private concerns*," with "*domestic matters*," with "*family arrangements*," have spoken of the highest of State Affairs as a thing beyond, or rather below, the cognizance of Parliament; and deprecated all interposition "in matters so delicate," as both improper and hopeless. Pass we over the indignation excited by their plainly discovered motives —leave we on one side the figure they make in their disappointment, as certain as signal—yet we must pause for a moment, to counteract, by plainly stating the question, the tendency of their attempts to raise a clamour, when they could not, by any chance, throw across the question the shadow of a reasonable doubt.

The King's royal family, as the law phrases it, is an essential component part of the monarchy; not a mere ornament of its columns, but a substantial portion of their strength. Its members form a part, and the principal part, of the splendour which is one prop of this form of government; they secure the continuation of the royal authority in a line unbroken by elections and changes, so perilous in other systems; and thus contribute essentially to the chief advantage which this kind of constitution possesses. They bear their part, too, in keeping the Sovereign above all rivalry with his subjects, and thus aid in securing the next grand benefit of the monarchical form. With a considerate attention to these their valuable functions, the State amply provides for their support in all the dignity of a splendid leisure; and if they ever are called upon to exert themselves, it is only in times of peril to the empire,

or when they act from a laudable ambition to obtain the only gifts which the public munificence cannot bestow gratuitously—the glory and estimation which is the reward of personal merit. As for what are commonly termed honours, titles, dignities, badges—they have these as matters of course merely on attaining a certain age. They become, at that period, Privy Councillors, Dukes, Knights of the Garter; they are covered, almost as soon as they can know the value of them, with as many marks of royal favour as the two most successful Generals that have appeared for a century ever earned by the greatest victories. In truth, there are but these two instances, in modern times, of any individuals gaining, by merit, as many honours, and as much emolument, as every prince of the blood is covered with the moment he leaves school, merely because he is a member of the family which the constitution regards as a branch of the monarchy. All these distinctions are deliberately conferred, not fondly lavished upon them, for the same reason that they are so sparingly distributed among persons even of the highest claims to public favour: The public service—the best interests of the country require it.

In their habits of life, both as regards their intercourse with the Monarch, with each other, and with the community, they are wholly unlike other persons. Although the law does little to separate them from the mass of society, custom and habit, the interpreter, and oftentimes the arbitrator, in the practical part of the Government, does everything. The distinction is broadly marked; they resemble petty sovereigns in their communications with the world; they have their households and their officers, and their several circles; they are to be approached according to certain known forms; and they enjoy, by the rules of court etiquette, as well as the courtesies of society, a multitude of privileges, all tending to identify them with the head of the house they belong to—the head of the monarchy.

When any matter of high concernment occurs to these illustrious personages, the Government is seen to take an interest in it; generally indeed by the outward and visible

sign of moneys voted. Their coming of age, and obtaining establishments, is communicated to Parliament; their marriages are the subjects of treaty with foreign powers, and also of parliamentary communication; they are thus the subject of national discussion, and have been even of remonstrance.

The law itself, indeed, most plainly regards them in a light widely different from private individuals; and, though sparing of the privileges which it gives them, it is sufficiently ready with restrictions when the public good requires; making them give recognitions, in a signal manner, of their being public persons, in return for the ample advantages which in that capacity they enjoy. They are placed by law under the control of the Sovereign, with little regard either to their convenience, their feelings, or the ordinary relations of blood. They have not the management of their own children, as other parents have; they cannot order the place of their residence, appoint the persons who are to educate them, or regulate the important article of their marriages. Nay, they themselves, in espect of marriage, are under the severest restrictions. A prince of the blood, how remote soever from the King, if he is only a descendant of George II., cannot marry without the consent of the reigning Sovereign, be he ever so distant a relative, until he attains the age of five-and-twenty; and then, if the consent is refused by the Crown, he must allow a year to elapse, during which a parliamentary address (not always very difficult to be carried in such matters) may still further prevent the match. The prince's demand and the Crown's consent, when it is given, are to be registered in the books of the Privy Council,—as if still more clearly to indicate, that the whole proceeding is an act of state. We omit the well-known disability under which they are laid as to religion, both in what regards themselves and their wives.

A variety of lesser examples may be given, all clearly pointing the same way. Before the statute naturalizing children of English fathers born abroad, the Common Law held the royal issue, wherever born, to be inheritable in England. So the law was *declared* as far back as the 25th

of Edward III. (St. 2. *de natis ultra mare.*) An alien wife not being dowable of lands in England, the King's wife was excepted, *Co.* & *Litt.* 31. *b.*; and all the judges in 26 Ed. I. held the wife of the King's brother (the Queen of Navarre) to be dowable, *Rot. Par.* 26 *Ed. I. rot.* 1. In 1641, Charles I. communicated to Parliament the proposed marriage of the Princess Mary with the Prince of Orange. The articles were nearly concluded; but he desired the two Houses first to consider the treaty of alliance connected with the match, before he would finally conclude it (*Journ. Feb.* 10, 1641). The Lords, in the same year, ordered the original, or a true copy of the articles to be laid before them, (*Lords' Journ. July* 3); and a motion was discussed in the same House for an address, desiring that the King would not conclude the marriage without settling the alliance. An address was voted in the Commons (*July* 14, 1641) against the Queen going abroad; and a bill was carried through several stages, to prevent her from taking the Princess Mary with her. By the Act of Settlement, no King or Queen of the Hanoverian family was allowed to leave the realm without the permission of Parliament (12 *W. III. c.* 2 *§* 3); and though this was repealed by 1 *Geo. I. st.* 2, *c.* 51, the principal reason assigned was, that the family was sufficiently numerous. When the bill was passed naturalizing the Electress Sophia and her issue, the reason assigned in the preamble was, that inducements might be held out to these eminent persons to study our laws and constitution, by residing here during the Queen's lifetime (4 *Ann c.* 4). With similar views, the act was passed for giving the House of Hanover precedence as nephews and children of the Crown (10 *Ann. c.* 4). When the Prince of Orange was naturalized on his marriage with our Princess Royal (7 *Geo. II. c.* 4), no clause was inserted disabling him from holding offices—an example since generally followed on similar occasions. Such acts clearly show, that the law regards the family, as well as the person of the reigning Monarch, and makes them, as a distinct race, the subject of peculiar provisions. Thus, too, when Mary was to wed Philip II. a treaty was made, and ratified article by

article in an express statute. One of the articles provides for the residence of both the Queen and her issue. It states, that the education of the latter within the realm is of great moment; and enacts, that they shall not be carried out of it but on reasons of state necessity, and then only with consent of Parliament, (*see Rymer, XV.* 377, and 1, *Mar. st.* 3, *c.* 2, not printed in the common editions.) In the House of Commons, December, 1699, an address to the King was debated, praying him to remove the Bishop of Salisbury, the Duke of Gloucester's governor; and though it was negatived, and, very possibly, upon arguments favourable to the prerogative, and against the necessity of parliamentary interference in such a case, we believe no man ever thought, in that day, of representing the whole concerns of the Royal family as private matters, in which the public had no interest.

We cannot close these notices better than by referring to the celebrated case of George I.'s grandchildren in 1718, when the rights of the Father and the King came in conflict. The Judges there term them "the children of England;" and say, "they were born Princes and Princesses of England, before they had any title." The opinions delivered by ten of the twelve Judges was to this effect; "that the care and education of the persons of his Majesty's grandchildren, now in England, and of Prince Frederick, when his Majesty shall send for him from abroad, and the ordering the place of their abode, and appointing governors, governesses, and other instructors, attendants and servants, and the care and approbation of their marriages when grown up,[1] belongs of right to the King."—11. *St. Tr.* (*fol. ed.*) 295.

Now, we confidently ask, if there is in the description of the Royal family which we have just brought to a close, any one feature of resemblance to ordinary, private families? We desire to know, whether they do not evidently form a separate and distinct class set apart by the Constitution for purposes of state, and dealt with, both by the

[1] This seems to admit, that the common law restrained the royal marriages almost as much before the Royal Family Marriage Act, as they now are restrained by force of the statute.

law and the custom of England, as if they were, in the strictest sense of the word, public functionaries? Other men have public and private capacities; but with them these are never confounded. They are officers or statesmen; and they are also husbands and fathers: The duties of those private relations are kept separate and distinct from the duties of their public stations. But not so with the family of the Monarch. They can hardly be said to have any private capacity at all: At least its duties are almost all the very duties which connect them with the State; for, it is as husbands and wives, fathers and children, that they render to the state by far the greater part of their services. Thus, if their private do not wholly merge in their public duties, the two are so mixed up together, that they can rarely be severed.

It is, indeed, truly astonishing to hear men denying or disregarding, or pretending to mistake a proposition so clear in itself, and so perpetually presented to their view in every shape of irresistible evidence. When they summon up the powers of face which it requires to assert that the management of the Royal family is a private concern of its head, and that we must not be so indelicate as to interfere in it—have they furnished themselves with a single instance of this "*private nature*," or with one particular in which the law or the practice of the Constitution lends any countenance to such preposterous delicacy? A private family, indeed! Who grants them an establishment, defrays their expenses, and discharges their debts?—Domestic questions, and arrangements among near relatives! What sort of relationship?—A husband whose wife's infidelity is punished with death;—a wife, whom to seduce is capital—a son and daughter, whose honour it is equally fatal to violate—a family, the heads of which it is death to talk about killing.—Feelings! Delicacies! Scruples! Are not the whole of these august personages sternly interdicted by law from knowing what these words mean, upon the very points where the hearts of all men are most tender? They may not love without leave from the Crown—or rather, they may devote their whole souls to the passion, but shall not gratify it unless the King in

council allows them. The King himself considers it as his duty to marry a Princess he has never seen, from mere regard to the welfare of his people, and the undisputed succession of the monarchy in the Protestant line. His design is promulgated in the Gazette—the pregnancy of his consort announced to the public—and his first-born actually brought forth, as the child of the nation, in a great assembly of prelates and officers of state. Finally, the relation of parent and child, in their instance alone, is utterly disregarded and annulled; and all the tender feelings that arise out of it, constantly and systematically set at nought. Such are the necessary consequences of their exalted rank, and the mighty public interests which are identified with their personal concerns; and such a part of the many sacrifices of private comfort and individual indulgence which are required of them, and for which their power and dignity are perhaps but an inadequate compensation. Yet this is the family of whose privacy we hear so much, whose concerns, how deeply soever interesting to the State, we are on no account to touch, for fear of rudely trespassing upon the feelings and the retirement of a domestic circle!—Really the absurdity of such pretences is too gross for serious argument.

That the Constitution entrusts large discretionary powers to the Sovereign, in the government of his family, so far from being a position contrary to the doctrines now maintained, is in reality an important part of them. He has this trust conferred upon him, as he has the higher trust of his crown, for the public benefit—and he must perform the duties of both, himself irresponsible, through known and responsible ministers. He is the Executive branch of the government; and to him alone belongs the power of making peace, war, and alliances. Why is he, rather than the whole Parliament, invested with such high discretion? Because, from the nature of the thing, it is believed that a single branch of the government, and that branch an individual, is better fitted to exercise the power. It is a power, however, to be exercised not for his private gain or sport, but for the public good, and through known agents answerable for their acts. In the same manner the Con-

stitution has given the Sovereign a high discretionary power over the concerns of the royal family, partly because this is manifestly a branch of Executive government—partly, no doubt, because he generally stands related to them by the ties of blood. The grounds of selection here are very similar to those upon which he was pointed out exercising discretion in the former case: The office is held in the same manner, as a trust for the State; he superintends the Royal family as he concludes a treaty, not for his private emolument, or the gratification of his individual caprices, but as delegated by the community to perform this office for the commonweal. If any one can for a moment doubt in what capacity the Sovereign here acts, the Royal Marriage Act, and the opinion of the Judges, at once decide the question. What is more a private and domestic concern than the care and marriage of a man's children under age? Yet the law, as laid down by the statute, and declared in the case, sets aside the authority of the natural *father*, nay excludes him from all voice in the matter, and transfers the whole power to the *King*. This is absolute demonstration that he receives, and is to exercise this power, not as a private and blood relation, but in his public capacity as Sovereign.

But though such be the quality in which the Sovereign exercises a superintending power over the Royal family, it is by no means to be contended, that, upon every light occasion, an inquiry should be encouraged into the manner of executing this high trust. Into the branches of the prerogative, it is not usual to examine, unless some ground is laid for the supposition that there has been maladministration: and perhaps, from the peculiar nature of the functions in question, a peculiarly strong ground should be required to justify either Parliament or the public in interfering. But that the attention of both should at all times be awake, and that every circumstance should be deemed fit for consideration which may bear upon such high public interests as are involved in the exercise of this power, must be manifest to all who have attended to the preceding observations. It may very possibly happen that a case should not be made out to justify public and formal pro-

ceedings against the advisers of the Crown, or even a rigorous inquiry into the discharge of the duty in question; but it never can be a sufficient answer to the complaints preferred, to deny the right of interference; to assert that the matter is private and not public; and to speak of the Royal House and its affairs, as of the domestic establishment of any private individual. On this, as on every other question respecting the exercise of the prerogative, it is the duty of Parliament to watch; always to entertain the matters propounded, as if abuse of power were possible, and further proceedings might be necessary; but only to adopt those further proceedings when their necessity is evinced by evidence sufficient to make it probable that the abuse exists.

Thus much may suffice for the present upon the general topics connected with this subject—topics eminently interesting to all who value the security of the government, and the tranquillity and happiness of the country. But we should be meanly declining the duties required of good citizens in arduous times, if we shrunk from going a step further, and indicating some of the matters to which it chiefly imports the community, that the principles now laid down should be applied. Once for all, we desire to be understood as casting no reflection upon any person whatsoever. We do not insinuate that guilt exists; and we hope and trust that there never will be room for such an insinuation: But we say, that circumstances require a vigilant and jealous attention. We complain not of what has been done, or omitted; but we assert, that the more alive the people are to their best interests, the less reason will they hereafter have for complaints of mismanagement or neglect. Without affirming that a discretion has been abused, we assert that large powers entrusted to men are liable to be misused; and the more so, when their exercise is withdrawn from the public eye. Without so much as insinuating that any sinister interests have in fact been suffered to stand in the way of right, we venture to remind the community, that watchfulness is doubly necessary, when right, unaccompanied by any power, is exposed to a collision with interests invested with the highest power.

We speak only the language of the Constitution. Why should we hesitate? There are precedents to bear us out; ay, down to the year before the last, and relative to the very persons now in supreme authority — precedents in which all squeamishness was sacrificed to a sense of duty. Why then should we scruple, from any motives of false delicacy, to speak out? When the Regency was arranged, it was not deemed fit to commit to the Illustrious Person at the head of the Government, the care of the King's person! Who ever thought of opposing this precaution, upon the ground that it was unhandsome or invidious towards the Prince; that it conveyed suspicions of the most atrocious kind; and such as no human being had ever harboured against him? It was enough that so tremendous a danger was in itself possible; and that the public was bound to guarantee such mighty interests against the most remote and unlikely hazards. We have in truth the highest of all authorities for vindicating the extraordinary scrupulousness manifested by the authors of the measure; for they were speedily received into the favour and confidence of the exalted Individual against whom their vigilant cares had so recently been directed.

The anxiety of the public has been more than once very strongly excited by the peculiar predicament in which the presumptive Heiress of the Crown is placed. Arrived at the years of womanhood, and liable at any day to be raised to the throne, without the least chance of any restrictions being imposed upon the exercise of her royal functions, it is natural for the people whom she will one day govern, to be anxious that her education should fit her betimes for those exalted duties which she will then have to perform. They ask, if she is permitted to associate with the world, to become acquainted with affairs, to learn the science of practical government, to engage in that which is "the proper study of mankind," but the peculiar qualification of their rulers. What answer is made to inquiries so natural? First, we are told, that all this is private matter—But to that we have already replied perhaps too much at large. Then it is said, in the same spirit, that a young woman ought not to go about, or be left too much to herself.

Does any man seriously believe that such nonsense can for an instant deceive or satisfy the inquirers? He must then be prepared to introduce the Salic law at once, which excludes females from the succession; though his reasons will be very different from those of the old lawgivers, for he must proceed on the mere fear of offending female delicacy, and running counter to a lady's habits. Such reasoners as this have no other alternative; for how can they bear even to think of a Queen Regnant's occupations? Are they aware that the "*young woman*" whom they would lock up because ordinary misses are sometimes so treated (at least one in ten thousand we believe may be so [1]), is doomed, by the condition of her birth, to overcome and disregard the delicacies which all other females are bound to observe, indulge, and cherish? Do they mean to say, that Courts Martial shall, in her reign, never be held, where the evidence may wound a female ear, because that evidence must be all reported to her? Or that no offences of a nature inconsistent with decency, shall ever be brought to trial, because it may be necessary to lay their details before the Supreme Dispenser of mercy? Really a single glance at the subject, is enough to demonstrate the extreme absurdity of confounding a personage so peculiarly circumstanced, with the common run of women, whose lot is cast in private stations, and who never can have any duties to discharge but those of wives and mothers.

But, perhaps the necessity of early appointing a Court and Establishment for the Heiress-presumptive is, in a constitutional view, still more apparent, when we consider the fitness of affording her defence and protection against risks, imaginary no doubt, as to the existing circumstances, but in the eye of the law necessarily regarded as possible. She, whose wellbeing stands in the way of many great interests, requires extraordinary protection; more especially if those interests appertain to powerful individuals. Again we deprecate all petulant misconstructions; we are far

[1] We doubt if more than this proportion in London can be found who, at almost nineteen years of age, never have been allowed to see a play!

indeed from insinuating that any danger exists: But remote impossibilities are to be contemplated in affairs of such paramount importance; and they who approved the excess of caution which refused to entrust a son with the care of his sick and aged parent, cannot surely be impatient of the reasonable objections which may arise to surrounding a defenceless niece with uncles who have regiments, ay and armies at their disposal. The man who dares not speak out upon this subject, would never, by the honest discharge of his duty to the Constitution, rather than the individual Monarch, have earned the high distinctions of Princely favour, which rewarded the framers of the Regency Act, as soon as the Illustrious Person whom, out of an extreme jealousy, it hampered in the most delicate particulars, succeeded to the pittance of authority conferred by it. He is not dealing fairly, we may be assured, who affects not to see in the peculiarly critical situation of the Illustrious Female, a more than ordinary occasion for separate establishment, household, office-bearers—in short every arrangement which can multiply checks and defences, by creating interests favourable to her protection, and bestowing on her the security which publicity alone can fully give:

In these circumstances, we are persuaded, no difference of sentiment can exist, upon the extreme impropriety of any arrangement which should carry this exalted Personage out of the country. Such a plan would be highly unconstitutional, and, we believe, it would be pregnant with danger to the tranquillity of the country. Upon this subject let a single remark suffice. Suppose her Royal Highness to be abroad, and incapable, from approaching confinement, to return at a moment's warning—But indeed it is enough to suppose her abroad. The Regent's decease, or illness, or going abroad, occasions a vacancy in the regency. We know that Parliament refused to provide beforehand, by a general law, for such an emergency: the reasons of this refusal we do not know, nor can they be easily conjectured; but a vacancy takes place: Is it not manifest that there will be an election of a person to fill it? that there will be competitors and conflicting claims?

We shall have the rightful heir absent, under circumstances likely to furnish arguments to those on the spot; the other competitors present, one with a family—perhaps the other with an army:—Can any man contemplate the bare possibility of such a contest without dismay? We are afraid of extending the right of voting for members of Parliament, for fear of multiplying Contested Elections; but what shall we say to a Contested Regency? In very truth, it would be as bad as an elective crown. Now it may be remarked, that the case, here put, imputes no criminal intent to the supposed competitors. The law, as declared by the precedents of 1788 and 1811, is, that no person has a strict right to the place; that the Heir-apparent, or presumptive, has a paramount claim (to use Mr. Pitt's distinction); but that the choice rests with the two Houses of Parliament. A principle borrowed from the anarchy of elective constitutions, is thus transplanted into our hereditary monarchy: it becomes us most sedulously to see, that it brings none of the evils along with it which so rankly infest the soil it came from. Parliament, by rejecting the proposal of a general prospective arrangement, and leaving each vacancy to be filled up in the confusion which it creates, has given up the best means of prevention that could be devised; but on this account it becomes the more indispensably necessary to guard against elective anarchy by all the means that are left: And surely the unfortunate state of things which those decisions of the Legislature have created, increases a thousandfold the dangers of such vacancies happening while the principal candidate, the person whose appointment alone can maintain the peace of the realm, is detained beyond the seas, and the field is occupied by powerful competitors. We have already observed, more than once, that in matters of such high concernment, it is the part of wisdom to provide against remote possibilities, following therein the example of the law, which is not satisfied with removing every solid reason that might tend to disturb the tranquillity of the realm, but seeks moreover to destroy all pretexts for discord,[1] as well aware, that in contentions of this nature,

[1] The Treason law affords a remarkable instance of this anxiety.

a pretence, and that not always the most plausible, may, when backed by force, have a fatal power to unsettle the public peace.

Having touched upon this subject, we cannot close the discussion without observing upon another intimately connected with it, the alliance by marriage with a foreign prince, which many persons have so much desired, that we may plainly perceive they had never attentively considered the subject. Such a connexion is in every view to be deprecated. Have we not had enough of continental family concerns? Must the interests of England be wedded to another part of Europe, and still more deeply entangled with its affairs? No one can doubt that this country has an interest in everything which passes on the Continent; and they know little of our real policy who would counsel us against maintaining, by every means, our connexions with the rest of Europe. But those connexions must be the result of our interest, and not the dictates of personal or family attachments, of which we have already had enough and to spare. Accidental circumstances promise speedily to put an end to these, at least, in the person of the next Sovereign: Would it not be the height of folly, if, instead of profiting by this good fortune, we were again to entangle ourselves in another quarter, where the difficulties must needs be infinitely more embarrassing?

We own that, in a domestic and constitutional point of view, the objections to such an alliance strike us as being yet stronger. It is repugnant to the whole spirit of our laws, and the analogies to be traced through their provisions, in a degree, perhaps, not always clearly perceived. If there is anything about which the English law is more scrupulous than another, it is the admission of foreigners to influence within the realm. An alien has scarcely more

It might have been enough to enact, that all the Queen Consort's children born in wedlock should be deemed legitimate. Indeed the common law makes them so: but because any suspicion cast upon their real parentage might be used as a pretence for setting them aside by a powerful pretender, extraordinary penalties are denounced against whatever may tend to excite this doubt, and to furnish such pretences.

existence, in its contemplation, than a person attainted or deceased. He can hold no lands, not even an acre, by himself, or by trustees, or in trust for others. He can enjoy no office of trust, from the place of Minister and Legislator down to the employment of a petty constable.[1] Even a denizen can hold no office;[2] nor can an alien naturalized:[3] and, to shut them out the more completely, it is not lawful to introduce a naturalization bill into Parliament, without a clause expressly disabling the party to hold any office.[4] Such is the law with respect to common persons, whose chances of ever holding high offices are indeed slender, and the probability still more remote of their using them against this country. But by an inconsistency somewhat startling, this rigorous spirit of exclusion wholly evaporates when a foreign Prince is to be naturalized, whose advancement to office is almost certain, and whose retaining a predilection for his own country can hardly be doubted: For the general rule is here suspended almost regularly; and the bill passes without the disabling clause. This deviation from the principle, however, is as nothing, compared with the inroad made upon it by the admission of an alien to the very highest station, one excepted, in the country; to the station which may give him all but the name of King, and most probably will give him many of the royal powers. That the law should be silent upon this point, is strange; but, since the settlement of the English government, no case has ever occurred where constitutional jealousy could be called upon to supply the defect; for Queen Anne was married some time before the Revolution,[5] when her succession was far from certain, —during a four years' intermission of Parliaments,—at a period the least favourable to liberty,—in a court the least jealous of foreign influence. We contend, however, that the whole spirit of the law and constitution, as now established, inculcates a repugnance, if not to any foreign match, at least to a match with a foreign Sovereign; who cannot fail

[1] It has been expressly decided to be a place of trust within the statute.

[2] 12 Will. III., c. 2. [3] Ibid. [4] 1 Geo. I., c. 4.

[5] In 1683.—There was no Parliament from March 1681 to 1685.

to have interests clashing with those of England, and who cannot possibly become English by obtaining a high station amongst us. It might be going too far, to attempt the dissolution of an alliance already formed, upon the succession unexpectedly opening. But when there is a question how the Presumptive Heiress shall contract this most important connexion, surely the time is opportune for bringing into view those constitutional principles, which are grounded in the uniform analogies of the law, and rest upon the soundest, as well as the most obvious, views of expediency.

In touching upon these topics we have avoided all details, and pressed as lightly as was possible, in order to avoid all unnecessary offence or irritation. We have omitted some subjects closely connected with the question, because there was no occasion at present for going more fully into it. Our object has been, to direct the attention of the country to a most momentous branch of state policy, insidiously attempted to be withdrawn from public discussion, and veiled from the eyes of the people, the parties most nearly interested in it, under the hollow pretext that it does not concern them at all. In truth, its importance can hardly be overrated. How the Crown shall be transmitted—whether peaceably, or through the storms of a contested succession:—by what manner of person it shall be worn—whether by one carefully prepared for its duties, or, as it were, purposely unfitted to discharge them,—are among the most interesting questions which can occupy the minds of a free people. They involve the contemplation of the worst evils felt in political society—a civil war, and an incapable ruler. Nor can we imagine a more signal service to his country, than that man renders, who contributes to save it from the infliction of those two unspeakable calamities.

DANGERS OF THE CONSTITUTION.

(SEPTEMBER, 1816.)

Reflections on the Progressive Decline of the British Empire, and on the Necessity of Public Reform. By H. SCHULTES. 8vo. London, 1816.

Liberty, Civil and Religious. By a Friend to Both. 8vo. London, 1815.

IT is a very constant practice with the advocates of existing abuses, to accuse those who would correct them, of political fanaticism;—and to this charge he is in an especial manner liable, who shows any jealousy of encroachments upon the Constitution. To what danger, it is asked, are the liberties of the people exposed? Who thinks of attacking them? Is it to be supposed that any minister will ever be bold enough to raise taxes by the army, or suffer a year to pass without calling Parliament together? or that he will rely upon a military force to obtain the sanction of the two Houses to his measures? Are there not besides, (the argument proceeds, in the nature of a compensation or set-off,) the courts of justice always open, where the subject may be secure of protection for his liberty, where royal influence is effectually excluded, and open violence never was used, even in the worst of times, by the most audacious ministers of tyranny or of usurpation? Besides, it is added, let the whole constituted authorities be ever so much inclined towards submission, through corruption or through fear, the public opinion will always keep them right:—the press is free; the people speak their minds openly; the Parliament is virtually under their control: And, finally, the members of that body, as well as of the army, being taken from among the classes of the community which

have the principal interest in preserving the purity of the system, the people never can be enslaved, till they choose to engage in a plot against their own liberties. Upon these grounds, the alarms excited by any particular measure in the minds of constitutional men, are treated with infinite contempt; they are termed vain, imaginary, or affected panics: whoever mentions them is set down at once as either factious or foolish, that is, an impostor or an enthusiast. All men of sound practical sense, we are told, know better than to regard such bugbears; and, whatever may be attempted or effected against any one branch of the Constitution, those sound men bid us look at all that is left untouched, and say whether he must not be a furious lover of freedom who does not admit that we have still liberty enough.

We regard the prevalence of this kind of reasoning (if the word may be so applied) as beyond all comparison the worst symptom of the times, and of the most fatal augury for the rights and the prosperity of the country. It evinces a degeneracy of political virtue and courage truly humiliating; it arises from the most sordid views, or the most effeminate habits; and as its existence a century, or even half a century ago, would have brought England to the state of slavery in which the rest of Europe is now hardly struggling, so its continuance for any length of time bids fair to naturalize amongst us, even now, the worst abuses of foreign despotisms. The topics to which those weak or corrupt declaimers against the true spirit of the Constitution appeal, are the more dangerous, because they wear the guise of plain matter of fact as opposed to theory; of moderation as contrasted with exaggeration; of something rational and solid instead of something fantastic and even ridiculous. Thus they easily enlist on their side that class whose influence is always so much beyond their numerical strength, the dealers in ridicule,—the lovers of satire and merriment, rather than truth,—a class composed of lazy, squeamish, effeminate spirits,—peculiarly formidable in a soft and luxurious age,—exercising an unbounded dominion over the frivolous and the timid, and almost ruling over what is termed "SOCIETY," by the same fear of a laugh, to

which for their punishment they are themselves absolutely enslaved. We consider it as a sacred duty, to stand forward at the present moment, in defiance of all this noise, this declamation, and derision—and to show how rational and solid the fears are, which the friends of their country entertain for its liberties in these times. It is the more necessary for us to do something of this sort, since views of foreign policy, and the recent dangers from that quarter, have lulled some of the stoutest advocates of the people, and set those against us "that should be ours." They have leagued themselves, though we trust but for a season, with the enemies of liberty, or the cold-blooded sycophants of a Court, who have not even feeling enough to hate, but are only indifferent to the rights of their fellow-subjects—the true foundation of the glory of their country.

It is an unfortunate thing, that the alarms excited by the French Revolution should for a while have silenced Mr. Burke and his partisans, upon all other constitutional questions except those immediately springing out of that great event. Their minds were filled with the contemplation of what they regarded as the paramount danger; and they could not stop to look at any other. Hence they were sometimes led to use expressions, casually indeed, and hastily, which were greedily caught up by the herd of vulgar politicians, whose interests, as well as what they call their principles, bind them to the defence of every abuse, and the ridicule and reprobation of all who plant themselves in the outworks of the Constitution, and defend, inch by inch, all its approaches. This servile tribe have thus contrived to borrow the authority of Mr. Burke for their bad cause, and to persuade the unthinking mass of mankind, that they act in concert with him, in their warfare against the rights of the people, and their mockery of the champions of the Constitution. Because he overlooked lesser points, in preventing what he deemed for the time the pre-eminent evil, he is to be cited as careless of all attacks upon popular rights. Because he thought anarchy the most pressing danger in his latter days, he is to be invoked as the patron saint of those who love despotism as convenient to their purposes, or congenial to their habits;

and the man who was, of all others perhaps that ever spoke or wrote upon political subjects, the most feelingly alive to everything like a constitutional principle, whose life was spent in struggles against encroachments hardly visible to the naked eye—in endeavouring to dissipate political disorders in their first stages, and while their symptoms were not yet discernible to the vulgar; he whose fault it was to magnify, if it be a fault, the importance of every movement, which, in any quarter, and with how little force soever, touches the fabric of the Government—is now held up as covering, with the authority of his great example, those whose doctrine it is, that nothing the Government can do is dangerous, short of turning the Parliament out of doors by grenadiers, and levying the taxes by the armed force of the Crown! If Mr. Burke were an authority for the revilers of constitutional jealousy, it would only destroy the weight of his name in all other matters, without affording the least support to such a course. But it is fit to have remarked, how unfairly he is called in by those impostors to their assistance.

There is perhaps no way of arriving more speedily at a view of the intimate connexion between the different parts of the English constitution, and of the imminent danger to which the safety of the whole fabric is exposed, by the injury of any part, than a plain consideration of what it is that forms the real security of our liberties—the principle that keeps the system in order. After all that we have seen of Parliaments, it would be a vain fancy to imagine, that the representation of the people is of itself a sufficient security for their rights. Even if that representation were much more perfect than it is, it would be liable to the influence of the Crown, and might be intimidated by violence. In fact, to what baseness has not the Parliament at one time or another made itself a party? The administration of justice, again, is no doubt singularly pure; and the Judges, from their habits of seclusion, are, generally speaking, little under the evil influence which a contact with the Court is apt to engender. Nevertheless, their leanings are almost always towards power; and if the Crown could safely tamper with them—if it could fully exercise the

discretion vested in it by law, of choosing them from among tools fit for wicked purposes—the distribution of justice might soon become as corrupt as the accomplishment of those purposes required.

Observe then the kind of defence for our liberties, which, by the letter of the law, we have in those great bulwarks of the Constitution, Parliament and the Courts of Law; see how the lawful authority of the Crown encroaches often upon them—how its indirect influence tends to sap them; and then say if it is by them that we keep our rights, or if they have not as great need of being maintained against attack, as the privileges which they are meant to protect. That the majority of the Parliament is steadily with the Crown, supporting all its ordinary measures, is admitted. That when a minister has been thus supported by it in all his measures, and happens to lose his place for pursuing those measures, he speedily loses the support of the very men who, the day before, backed him, is a matter of fact. That no proposition can be named much more absurd, than many which the Parliament has voted by a great plurality of voices, is equally the result of experience. Yet still we trust to this body with a very firm, and, we think, a reasonable reliance, that were the Crown to propose certain measures of an extremely violent, or a highly impolitic nature, it would reject them; nay that, even if the Crown could obtain its concurrence, the measures would remain unexecuted. Again, every one knows, that the Judges are chosen, generally speaking, from among barristers educated in long habits of connexion with the ruling powers; men accustomed to Crown employment, and whose opinions are those of the Government. But the Crown might also, by law, choose the basest of sycophants to fill this important station. They have their places, it is true, for life; but they have still promotion to expect for themselves, and favours to ask for their families,—if gratitude to their patrons were out of the question, and the servile habits or slavish opinions that recommended them to notice were forgotten with their elevation.

In the hands of parliamentary majorities so constituted, and of Judges so appointed, are our whole liberties placed

by law. Thus, for the protection of personal security, there is the Habeas Corpus Act: but those Judges must execute it; and if they expose themselves to its penalties, by refusing to give it effect, they themselves, (that is, some of their body,) have to interfere for the infliction of the punishment. If they refuse to inflict it, what remedy is there but a petition to, or a motion in Parliament? But the majority may reject the petition, and negative the motion; and thus the Constitution is virtually at an end, without any struggle or convulsion, or the least degree of apparent injury. All its outward parts and features remain untouched,—and yet the whole life and virtue has departed out of it. The letter has been preserved entire,—the spirit is gone. Now we are inquiring in what this spirit and this life consists:—*Wherefore* the sort of events now supposed strike us, when mentioned, as in the highest degree improbable:—*What* it is, in short, that secures the system against such attacks as we have alluded to, and in like manner against more direct and open invasions of power? —It is unquestionably the influence of public opinion, and the apprehension of resistance, intimately connected with it. As long as the proceedings of Parliament occupy the attention of the people, an effectual control is exerted over them; and the discussions in the two houses, how little soever they may seem to influence the votes, are engines of the highest power in controlling the executive through the public. As long as Judges sit in the face of the country, and, above all, in the face of an enlightened and jealous Bar, the most scrutinizing and unsparing of all auditories, the Crown can neither fill the Bench with its tools, nor can better instruments degenerate into that occupation. As long as all the proceedings of Government are public, canvassed freely by the press, and made known through that and other channels of information; and as long as there is reason to believe that gross misrule will engender resistance,—a corrupt Judicature and a venal Parliament may in vain combine with a despotic court, in defiance of public opinion. Tyranny will dread going beyond a certain length, and this fear will supersede the necessity of applying the ultimate check.

This sacred principle of Resistance is the very foundation of all our liberties; it is the cause to which we owe them:—Let it only be destroyed, and they are gone. Mr. Fox is represented to have said, that it should always be held up to the Government, as possible; to the people, as impossible. We suspect there must be some mistake in this statement of his opinion; or that if he used such an expression, it was only an epigrammatic manner of hinting, what had better have been at once plainly told, that the people should not be reminded of resistance, as long as their rulers kept the possibility of it before their eyes. In no other sense is the proposition at all correct. By rulers, however, in this remark, are to be understood not merely the executive government but all the constituted authorities, through whose means the despotic designs of the Crown may be carried into effect. As long as Parliament and the Courts of Law are retained in the line of their duty by the force of public opinion, no necessity ever can arise for bringing the Crown and the People into immediate conflict. This, indeed, is the great use of such institutions; and it is thus only that they may be called bulwarks to our liberties. They enable us to make head against oppression, not merely with advantage, but at a distance from the danger, and without coming to close quarters; they form the grand distinction between regular and despotic forms of government, precisely because they perform this function. By means of them it is, that public opinion operates by its preventive influence, and renders it unnecessary to employ force; by their means, the Crown with us is either deterred from attempting an oppressive measure, or is foiled in the attempt, peaceably and harmlessly; while, in an absolute monarchy, it would probably have persisted in the same course, until a rebellion overthrew the dynasty; or the immediate dread of it, in the courtiers, worked the destruction of the reigning prince.

The great security of the Constitution, then, being the vigilance of public opinion, and the possibility of resistance, every encroachment upon the rights of the people, how trifling soever in itself,—every act of power in any the least degree contrary to the Constitution, is to be regarded

not merely as injurious in itself, but as undermining the stability of the whole system: For it is manifest, that every such act, if acquiesced in by the community, accustoms the public mind to submission; destroys that integrity of feeling, which alone can render the people capable of defending their privileges; and lulls that spirit of independence, which, to be effectual for resistance in a time of need, must be jealous and watchful at all times. The success of the attempt, in an equal proportion increases the confidence of the opposite party, and prepares him for new aggressions. Thus, we have to consider, each time that an unconstitutional measure is proposed, the four points of view in which it is dangerous. It is injurious in itself, more or less, to the happiness or well-being of the people;—it arms the Government with a certain portion of new power, positively and directly;—it encourages further attempts against liberty, by the experience of impunity and success;—and it breaks the independent feeling of the people, habituating them to defeat, and preparing them for new submissions. Let us consider these particular heads a little more closely, in their order.

Nothing can be more false, or more dangerous, than the idea, that any one act of violence, or even of misgovernment, is unimportant in itself. Although no indirect consequences were ever to ensue, each proceeding of this description is most material; it is a serious evil. Indeed, if it were merely indifferent, that would only be a sufficient argument against it; a conclusive reason for making no change. But can any act of misgovernment be indifferent? Connected as all the parts of every political system are together, who shall say that an injury to one of them may not reach all the rest? The notion, that because an abuse or oppression of any kind is not as great as might be imagined, therefore it is inconsiderable—is founded upon the supposition that the people have no right to complain, unless they are governed extremely ill; whereas they have a right to be governed as well as possible: they are entitled to complain of every deviation from this straight line; and they are only blameable when they attempt to correct errors, or repress encroachments, by acts of violence which

might lead to greater evils than those they wish to redress. Let it only be considered, that the well-being of a people is made up of various parts; and that, to make them completely miserable, it is only necessary to injure each part in detail. Let it also be remembered, that the evils arising from any even of the less important abuses, cannot be equally distributed over the community, but will necessarily press most heavily upon some parts, and upon some with a weight wholly destructive—while many may altogether escape. Now, the severe pressure of any evil upon a very small number of persons, is a very great mischief, although the rest of the people may go free; for no principle can be conceived more absurd in itself, and in its consequences more dangerous, than that of balancing the enjoyment of one class against the sufferings of another; and disregarding the amount of a calamity, by attending to the numbers who escape.

Again: it is difficult to imagine any encroachment upon the Constitution, which does not arm the Government with new powers; and consequently render the next step more easy than the last. An objection, we shall suppose, is made to an increase of the army; the answer is, only a few thousand men are to be added. The reply is easy: This addition makes the executive more strong; increases its influence sensibly, as well as its force; and renders a new aggression upon our rights, by steps regularly and formally taken, or by open violence, more easy, by means of this new influence and this new force. Has an individual been overwhelmed by oppression? Beside the fear which the example holds out to others, a zealous adversary has at least been removed.

The accession of spirit and audacity which such steps, how small soever, successively give to those who are plotting against liberty, is equally obvious. There is no greater danger than letting the enemies of freedom know their own strength. It is a lesson, however, which nothing but experience ever teaches. They are naturally timid, and see very little way before them. To understand that they can advance safely, they must feel it; and, in civilized countries especially, and in modern times, they proceed slowly and

systematically. Despotism is now grown old and wary. It has learnt how alone the people may safely be overcome: and its maxims, the result of long observation, are well worth our attention. One is, to change things without changing names—that something may be gained by surprise, and the vigilance of the enemy be evaded:—Another is, to be perpetually moving forwards, however slowly and silently:—A third, to choose the time when the attempt is the least expected. But the grand and ruling principle is to risk nothing—to go by steps—and never to move one foot until the other is safely planted. In the nature of things an encroaching government can never know its own strength beforehand; for that depends exactly upon what the people will submit to. If then the attempt at gaining a small accession succeeds, it knows that so far the people are ready to yield; and this knowledge, by encouraging it to aim at somewhat more, frequently enables it to obtain it.

But the most fatal effect of the encroachment is, its injury to the public spirit. When a man has once suffered himself to bear dishonour in anything, it is in vain to expect any resistance afterwards. He is no longer the same being, and his sense of honour is gone entirely. Therefore, we never talk of anything as *a slight insult.* It is an insult, and that is enough. Thus, too, an army once beaten and disgraced, is destroyed; nothing but some violent change, which alters its whole composition, can ever restore its feeling of confidence, and the courage which, if it does not command success, at least deserves it. The people is to the full as much changed by the act of submission: They are not the same beings the day after they have submitted to an encroachment of power. Their pride is gone—their honour tarnished. They are prepared for new encroachments by the recollection of the past. "They will not make a stand now, because it is not worth the struggle, after having given up the first point: Had the matter been new, indeed, it might have been otherwise; but it is a trifle, after the ice is once broken, and the first step has been made." Such are the feelings implanted in the minds of the community by the beginning of submission; and so,

while the Government is encouraged to proceed, the people is disheartened, and acquires the habit of yielding. It may truly be said, that they alone can make their own chains; and every new lesson of submission learnt, is a new link forged, be the subject-matter of the lesson ever so inconsiderable in itself.

To illustrate these different effects of an encroachment upon the Constitution;—let us suppose the question to be raised, by the Government acquiring an accession of force or revenue without the consent of Parliament. This is not a vain or imaginary case. As far as money at least goes, the Crown has, by the course of hostilities, come frequently into possession of large sums never voted nor appropriated by the House of Commons. We may therefore take the actual case of the Droits of Admiralty, and mark the progress of this question. It was first objected, that the Crown, according to the spirit of the Constitution, should owe every part of its resources to the grants of the Commons, and that this was a sacred and inviolable principle; that the deviations from it in former times, were no authority against its force, inasmuch as the ordinary revenue was then comparatively small, and the perquisites of war were understood to go in defraying its expenses, the system of parliamentary appropriation being irregularly established. It was therefore contended, that the Droits should go into the public treasury, with the other branches of revenue, and be under parliamentary control. The influence of the Crown, however, prevailed against these arguments; and those funds were retained as a separate and independent patrimony,—it being, however, distinctly admitted, that some regulation should be made respecting them when a new arrangement of the Civil List became necessary.

This happened in 1812. We regard it as an encroachment upon the Constitution, and we are now to observe how it operated. *First*, it was in itself so much money taken from the people: for, whatever part of it did not go to the expenses of the war, might have set free an equal amount of taxes; and such part of it as was spent in war, was, of course, much more extravagantly and carelessly spent, than if it had been voted by Parliament. The taxes

rendered necessary by this diversion or misapplication of the fund, would not perhaps have been a very great burthen on each individual, if distributed over the whole community equally; that is, according to the means of each person called upon to contribute. But they must have fallen unequally; perhaps most heavily upon the poorer classes. If they fell on articles only consumed by those classes, they alone bore the burthen:—at all events, they produced, it is almost certain, great misery to some individuals in particular branches of employment, and in all probability ruined entirely several persons. *Secondly*, the expenditure of this fund by the Crown directly increased its power, by gratifying many persons of considerable weight in the community, who, with their connexions, became the more dependent upon the Court. Many voices were thus gained at elections; many advocates for bad measures, in private society; perhaps some votes in Parliament upon delicate questions. If the captain of a vessel who had been favoured to the amount of several thousand pounds, either as a compensation for the loss of prize money, or to repay him for a loss that might have ruined him, were asked to support Government at an election, or to make his relative abstain from voting in Parliament on an important occasion, where he was likely to decide the question against the Court, it is highly probable that the application would prove successful: And the question might very likely affect the rights of the people in a tender point. *Thirdly*, the Government having gained the point respecting the Droits, saw that there was an end of the extreme delicacy about such irregular and peculiar sources of revenue, and felt that the people would yield, upon this, as upon less ticklish questions: It therefore was encouraged to try a further encroachment. And as the people, in the *fourth* and *last* place, no longer felt that it was a new attempt, or that they were for the first time called upon to make a struggle upon the matter, they were disposed to yield, as they had done before, only with much less unwillingness and alarm.

Accordingly, the event has already happened: And two several encroachments have grown out of the first, within

four years, beside a kind of abuse which may well be reckoned a third encroachment. In the last campaign, the Crown has, beside the usual perquisites of Admiralty, used the military resources of the country, in war and in negotiations, to obtain terms advantageous to itself, in a pecuniary point of view. We speak not merely of the accessions gained for Hanover, which are clearly owing to the military exertions of England, and not at all in proportion to those of Hanover itself; but we speak of the large sums secured to the Crown by the treaty, out of the booty taken from France, and over which, it has since been contended, and successfully contended, that Parliament has no control: And thus, from having the right to appropriate all captures made before proclamation of war, and some others of a similar kind, the Crown has advanced to a new position; and been suffered to assert a right (and to maintain it successfully, in the face of Parliament) to use the military power of the country for its private aggrandisement, calling upon Parliament to support the expenses of the war, and withdrawing from parliamentary control, and from all participation, the whole profits of the victory.

Again, a new arrangement of the Civil List became necessary last session; and the promise of Mr. Perceval was expected to be fulfilled, viz., that those irregular funds should at length be placed under the control of the Legislature. But various pretexts were found to evade the fulfilment; and, the country having allowed the question to be put off in 1812, in expectation of this arrangement, in 1816 it was not thought going much farther to let it lie over until a demise of the Crown—when, in all human probability, it will be again put off, or, in other words, the separate rights of the Crown will be admitted in their utmost extent.

Lastly, the knowledge that money so obtained could be applied without parliamentary control, encouraged the Court to deal freely with the fund. Largesses were made to some branches of the Royal family, for entertaining foreign princes; and large sums were applied to aid the deficiency in the Civil List; that is, an immense expen-

diture was undertaken, beyond what Parliament had sanctioned as fit for the maintenance of the Royal dignity; and this extravagance was owing entirely to the knowledge that those peculiar funds could support it.

We have already remarked, that the enemies of liberty generally choose their time well; availing themselves of some peculiarly favourable combination of circumstances, to give it a blow. Unexpectedly they make an encroachment, greater in reality than in name, while the alarm of foreign danger, or internal confusion, secures them an extraordinary degree of support. A consequence then follows, deserving all our attention. Soon after this point is gained, another occasion presents itself, when some new, but less considerable inroad, is to be made upon the Constitution. The argument for it is at hand—"This is nothing, compared with what was done before without objection;"—and unhappily it is a consideration which reconciles too many thoughtless persons to the fresh invasion of their rights. How many things have been submitted to of late years without a murmur, almost without a remark, only because, during the times of terror, so many more shameful violations of the Constitution were committed! It is exactly in the same manner that our system of expenditure has become so extravagant. For years, we have talked of tens, and almost of hundreds of millions, until thousands of pounds excite no attention. After spending above one hundred and twenty millions in a year, we cannot stop to consider whether a particular branch of service shall cost five hundred thousand pounds, or six. Nor shall we ever be awakened to a just sense of the value of money, until a deficit in the ways and means shall force it upon us.

This topic leads us to observe, that although we regard constitutional questions, questions touching only the rights of the people, as much more important than any others, yet there are few of them which have not a very direct connexion with the class of questions at all times interesting, even to the most common herd of political reasoners —questions of money. The increased power of the Crown has led, by a straight and short road, to increased burthens upon the people. We are asked, who it is that can be

supposed an enemy of liberty in the abstract? We answer, there are probably none such: But there are very many who hate it because it stands in their way, and obstructs the attainment of objects which they vehemently desire. The expenditure of a large revenue is at once the favourite object of all absolute governments, and the most effectual engine of their power. Let us only observe, to be convinced of this, how profitable, in point of money, all the encroachments on the rights of the subject have proved; that is, how fertile in taxes and expenditure. When Mr. Pitt sent a subsidy to Germany, during the sitting of Parliament, without its authority, and the body whom he had thus trampled upon almost thanked him for the insult, it was vain to expect any resistance to any expenditure in further loans and gifts, which he might propose in the regular way. Parliament and the people were too well pleased that the violence was not repeated, to think of criticising the prodigality. The system of alarm in general, by means of which he carried on a war against the people, enabled him to consume hundreds of millions in the war against the enemy. Blind confidence in the Government became the prevailing maxim; and, contrary to every principle of the Constitution, Parliament, from year to year, entrusted the minister with a discretionary power of spending vast sums during the recess, in services never once mentioned during the session. At length, the *yearly vote of credit* became, as the name implies, a matter of course, until it actually reached the sum of six millions. To oppose such dangerous grants, would have been deemed hardly loyal; in fact, no real opposition was ever offered to them:—and thus it became a part of the ordinary administration of affairs, to entrust the ministry for half the year with the absolute disposal of sums equal to what could be wanted for any purpose which despotism or extravagance might desire to accomplish. The Government was of course satisfied with the latter; and only indirectly obtained, by the expenditure, an extension of its authority. But no man can entertain a doubt, that to this practice was owing much of the boundless expense for which we are now so sorely smarting, and of those confirmed habits of squander-

ing, which not even the total want of means appears capable of reforming.

Other deviations from the Constitution, leading again to new waste of money, have sprung occasionally out of these habits. A treaty was made with Russia to maintain her fleet during the time it took refuge in our ports; and this arrangement never was communicated to Parliament. When, however, the money was wanted, a slight mention of the bargain was made in the estimates; and thus it was brought to light. Half a million was thus promised in secret, when there was no earthly reason for concealment, except the chance of Parliament disapproving the agreement, and preventing its fulfilment. The same secrecy was therefore preserved until after the money had been actually spent in this service; and then Parliament was asked to replace it. Can any man entertain a doubt, that the removal, or weakening of every check upon expenditure, must always augment its amount? Can any man deny, that all such deviations from the Constitution are paid for by the people, first in loss of liberty, afterwards in taxes?

But it is not only by encroachments of a nature immediately connected with the revenue, that the property of the subject suffers along with his privileges. Other infringements of the Constitution are, somewhat less directly, but very certainly, attended with similar consequences. It is no small objection to a great military establishment, that the expense of it is extremely burthensome. All patronage is, by the nature of the thing, costly to the people; and the more the Crown is enabled to abuse it, by the uncontrolled power of bestowing it, the more likely is the country to be ill served, that is, to pay for services not rendered. Every interference of the Government with the commerce of the country, is directly prejudicial to its riches; and all powers of giving undue preference to one class of men over another, are substantially powers to drain or to stop up the sources of public wealth. The remembrance is still fresh of the evils produced by those unconstitutional measures pursued some years ago with respect to trade. Not only by the illegal interruption of commerce with neutrals, but by the equally illegal use of belligerent

rights to the profit of some individuals, and the loss of many more, the trade of the country suffered a shock unparalleled in its history. In short, it would be difficult to point out a single deviation from constitutional principles which has not been followed by a serious loss of property to the people.

In another light, however, this connexion between the two classes of oppression appears still more plainly. Whatever multiplies the chances of misgovernment, increases the risk of prodigality, and of errors—of great burthens upon the people, and great injury to their private affairs. Every step, therefore, which the Crown makes towards independence, inasmuch as it removes the only effectual check upon maladministration, is a step made towards increased public expense and individual loss. It is a step made or suffered by the people towards the surrender of all control over their own affairs, and consequently over their money matters. How little soever, then, the particular question may seem to be connected with finance, if it relates to the power of the Crown and the rights of the subject, it must be viewed as ultimately resolving itself into a question of taxes. Money is not more certainly the sinew of war, than it is at once the sinew and the food of absolute power. To domineer, and not to tax, is impossible. As often as our rights are invaded in any quarter, let us only ask if the power of the Crown will not, upon the whole, be something the greater for the change? If so, then, we know that, sooner or later, we shall have to pay for it in money; and those who are only to be moved by such considerations, should therefore defend their liberty for the sake of their purse. A frugal man never undervalues small savings. His maxim on the contrary is, to take care of the pence, and leave the pounds to take care of themselves. To undertake anything needless because it costs only a trifle, or even to indulge in what is pleasant because it is only a little beyond what he can afford, he considers as the road to ruin. In like manner, if we are a frugal nation, and would avoid paying our all in taxes, we must estimate every loss of liberty in money, and never reckon any the smallest accession to the influence of the Crown as of little cost.

We may be well assured that it can make no progress but at our great expense. Each step brings it nearer our pockets. They whom no higher feelings can touch, may thus learn to dread absolute power for its rapacity. Let them remember, that the rod of iron picks all locks; and they may begin to think their rights worth defending.

It is a very common thing to say, for the purpose, no doubt, of lulling that watchful jealousy in the people upon which everything dear to them depends, that the lawful guardians of their rights is the Parliament, and that every struggle in their defence must be made there. "To leave things to our representatives," is therefore held out as at once the most safe and the most efficacious method that can be pursued, for the protection of the Constitution. We have already shown the absurdity of such a doctrine: But let us also observe, that it is inculcated without the least good faith; for the very persons who profess it, are those most ready, upon all occasions, *in Parliament*, to cry down the efforts made against the encroachments of the Executive; and to treat every one as a wild enthusiast or a factious alarmist, who would guard against the dangers of absolute power. Thus, while they bid the people trust to Parliament, they do their best to prevent Parliament from proving itself trustworthy. But when they come to argue upon the safety of the Constitution, and attempt to prove the fears of its real friends chimerical, they show a degree of perverseness and self-contradiction, which would be pleasant, were its consequences not so pregnant with mischief, and its success often too melancholy, even with persons of fair understanding.

First, they urge that it is in vain to talk of the Constitution being in jeopardy, as long as the people are enlightened, and the press free; and they cite the progress of popular information and discussion, as an ample security against any little increase to the power of the Crown. It is incredible, they assert, that in such a state of things, any considerable invasion of our liberties should be attempted; and impossible that it should succeed. Once more, let the extreme bad faith of this kind of argument be observed, when compared with the language held to the

people out of doors. To the people these men say, "Be quiet; the Constitution is safe in the hands of the Parliament." In the Parliament they hold all idea of danger to the Constitution infinitely cheap, "because it is safe in the keeping of the people!" When the advocates of the Slave Trade denied the right of Parliament to abolish it, and said that this measure might safely be left to the Colonial Legislatures, professing all the while, that they were most friendly to it, and only wished to see it undertaken in the right place; some simple persons were extremely surprised to find the same individuals in their places, as Colonial representatives, oppose the abolition upon its own merits; and this conduct used to be reckoned the height of bad faith. But it is not quite so intolerable as the mode of proceeding which we are at present considering; for, at any rate, the slave traders did not first tell the Mother-country that the question should be left to the Islands, and then bid the Islands leave it to the Mother-country. This sort of argument, this *alibi* sophism (as Mr. Bentham would term it), is peculiar to the advocates of abuse and corruption; and it is the weapon they most constantly and most successfully employ.—Thus, they tell us perpetually, that the press is free; and therefore any given constitutional question signifies little; that is, we are desired to tolerate an encroachment upon our rights, because we possess, in some other quarter, a means of defending them against encroachment; and, of course, against the one proposed, as well as others. This would be but a sorry argument, taken by itself. But how do the same persons treat any encroachment on the liberty of the press? Exactly in the way now described;—they laugh, or affect to laugh at such fears; and assure us, that while we have trial by jury, all is safe. Then, if we complain that there are abuses in the management of special juries—that the same panel is constantly recurred to from the small number of names in the freeholders' books—that persons in office, and intimately connected with Government, even in the collection of the revenue, are often called upon to try questions respecting the Government—that the advantage of being summoned on Exchequer trials operates as a douceur to special jurors

in their other duties—that the whole system of special juries in Criminal, but especially in State trials, is vicious and dangerous to liberty;—we are again treated as enthusiasts and alarmists, and are asked, if we really think there can be any danger, so long as the Judges are pure, and the Bar jealous? If a political jobber happens to be made a Judge, from Court favour or ministerial services—if he is seen assiduous at the levee, and observed to treat that very Bar according to the cast of its political principles, still there is no danger, Parliament may impeach him.[1] And, as soon as a remark upon his conduct is offered in Parliament, we are once more bandied back to the bulwarks of liberty—the inestimable privileges of a free press, and public discussion, and trial by jury.

But the grand topic of the Quietists, of whom we are speaking, is Parliament. To think of danger to our liberties, while the business of Government is regularly carried on in that great public body, and no minister ever dreams of dispensing with its services, is represented as the extreme of folly. Now, we admit that we have no fear of seeing Parliaments disused, and still less of seeing them put down by violent means. He must be a clumsy tyrant who should think, at the present day, of employing his influence or his troops in this way. If, indeed, inroads should be made time after time upon the Constitution, and acquiesced in under the vain idea, that the stand might be made when it became a matter of the last necessity; if, at length, the Parliament were found steadily to support the privileges of the subject, and its repeated dissolution only identified it the more with the people; it would probably be found, that some violence might safely be attempted against its privileges, by means of those weapons which its long habits of criminal compliance had put into the hands of the Crown. But, for the present, the danger arises from the Parliament itself, identified, as it is too apt to be, with the Executive,

[1] It is necessary, from the course of the argument, to state, that the case put here (and in other places) is merely one of supposition; and that, so far from having any application to recent proceedings in Parliament, we deem the attempts there made to rescind a judicial determination to have been hurtful to the cause of the Constitution.

rather than with its constituents. The Court party have long since discovered, that by far the easiest and safest means of stretching their power is through the medium of a compliant Parliament. To gain this body to their interests, and to prevent every reform which may more closely connect it with the people, is, accordingly, the great secret of acquiring a power dangerous to the Constitution. They may, perchance, be now and then thwarted by the House of Commons; but they forget and forgive readily—trusting to an early mark of favour from the representative body, and unwilling to quarrel with it while so much may still be effected by its assistance. Nor will they ever break so useful a correspondence, and quarrel with such an ally, until its services are no longer worth having, and until they may safely be dispensed with. But it is for the people always to bear in mind, that the Government, that is, the Executive, acting in concert with the other branches of the Legislature, may attempt measures hostile to their rights; and that it is therefore necessary to keep in their own hands the security for the Parliament always proving a real check upon the Crown.

The uses of parliamentary government, of ruling in concert with the House of Commons, are indeed prodigious to the Sovereign. We have noted the ease and safety of this method of stretching the executive power; but, beside this advantage, it confers a kind of authority, and obtains resources from the country, wholly unknown in any other system of polity. No absolute monarch can call forth the means of a nation as our Parliament has done. To say nothing of the men raised, and the sums borrowed, we have paid between sixty and seventy millions in twelve months, and this for a length of years together. The utmost feats of finance in despotic countries are a jest, compared with this; and this is only practicable by means of a Parliament. The people feel a sort of connexion with that body, how unequally soever the elective franchise is distributed. They are allowed to see from day to day all the details of its proceedings. They follow every tax proposed, from the first mention of it to the ultimate decision upon its merits. They petition, and the door is opened wide to their repre-

sentations; their prayers are civilly, even respectfully treated; many highly palatable things are said on all sides; there is a hope of final success held out; the petition is meanwhile solemnly conveyed to its long home, accompanied by a flattering attendance of friends; the affecting service is performed over it by the proper officers; and it is decently laid upon the table, to repose among its distinguished predecessors, who were equally useful in their generation. Were the House of Commons emptied, or, which would exactly amount to the same thing, were it shut up, so that the people knew nothing of what passed within its walls, and only saw a long ugly building, with many doors and windows, where a secret manufactory of taxes was carried on, there would very speedily be an end of the vast contributions hitherto paid to the services of the State. It may further be observed, that even Parliament, with all its means of taxing, has only been able to raise the revenue now paid, by adopting the principle of gradual increase; laying on straw by straw upon the people's back, until at length they find it breaking, without knowing when the burthen began to be unbearable:—A new illustration, to show the necessity of making an early stand, and never suffering ourselves to be lulled with the phrases —"It is a mere trifle."—"What can it signify?"—"We have borne worse, and survived it."—"It is not worth the trouble of resisting."

The struggles which have been recently made, and with signal success, have been almost all against public burthens. The people, by a resolute determination to obtain justice, shook off a load of above seventeen millions a-year of war taxes, which the Crown would fain have made perpetual.[1] The successful issue of this great contest ought for ever to teach them a lesson of their strength. But it would be well if the same vigour were shown in resisting the smaller impositions. Great attempts to pillage the country are not very likely to succeed; but when the Government goes on by its favourite rule of gradual and insensible progression, it only takes longer time, and gains ultimately the same

[1] Defeat of the income-tax in March, 1816, followed by the abandonment of the war malt-tax.

end. Had we been awake to our true interests, while the burthens were accumulating, we never should have had to fight that arduous battle, and our means would not have been left in their present state of exhaustion. It should be steadily kept in view, that a financier never is so dangerous as when he proposes a tax which seems not to touch any one sensibly—which raises some commodity by a sum almost lower than any known currency; and therefore such taxes ought, if objectionable in themselves, or if not absolutely necessary (which is indeed the greatest of all objections), to be as strenuously resisted as if they at once cut off a tenth of our income, or subjected our heads to a tribute.

But, independent of pecuniary considerations, we would fain hope that the love of our Constitution, the attachment to those inestimable privileges which so nobly distinguish us among all the nations of Europe, and to which the enjoyment of every baser possession is also owing, would be a sufficient motive to keep alive the jealousy of Royal encroachment, so absolutely essential to the conservation of liberty. Confidence in our rulers, whether arising from supineness, or timidity, or personal predilection, is as foolish as it is unworthy of a free people. The task, indeed, which a Sovereign is called to execute, is the noblest which the mind can imagine—the security by one man's pains of a people's happiness, and, it may be, at the expense of his own. But it is also the most difficult of all offices to perform; and we may rest assured that he will be but too apt to exchange it for another, which, as it is the very easiest, is also the basest of employments—the sacrifice of all a nation's interests to his own. The mechanism, even of our excellent Government, furnishes him with but too many engines for the accomplishment of this object; nor can anything effectually check his operations, but the perpetual jealousy of the people, within and without Parliament, in discerning and repressing even the smallest of his encroachments.

Peace is once more restored. At home and abroad we are in profound repose. We have gone through many perils, and submitted to many sacrifices; and we please

ourselves in the hope, that we are sitting, for a length of time, secure under the shadow of our victories.—Now then that the struggle is ended, and the battle won; let us, instead of crouching before domestic oppressors, bethink us, in good earnest, of repairing, in that Constitution which our triumphs have saved, the breaches which the struggle itself has occasioned.

ALARMS OF SEDITION.

(MARCH, 1817.)

Speech of the Right Honourable George Canning in the House of Commons, on Wednesday, January 29th, 1817, *on the Motion for an Address to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, on his most gracious Speech from the Throne.* Accurately taken in Short-hand, and containing all the Passages which were omitted in the Daily Papers. London, Hatchard. 1817.

WE do not purpose to call the attention of our readers to this Speech upon the score of its literary merits: nothing being, in our opinion, more unfair than to judge of any oration by the reports of it given in the daily papers, or even by those more ample, but equally incorrect representations, which frequently appear under the name of short-hand accounts separately published. Unless, therefore, we have some reasonable assurance that the orator himself corrected the report, we do not feel ourselves at liberty, by commenting upon it, to make him answerable for words, or even for arguments, thus put into his mouth. The publication before us we should have considered, from internal evidence, as proceeding from Mr. Canning himself, had we not been informed, by the title-page, that it is given from a short-hand writer's notes, and still more by the motto, which can only be meant to negative the speaker's having published it,—"*Sit mihi fas audita loqui.*" The truth may possibly be, that he did correct some passages, and that the rest were reported in the usual way. In this state of uncertainty we shall abstain from viewing the work critically, any further than to say that the body of the speech, relating to the question itself, is by no means successful; and that the concluding part, in which the subject-

matter of debate is kept out of view, and an elaborate attack upon Reform is introduced for the purpose of creating alarm, possesses very great merit as a piece of declamation. It is quite clear from this specimen, and from what is known of Mr. Canning's former speeches of a more argumentative nature, particularly his admirable ones upon the Bullion question, that were his taste a little more chastened; were he less solicitous about turning sentences, and doing always, what he certainly does well, indulging in rich and even gaudy diction; were he to apply his mind more to the *business parts of speech*, if we may so speak, and not hurry through these as well as he can, in order to reach the passages of effect, that is of effect with the vulgar, he would become a much better speaker than he has yet shown himself. We are very far indeed from underrating his present importance and merits; they are very great in the line of rhetoric he has chosen; but we mean that he might, if he pleased, be a speaker of a higher order—perhaps we should say of the highest—for we know not that there is any intermediate class between that to which he belongs and the highest of all. It should seem, however, as if he were afraid of incurring the censures bestowed by the illustrious Roman upon the Attic style, or rather the excess and caricature of the Attic; as if he dreaded a dry, jejune manner of speech—a "*tenue genus dicendi*." But he ought to reflect that Cicero himself has exhibited the purest models of abstinence and simplicity, if he has not attained the mingled plainness, elegance, and strength of the Father of eloquence; and that the extreme of the Attic is far better adapted to modern times, than even a slight degree of the Asiatic, towards which (as far as we can judge of it) the ornate and self-indulgent style we are speaking of must be allowed to approach—a style which, if it does not wholly consist in the imagery and diction, consists much more in these than in argumentation.[1] We throw out this single remark with

[1] We shall be glad of an opportunity to discuss a subject which has never been examined with attention by any writer at all qualified to undertake the task—we mean the qualities of modern eloquence, more especially that of the Senate. The oratory of the

no unfriendly meaning; and shall only add, that we should be glad of a better opportunity of recurring to the subject, and handling it more at large, and that we should at present have said nothing critically, for the reason already assigned, had we not been apprehensive that passing over the merits of the composition before us might have been construed into a want of the respect which we very unfeignedly entertain for the talents and accomplishments of Mr. Canning,—however widely we may differ with him in principles, and how deeply soever we may lament the political life by which, more especially in the later periods of it, he has chosen to throw so many endowments and advantages almost entirely away, with a view to the first objects of every considerable man's ambition.

It is not then as a matter of critical disquisition, nor with any reference to the individual, that we are now induced to notice the Speech before us. But we observe by the price, the time of publication, the careful advertising, and many other symptoms pretty well known in these times, that this tract is intended to aid the Ministers in sounding an alarm over the country; and for this reason we deem it peculiarly worthy of attention. They seem to be circulating it as they used to do very superior productions in other times; and, forgetting at once the difference in the circumstances, and in the instruments they have to work with, they appear to expect that by such means they can revive the golden days when all jobs were sheltered, and all opposition disarmed, if not silenced, by the cry of

ancients has been studied and explained by their own critics, and, after them, by those of modern times: but when our writers upon Rhetoric come to descant upon modern eloquence, they are singularly deficient. The rules laid down are chiefly drawn from the ancient critics, who were of necessity entirely ignorant of what is meant by "*debating*;" and when they speak of the modern eloquence of the Senate, they plainly show that they never heard, probably never read, a single parliamentary speech. They think, it is true, that they have read speeches; and they suppose that Lord Chatham spoke what every one knows was written almost from fancy by Johnson, in his own very peculiar style. But even if they had read an accurate account of parliamentary debates, the probability is, that men writing in their closets upon such a subject would fall into constant blunders. The extreme confidence of these authors forms an amazing contrast with their entire ignorance.

danger to the Church and the State from Jacobin principles and French philosophy. The Reports of the Secret Committees have been amply discussed in Parliament; and we hardly feel at liberty to inquire formally into the merits of performances sanctioned by such high authority, further than to express our belief that they have failed signally in producing the effects which were expected. But the tract now under consideration is to be viewed as a common pamphlet, published and circulated, if not originally spoken, for effect out of doors; and it must be taken as the address of the Ministers to the community in behalf of their plot; and the argument, by which they would identify their own safety with that of the Constitution, after the example of a former period. Regarded in this point of view, it obviously merits very particular attention.

If the Ministers had been satisfied with alleging that an unparalleled pressure of distress had prepared the minds of the lower orders for pursuing seditious courses; that, in this state of things, extraordinary vigilance of police was rendered necessary; and that even some slight changes in the law might be required, in order to counteract the efforts likely to be made by reckless and designing men, who always exist in every free country, and whom periods of public calamity raise to more than their natural influence—there would have been nothing unfair in the proposition, and rational men would probably have entertained it favourably. But every part of the conduct of the Ministers, and their supporters, has been marked by an unprincipled disregard of their duty to the Constitution, and an extreme anxiety to turn the general distress to their own advantage, by exciting an alarm,—confounding all opposition to their measures with disaffection to the cause of good order,—and creating such a diversion in the public mind as might prevent their own failures and malversations from being severely scrutinized, and stifle the voice of the community, raised generally for reform, universally for retrenchment. It is of the utmost importance, both with a view to the measures already adopted under the influence of this alarm, and with respect to the pro-

bable attempts at further encroachments upon the Constitution, that we should stop to examine how far the conduct of the Government disproves the good faith and sincerity of its professions,—how far it stands convicted of having acted treacherously towards the country, and towards those whom it has deluded, without themselves really believing the existence of the danger in anything of a formidable extent. This inquiry is of the highest importance, both with a view to the present state of the country, and the constitutional questions lately discussed.

We can only judge of men's motives by their conduct: But if we find them acting in a way in which no one could possibly act under the influence of certain opinions or feelings, we may fairly conclude that their pretensions are false, when they affect to entertain those sentiments. There is no other rule by which we can safely form a judgment upon such matters; and we proceed to its application.

The Government have taken great pains to state, that the alarm which they professed to feel was quite independent of any occurrences at the commencement of the Session of Parliament. They have uniformly alleged that a system of long standing and great extent had been discovered by them months before the meeting; and that these measures were directed to counteract its effects—if possible to put it down. According to their story, the indecent and most reprehensible outrage which took place the first day of the Session, had no share in determining their councils; they were resolved, long before, to propose the same measures to Parliament. Let us see how far the facts tally with this statement.

In the *first* place, it is certain that Parliament was not assembled one day earlier on account of the pretended alarm into which the Government had thus been thrown. It met only four days earlier than the year before; and that was the latest meeting ever known. Nay, the last prorogation took place after the meeting at Spafields, when those acts of violence were committed which gave the only colour that has as yet been given to the statement of seditious designs. If the Ministers really knew of plots, com-

binations, secret societies, and all the rest of the apparatus since described so fully, why did they not call together the Great Council of the nation? They do not pretend that any one tittle of evidence upon these subjects has come to their knowledge since the Spafields meeting; and yet, at the period when that assembly was most in their minds, they prolong the vacation by six weeks.

But, *secondly*, the Speech at the opening of the Session says not one word of new laws, or the necessity of any deviation from the old usages and constitution of the realm. On the contrary, the Sovereign merely states his regret at the disposition manifested by a few turbulent persons; expresses his satisfaction at the general good order that prevailed, and the great patience of the people under their misfortunes; and professes his intention to maintain the public tranquillity, by the means with which the Constitution armed his hands. Can any man read these things and suppose it possible that the Ministers who put them together had resolved to call upon Parliament for a suspension of the Constitution, and a creation of an almost dictatorial power? Is it to be believed that those strong measures had ever entered into their minds, or, if they had, that they were for a moment seriously entertained? As the Regent returned from delivering that speech, a stone was thrown at his carriage; and the alarm naturally excited by so indecent an act, seems to have given a new light to his Ministers. They then, for the first time, bethought them of secret committees, and violent measures; or they began to conceive hopes that such engines of alarm might be played off upon the public, having previously wished to try them, and dreaded their failure.

Thirdly, this is still further proved by their attempts to magnify the accident just now alluded to. At first it was confidently alleged that a bullet had been fired. No smoke, it is true, had been seen, nor any report heard, by the thousands standing close round the spot:—but then an air-gun had been used. The size of this implement of treason was objected to, and therefore it dwindled into an air-pistol—a weapon invented, we suppose, for the occa-

sion, by some ingenious traitor. The laws of projectiles, however, presented several difficulties, not so easily got over. The glass was broken in two places, the holes being small and definite. This was explained by the instantaneous discovery of a new law of motion; the bullet, it seems, struck in a slanting direction, made a hole, and rebounded—then struck again, and made another hole—just, we were glibly told, as a stone does when thrown upon a surface of water to make what is called ducks and drakes; as if this could possibly take place on a *vertical* plane, and did not entirely depend on the *gravitation* which brings the stone back to the horizontal surface from which it had rebounded. Besides, the bullet was not found to have entered the carriage at all; so that the laws of motion must have been a second time suspended; and the public were actually desired to believe (as they valued their character for loyalty) that a bullet had been fired by an air-pistol, from a tree, in open day, among thousands of people, so as to hit the pane of glass, make a clean hole, then rebound and hit the glass again, make a second hole, and then fly off, without penetrating the glass either time, though both times it made a hole clean through. The impossibility of making the public believe this extravagant nonsense, speedily put an end to the story of the bullet:—But it was not a little disgusting to see the children of corruption ready to persecute every one who refused his assent to such absurdities, and roaring out the hackneyed charges of disaffection against all who retained the possession of their reason when the interests of peculation required them for the season to surrender it.

As soon as the Ministers found that they could not maintain the high ground which they had at first assumed, when they expected to persuade the country that a direct treason had been attempted, they also perceived that the incident was too flimsy to bear the weight of the measures they intended to ground upon it. They therefore discovered that there was a wide-spread and deep-rooted sytem of conspiracy in the country,—and that they had known it long before. They now tried to disconnect it with the outrage against the Regent's carriage, and they

induced Committees of both Houses to concur in vague and indefinite reports of a danger, not very easily understood, threatening the Constitution and the property of the country. We have already said, that we cannot enter upon the discussion of these reports, for reasons which must immediately present themselves to the mind of the reader. But we must state with the distinctness which the importance of the subject demands, and the notoriety of the fact warrants, that these reports omit one most essential consideration, and that they are liable to suspicions of inaccuracy, when we compare them with the report of 1812.

They omit the essential consideration of the distress universally prevailing, in a degree wholly unprecedented in the former history of the country. It has been clearly proved, that at no former period were so many hands wholly out of employment,—or so much misery among those having work from wages extremely reduced. All parties have concurred in admitting this; and in also allowing that the people have generally behaved in a peaceful manner under their sufferings. Now, it is very much to be lamented that the Committees should not have reflected how naturally all the symptoms detailed to them might be accounted for by the existence of this distress. The outrages against machinery have been carried on for some years. They began in 1811; and, in 1812, the distresses being great, though nothing in comparison with the present calamity, these disorders increased considerably, so as to require legislative interposition. Since that period they have varied in their extent and violence, according as the cause varied in which they originated—the want of employment in the manufacturing districts where machinery comes most in competition with human labour. That the present state of things should have somewhat increased them, is nothing wonderful; yet it really does not appear that there is much more of this mischief than in 1812.—A number of disbanded sailors are also to be found everywhere, but chiefly in the great towns, wholly destitute of the means of subsistence.—A vigilant police is, no doubt, requisite for repressing the

disorders likely to arise from hence; but no extraordinary appearance of riot has hitherto been observed,—nothing beyond what the universal misery, the number of idle and starving people everywhere abounding must of necessity occasion.

We cannot, indeed, doubt that a few mischievous persons will always be ready to avail themselves of such a state of things, in order to excite disturbance. But what symptoms are there of their succeeding? What proofs of their even having formed any regular system for promoting any such schemes of revolution as are imputed to them? As often as they have attempted to excite riot, the good sense or the indifference of the multitude has preserved the public peace. At the first meeting in Spafields, the metropolis was entirely at their mercy; there were no precautions taken to defend it, and no force was in its neighbourhood; yet nothing was even attempted beyond breaking a few bakers' windows. At the second meeting, an attempt indeed was made, but it failed entirely:—It was nothing more than the ordinary police of the city could cope with; and it was in fact put down by two aldermen and a few constables. The Lord Mayor is admitted to have furnished much of the evidence—we may say the chief evidence—to the Committees; yet he has openly avowed his opinion, that there exists no danger of an extraordinary nature. The Ministers, to be sure, say he is prejudiced, because he is a friend of the liberty of the subject, and satisfied with the existing securities which the laws afford to the public peace. They, therefore, deny his competency to judge of a danger which he describes from his personal knowledge—as he repelled it by his courage, and by his constitutional exertions. But the other alderman, Sir J. Shaw, has no such party bias as they complain of in the chief magistrate: He has been the steady supporter of all administrations; and is the man personally opposed to the Lord Mayor in the politics of the city; but he has behaved like an honest man, and declared openly in Parliament his disbelief of any such dangers as to require new laws.

The transactions in 1812 throw great suspicions upon

the grounds of the alarm thus anxiously sought to be spread. The Ministers at that period were sorely pressed by their opponents; the public distress was great; the discontent at their measures had risen high; they had sustained a signal defeat in the overthrow of their commercial system of war; they were as weak, and almost as much divided as they now are among themselves; a general election approached; and it was highly expedient to raise a clamour by all means—because their adversaries are rendered unpopular by every successful alarm, and the faint-hearted naturally rally round whatever Government is actually in office, as often as they are stricken with fear of some danger, they know not of what nature, and are not interested to know.—In these circumstances, nearly the same course was pursued, in working up this alarm, that the Ministers have recently followed. All that had happened for six months was carefully collected, and the prominent parts culled out for the Committees. The worst of the outrages had taken place two or three months before any Secret Committees were ever thought of; and undoubtedly, if Mr. Perceval's murder had happened in the country, as Mr. Horsefall's did, it would have been used to swell the account. We must now beg leave to lay before the reader some particulars of the Reports which the Committee then made, and some facts afterwards brought to light connected with the subject. We deem the importance of the inquiry an ample justification of these details. It is no light matter to have the Constitution suspended during a season of peace, because a number of silly people choose to take fright, and a few more designing ones would turn their fears to their own profit. The present alarm, we are aware, will pass away like its predecessors; but probably not before it has answered some of the purposes for which it has been raised. Yet when we see how repeatedly the same expedients can be resorted to by designing men with success, it becomes necessary that endeavours should be made to open the eyes of the country, in order to prevent the imposture from being once more attempted; and the most effectual way of doing this seems to be the demonstration, that the

last time the thing was tried, not only was the same kind of plot described, which is now so much talked of, but that in a few months it had not only ceased to be credited, but had entirely vanished from our recollection. We should think, too, that there is no such positive enjoyment in a state of panic, as to make men desirous of its continuance, and averse to all topics of encouragement and comfort. Now, we do think that it must be difficult for the most alarmed of man or woman kind, to look back at the proceedings in 1812, with their ultimate results, and not feel in better heart and spirits at the present hour.

The Report of the Lords is the fullest in the former, as it is in the present period.[1] In 1812, then, their Lordships began by describing the prevailing disposition to be one of "combined and disciplined riot and disturbance." They then traced it through Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, and Leicestershire, into Cheshire. As a specimen of the animated picture, drawn by those noble historians, of the state of their country, we shall give the following masterly sketch of part of Cheshire.—"The spirit of disorder then *rapidly* spread through the neighbourhood; inflammatory placards, inviting the people to a general rising, were dispersed; illegal oaths were administered; riots were produced in various places; houses were plundered by persons in disguise; and a report was industriously circulated, that a general rising would take place on the first of May, or early in that month. This spirit of riot and disturbance was extended to many other places," &c. It is to be remarked, that all this preparation, or rather actual commencement, of rebellion, had taken place four or five months before the date of the Report:—however, let us proceed. In the middle of April (three months before the Report), in the night, a meeting was held "for the purpose, as supposed, of being trained for military exercise"—"contributions were levied in the neighbourhood at the houses of gentlemen and farmers." A singular arrival also happened at Manchester. "On the 26th and

[1] The Commons have not stated, as a ground of alarm, "the systematic attempts to undermine the chastity of young females," mentioned in the Lords' Report.

27th April, the people were alarmed by the appearance of *some thousands of strangers* in their town—the greater part of them, however, disappeared on the 28th.—Part of the Local Militia had been then called out, and a large military force had arrived, which it was supposed had overawed those who were disposed to disturbance. An appehension, however, prevailed of a more general rising in May; and in the neighbourhood of the town many houses were plundered. Nocturnal meetings, for the purpose of military exercise, were frequent; arms were seized in various places by the disaffected; the house of a farmer, near Manchester, was plundered; and a labourer, coming to his assistance, was shot. The manner in which the disaffected have carried on their proceedings, is represented as demonstrating *an extraordinary degree of concert, secrecy and organization. Their signals were well contrived and well established;* and any attempt to detect and lay hold of the offenders was generally defeated." After detailing, in the same warm and impressive style, the attacks upon many manufactories, the Report states the murder of Mr. Horsefall "in broad daylight;" and adds a particular, well calculated to increase the alarm, though happily proved a short time afterwards to be a mere fiction of the imagination. "When he fell, the *populace surrounded and reviled him*, instead of offering him assistance; and no attempt was made to secure the assassins, who were seen to retire to an adjoining wood." It is likewise said, that "a reward of 2000*l.* was offered for the discovery of the murderers; but no discovery has yet been made, though it appears that he was shot by four persons, each of whom lodged a ball in his body."

Let us pause over this frightful story for a moment. Some time after the Report, and without any means of discovery but the vigilance of the Magistrates acting under the old law, and the temptation of the reward, the murderers *were* discovered. They were tried by a special commission at York; the Solicitor for the Treasury, who conducted the proceedings, published officially a report of the trials; and from this it appears, that there were *no populace* near at the time; that Mr. Horsefall was not

insulted or reviled; but that the only persons who saw or knew anything of his misfortune, were two who passed after it happened, and who carried him to a neighbouring inn for medical aid! That these two should not have been able to secure the four murderers, is not surprising; but is it possible that the Committee could have made any inquiries of persons in the neighbourhood of those who helped Mr. Horsefall? Indeed, it is a rule in such secret investigations, only to receive such evidence, almost always written, as the Ministers choose to produce. They consist almost entirely of reports from active Magistrates, a class of the community highly meritorious, but peculiarly liable to the influence of alarm, and not unfrequently desirous of displaying their zeal and activity to the Government.

The next statement shows such a disposition to magnify the grounds of alarm, as speaks volumes. "Some time after, a young woman was attacked in the streets of Leeds, and nearly murdered, her skull being fractured; and *the supposed reason* for this violence was *an apprehension* that she had been *near* the spot when Mr. Horsefall was murdered, and *might therefore* be able to give evidence which *might lead* to the detection of the murderers." It is not pretended that she was near the spot; then how could any one guess that the murderers had such an apprehension? Here is a mere vague fancy of some gossip or busy person wishing to connect together two events which had no relation to one another; yet their Lordships record this solemnly in their alarming Report. The same degree of courtesy is not indeed shown towards suppositions of another nature. The riots at Manchester having been in fact meal mobs, their Lordships allude to this circumstance in a tone of authoritative disbelief—"the general *pretence* was the high price of provisions." Now, at least, there was a ground for this pretence; provisions were high, and the lower people were starving. But supposing, what has never appeared in anything like evidence, that a young woman at Leeds really was seriously hurt, what ground is that for pretending that it was because the murderers supposed that she might have been *near* the spot, and

therefore apprehended that she might have given some evidence which might have led to their detection?

After describing, in the same glowing and energetic style of reporting, that all the inhabitants near Huddersfield and Bristol had "their arms *swept away by bands of armed robbers*," and that "in one hundred depositions there was only one as to the perpetrator of the crime," their Lordships proceed as follows—"It is represented, that nightly robberies of arms, lead, and ammunition, were prevalent in the districts bounded by the rivers Air and Calder, and that the patroles which went along both banks of the Calder, found *the people in the ill-affected villages up at midnight*; and heard the firing of small arms at short distances from them, through the whole night, *to a very great extent*, which they *imagined* proceeded from *parties at drill*." They then deliver an opinion as to the real object and nature of the conspiracy which they assume to have been formed; after negativing the opinion, that want of employment could have any connexion with the outrages —"the views, their Lordships state, of some of the persons engaged, have extended to revolutionary measures of the most dangerous description. Their proceedings manifest a degree of *caution and organization*, which appears to flow from the direction of some persons under whose influence they act; but it is the opinion of a person, whose situation gives him great opportunities of information, that their leaders, although they may possess considerable influence, are still of the lowest orders; men of desperate fortunes, who have taken advantage of the pressure of the moment, to work upon the inferior class, through the medium of the associations in the manufacturing parts of the country. The general persuasion of the persons engaged in these transactions appears however to be, that all the societies in the country are directed in their motions by a secret committee, and that this secret committee is, therefore, the *great mover of the whole machine*; and it is established, by the various information to which the committee has before alluded, that societies are formed in different parts of the country; that these societies are governed by their respective secret commit-

tees; that delegates are continually despatched from one place to another, for the purpose of concerting their plans; and that secret signs are arranged, by which the persons engaged in these conspiracies are known to each other." Their Lordships proceed to show, that the members of this universal association (as it seems to be) are bound together by oaths; that these are the same, or nearly so, in all parts of the country; and that, from this similarity, "the systematic nature of the concert" is proved. They give a copy of this oath, and it is to the full as solemn and formidable as any that has recently been disclosed. It binds him who takes it, "never to reveal to any person or persons, under the canopy of Heaven," anything relating to the association, "under the penalty of being sent out of the world by the first brother who shall meet him, and his name and character blotted out of existence, and never to be remembered, but with contempt and abhorrence." It also binds him "to use his best endeavours to punish, by death, any traitor or traitors, wherever they may be found, and to pursue them, with increasing vengeance, though they should fly to the verge of nature." Their Lordships next state the sort of discipline subsisting among the persons thus bound together. "Their *military organization*," they say, "has proceeded to an *alarming length*; they assemble in large numbers, in general by night, upon heaths or commons, which are numerous and extensive in some of the districts where the disturbances have been most serious. So assembled, they take the *usual military precautions* of paroles and countersigns; their muster-rolls are called over by numbers, not by names; they are directed by leaders, sometimes in disguise; they place sentries, to give alarm at the approach of any persons whom they may suspect, and they disperse instantly at the firing of a gun, or other signal agreed upon, and so disperse as to avoid detection. They have, in some instances, used *signals by rockets or blue lights*, by which they communicate intelligence to their parties." Their Lordships proceed to show how they collect lead for balls, and "make seizures of gunpowder;" and how they levy contributions of money, both

to form a treasure, and to induce persons to join them; and conclude, as usual, with asserting the insufficiency of the existing laws, and the necessity of stronger measures to destroy such a system!—Yet upon this Report, so abounding in facts of a serious complexion, be it observed, the Government of 1812 only proposed the trifling measure of police known by the name of the Arms Bill, which was never once acted upon, and the bill making certain unlawful oaths a capital felony.—A general suspension of the Constitution, or even a renewal of the Gagging Bills, never was thought of.

We have already stated a very remarkable instance, in which their Lordships were as completely deceived by their informants, as it was possible for men to be. They had believed and reported a very striking circumstance, the most striking indeed of any in their Report; and it afterwards turned out, that this was a mere invention from beginning to end, without even the shadow of a foundation. But we must go a step further, and ask, whether the whole of the organized system now described from the Report, has not been proved to be an invention? The lapse of five years, without more coming of it, is quite decisive of this point. A country cannot possibly remain as many months in the dreadful state painted by the Report, and be quiet. No such instance can be given in the history of man. The country is represented as organized for immediate revolt, and there comes an open trade and a good harvest, and we hear no more of the organization—the system—the "usual military precautions"—the parole and countersigns—the muster-rolls, in which men are called over by numbers, not by names—the leaders in disguise. There are no more guns fired as signals; even the rockets no longer rise, and the blue lights are all gone out. To suppose that such a system existed, and that the restoration of prosperity suddenly put it down, is ridiculous. When men have gone so far as the Report describes, they do not return to their peaceful avocations because the quartern loaf has fallen a fifth in price. In truth, no such system ever did exist: But busy men, and timid men, deceived the Committees; for we

have no right to suspect those distinguished bodies of making the most of the facts sent to them, in order to suit a party purpose. In less than two months after the Reports were presented, the conspiracy was wholly forgotten; and scarcely any one recollected that there had ever been a Secret Committee, or a Report in 1812, until it was deemed expedient once more to pursue the same course, to assemble new Committees, and obtain new Reports. Can any reasonable man look back upon the proceedings which we have been relating, without some feeling of shame for those distinguished persons who were so misled? Can any one avoid suspecting, that we are running over again the same course of delusion?

The alarmists of the present day have by no means the same materials to work with, that enabled their predecessors, in 1812, to compile the Reports now alluded to. Instead of outrages in various parts of the country, one only breach of the peace has been committed. The cruel murders, the systematic attacks upon manufactories, the attempts to prevent justice from taking its course, are now wholly wanting. The training, the organization, the connected system moved by central committees, could not easily be revived, because it would recall the failure upon those points of learning in 1812; and, therefore, a more vague and general account is given, of designs to overthrow the government and spread revolution through the country. As no specific acts of violence have been observed, with the single exception of Spafields, the exaggerated story of the outrage in the Park has been reinforced with allegations of designs to attack the Tower, burn the metropolis, and destroy the bridges. Much has been made of a seditious handbill, and of some most indecent parodies upon the Liturgy, which, though more offensive to the ears of our brethren in the South than to those which have heard the language of the *Solemn League and Covenant*, must nevertheless be reprobated by men of all persuasions, as highly indecorous and criminal. Those papers, however, were confined to the metropolis, and were liable to severe punishment by the existing laws. Something more, therefore, was wanting, to make the alarm-

cauldron "boil and bubble." Accordingly, the Ministers appear to have agreed, that the gentleman, whose speech is now before us, should fling into it a forgotten pamphlet, whose author has been many years dead, and who was only known in his life as a harmless and ignorant enthusiast. The following passage will show the manner in which this piece of conjuration was performed.

"But these men, it seems, 'are visionary and fanciful theorists!' Why, Sir, let us hope that they are no more: let us hope that their whole object is to mould and square the Constitution to some ideal model of perfectibility; and that, though (as is the nature of theorists) they would not, perhaps, suffer any consideration for established institutions, for property, or for life, to stand in the way of their experiments,—such hazards are merely incidental to their plan,—that their only aim is theoretical perfection. But I confess I have my apprehensions that there is something much more *substantial* in these theories; that not only this House and the Government furnish matter for their fanciful speculation, but that, in some of their waking visions, even the solid *Land* presents itself as an object of desire.

"I know how easy it is to despise, or to affect to despise, daring and extravagant projects, announced and supported by comparative impotence and imbecility; but I know also how dangerous it is to do so. France is the standing example of perils too lightly estimated in their beginning, and not resisted until they had grown to a strength which at once alarmed and overpowered resistance. The projects of innovation do not stop with Parliaments and Governments; the projectors would, in the end, shear property to the quick. This is no conjecture of mine; nor is it merely the day-dream of ignorant and illiterate men. The purpose is avowed: it is detailed and reasoned upon, in a pamphlet which I hold in my hand, with no contemptible degree of intelligence and dexterity. There is nothing in the style which betrays an absence of literary acquirements. This pamphlet, as I have been informed, has been circulated with astonishing industry through the country. It contains the dogmas of a considerable Sect; considerable, I mean, from those circumstances which make sects formidable,—its numbers and its enthusiasm. Hear, then, the ingenious Creed of these Patrons of the Soil! The great and crying evil of the time is, the '*usurpation of the Land, the gift of God, from the people.*'—'*Landlords,*' it is stated, '*are the only oppressors of the people.*'—'*All the land, the waters, the houses, the mines, &c., &c., must return to the people, the whole people:—without the restoration of this property, Reforms and Revolutions are unavailing.*'——Such is the substance: the matter is treated much at large, and, as I have said, with no inconsiderable ability; and the doctrine is disseminated with proselytizing zeal. Let then the Property of the Country be aware of the danger of countenancing the first breach in our Civil Institutions. It is not only against us, the corrupt

House of Commons; it is not only against us, corrupter Ministers, that the wrath of Heaven is kindled, and the vengeance of the people denounced. The corruption of Parliaments and Ministers may be cured. Reform will dispose of the one, and Revolution of the other: but all in vain,—all to no beneficial purpose,—while the Land continues in '*usurpation*,' and the '*property of the people*' is undivided and unrestored."

Mr. Canning does not here give *much* of the tract which he cites; he mentions as its substance, and as the leading doctrine of the sect, an hostility to all property.—That was sufficient, he conceived, to alarm all proprietors; and he judiciously enough omits the rest, suppressing even the title of the book, because it would have shown that the author was a poor deluded fanatic. It is given, indeed, in a note to the publication before us, but was, of course, not spoken.

Thus far Mr. Canning; but the reader may be desirous of seeing a little of Mr. Spence, the founder of the sect—who kept a bookseller's stall during his life; and of his commentator and expositor Mr. Evans, a reputable brace and breeches-maker, in Newcastle Street, Strand. We have a copy before us of this delectable performance, from which the following passages are taken almost at random.

"Fellow-Countrymen,—These nations are arrived at a crisis the most tremendously awful to contemplate; brought upon us by the mistaken policy of our rulers, the avarice of our landholders and merchants, the influence of a corrupted press, hired, terrified, and induced, by all manner of means, to deceive the great body of the people; while they have been drained, by taxation, of their rightful share of national property, the only source of power. By want of foresight in our rulers, they have allowed themselves to be flattered by needy courts to squander among them unsparingly our wealth, not perceiving that wealth is power, in a nation as well as in an individual; and that when they were transferring our wealth to foreigners, they were actually transferring our power to them also. It was thus that Napoleon, *by gathering our wealth*, raised himself to power; and now, by the same means, we have raised Alexander in his place, fearfully gigantic!

"Such has been the effect of the impolicy of putting down Napoleon to elevate Alexander. What have we gained? *Napoleon was a mere pigmy to Alexander*; his boasting served to talk about, but he could have been managed and guarded against. *Alexander is a still, steady man of business*, laying firm hold of all he can get, and relinquishing nothing; nor is there any power now that can compel him.

"What has Russia gained by the war? The whole of the Caspian Sea and ten provinces of Persia; the best half of Sweden, viz., Finland, nearly the whole of Poland. Yes, Poland is conceded! *Poland,—that country from whence we have these twenty years drawn such a mine of wealth*," &c.

The mysteries of the sect then are unfolded, as it were, historically.

"There have already been three great eras from which to date the liberty of the world, that of Moses, that of the Christian, and that of Alfred,—and a new one has arrived.

"From the date of the first, when Moses established his agrarian republic, to this hour, the struggle of despotism has never ceased in endeavouring to reduce mankind again to universal slavery; but now it cannot succeed; it is so well understood, universally, public opinion rejects it; and that is the lever with which the world is moved. The divine laws promulgated through the interposition of Moses, command the establishment of an agrarian commonwealth, a republic. The Israelites were every one of them to have a possession in land for ever—not to have kings like the people they displaced, as they were the cause of all manner of wickedness—nor lords like the Philistines, for, if not quite so bad, they were much too bad, God is said to have declared. But they were to live on a footing of *equality*, every one under his own vine, and under his own figtree, brothers and equals, pledged to each other for the fulfilment of this law, which if it be the revealed will of God, why is it not done?—And the Christian epoch was ushered into the world on the broadest republican principles;—the Church has all along, and everywhere been administered on the principle of a republic. The Roman Catholic church, the Greek church, the Reformed church, and all others emanating from them, more or less retain the principles and policy of the first Christians. God, in all his commands, has been most explicit in declaring, whoever shall oppose this his just system of policy are his enemies; from whence it follows, that all the land and all the buildings in a Christian community should be the declared property of all the people (who are equally members of the Church, brothers and equals in the sight of God), and should be let on their account, and the rents equally divided among them, to every man, woman, and child. I ask the present pretended proprietors of the world, how came it theirs? Did they make it, and the people they call their subjects? If not, did the Maker of it give it to them, with the people it contains? Judaism and Christianity assure us to the contrary. Courts and kings, and lords and landlords, and slaves and oppression, and war and priests, and ignorance, are the produce of paganism—they were pagan in their origin, and they remain pagan still. Idolatry was their parent, and it is observable with what pertinacity they adhere to it, even now. In which of their dwellings will not be found the pictures, the statues, the busts, of their Jupiters, Junos, Apollos, Dianas, Venuses, &c., &c.? Tyrants and pomp, and monopoly and cruelty, and all and

every proceeding for ages, and at the present day, are the direct reverse of Christianity. There is but one sect of Christians extant, viz., the Moravians, who make common stock of what they possess. And what is the cause we find things so different to what they were ordained to be? The question is easily solved,—corruption and paganism.

"Turn, O turn, to the page of history, and judge from thence if that good and virtuous man, Jesus Christ, did anything more than endeavour to enforce an observance of the laws of Moses as a divine system of policy, to reproduce that harmony and brotherhood so necessary for the well-being of society. Was it not the pagan Greeks that made this man a divinity, and not his first followers, the Jews?"—pp. 8-10.

That reason merely is the weapon which these enthusiasts intend to use—that they are a well-meaning, a deluded, and, whether we regard the weakness of their weapon or the strength of the interests opposed to them, a very innocent people, needs no proof.

"Such national partnership," they proceed, "is the natural, the indefeasible, the inalienable rights of all mankind, and is what makes Christianity so much superior to Judaism, viz., the more just and equitable mode of dividing the rent or produce of land, than that of dividing land itself. The great philosopher and lawgiver, Moses, as the projector of a system to put mankind in possession of the land Nature intended for their use, is venerated as the servant of God; but Joshua, the son of Joseph and Mary, who is said to have established this division of the rents of the land (which the Church practise) as an improvement in the world more equitable, and easy of practice, as well as more natural, is esteemed a Divinity, as the Son of God himself, sent down from heaven for that purpose. And my intent in writing this book, is to inspire my countrymen, and all mankind if possible, with the consideration of this system of policy; which, viewed in whatever light it may, is strictly just, is justice itself; would render the world a paradise, a heaven upon earth; would destroy war, oppression, and misery. For how many ages, from the elevated temple of Justice, have we viewed with delight, on shining pedestals of immortality, the images of Moses, Lycurgus, the founders of the Christian Church, and the greatest of monarchs, Alfred! If, then, these characters in the practice of justice, under all manner of disadvantages, have gained such immortality, how happy, great, and glorious must be the nation that shall adopt and establish this plan of pure and unalloyed justice, on a permanent basis of practice—how immortal will be that king, or legislature, under whose auspices it shall be established!"

The work concludes with a hymn against exclusive property, appointed, we suppose, to be sung in all the churches of this communion; and we shall not trouble

our readers with any specimens of a piece which is as distant from rhyme as the prose which precedes it is from reason.

Absurd and contemptible as all this may even already appear to every sober-minded man, its effects were complete for the moment.—Parliament was induced to adopt the measures recommended by the authors of the alarm; the writ of Habeas Corpus for England, and the benefits of the Wrongous Imprisonment Act for Scotland, were taken away from the subject during a limited period, and severe restrictions imposed upon public meetings. Such a suspension of the Constitution had never taken place at any former period of peace, unless when a pretender to the Crown was threatening the realm with invasion, was supported by a party of the principal nobility, and numbered among his adherents the majority of the proprietors in the country. Even in time of war, it had only been attempted in circumstances of peculiar danger; and it had never been tried in so complete a manner. This matter deserves a little further attention, as indicative of the extraordinary circumstances which have characterized the present alarm, and the thoughtless zeal with which it has made men act.

The Reports of the Committees in 1794, detail, at much length, and with a great deal of documentary evidence, the proceedings of the disaffected. Their clubs, and other affiliated societies, were openly holden, in defiance of the civil power. No difficulty of tracing their numbers seems to have existed; and instead of describing, in general, ill-defined terms, certain combinations, schemes, systems, machines, organizations, and the rest of the imagery of the present Reports, those documents furnished ample and precise accounts of the associations formed for changing the frame of the Government. They dwelt principally upon the correspondence of the disaffected with the Jacobins of Paris, and the missions of their delegates to the Convention; the encouragement held out by the French Revolutionary Government to all who in other countries should embark in rebellious designs; the threatened invasion of this realm to be attempted in concert with

the seditious at home; and, above all, upon the marked disinclination of the latter to look for redress to Parliament, and their steady and avowed determination to seek it from other quarters. In the present day, every one of these perils is wanting:—there are neither Jacobins, foreign correspondence, nor threats of invasion; and, instead of a disinclination to petition Parliament, the multitude of petitions impedes the progress of business in a degree wholly unprecedented.

But, even in this time of serious apprehension, when, from the circumstances just now stated, it might seem more reasonable to take alarm, Parliament did not proceed so far as it has recently done. In 1794, upon the reports being presented, the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended;[1] but no bills were brought in to prevent and restrain public meetings. In the summer of the following year, the Suspension Act was suffered to expire; and, during its expiration, in consequence of some violent proceedings which took place, what are commonly called the *Gagging Bills* were passed. It was not for about two years afterwards, and in circumstances of an aggravated nature, that the Suspension Act was once more passed. The present alarm about the Spencean sect (which, though not at all a secret society, but openly avowing its delusions, is found so trifling in numbers that hardly any members can be discovered) has so far swayed the Parliament, that, without any one of the dangers existing in 1794 and 1795, they have at one and the same moment passed *all* the bills, then passed separately, and the one set after the other had ceased to exist; and they have, moreover, enforced by new enactments, the act passed in 1799, besides utterly putting down the Spenceans by name, and all *such* sects, by a sweeping description.

The great difference in the mode of proceeding now and in former periods, when men of real talents had sway in the public councils, and when extraordinary dangers did

[1] The vulgar and inaccurate phrase is here employed for the sake of brevity. The Act known by the name of the *Habeas Corpus Suspension Act*, is in truth an Act to enable the Crown to detain suspected persons without trial.

in truth press upon the government, may be still further illustrated, by referring to the preambles of the statutes then made to meet the emergency of the times. The Suspension Act of 1794 (34 *Geo. III. c.* 54), states the existence of "a traitorous and detestable conspiracy for subverting the laws and constitution, and for introducing the system of anarchy and confusion so fatally prevalent in France." This act was continued to 1st July 1795; and then it expired. It was renewed in 1798, by an act which stated, "his Majesty's enemies were making preparations for invasion with considerable and increasing activity, and that their designs were encouraged by the traitorous practices of wicked and disaffected persons within the realm."

But if we go a little further back, to times more nearly resembling the present, or rather exceeding them in the amount of danger, but before the habits of alarm, engendered by the French Revolution, had spread so widely among the people, we shall find more constitutional methods practised of warding off the attempts of disaffection. Not to mention the disturbed state of the country in 1767 and 1768, when the speeches from the throne lament the apparent "tendency to disaffection loosening the bonds of constitutional subordination;" in 1780 the excesses of sedition were heightened by fanaticism; a war, generally unsuccessful, raged, and invasion was apprehended from more quarters than one. His Majesty, in his Speech from the Throne, describes the prevailing outrages as "overbearing all civil authority, and threatening the immediate subversion of all legal power, the destruction of property, and confusion of every order in the State." He adds, that he has therefore "provided for the public safety, by the most effectual and immediate application of the *force* entrusted to him by Parliament;" and that he has given directions "for bringing the guilty to speedy trial, that they may receive such condign punishment as the laws of the country prescribe." Thus, resting satisfied with the existing laws, and the powers already given to the executive Magistrate, the King adds these memorable expressions—"Though I trust it is not necessary, yet I

think it right, at this time, to renew to you my solemn assurances, that I have no other object, but to make the laws of the realm, and the principles of our excellent constitution, the rule and measure of my conduct; and I shall ever consider it as the first duty of my station, and the chief glory of my reign, to maintain and preserve the established religion of my kingdoms, and, as far as in me lies, to secure and to perpetuate the rights and liberties of my people."

During the earlier periods of the French Revolution, these promises, so truly worthy of an English Prince, were not forgotten. In May 1792, when the country was inundated with seditious publications, and practices of a dangerous nature to the peace of the realm began to prevail, a Proclamation was issued, warning the people against such a contagion, and especially against "correspondence with persons abroad for wicked purposes." In December, when the danger had increased, the militia was called out; and the ground of this measure was stated to be, the "correspondence with foreigners, for the purpose of subverting the Constitution." When in January 1793, Chauvelin had been dismissed, and hostilities impended, the King's message states the connexion between the efforts of the disaffected, and the "subversion of social order." Yet no innovations were attempted on the Constitution. On the contrary, the King's speech at the close of the Session commends the "firmness of Parliament in *supporting the Constitution*;" and asserts that this "had checked every attempt to disturb the public repose." Alarm then had not become so easily catching. At present it is epidemic; and we seek to allay it instantly by performing the most violent operations as mere matters of course. We give the Constitution no kind of credit for its power of resistance; we listen to wordy, mouthing, ranting declaimers, who prate about its containing within itself the means of extending and adapting itself to emergencies; and those means turn out to be (that the metaphor may suddenly vanish) the suspension of the Constitution while the panic lasts,—or until the turn is served for which it was raised!

Nothing, in our apprehension, can be more evident than THE OBJECT of all these proceedings. The prevalence of distrust in their measures almost universally; the loud and unanimous cries of the people for retrenchment; the extraordinary accession of popularity recently acquired by the cause of Parliamentary Reform; the great and increasing strength of the Opposition in Parliament, a party wholly unparalleled in numerical force at any former period of our history—all these unquestionable facts rendered the situation of the Ministers nearly desperate at the beginning of the Session. It became absolutely necessary, therefore, to divide the strength of their opponents, and to raise an alarm in the country, which should produce the same benefits to the rulers of the present day that Mr. Pitt had derived from it in 1793. That they have failed signally in this plan, we believe few of their adherents are now sanguine enough to deny: But it is equally impossible for their adversaries to doubt, that a temporary success has attended the scheme. The Opposition was found, contrary to all the expectations of the Ministers, resolved to hold its course steadily and constitutionally, without the smallest disposition to form any connexion with the hairbrained zealots of universal suffrage out of doors. It showed as great contempt for the nonsense of these men as the ministerial leaders themselves. Moreover, it was found incapable of any serious divisions;[1] many, who had warmly approved the measures of 1794, now, under the total change of circumstances, with the plain evidence of the contrivance before their eyes, refused to lend themselves to promote its success; and a much larger number divided upon the Habeas Corpus question, than can usually be induced to concur in opposing the ministerial questions of the day.—In the mean time, the evidence of facts served to convince the country at large, that there was in reality no danger beyond the casual dis-

[1] Three respectable members of the Opposition, who had been unfortunately prevailed upon to concur in the Report, in circumstances of a very peculiar nature, opposed the principal measures founded upon it; and they did not find any support in the party generally, when the merits of the Report were considered.

turbances arising from disbanded troops, and from the extraordinary distresses of the times, of which scarcity formed a part. But one object was gained by the promoters of the measures. The attention both of Parliament and the country was drawn away from the proper business of the Session.—Retrenchment was no longer the principal, nay, the sole object of discussion, as it must have been but for the plot; and a few troublesome mouths, and still more galling pens, were stopt out of doors. The breathing-time thus obtained for corruption and extravagance, is, however, only a respite: The sentence has gone forth against them; it may in part be executed during the remaining portion even of this session; and the axe, now uplifted, must fall with its full force, at all events, in the next. The present Administration is, indeed, one of shifts and expedients; it tries to live over the passing hour; it trusts to the chapter of accidents; and having now hardly a possibility of relief from any chance, may perchance be consoled with the reflexion, that at least it has prolonged for one season its puny and pernicious existence.

But attempts will, in all likelihood, be made during the approaching recess, and at the probable dissolution of Parliament, to lay the foundation of measures which may, contrary to all considerations of right as well as expediency, prolong still further the mischievous system which has well nigh destroyed this once rich and happy country. If the alarm can be made subservient to the election of a Parliament more submissive to the Court, and so regardless of the public interest, and the declared sense of the community, as to adopt, under whatever modifications or disguise, the abominable *impost upon Income*, and to sanction its continuance as a permanent branch of revenue—there is little doubt that all retrenchment is at an end, and the perpetuity of abuse is secured. Should the country either be frightened into the choice of a Parliament capable of this enormity, or lulled into security by the vain notion that no such attempt will be made, after the signal defeat sustained by the Government last year;—nay, if members are returned to the new Parliament, without express and

distinct pledges given to oppose everything like an Income-tax—the measure will be carried.—The design has never for a moment been dropt. All the proceedings of the Ministers demonstrate this. They never come near the subject without lamenting the loss of that favourite tax—they never propose any new and odious duty—any duty pressing upon the lower orders, and repugnant to every sound principle of taxation—as, for instance, the Soap tax—without ostentatiously stating it to be rendered necessary by the unfortunate decision of Parliament against the Income-tax. This tax, they insidiously and most falsely represent as pressing only upon the rich; and its repeal is described as a selfish triumph of the wealthy over the poor. Their other schemes of finance are evidently all temporary. A deficit of many millions is already avowed. By that amount they declare it to be impossible they should make the two ends meet. Yet they adopt no measures for reducing the expenditure; and they supply the defect, in the mean time, by aids from the Bank, which must be confined to a single year, and, by increasing the unfunded debt, which could not be even attempted beyond the present amount, but for the stagnation of all trade, and the consequent superabundance of unemployed capital. All their speeches, all their proceedings, manifestly prove that they are waiting for *better times*; that they still cling to their favourite resource; and that they expect, at the commencement of a new Parliament, to obtain that unlimited control over the property and industry of the country, with which the present Parliament peremptorily refused to entrust them.

Against this design, the country cannot be too watchfully upon its guard. They must not be lulled by any audacious falsehoods which the minions of the Treasury may put about, respecting the intentions of their masters. Those stories are easily told; they do not commit the principals; and the agents have no character to lose. Neither must the people be deceived by the plausible shape in which the measure will certainly be proposed. It will probably be only partial at first; perhaps it will be more strictly a Property than an Income tax; perhaps the

more odious parts of the former impost will be left out; so that the professional, and even the mercantile classes, may be conciliated, that is, bribed to neutrality by exemptions. It is not improbable, that other taxes may be repealed at the same time, and that those others may be of an unpopular nature. The Ministers will give up anything for the Income-tax; they will take it back on any terms; they will be satisfied with the lowest scale—with the most partial renewal of it. All they desire, is to have the machinery; and when they have once gotten that, they will screw it to the pitch they please. Give them but one per cent. upon land; and, by units and by fractions, they will speedily get the same control over the whole revenue of land, trade and labour, which they formerly had; nay, they will possess themselves of the whole disposable means of each individual, as well as of his entire secrets, and run anew the career of profligate expense, in peace and in war, which has left us in the state of exhaustion we all now feel and deplore.

Nor is it impossible, that the distresses of the times should themselves assist a little in the accomplishment of this scheme; and followed, as they probably will be, by a considerable improvement in our circumstances, from a good harvest and a large American-fall shipment, the people will be animated with new hope, after the sort of despair they have been sunk in; a partial relief will be overrated; and far more trade will be expected to follow, than there is any chance of in the present state of the world. That will be the moment for the Ministers to make their attempt;—first, at obtaining a favourable Parliament; next, at passing the Tax Bill. And, against the exhilarating effects of such a gleam of prosperity, as much as against the influence of the alarm which it seems to relieve, we earnestly and solemnly warn all our countrymen to be upon their guard, if they have any regard left, either for the Liberty or for the Property which they have received from their ancestors, and which their children have a right to expect at their hands.

CANNING—PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

(NOVEMBER, 1822.)

The Speeches of the Right Honourable George Canning, at Liverpool, on Friday the 23rd and Friday the 30th of August, 1822. Liverpool, Kaye. 1822.

IT is with the design of calling the attention of our readers to the subjects handled in these Speeches, and not with any view of discussing the conduct of the speaker, or even of criticising his oratorical merits, that we have laid this pamphlet before us. Without any disrespect towards Mr. Canning, we may be allowed to say, that, how interesting soever to his personal friends, and to his implacable enemies both among the Courtiers and the Reformers, his late proceedings may have proved, they are likely to be of very little importance to the course of public affairs, which will go on in pretty much the same way, whoever may make the show speeches for the ministers in either House, until some change of system shall give the people a more adequate share in the representation; and that event, becoming daily more necessary, is not likely to be either retarded or very much accelerated by the incident of the gentleman in question having once more got a place. Of his merits as a rhetorician we have already had occasion to speak with the commendation which they deserve.[1] He is a most able and entertaining speaker; with much acuteness and even subtlety, but apt to sacrifice his argument to that point for which indeed he seems content to sacrifice everything; with a great deal of address in shaping his case, but very little fairness in stating the arguments or propositions he is contending against; with considerable power of declamation, but of the second-rate kind, which resides in

[1] Canning—Alarms.

the mouth, or rather, we ought to say, being the work of the head, and not coming warm from the heart, addresses the understanding, and does not go to the heart; with very admirable ingenuity, and powers of fancy not often surpassed, though not chastened by a severe taste; and, more particularly, with a copiousness and sprightliness of wit, or rather drollery, which would be nearly perfect in its kind, if under more control, and somewhat more varied. How high a place among modern orators he might have attained had he pursued another plan, regarding his subject more than himself and his audience, we presume not to conjecture. That he has sacrificed the higher eminences cannot be doubted; and, as far as the mere style and composition are concerned, he has done so by preferring to the Greek, or even the best Roman models, such clever and difficult, but certainly very inferior ones, as Sallust, Tacitus, and Seneca. The late change in his plans has probably removed the only chance that he had of retracing his steps, and gaining the heights from which he had been seduced, possibly by the taste of the age as much as by his own. As Cicero changed the manner of his oratory when he went into the East, he also might have employed his absence in occasionally reflecting upon the beauties of those pure models with which he is so well acquainted, not indeed as the Roman did, to mitigate any harshness by a mixture of the Asian style, but to reclaim himself from the defects of that Asian style into which he has fallen, and of which the complaint used to be, that it wanted "*judicium et modum*;" and showed the "Asiana gens" to be "tumidior et jactantior, vaniore etiam dicendi gloria inflata." (*Quint.* xii. 10.)

But, beside its inconsistency with our design, nothing could be more unfair than to comment, with any severity of criticism, upon even the most accurate reports of speeches delivered after dinner at a tavern, to a party convivial as well as political, and all the chosen friends of the speaker. If he had acquitted himself but very moderately on such an occasion, he clearly would have done far better than was necessary; and a speech half as clever or lively as the worst of those before us, would have been, beyond

all comparison, the very finest of which his hearers could, from experience, form any idea.

Before proceeding to the topic of Reform handled in his principal performance, we must refer shortly to the only matter of any importance in the shorter one—the allusion to the distresses of the times. These, he thinks, prevail no longer in the humbler classes of society, but in "quarters where education and intelligence may be expected to counteract intemperance of feeling, to correct prejudice, and to discountenance faction." Formerly, it seems, those were affected in whom suffering begets impatience, and delivers over the sufferer "a prey to every designing demagogue who points out resistance as a remedy." But he appeals to those who now feel the pressure,—the landed interest—the aristocracy—with much confidence; and, reminding them of the zeal which they showed in preaching patience to the poor, when they had no opportunity to practise it themselves, he hints in somewhat plain, and, we take it, in no very palatable terms, that it might be just as well if they were now to avail themselves of the very favourable occasion which offers itself for practising what they used so freely to preach.

So notable a piece of indiscretion as to make merry with the country gentlemen in their extremity, or at least to sneer broadly at their conduct, with the most philosophic indifference towards their sufferings, could hardly have been expected in one who was at the moment a candidate for place, and for the place of leader of the House of Commons, and indeed in the act of advertising for the situation. It may be fit, therefore, to give the words, lest any one should find it impossible to believe that their substance has been correctly stated. "I am confident, that having, during a great struggle of so many years, *preached patience* to the humbler classes of the community, the higher will not now desert their duty, by refusing, *in their turn, to practise the same degree of patience* which has been generally displayed by those beneath them." Now, this is precisely the advice, so exactly do extremes oftentimes meet, which those plain-spoken gentlemen, whom Mr. Canning calls Radicals, and whom he used to call Jacobins, are

every day tendering to the "*higher classes*," and which the latter receive with very little gratitude, or indeed civility. The meaning of both Mr. Canning and those other writers and orators is the very same, and their language is nearly so. "You," say they, "who used to show so edifying a degree of resignation to our distresses; you who so glibly lectured us on the duty of submission to the will of Providence, that is, to your own arbitrary measures, while we were starving, and enforced your instructions with the Bastile and the bayonet; you who deemed nothing so easy as patience under the miseries your own impolicy had loaded us with, and nothing so criminal as repining at the pressure, and murmuring at the hands that inflicted it—come now and show us somewhat of that patience in your own case! edify us with applying to your own use the lessons you so lavishly bestowed on us; and try if the remedy you dispensed so freely to others will not suit yourselves. We were starving in 1812—you gave us an American war and new gagging bills. We were starving in 1817—you sent us to solitary dungeons, and barred the courts of justice to our suits. We were starving in 1819—you laid on millions of new taxes, cut us down with cavalry when we met to complain, and made new laws to stifle our complaints. We are still distressed, but now you are our fellow-sufferers; we recommend you to say nothing about the matter, but to reflect, that when we cried out, it was at our peril, although no man could charge *us* with having caused any of the evils that afflicted us."

But Mr. Canning finds it very convenient to assume (as all reasoners on his side do), that the present distresses are "such as neither laws nor governments can cure." We flatly deny it. Let a large amount of taxes be taken off, and a great relief will be given; a great step be made towards a cure. It is obvious to every one who can count ten upon his fingers, that whether you diminish the cost of production or increase the price of produce, the relief is precisely the same as far as regards the primary interest of the producer; and it is equally plain, that ultimately he, in common with others, will gain much more by a reduc-

tion which makes the balance upon his transactions more favourable, while it leaves the market price of his commodity lower. Now, the glaring deception of the argument we are grappling with is this; it regards the rise of price as *the only remedy* to which the farmer can look; and because "neither laws nor governments" can raise the price of produce, it concludes, that the distress is "such as neither laws nor governments can cure." If, on the other hand, it is said that no further diminution of the public burthens can be effected, we answer, *first*, that the same objection has been made in nearly the same terms to each succeeding proposition for reducing the expenditure of the country, and has as uniformly been found, by those who urged it, easily overcome when the loss of some vote compelled them in good earnest to bethink them of economy; and *next*, that such an assertion never can be borne as long as salaries are double and treble and quadruple what they were the last time that wheat sold for 40*s.* a quarter. Much may undoubtedly be still taken from the burthens of the people; but if ten millions more were spared, by retrenchments and the abandonment of the sinking fund, now admitted on all hands to be a delusion, we should contend, that common decency required all objectors to a still further reduction to be silent, if the public distresses were still intolerable, and these very objectors themselves held or coveted places of overgrown emolument. In a country, suffering as this now suffers, it is indecent to speak of the malady as incurable, while large salaries are paid for mere convenience, or luxury, or pomp. Even the most efficient places under the Crown could be filled by the very men who now hold them with a third of the emoluments, and they would be as well paid as in many other countries. But it seems to be always assumed, that every part of the community must be exhausted by sufferings, and endure every species of privations, rather than that those who have occasioned all those calamities should have a single rose-leaf turned beneath them to disturb their repose; and to make this doctrine the more complete, whosoever shall have the boldness to hint that place may peradventure be desired by the place-hunter, among

other things, because of its profits, must lay his account with being reviled and ridiculed, as if he had uttered something shocking to human nature, or utterly abhorrent to reason and the nature of things. No one holds so high a tone on this topic as Mr. Canning has done upon all occasions. To hear him, you would suppose the emoluments of place to be not only the very last thing that any one dreams of, but rather that they are wholly out of the question; and, indeed, that men take office in spite of the salary, and not because of it. We know not whether, in his instance, this may be called canting; but we are sure, that, with most public men, it is outrageously so. The bulk of the present ministers and their adherents are notoriously men to whom the loss of salary would be so inconvenient as hardly to be bearable. Being a year or two now and then in place is not very lucrative, but half a lifetime of it is extremely profitable; and, at any rate, nothing can be more grossly inconsistent than the bitter resistance to every reduction of their salaries which these very men offer, who so constantly proclaim the pay to be no part of their motives in seeking office.

We have been led into this train of reflection by Mr. Canning's general assertion of the convenient doctrine, that "nothing at all can be done for us." And a curious passage in these Speeches, affords a striking illustration of the principles to which we have referred as presiding over the conduct of the place-loving portion of the community. We allude to his explanation of the reason why he allowed himself to be made Governor-General, and sent to India for a period not less than seven years. His account of this matter is really exceeded by nothing in Bubb Dodington. We must therefore give it in his own words.

"When called to office in 1816, I was called to a department perfectly alien from my official habits, and with the business of which I had no previous acquaintance; but, in the course of nearly five years' diligent administration of that department, *it has so happened* (1), that I am supposed, by those in whom the law has vested the power of appointing to the Government of India, to have qualified myself for the more immediate direction of that government, over the concerns of which it has been my duty to exercise a distant superintendence.

"*Many obvious circumstances*, undoubtedly, would make *it more agreeable to me* (2) to remain in this country—(*Loud cheers.*) I see around me more than one hundred and sixty motives for so wishing to remain—(*Renewed cheers.*) But, Gentlemen, *I hold that a public man is*, unless he can show cause of honour or duty to the contrary, *bound to accept a trust which he is selected* (3) as competent to administer, FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST (4).

"Gentlemen, those in whom the law, as I have said, vests the power of appointment (subject to the approbation of the Crown), have done me the honour to think, that I may be the humble instrument of conferring some benefit on the population of an extensive empire. I fear they overrate my capacity for the task which they impose upon me, as your kindness has overrated my services to you —(*Cries of 'No! No!'* But *I have not felt myself at liberty* (5) to decline a task at once so difficult and so honourable; I MUST EXECUTE IT TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY."—pp. 9, 10.

We recommend the gentle reader to try an experiment on this passage. Let him compose his muscles as carefully as he can; let him drive every witness away from his presence, and lock his room-door; let him then try to read aloud, with a grave face, the above extraordinary lines; and if he can get through them without laughter, we have underrated his powers of countenance. How prodigious, then, must have been those of the speaker! As for the fate of any ordinary reader we can have no doubt. We have marked certain portions in Italics; and we will hold him a wager, that if he gets over the first, or the two first of them,—if he passes these distance-posts, he still is thrown out before the third. But as to his passing the fourth, there are hardly any odds we should not offer; and we take for granted that no one but Mr. C. himself ever dreamt of passing the fifth.

Why, positively, it should seem as if, in this free country, the home of "rational liberty,"—the "model" for others which are in quest of a constitution, (p. 36)—where, "God be praised, we have long ago arrived at all the blessings," which freemen can enjoy; it should seem as if, notwithstanding all severe penalties against forcibly sending persons out of the realm, there were a sort of pressgang suffered to roam our streets, and carry off the liege subjects of the King, to parts beyond the seas to make them Governors. It should seem as if the act renewing the Honourable Company's charter had, by a side-

wind, repealed the Habeas Corpus Act, and enabled them to spread their Asiatic despotism abroad from Leadenhall-street. We had thought that there was only one remnant of this kind of slavery among us in modern times, and that it had been recently abolished; we mean, the forcing the Speaker of the House of Commons into the Chair, after he had been elected by dint of an assiduous canvass on the part of himself and his friends; unless, indeed, the unseemly violence with which Deans and Chapters exercise the sacrilege which they term an election, in forcing men to be Bishops, may seem to furnish another instance. Possibly, from hence may have arisen the rumours, that the present Speaker was destined to be seized upon, and exported to India, after Mr. Canning's escape. The Directors having found the last man they caught so refractory and slippery, may have thought of trying one better broken in to such acts of forcible appointment, by having undergone the process of compulsory elevation to the Chair of the House.

When we perceive the reluctance with which he yields to the gentle violence that sentenced him to banishment, and mark how painful the infliction is, notwithstanding the consolation afforded by the prospect of benefiting the Hindoos; when we note, moreover, the hundred and sixty reasons for wishing to remain at home—a very small allowance, compared with those which the hearers probably hoped to have for joining in the wish—it is really some relief to learn, that, in the course of a few days, he obtained protection against the Honourable Company, whether by a writ of privilege, or by application to a Judge at Chambers; for at the next dinner we find him speaking more as a free agent, and as one who actually had some voice in the question of what was to become of him. He begins with an odd kind of joke, somewhat akin to that familiar one which consists in answering a request for information, by asking, "*Can you keep a secret?*"—and on the curious inquirer saying "*Yes,*" replying, "*So can I.*" For after stating at some length the difficulties which beset him, and the misconstructions he is exposed to whichever line he takes, whether that of

maintaining silence as to his negotiation with the Government, or of telling his friends the whole, he informs them, that "after doubting much and long," and "on full reflection," he has "determined to brave the danger" of telling all; and then he says, "Upon my honour I have nothing to tell" (p. 38). In short, he has had no communication whatever made to him; and this he declares, because his select body of confidential friends, assembled in a place, and at a period of the day consecrated to delicate disclosures, 160 in number, including newspaper reporters, have a clear right to know it, inasmuch as their kindness and attachment "to him gave them *an interest* in whatever concerns him" (p. 39). Then, justly foreseeing that those dear and *interested* friends (as he will probably soon feel them to be, if he has not already) might naturally carry their anxious inquiries one step further; and having learnt from him all he knew touching the part of the business of which he was wholly ignorant, might desire to be informed respecting the only thing which must have been known to him, his intention of taking office, if allowed,—he adds, that he will tell them nothing at all about it:—and that he hopes they will not expect it! "This only he can *frankly* declare, that his decision will be founded upon—" what does the reader think?—"upon—an honest and impartial view of public considerations *alone*, and that it will be determined, not by a calculation of interests, but by a balance and comparison of duties." That is to say, he will, in one scale, put the interests of the Indian subjects, and, in the other, the great object of resisting reform, and defending the constitution; and according as the one or the other scale preponderates, he goes or stays! Regard for his own interest, of course, is wholly out of the question; that of his political friends is equally to be neglected; his family is to be put entirely on one side, as well as his personal friends; he is only occupied with "that diffusive benevolence which neglects the circle immediately around it" (p. 30), and of which he had, a few moments before, "confessed some little suspicion" (ib.). But suppose he should, after accurately balancing his conflicting duties,

find that he was better fitted for the European than the Hindostannee department, an obstacle must be removed, namely, the Catholic question. The difficulty, to be sure, is great; and so long as it exists, there is little chance that the Court of St. James's will cast upon him the same longing eyes which had so bewitched him in the Court of Directors. But what will not the ardent and disinterested love of our country effect? What sacrifices of interest (nay, of principle too) will it not prepare us for? This zeal to serve our native land in her need (never, of course, in our own), is, it should seem, above the most powerful propensity of our nature. It masters all the rest, and survives them all—tenacity of place being to "public men" what tenacity of life is to reptiles. Therefore, the Catholic question is got rid of with very little ceremony, in a passage which we will not cite, because it varies materially from the first newspaper reports of this Speech; and though either edition is humiliating enough for Mr. Canning, and must be sufficiently grateful to the Lord Chancellor and the Orange party, yet we might, by giving the one, misrepresent him unfavourably; and by adopting the other, we might weaken the sort of recantation which he unquestionably intended to make.

How the Court has been propitiated, and how Mr. Canning has settled his balance of duties to the empire, we all know. He has suffered the interests of India to kick the beam. With the mysteries of this calculation we profess not to be acquainted. Report assigns but a few hours' time to the operation of calculating. But one thing we should think those who are curious in such *calculus* might desire to have explained. How happens it that a strict sense of public duty prevented him from hesitating about leaving the Constitution a prey to Reformers, because he had been thought fit for the Government of India, while his fitness continues the same, and the dangers of the Constitution having in nowise increased, he now hesitates as little about remaining at home? How happened it, that he had all but embarked, and left the Constitution to its fate, when no place at home was offered him; and that the instant one is within

his reach, he takes it, and leaves India to its fate? Is it that, beside public duties, there must be public employments to weigh, else he will fling none of them into either scale of his balance—that they must have the stamp of office, otherwise he deems them not standard, and cares not what may be their weight? One should have thought that the Reformers might be opposed in Parliament quite as advantageously as in the Foreign Office; and yet he never dreamt of delaying his shipment outwards until the doors of Downing-street were unfolded, although the House of Commons "threw open its doors wide" as usual. Not even when Lord Castlereagh's death left the enemies of reform without a leader, did this nice balancer of public duties *alone*, hesitate about his flight to the East, any more than he did when Lord Castlereagh, of whose capacities and views he was the recorded derider, managed both the foreign and domestic concerns of the country. He could leave the sum of affairs in his hands during the crisis of the war, after pronouncing him incompetent to their management in a season of comparative ease, and go to Lisbon, because, we suppose, his public duty required him, of all men, to receive the King of Portugal on his landing; he could leave all in his incapable hands when the Radicals had become so much more formidable, and hie him away to the Tropics, because the Court of Directors, over whom he had been placed for five years, had discovered in him a knack at Indian matters. He could persist in abandoning his place in Parliament, when no man could tell in whose hands the reins of Government might be left. The fear of reform, the love of our ancient order of things, could, it seems, avail nothing, unless place was superadded to the calls of duty: But the instant that this graceful and convenient union is formed, he is all ear to those claims to which he had been so often and so obstinately deaf, and, after ridding himself of the Catholic question, he steps unincumbered into his situation, indignant that any one should be found uncharitable enough to imagine the possibility of any personal or private motives having been regarded in the whole course of his calculations. We

expect that Mr. Canning will henceforth express himself with more forbearance towards the enthusiasm of Reformers, and the credulity to which it sometimes may give rise; that he will no longer laugh at the theoretical and impracticable public virtue which some of them recommend; that he will carefully shun all sneers at pitches of unattainable purity; and even avoid any allusion to cant, but little of which has ever been discovered in their professions, and that little, comparatively speaking, of an ordinary and not very revolting cast.

For some years past, Mr. Canning has taken upon himself to act as champion of the present system, against all Reform whatsoever. We state the nature of his assumed office thus generally, because no other description is fitted to represent it. He may tell us, that he is only combating Parliamentary Reform: but his whole reasonings, all his topics and all his appeals, are equally applicable to any proposed alteration of any existing portion of the institutions of the country. In vain will he profess that it is against wholesale and violent changes in the representation that he warns the country: For there is not an abuse in it so flagrant that he would suffer to be removed by an amendment the most cautious and gentle. He may protest as he pleases against being supposed to defend everything; and cry out for specifications of corrupt practices, which, when detected, may be separately and piecemeal corrected. Not one of his arguments will admit of any qualification. They are uncompromising, and of universal application; they will do as well to defend or to attack one position as another, skreening alike all established evils, assailing equally every proposed improvement, as indifferently as the redoubt or the artillery act with respect to the merits of those whom they shelter or annoy. Indeed, not only is this the nature of his arguments and declamations, but he has throughout pretty distinctly showed that he was aware of it, and has never proved, except perhaps in one instance, very prone to baulk their genius. Save on the Catholic question, where is the amendment of our law that he has not resisted, and always with the same general appeals to the alarms of the aristocracy? He was pleased, indeed,

to sneer, and even to laugh pretty loud, at the "*Wisdom of our Ancestors*," on the late debates upon his Bill. You would have thought that this was some favourite phrase of the Orange faction, invented to stifle all inquiry, and supersede the use of reason upon the subject of the Penal Code. No such thing. To stifle inquiry and supersede reason was indeed the purpose of its invention; but the inventor was Mr. Canning himself, and the occasion, was Sir Samuel Romilly's Bill to prevent men of landed property from defrauding their creditors, and to make *every* member of that class do, what every *honest* member of it does as a matter of course, pay his debts out of his estate, and not enrich his family by the ruin of his tradesmen. No matter how plain the justice of the measure was, how degrading to the landed interest the supposition, that they were desirous of resisting it;—no matter how glaring the iniquity of the present law, and how intolerable the practical evils which it was shown to have produced; such is the law, was the only answer; you seek *to change that which is*,—therefore you are in the wrong. A better instance needs not be produced, to demonstrate that his perpetual application of his doctrines to Parliamentary Reform is accidental, and that, in truth, they equally exclude every change. At present, however, we are to view them chiefly in their connexion with this most important question.

His first argument in favour of the present system of election, is drawn from the circumstance of his own success at Liverpool. His grand answer to everything that can be urged against the existing abuses is always, that practically, "the system works well;" and he considers, oddly enough, his own return for that borough to be a striking illustration of this. "Let those," says he, "who doubt the practical excellence of our political institutions look at the scene which this assembly exhibits; and when they see how far an humble individual, without personal distinction, or personal claims of any kind, on the consideration or goodwill of a great community, can earn their good opinions,—I may venture to say, their affection, simply by the performance of his public duty

as their representative. Let them consider,"—and so forth. "Hence," he adds, "can such a country sink under the vainly apprehended dangers of despotism?" Translated into plain English, this passage should be read thus:—"Here is a man who had the whole weight of the Government to support him; who had been half his life in office; was expected to be restored to it again before the Parliament met; who was backed by a set of rich merchants, eager for the good things which ministers have to bestow. When you see how he obtained a majority of the votes, notoriously under the influence of those traders in produce and politics, and still retains the confidence of his supporters, even at the moment when he is about to have either the whole government of India, or half the government of England, can you doubt that elections are, in practice, pure and disinterested proceedings, or feel an apprehension lest they should be prostituted to support a corrupt administration?" To be sure, it must have required some command of countenance in both the speaker and the audience to go gravely through this elaborate and curious misrepresentation of his claims upon them; but his connexion with Liverpool is a favourite topic in illustration of his general argument, and he really appears to labour under some delusion respecting the right of election there. He is always appealing to his own situation as that of a person representing a place where no reform can be desired—a perfectly open and free borough. This seems so extraordinary a mistake, that we must give the words in which he states it.

"So far from my situation as representative of the second town in the empire, stifling my voice on this subject, I have not the slightest hesitation in saying, that if I were member for Old Sarum, I should more probably hold my tongue upon it. It is because I am member for Liverpool; because *I can have no shadow of personal interest in maintaining that more imperfect species of representation*, which I do, nevertheless, conscientiously maintain; it is because my opinion *cannot be questioned, as influenced by motives of individual convenience*, that I feel a confidence, which I otherwise might not feel, in exposing what I think the fallacy of those doctrines which push the principle of direct personal representation to an extent such as, if adopted, must change the Constitution."—pp. 25, 26.

Now, where did Mr. Canning ever find a Parliamentary Reformer who was satisfied with such a right of election as that of Liverpool, where freemen only, and they, whether resident or not, return the members? Is not this as much a close corporation as if it were a borough one-twentieth or one-hundredth of the size? Does the mere difference of extent change the nature of the franchise? If a corporation of thirty, in a town of 1200 inhabitants, save their fellow-citizens the trouble of choosing their representative, it is termed a close or rotten borough; and the member so chosen may, it seems, be taunted with having some interest in defending the existence of such limited franchises. But extend the same preposterous right of voting to "the second town in the empire;" suffer two or three thousand corporators to choose for 120,000 inhabitants, and no matter in what way the select and privileged body is composed, although it may consist of the very individuals most unfit to exercise the franchise, to the exclusion of all who might most worthily be entrusted with it; yet this extension of the size, and therefore of the mischief, is to be the cure! the place is to be called an open borough, the choice a popular election, and the person chosen by a handful of corporators and their immediate dependents, with every contamination of bribery and treating and threatening that can taint still more a proceeding grounded in corruption, is to vapour as if he were returned by the inhabitants at large, in the purest manner, and to take for granted, that no mortal can suspect him of any interest in maintaining exclusive corporate rights, and opposing all attempts to make elections really pure. Upon a little reflection, we presume, he will allow this, with several other matters, to be classed under the head of those "*exaggerations*" which, he tells us (p. 16), are "freely and frankly allowed in the celebration of municipal victories." Another exaggeration, however, occurs, so very gross, that we trust there is some error in the report. A deputation of the chairmen of different trading associations presented an address, thanking him for "his zealous attention to their interests," and "his kindness and impartiality" in doing the business of the town as their

member. In this piece of civility, at a moment when he was resigning his seat, and going to the other side of the globe, some of those joined who had been, and were well known still to be, his warm political opponents; and every allusion to the points of irreconcileable difference which separated them, was, of course, carefully avoided. Yet he is made (p. 16), in speaking of this flattering piece of personal courtesy, to construe it into a cessation of political hostility, and to say, in consequence of it, that "he stands in the peculiar circumstances of not knowing that he has even a political enemy" left in the place. So ungenerous a use never was made of such a kindness. We really believe Mr. Canning to be incapable of it; possibly he never said so; at any rate, he may have thought it allowable to exaggerate this kindness when on the point of leaving them for ever. As he is destined to remain, we can have little doubt that his ignorance will be removed, on the question, "Whether or not he has a political enemy left," as soon as the new writ for Liverpool is issued.[1] Having now cleared the ground, we may come more conveniently to the bulk of his arguments against all reform of the representation.

Those arguments may be reduced to the two following propositions, of which one is the speaker's most hackneyed topic in all debates on this question, and the other is, as far as we recollect, now for the first time brought forward by him, and dwelt upon with the kind of preference usually given to novelties, by those who think more of the popular effect than the solidity of their positions. The *first* is, that the Crown has no more influence in Parliament than is sufficient for maintaining its independent existence as a branch of the Constitution; the *second*, that all the mischiefs now traced to the state of the representation, and especially the support of corrupt practices and ruinous measures, cannot be ascribed to the House of Commons, *alone*, inasmuch as *the Lords* have concurred in every act of the Legislature; as a corollary to which, it is added, that the reform really desired would either do nothing, or

[1] A Pamphlet, entitled "Matters of Fact, by a *Political Enemy*," may already have cleared up this point.

destroy the House of Lords. Upon these views of the other two branches, the Crown and the Lords, rests his whole argument against any alteration in the construction of the Commons House; and we purpose shortly to examine them in their order.

I. The anxiety betrayed for the influence of the Crown, and the belief that it has not, upon the whole, increased, Mr. Canning shares with the late Mr. Rose, who put forth a tractate upon this matter. The fundamental views are precisely the same in the Speech and in the Book,—that the power of the Crown has only in name and appearance been augmented since the American war; that while the country has been increasing in "strength, wealth and population," the Crown, "if it be good for anything at all in the Constitution," must keep some sort of pace with the growth of the community; and that its increased influence is more than counteracted by the increased power of public opinion. These things are handled differently, no doubt, by the two artists, each working in his peculiar manner; the one deals in calculations, the other in metaphors; and yet, upon a closer view, there will perhaps be found a nearer approach than might at first be suspected, between the pamphleteer's figures of arithmetic, and the speaker's figures of rhetoric; for fancy is, with them both, the principal agent in conjuring. We certainly do not intend to enter into any detail of the facts, almost equally misrepresented by the accountant and the poet; but the case must be stated; and though unhappily it is too plain to leave any doubt, yet it lies in too narrow a compass to require many words.

The influence of the Crown must necessarily be in proportion to the direct power which it possesses by the force at its disposal, and the funds under its control for defraying the whole expenses of the State. Before the war, it had an army of about 53,000 men; at present, that force is nearly doubled. Before the war, the expenditure was 18 millions; it is now nearly quadrupled. Part of the increased regular force is no doubt employed in new colonies; but even the army within the realm is augmented in nearly the same proportion; and the operation of the increased

expenditure is evidently the same, in augmenting the influence of the Crown, whether it be occasioned by extended dominions or not. During the war, too, the extravagance of the Government reached a pitch wholly unparalleled, and beyond measure criminal in its agents. In three years 400 millions were spent or squandered; the average of the charges for these years, exclusive of the cost of the national debt, was 83 millions; including that cost (which is not to be deducted with a reference to the creation of influence) it exceeded 132 millions. Nor let it be imagined that the effects of such enormous establishments in favour of the Crown's power, cease with their reduction. For many years men's minds were trained to the contemplation of this system, and their plans were adapted to it. The habit of looking to Government for work, at least for pay, was engendered; the calculations of families were founded in part upon the easy access which they had to the public purse; and, in this intimate union of national and individual finance, most men relied for part of their ways and means upon the budget of the year. This habit is not by any means destroyed; it is not even sensibly weakened. How many persons who ought to be independent in their conduct, are afraid of giving their votes for the only measures that can relieve the pressure of the present distresses, because they have a vague, ill-defined notion, that if they keep well with the Government something may turn up in their favour, some sinecure for themselves, some provision for a son? How much more powerful is this feeling among persons of superior rank, and whom the present system of election makes the depositaries of that portion of the franchise which is not monopolized by the individual owners of boroughs, or the public boards?

Now, against all these mighty realities we are desired to set the force of public opinion. But this is an unpardonable misstatement of the question. The complaint is, that the Crown has so much power through the force at its command, and so much influence through the patronage at its disposal, that the independence of Parliament is become an expression only calculated to excite merriment. But is all the power and all the influence exhausted directly

upon the members of Parliament? Is it not an inseparable part of the same increase, that it must have augmented the sway of the Crown over public opinion also? Such reasoners as Mr. Canning argue as if the influence of the Crown were something kept altogether apart from the community; as if it were a weapon placed in store, and only to be used defensively when some crisis should bring the Crown and the people in contact; as if it were a weight in one scale of the balance,—the weight of public opinion being placed in the other, and all communication cut off between the two, and all interchange prevented; whereas in fact there is not an atom of that influence which is not constantly exerted in bending the public opinion, and preparing the people as well as their unauthorized representatives for the surrender of liberty. Even the press, of which so much is said, works for the established system with all its abuses. The dispensers of wealth and honours can use it, and do employ it, to promote their corrupt views, and we doubt if, at any period of our history, a greater abundance of venal writers was ever known to receive protection and encouragement from the rulers of the country and their immediate dependents.

We are very far from asserting that these attempts are successful. We do not apprehend, God be thanked, anything like a subjugation of public opinion, either by force or seduction, so as to make the voice of the people approve of the profligacy of their governors, and the gross mismanagement of their affairs. But what does this prove, admitted as it is by us, and asserted as the ground of their argument by those with whom we are contending? What, but that all the weight of Government is insufficient to give falsehood the currency of truth; that the misconduct of the public servants is so great as to set the people against them, in spite of all the means in their employ to blind and to overawe the country? In the Houses of Parliament, constituted as they now are, the same means of seduction are employed with very different results. Among those select personages, the success of the dispenser of patronage is tolerably well assured. There they can rely upon a ready approval of all their proceedings, at the very

moment when the same means of influence have been in vain tried to procure assent out of doors.

The argument, then, stands exactly thus. The increased influence is too powerful for the independence of Parliament. It operates sensibly upon public opinion also, but generally fails to stifle or beguile it. Sometimes it succeeds even in seducing the people from their duty to themselves, and making them blind to their best interests. But generally it occasions a wide difference between the sense of the country, and the deliberations of those who ought to be its representatives. Therefore, the only rational expedient for rendering the Parliament once more a true representation of the nation, and preventing the overgrown influence of the Crown from perpetuating the misgovernment of the many for the benefit of the few, is to restore to the people the choice of their members. The Crown would still have as much hold over the public councils as the soundness and honesty of its measures could give it, with a great leaning towards it, occasioned by the patronage necessarily in its hands, and sufficient to insure the adoption of its plans, unless where they were manifestly vicious or unwise.

The argument with which we are grappling, is only a skilfully disguised edition of the portentous doctrine broached by some of the Ministers, and so revolting, even to the Tory Members of the House of Commons, that it was retracted or explained away almost as soon as it was promulgated. *Knowledge*, said they, is increasing; *discussion* is frequent; the people busy themselves *more and more* with public affairs; *therefore*, to counteract the tendency of this progressive improvement in the community, towards an invasion of the Crown's authority, patronage must be conferred on the Executive Government, and places, otherwise useless, kept up! Nothing can exceed the folly, not to say the wickedness, of such a scheme, which is, in truth, preaching corruption for the sake of despotism. It was too boldly and nakedly brought forth, —too little veiled in decent covering, for the prudish society, among whom it was made known; and accordingly its reception was anything but flattering. And yet

it is a most logical inference from the doctrines of Messrs. George Rose and Canning. It is, if not the direct converse of their propositions, at least an easy corollary from them; nor can any one consistently refuse his consent to it, who agrees with those zealous advocates of the Crown, and enemies of Reform. For surely, if the progress of public opinion has been so great as to counteract the effect of so many legions and so many millions, and if the sound view of a happy government is that which represents the people as naturally in a conflict with their rulers,—a disbanding of legions, or retrenching of millions, would overset the beauteous balance; and all who deem "the Crown good for anything in our Constitution," are bound in consistency to uphold both the army and the treasury, without stopping its inquire what enemies there may be to fight, or what services to pay, since the most important purpose to which any establishment can be subservient is the protection of the Constitution. The extravagance of these positions cannot easily be palliated; but perhaps it has been surpassed by the Prelate who has lately promulgated to his clergy the doctrine of the necessary conflict between the progress of knowledge, and the cause of morals and religion.

It is strange to see a man of acuteness like Mr. Canning fall into so many glaring inconsistencies; the rather, that they occur not only in his reasoning, but, what is worse, in his feelings. Thus, he is a passionate admirer of our Constitution as established;—he "owes allegiance to the monarchy under which he was born;"—it is "quite sufficient for him to find these things so;" just in the same way that "Providence has ordained Great Britain to be an island, our ancestors have, from immemorial time, ascertained it to be a monarchy'" and yet he feels an equal reverence for the imperfections which are of yesterday, the rottenness which time has engendered, and the excrescences which, within the last thirty years, have, from a mere accident, grown upon the system. Nay, he is thoroughly persuaded that all these adventitious parts are essentially necessary to its existence; and he seems to conclude with the comfortable assurance, that the most venerable of possible governments could not go on for an

hour without the aid of the most flagrant of possible abuses. But for the Crown, his reverence is in an especial manner exemplary; and yet he shows it forth by asserting (and it is a favourite topic with him), that, to destroy the monarchy, and at once convert it into a republic, we have only to make the Representatives of the people really to speak the sense of the country! "Against a popular assembly so constituted," he says, "no monarchy could stand: such a government must be practically, whatever it be in name, a republic." Is not this distinctly to admit, that the people of this country abhor Kingly government? Is it not to allege, that the Throne is upheld by fear and by corruption—by bayonet and bribe? Yet, what is there in the history of this people, either heretofore or in our own days which gives any countenance to such a whim? So fond of Kings were they, that Charles II. was taken back without any securities, from mere hatred of commonwealths, and cherished, in spite of a life, both public and private, the most revolting to every principle and prejudice of the nation;—that his brother, hated as heir-presumptive, was no sooner associated with the magical sound of "King," than he became everything but all-powerful, and might have established a despotism, if he would only have made it a Protestant one; that the exiled family retained vast popularity, notwithstanding all their follies and crimes, merely because they had the elder title of descent, and maintained more strictly Royalist maxims; nay, that in these times, after all the rude shocks to which the love of Kings, and Queens, and Princesses, has been exposed, we have witnessed the interest excited by Royal sufferings more than once absorb every strong feeling of a private or selfish nature, to a degree which they who best know foreign nations, pronounce inconceivable anywhere but in England. We allude to the sickness of a King, the persecution of a Queen, and the death of a Princess.

Not less amazing than the inconsistency which we have just been remarking, is the blindness of Mr. Canning to the obvious and irresistible answer with which a moment's reflection must enable every one to meet his favourite

topic. If it proves anything, it proves by far too much. If a reformed House of Commons and a Monarchy cannot stand together, the doom of the Constitution is at all events sealed. For two things are quite certain; *first*, the pure representation of the people, by men speaking their entire sense, and acting, to use Mr. Canning's phrase, as the organs of their volition, not as a deliberative body appointed to consult respecting their interests, can only destroy the Kingly branch of the government, by fully representing a *republican people*, speaking the sense of men hostile to monarchy, and making effectual a volition to pull it down; therefore the nation must be supposed utterly republican in its principles and feelings, otherwise the argument entirely fails. *Next*, If the people are so bent upon a change, and so resolute to get rid of the monarchical form as the argument supposes, the only question is concerning the precise time when they will accomplish their desire; for no one doubts, that when a determinate purpose like this exists, sooner or later it must be accomplished; and least of all can Mr. Canning dispute the proposition, — he who has given us a whole allegory about steam, — to illustrate the omnipotence of public opinion, which he admits "governs everything in the last resort." Did it never strike him, that if the exact expression of public opinion by a reformed Parliament would be fatal to the existing order of things, it can only be so because public opinion is irreconcileably hostile to the system; and that, if it be so, and he cannot pretend to show any barrier against its force, the process of sap or of storm is the only choice left for the garrison; in one way or the other they must surrender.

Our own belief, upon both these points, is diametrically opposite to his. We are convinced, that the freest representation of all classes,—of the property, the talents, and the numbers of the people,—would only increase the basis on which the Monarchy rests, and make it more secure, by planting its foundation in the interests and in the affections of the whole community. To fancy that men would all at once become mere creatures of politics — wholly absorbed in contemplations of a speculative kind—careless

of every selfish and social feeling—deaf to the suggestions of individual advantage—changed in their whole habits of thinking respecting men and things; in other words, to suppose that rank, and wealth, and learning, and talents, and worth, would suddenly lose their influence either among the electors, or those whom their voice might delegate to consult for them, or, if you will, faithfully to tell their minds, is indulging in an extravagance of the imagination which carries one back to Swift's Flying Island and Academy of Projectors. The convenient assumption by which the reasoners with whom we are arguing always help themselves along, is nothing less than this—they take for granted that, when Parliament is reformed, no one will interfere in elections but the mere rabble, or, which comes to the same thing, that men of respectability and property will be so few in number as to have no direct weight, and will wholly lose their influence over the voices of others. That their indirect influence will be great, no thinking man can doubt; but the direct influence of their numbers is far greater than those thoughtless and dogmatical talkers are apt to suppose. Do they know that above half a million of individuals have property in the funds, many of them, of course, being also heads of families? How much more than a million of men does this connect with the established order of things, possibly with the most vulnerable part of it? If we suppose landed and trading capital to be only half as much subdivided, it will follow, that a million and a half are in like manner proprietors of the soil and stock of the country, or immediately connected with proprietors. But two millions and a half of men[1] are nearly one half of those whom, upon any plan, the most extensive that has been suggested, it would be possible to make voters at elections. Again, there were, in 1811, about two millions and a half of families in the island, and considerably more than two millions of inhabited houses; a tolerably good ground for believing, that there are much

[1] These calculations are upon the Population Returns of 1811, and the Income Tax Returns of 1815. The increase in the numbers cannot vary the proportions; nor can the diminution of Income materially affect the argument.

fewer than half the adult males of the community who are not connected with its security by some kind of property at least, either as owners, or their sons. These are among our reasons for thinking, that the direct universal force of property is much underrated by the enemies of reform; but the individual influence of property on which we rest, as our topic of chief consolation to such alarmists, is that which has always proved effectual to secure every established system of polity, whose corruptions were not too deeply rooted to admit of a cure, or whose rulers were not so deluded as to prefer the risk of destruction to the certainty of well-timed reform.

II. We shall give the second and most novel of the arguments now brought forward by Mr. Canning in his own words.

"What are the general arguments by which we are urged to admit a change in the constitution of the House of Commons? These arguments are derived from expensive wars, from heavy taxes, and from severe enactments, constituting, as is affirmed, so many outrageous inroads upon the Constitution. Granted, for argument's sake, that all these charges are true. Granted that all the proceedings of Parliament, for many years past, have been reprehensible. But were they the proceedings of *the House of Commons* alone? Does the British Constitution act by a *single* organ? Has there been no concurrence in the maintenance of those wars, no consent to the imposition of those taxes, no co-operation in the passing of those enactments? Is there no other assembly in existence which partook of the opinions on which the House of Commons has proceeded, and which would make, therefore, the reform of the House of Commons nugatory for the professed purposes, unless the co-ordinate authority were also reformed? If you reform the House of Commons, on the grounds of past misconduct, what will you do with *the House of Lords?* If the House of Commons is to be reformed because it sanctioned the war with America; if it is to be reformed, because it maintained the war with France—(sinking, for a moment, the undoubted fact, that the war with America was a favourite measure with the people of this country as much as with the Government; sinking, for a moment, the undoubted fact, that the war with France was emphatically the war of the nation)—if the House of Commons, I ask, is to be reformed, because it approved and supported those wars; if it is to be reformed, because it passed laws for the suppression of internal disturbance, is the House of Lords to go free, which consented to those wars, and of those acts consented to all, while some of them, and those not the least severe, it originated? If no such reform is to be applied to the House of Lords, what is the supposed effect upon that House of a reform of the

House of Commons? Let us fairly speak out: Is the unreformed House of Lords to continue in full vigour to counteract the will of the reformed House of Commons? Where, then, is the use of the reform? Or, is the reformed House of Commons to act upon the House of Lords by intimidation and compulsion? Ay! *that*, to be sure, is what *must be meant*, if there be truth in the argument; but that is what no man will say.

"My quarrel, then, with this course of argument is, not that it aims at an alteration, at an improvement, if you please, in the House of Commons; but, that it aims at quite another thing than a House of Commons as *part* of a Legislature. The legislative authority of the State, according to the Constitution as it stands, is shared between two Houses of Parliament. The suggested reform goes to provide a single instrument, which shall not only do its own work, but inevitably control the working of the other; which, if the object of the reform is obtained, must act so powerfully, that it must, in the very nature of things, reject any co-ordinate power, and speedily act alone."—pp. 21–23.

Now, to this plausible and shallow argumentation, we first of all give the same answer that we urged against the similar reasoning applied to the risk of the reformed House of Commons overwhelming the Crown. What preserves the Lords at present? Not surely their numerical strength—nor the force of the Commons, added to to theirs—not the army itself, at their joint disposal, nor even the public purse, alike in their hands—but the influence which rank, property, and accomplishments, give them in the country,—and the opinion of the people, upon the whole, favourable to the existing constitution, with all its blemishes, and willing to bear with abuses, in the hope and expectation of their reformation. Now, this security would only be augmented by reform. But further; had the Commons spoken more exactly the sense of the country, the Lords would have yielded to the same impression in most instances, and would only have been able to hold out against sudden gusts of popular feeling, and perhaps against one or two more fixed opinions in which the people were clearly wrong. But it is only in such cases that the Lords *ought* to control the opinions or wishes of the community, by the direct interposition of their negative. And the government could neither be conducted more beneficially, nor the rights of its several members placed on more solid foundations, than they

would be, if the voice of the community were always expressed by men freely chosen to give it effect, and only counteracted by a body more independent of the people, when there was room for a calm revision and correction. Great part of the dilemma into which Mr. Canning thinks he has driven his adversaries, consists merely in the nature of the thing; it arises from the coexistence of two independent legislative bodies, and is classed, if we rightly remember, as one instance of political paradox in an Essay of Mr. Hume's. Did Mr. C. never hear of compromise by mutual concession? Did he never know two arbitrators, chosen by opposite parties, come to an agreement without either calling in the umpire, or the stronger knocking the weaker down? Can any reform be seriously thought of, which would return a perfectly different class of men to Parliament? Would the admixture of some others, not now there, and the more intimate union between the whole body and their constituents, at once deprive *all* aristocracy of all sway, and plant in the midst of a people, perhaps too prone to respect birth and wealth, a vulgar democracy, unadorned and insecure?

It is unfair to assert, that the advocates of a reformed House of Commons mean it to act by "intimidation or compulsion on the unreformed House of Lords." Indeed, some reform in the House of Lords itself seems desirable for the increase of its own dignity and importance in the system; and perhaps that reform would do more than can ever be wanting to secure its influence in the legislature. If the right of voting by proxy were abandoned, its sittings would be better attended, and its deliberations would command more respect. A minister could never insure the acquiescence of a majority, by bringing in his pockets the votes of men necessarily ignorant of the matter upon which they are deciding; and the indirect influence of the body upon popular opinion would be extended, by the frequency of discussions in an assembly peculiarly fitted to attract public attention. But this is not our only objection to the statement. We maintain, that there would be far less "intimidation and compulsion," were the public voice peacefully echoed by their

chosen delegates, than at present, when, to make themselves heard at all, the people must speak in the thundering voice of menace, and assume the fierce attitude of resistance. Are the noble natures of the Lords ever swayed by the influence of such accents and such gestures, in the unreformed state of the Commons? We suspect some of them could name the occasions when they felt there was both "intimidation and compulsion," not indeed from the sister Assembly, but from those whom that Assembly oftentimes ill represents. But can any man breathing, or at least thinking, have a doubt that such conflicts expose the existence of the whole system to infinitely greater hazards than could attend the regular and peaceful indication of popular opinion by the assembled delegates of the community? Or can that be said, without the grossest abuse of language, to be a representative government, and a popular government, in which the firm and almost unanimous determination of the people, wholly disregarded by those who call themselves their deputies, only becomes known and felt through the slow and roundabout operation of its influence upon those who have no connexion with the people, and are known to the constitution only as a check upon them and their delegates? The precise difference between a despotic and a free government, is, not that the people exercise no control over the former, but that they control it regularly and peacefully under the latter. In Turkey, the fear of revolt imposes restraints upon the Sultan, and his viziers and bashaws: in England, the worst of ministers, and the most submissive of Parliaments, dare not go beyond certain limits. But the difference ought, by the genius of our free constitution, to be far wider in practice than it actually is. The avowed representatives and authorized attornies of the people, ought to exercise a direct and legal superintendence, as a matter of acknowledged right, and not leave to the people themselves the office of preventing misgovernment, by threatening convulsion.

They who oppose all reform because it is innovation, and, among the foremost, Mr. Canning, are themselves, as has often been remarked, the greatest patrons of change;

for, as everything decays in the progress of ages, and they would prevent all interference to stay its ravages, they are the real abettors of innovation. But they pretend that to one kind of improvement they have no objection—that which is effected slowly, to use their own trite and figurative language, by the gentle hand of time. Nothing can be more absurd than their conduct with reference to this maxim; it is really grounded on the delusion of a metaphor. They wait for improvements as if *Time* were a substantive agent, and could work of itself; and as often as any change is proposed, however gentle, they resist it because it is attempted by man, and not by this metaphysical being. Ask them to name any improvement brought about by Time, and see how they will be puzzled! For they must either admit that none is to be found, or they must point to some measure of reform actually devised by human heads, and executed by the hands of men. The Feudal system, for instance, was gradually destroyed in this country by a series of changes, ending with the abolition of military tenures after the Restoration. This happy improvement is among the foremost in importance of all those which are ascribed to the safe and gentle and healing hand of the loyal and orthodox reformer in question. The anti-reformers, then, approve of so excellent a consummation? Of the result possibly they may, now that the process is complete; but, to be consistent, they must disapprove of every one of the series of changes through which it was brought about; for every one of them, from the statute of *Quia Emptores* to the statute of Charles II., was, when adopted, a great alteration of the existing order of things, brought about by the direct agency of reforming legislation. If they had had their wish, then, with all their praises of Time as a reformer, not one of his improvements could have been accomplished. In a word, whatever abuses may be slowly engendered in the course of ages, they will suffer no interference to check or to remedy them; whatever salutary changes are suggested by the enlargement of knowledge, or the events that occur in the ever-varying scene of mortal existence, they resist with all their might. Their

wise policy ends in securing to us all the evils which Time can create, and excluding us from the benefit of all the good which it brings.

Hitherto of Mr. Canning's arguments against Reform. Before proceeding very shortly to state our own view of the question, a few words may be expected upon the subject of his Jests; and we must take leave to express our surprise, that he should have condescended, apparently for no other reason than to introduce some extremely misplaced merriment, to make so gross a misrepresentation of the Reformers, as to allege that Reform was the cure proposed in 1817 for high prices, and now for cheapness of provisions. He ought to know, that no Reformer—no one but his own colleagues—ever deemed the low prices arising from abundance, anything less than a blessing. The *high* price of *production*, not the *low* price of *produce*, is the evil complained of; and that is, in great part, caused by the taxes mercilessly laid upon the people by a Parliament, in choosing which, the people had little or no share—laid upon them in order to support profligate and senseless measures, principally intruded to prevent the people from ever acquiring their just share in that election, and to keep Mr. Canning's friends in place—burthens, which, however unbearable they may prove, will never be taken off until the people obtain that just share; in other words, until the Parliament is Reformed. The other great source of our calamities has been the profligate conduct of the same statesmen, Mr. Canning among the number, with respect to the currency; and as none but a corrupt House of Commons, representing interests opposite to those of the people, could ever have become the tools by which such measures were carried on, so the only security against a repetition of the same crimes, is to be found in giving their full share of the Government to the people, whose interest is ever of necessity opposed to the commission of them. But what cares Mr. Canning for these things? What signifies it to him whether these be the real doctrines of Reformers? He had a story to tell about a red lion, and he must make, if he could not find, a way to let it into his Speech. We shall not extract this fable, as the

reader has, in all probability, already seen it; but we will remind its author of an old maxim connected with the subject of Lions, the substance of which, though not in the same language, his new colleagues will, doubtless, oftentimes have in their minds during the limited period of their connexion with him.

> ου χρη λεοντος σκυμνον εν πολει τρεφειν
> μαλιστα δε λεοντα μη'ν πολει τρεφειν
> ην δ' εκτραφη τις, τοις τροποις υπηρετειν.
>
> *Aristophan. Ranæ.*

—which, for the benefit of those hapless objects of his ridicule, the Country Gentlemen, may be thus shortly expressed,—"If you choose to take up one of this breed, and make much of him, you must lay your account with having to bear with his tricks" (literally his "tropes").

We are now anxious to obtain for a moment, the attention of all sober thinking men, alike incapable of being misled by wild and visionary schemes of honest enthusiasts, as of being deterred by the indecent ridicule of the thoughtless, and those jesters who cater for them, from adopting plans of rational improvement. First of all, let them reflect how impossible it is, that the people of this country should much longer submit to be excluded from their just share in the management of their own affairs. Every kind of knowledge is now diffusing itself with a rapidity unexampled in former times among all classes of the community; but political information, and everything connected with it, has become of all other branches the most universally spread. Since the French Revolution, all ranks, even to the humblest, have learnt much of it, and have taken an interest in the practical matters connected with it, still greater than their knowledge. An increase of their attainments is evidently for the benefit of the State, and must tend to its tranquillity as well as improvement; for as nothing can ever hereafter wean the people from their habits of political discussion, and from their firm resolution to make their opinions felt and respected by their rulers, so the more maturely those opinions are formed, the less danger is likely to arise from their expression. Can a nation thus circumstanced, rest satisfied

with the same share in the direct administration of its government, as when nearly all were uninformed, except the highest classes, and no one out of Parliament presumed to have an opinion of his own? We appeal to any one who has mixed at all with the middle, and even the inferior ranks of society. The most respectable opinions, both as to honesty and sound sense, are to be found among the former; but the latter, too, have their own notions, and are daily becoming more enlightened, as well as independent in their views. It is a monstrous state of things which would exclude all the latter, and by far the greater part of the former; that is, the great strength of the nation, both in numbers and in real respectability as well of character as understanding, from a direct share in the representation. We go further; the time is approaching, if it be not arrived, when a considerable number of the middle classes must be admitted within the walls of the Legislature. We must see some yeomen and some tradesmen in the House of Commons. That Assembly must soon be more popular both in its origin and in its composition. We cannot much longer expect to have, as it were, a caste of statesmen, a privileged order of politicians, from among whom all representatives must be chosen, and all persons selected to fill the offices of the State. Let higher rank, greater wealth, and superior accomplishments have still their large share in the direction of affairs; nothing can ever deprive them of it; but to a monopoly *they* are not entitled; and justice as well as the good government and tranquillity of the State require that they should share the task, in some degree at least, with those whose numbers are far greater, and whose respectability is in no one particular less.

We earnestly entreat those whom we are addressing, further to observe, that both the stability of the Government would be incalculably augmented by such a Reform as would give to the voice of the people its due weight, and the administration of our affairs would be improved in an equal degree. No one denies that this voice, sooner or later, makes itself heard and obeyed, even as the Parliament is now constituted. But the difference is prodi-

gious between its irregular, and oftentimes violent operation, and the regulated and prompt action which it ought to have in the system—it is like the difference between steam acting in spite of us by explosions, when violently pent up, and by uniform pressure when employed as a mechanical power. So the effects produced by public opinion at present are always too late, and often dangerously violent. Instances of the latter evil we need hardly give. The former is the most important; and a full illustration of it would comprise at once the history of all the maladministration of our affairs for the last half century, and the clearest demonstration of the policy, nay, the necessity, of Reform. Scarce any of the calamities which have visited this country—scarce any of the barbarisms in policy and in jurisprudence which have disgraced our system, but may be traced to the long intervals that have always elapsed before the voice of the community could produce its effect in changing the councils of the Government, or improving our legislative system. Had the popular desire of peace been listened to in the American and French wars; nay, had the dislike of extravagance been felt by the Government, as it always was by the nation, what millions would have been saved of the debt that now oppresses us, and of the wasteful expenditure that has displaced all capital and convulsed the State! How many abuses of the grossest kind, from the Slave Trade to the severity of the Criminal Law, have been borne withal for a series of years, after the loud and general voice of public indignation had pronounced their condemnation! What miseries have not these criminal delays occasioned! what wounds to humanity! what dishonour to the English name! Nay, at this hour, are we not persevering in the same course, and permitting the Government to hold fast by many of the most ruinous abuses and blunders, while the time is passing never to be recalled, and mischiefs are made perpetual and remediless by the delay—and all because the universal opinion of the country has not yet penetrated to the Government, through the Parliament—that opinion which Parliament ought to represent faithfully, and give effect to speedily, with no more modification

or check than is necessary to prevent the accidents of a hasty and tumultuous decision! This is a long chapter, to the contents of which, we shall again solicit the reader's serious attention. For the present, it may suffice to have indicated them generally, as of extreme importance in the practical discussion of Parliamentary Reform—and, to our apprehension, quite decisive, in its favour.

It is impossible to conclude this Article, without expressing, more distinctly, the astonishment with which we have been stricken at the prodigious assurance with which Mr. Canning ventures to treat the subject of the country's distresses. His levity we say nothing more of; but it required the evidence of our senses to make us believe that any man *in his situation* could have the audacity to come forth and tell the ruined landowners of England, that the only thing he could recommend to them was PATIENCE. Patience enough, indeed, they had shown, before he had obtruded his advice; and if they can endure that advice, they will prove that they have no need of it; for to be patient under such an outrage, is more hard than to bear all the buffetings of their cruel fortune. *He*, indeed, to tell them so; and in the body of his advertisement for the place which he has since gotten—the very *constitutional* office of leading those same landowners, as manager of the House of Commons! He to recommend patience as the only remedy! the coadjutor of those Ministers whose blundering and profligate courses have brought the landowners to ruin! For which of all the schemes that have sunk them to the earth, did he not support? Which of all the men that have stript them of their revenues, did he not league with? And when he sees staring him in the face, the countless miseries which he has occasioned, he can coolly stop the current of his mirth to give them a bit of serious advice—it is all he can do for them, after what he has done to them. "Take my word for it (says he), we have undone you so completely, that no power on earth can mend your lot, and all you have for it, is to bear with patience what we have brought upon you." Such experiments upon the temper of the country, could only be attempted in the present state of its representation; and

we may venture to foretel, that the House of Commons will practise the cardinal virtue thus recommended to the landowners in a manner as exemplary as Mr. Canning could desire. They will bear even him, and his gibes, and his councils—that is to say, as long as the Court pleases.

Since this Article was written, and just as we are going to press, the county of York has been put in motion;—fulfilling many of our predictions, and giving to Mr. Canning's arguments and jokes the best practical refutation. In an evil hour it was that he bethought him of turning his sentences upon "*dying embers*;" and with even less than his wonted discretion, did he at this crisis make Parliamentary Reform the subject of his merriment. Those speeches, and the knowledge that the person who professes to be the Champion against Reform was brought into office, appear to have been at least the proximate causes of the great measure by which all Reformers, in all parts of the country, are now engaged in co-operating to insure the success of their plans. The principles which we have explained in these pages, would have led, no doubt, to a similar effort, sooner or later; but for its being made now, and with extraordinary unanimity and zeal, the cause and its well-wishers have to thank the jibes and the promotion of Mr. Canning. Possibly the Spanish proverb respecting *friends* may already be in the mouths of sincere Anti-reformers.

HIGH-TORY PRINCIPLES.

(OCTOBER, 1824.)

1. *Reflections on the Nature and Tendency of the present Spirit of the Times.* By the Rev. G. BURGES. 8vo.
2. *A Comparative View of the Principles of the Court and the Country Parties in Modern Times.* 8vo. London, 1821.
3. *Le Roi est Mort—Vive le Roi!* Par le VICOMTE DE CHATEAUBRIAND. 8vo. Paris, 1824.

THERE is no better way of making any one sensible of his failings, than exhibiting the same failings in another person; and even nations, whose self-sufficiency and vanity far exceed that of individuals, may sometimes be prevailed upon to contemplate their own faults and prepared to correct them, by seeing their effects upon the people of other countries, when they would be too angry to listen to any reproofs of themselves. As there is, in the present age, a disposition, extremely prevalent with a party among us, to inculcate the most slavish maxims under the flimsy pretext of holding up loyalty, and recommending a sort of religious veneration for all establishments; and as there can be no doubt that the effect of their doctrines being generally received, if it is not the very object they have in view, would be to destroy the fundamental principles of the English constitution,—it is fit that the people should, from time to time, be put on their guard against such wiles; and warned against suffering themselves gradually to adopt the language of despotic governments, and to substitute the feelings of servile flatterers, abjectly cringing before an arbitrary master, for the manly attachment to their country and its institutions, which becomes the citizens of a free state, the subjects of a limited monarch, who is as much as themselves under the law of the land. It is true, that the party

we allude to may be thought to have come a century, or rather two centuries too late—with their "legitimacy," their "rightful sovereigns," their "chivalrous devotion to the crown," their "consecrated thrones and celestial altars." There is no great fear, indeed, that such boyish tropes should ever usurp the place of that rational preference for limited monarchy, which has, upon the whole, cast the balance in its favour as against a commonwealth, chiefly because the latter is more likely to end in an absolute government. Yet the direct power, and the weight and influence of those who hold, and by their tools would propagate, the very worst opinions, is so great, from the station they occupy in the country, and their place in the administration of its affairs, that their unceasing efforts in society, and through the press, cannot but be attended with some little success; and a tone of sycophancy towards mere Royalty is sometimes observable, which seems wholly at variance with the spirit of the age. The efforts of the High Church party, too, always unfriendly to liberty, and indeed to all improvement, are steadily pointed in the same direction; because they justly believe that whatever tends to make the crown despotic, must lead to the extirpation of religious liberty, and the joint domination of priestcraft and kingcraft. It may therefore be worth while to show those whom the parties in question would fain seduce into the worship of despotism, how very creditable a figure its most pious adorers make in the eyes of reasonable men; and for the reason already given, as well as because this piety is far more fervent in France than elsewhere at the present moment, we may advantageously turn our eyes towards the lively emotions of religion and loyalty lately exhibited in the capital of that country.

Louis XVIII., though, as a private gentleman, he might have passed for a good-humoured and sensible man, of considerable information and classical attainments (nay even for a person of talents, until he unwarily wrote a book), was certainly one of the least distinguished kings that ever sat on a throne. It is not that more insignificant princes have not reigned in ordinary times, but that he showed an eminent defect of all great qualities in trying emergencies.

His emigration; his long life, or vegetation, abroad previous to the sudden reverse of fortune which befel the French arms; his restoration by foreign force; his inglorious expulsion thereafter, when the mere sight of a great man's face, and the sound of his voice, drove all that was Bourbon instantaneously out of the country; his far more inglorious re-entry in the rear of the enemy's troops, by whom that country had been conquered and ravaged; his enduring the sceptre for years while the enemy's soldiers garrisoned his territories; his later years passed in favouring all manner of attempts to defraud the people of the constitution to which he and his family pretended they owed their restoration—Such were the claims of the Monarch to the respect and the gratitude of Frenchmen; while the man was commended to their veneration by a life in which, for a considerable time past, the rational had nearly merged in the animal nature; and it was notorious that the state to which he was at last reduced by the most hopeless and shocking infirmities, rendered his death a release, in a degree exceeding almost any case before known. Over this prince—this individual—but above all this patient, whose deplorable condition was as well known as his advanced age, and about whose physical state, at least, the most loyal of devotees could not affect a doubt—there have been chanted rhapsodies of lamentation and of love that would have appeared extravagant to all rational minds had Henry IV. been suddenly snatched from his people in the fulness of clemency and success, or Louis XIV. at the height of his splendour and his fortunes. "Every one (says a leading journal) has learnt, with the utmost grief, the sad event which covers France with mourning." This affliction was thus communicated to the soldiers of the garrison at Paris by their commandant, an officer, we will venture to say, not to be equalled in any army for steadiness of countenance, whatever may be said of him in other respects. "Soldiers! his Majesty Louis XVIII. has just closed his *glorious* life. The King has ordered public prayers. It is his Majesty's, Charles the Xth's, intention that the troops should be present. Your standards, drums, and trumpets, are to be covered with black crape; the officers are to wear

black crape on their arms, and on their swords, till further orders. Soldiers," he added, *with a loud but tremulous voice*, " after having given your tears for him, whom it has pleased God to take to himself, let us give our hearts, and our arms, and our blood, if necessary, for his Majesty Charles X." These words were answered by unanimous cries of " Vive le Roi ! " " Vive Charles X. ! " from the soldiers, of course, but whether with the " loud and tremulous voice " or not, we have no means of ascertaining.

It is the custom, when a king of France dies, to show the body for some hours, as they do in Russia and elsewhere; a custom originating in the tricks so often practised or suspected within the walls of " legitimate" palaces; and arising from the liability which their inhabitants have to go out of the world by other than natural deaths. Multitudes go to see, as a matter of course, in a populous city, where there are always thousands of idly curious people. But even such an indifferent act as this must be turned into something tenderly sentimental, by the indefatigable chronicler of the court.

" An innumerable crowd came to-day to the Chateau *to bestow a last look* on the coffin which contains *the King France has just lost.* More than sixty thousand persons came to offer this last homage; besides those who had cards, there were more than 1200 equipages in the Place du Carrousel, and the adjacent parts. At three o'clock the multitude was admitted. Not the smallest accident occurred." It should seem, however, that the excess of grief was somewhat assuaged by the idea that the body yet remained in Paris. But the time was to arrive when even this consolation should be withdrawn; and who shall then presume to imagine the depth of woe into which the orphan people must be plunged! An ingenious device happily comes to their relief; by an opportune recourse to the constitutional fiction, by a sort of " confounding of the persons," a revival of the dead king is, as it were, operated. The manner in which these glad tidings are announced, must be allowed to be in admirable harmony with the subject matter.

" This day (September 23rd) the capital will be widowed

of its King, *who will not be restored to it, under new circumstances*," (that is, in the shape of another and a different man,) "till Monday next. A funeral procession will advance this day through our walls, escorted by our tears; three days hence a Royal procession will return to us, saluted by the acclamations of our love. The immortal city will regain *immortal Royalty*—France and the Bourbons are imperishable." Nor is it the least notable part of this happy receipt for the cure of loyal affliction, that the nostrum is one of universal application; for the dead King may be one of the Antonines, and succeeded (as indeed they were) by a Commodus; and yet he will revive in this successor, according to the cheering tenor of Royalist logic. It is another crumb of comfort afforded by the same rational system of legitimacy, and, with a kind consideration, afforded on the same day, that the appointment is announced of the Duke de Bordeaux, aged at least three years, perhaps four, to the Colonelcy of the Swiss Guards. How feelingly does this felicitous combination bring home to the thinking mind, the genius of "*immortal Royalty!*" How exquisitely fitting is it that foreign mercenaries, kept in spite of nature to overawe "imperishable France," should, in spite of nature, be commanded by an infant! Truly the "Bourbons are imperishable," if such things excite the gratitude of France.

Let us now hear the clamorous, the unruly grief of the organ of the Ultra party—the genuine lovers of Royalty for its own sake, and determined enemies of all popular rights. The overwhelming intelligence that an old man of seventy, who had never distinguished himself by any one act of his public or private life, had died, and was succeeded by an old man of sixty-eight who had distinguished himself as much, is thus communicated to an undone and sorrowing world.

"*The terrible catastrophe*, which the ardent wishes of a whole people hoped in vain to avert, has been this instant accomplished. The King has ceased to live! Another son of St. Louis has ascended to heaven. Let us pray for him; *let us weep for ourselves*, for his whole life was lavished on us. His last words were for his family, for his people, for all his children. Grief interdicts us even the praises which gratitude would dictate on the tomb which opens, on the

benefits accumulated upon France by the monarch who has just been ravished from her love. We would praise the King, the legislator, but words fail us: we can only lament the father.

"The agony endured long; Louis supported it as he had borne misfortune. Never did a monarch, never did a man, know better how to support the heavy burthen of age, adversity, of infirmities, of the throne. He has quitted the earth for ever; but not a French heart will forget that he restored peace to our fields, children to our mothers, liberty to our laws, and, more recently still, glory to our standards. O Louis! thy last moments might be softened by the reflection that nothing more remained to be done for our France, for ever secured under the immortal sceptre of the Bourbons.

"The night conceals from us as yet the aspect of this afflicted capital. We pray, we weep, in the secrecy of our hearts. To-morrow our temples will be opened. *Let us go thither, Frenchmen, to derive strength to support the immense loss we have suffered.* Let us go to pray for the precious days of the King, who does not die, and who is restored for the consolation of France in the person of a magnanimous heir.

"*King Louis XVIII. is dead—Live King Charles X.!*"

We trust no one can for a moment suspect us of believing that there is a word of truth in this most base piece of folly and sycophancy, excepting the single statement, that "the King has ceased to live." That the whole, or any part of the French people, wished ardently, or at all, to avert the terrible catastrophe, is as contrary to the notorious fact, as that his last words were for his people, or that his exploits had left nothing to do for France. The contempt of fact, however, is not more remarkable than that of reason—the people are urged to pray for the King's life—why? Because "he does not die."

It was to be expected that, upon this occasion, calling for all the efforts of the undertaker's art in all its branches, M. de Chateaubriand, one of the chosen priests of Libitina, should step forth, tired in the most gorgeous livery of woe; not that we would be understood to confine his genius to funerals, when we remember how great he also is in the matter of christenings. Indeed, it is rather from a recollection of his extraordinary skill in this last department, that we are led to form a high estimate of the refinements to be expected upon the present occasion. He who provided water from the river Jordan to baptize the young Napoleon withal, must surely have some cedar deal from Lebanon, if not a rafter of Solomon's Temple, to make a

coffin for "the King who saved France" from Napoleons, old and young Let us not harbour a doubt on this subject; but in the mean time, and before the funeral can be got ready—before the Royal remains can be prepared for interment—nay, before any steps can be taken for the purpose, out comes a pamphlet by this celebrated artist, in less than twenty-four hours after the King's decease. The title is—"*Le Roi est Mort, Vive le Roi!*"—which must not be translated, "*The King is dead, Huzza!*"—but rather, we suppose, according to the Irish anecdote of one in a branch of business somewhat akin to M. Chateaubriand's—"*The King is dead, long life to him!*" The opening of this Tract is of a piece with the title.

"The King is dead! Day of terror! when this cry was heard the last time in Paris thirty years ago. The King is dead. Is the monarchy to be broken up? Is Divine vengeance again ready to fall on France? Whither can we fly? Where hide ourselves from terror and anarchy? *Weep, Frenchmen; you have lost the King who saved you*—the King who restored you peace—*the King who made you free!* but do not tremble for your fate. The King is dead, but the King lives! THE KING IS DEAD—LONG LIVE THE KING!"

It required all the firmness of countenance which the habits of a court acting upon a happy natural constitution can bestow, to call Louis XVIII. the King who saved and liberated France; but the following passage very greatly excels the one now cited, rich as that is in the beauties of Royalism.

"The first service which the inheritor of the *fleur de lis* performed for his country *was to get rid of the European invasion.* The capital of France was *never conquered* under the legitimate race. Bonaparte had conducted foreigners to Paris with his sword. Louis XVIII. sent them away with his sceptre. A whole nation yet animated, yet intoxicated with the glory of arms, saw with surprise an old Frenchman come and place himself naturally at its head, like a father who returns to his family after a long absence, and never supposes that anybody can contest his authority."

Each assertion here is a glaring misrepresentation of a known fact. It was to place this man and his family on the throne that foreign armies invaded France and brought the King and the other Bourbons in their baggage-waggons, the battle having been wholly fought for them by others. The foreign armies remained in the country for years.

The "father" who came so "naturally" to place himself on the throne, was forced upon the people by foreign bayonets. And as for Paris never having been occupied by foreigners "under the legitimate race," we presume that Charles VI. was nearly as legitimate as Charles X.; and we never yet heard it denied, that his imbecility and the quarrels of his equally legitimate kinsmen, the Dukes of Orleans and Burgundy, one of whom murdered the other immediately after taking the sacrament in pledge of his sincere reconcilement, and in token, we presume, of the union between the throne and the altar, were the causes of the kingdom, capital and all, being conquered by Henry V., a prince who was very far from being as legitimate as themselves, being, in truth, the son of a usurper. The assertion that freedom is the gift of the late King is, however, the one which occurs most frequently, and is the most wide of the truth. Can any reader observe, without amazement, this author, a week or two after he had filled the shops and stalls of Paris with invectives against the last act of Louis's life, the abolition of the liberty of the press, now describing him as "the sovereign who established liberty on the ruins of revolution,"—the man who "secured us independence abroad after having given us liberty at home,"—"who, being at liberty to grant nothing on his return to France, gave us liberty for misfortune,"—nay, actually assert, "that the French are one of the freest people on earth?"

In the midst of all these courtly misstatements, it is refreshing to find a single thing that wears the appearance of a fact. After describing the malady that seized Louis's lower extremities, in consequence of the cold to which he was exposed in flying before the French armies, our author very justly observes, that "his disease was partly the work" of the French. In truth it was wholly owing to them and the frost together; and we marvel it should never have occurred to him that this allusion brings naturally to mind another fact, namely, that the whole French people, with the exception of some few hundreds, in those days, were determined enemies of everything like a Bourbon. Possibly the hundreds may now be changed

into thousands, if even that is not too great an allowance, as far as regards free choice and a predilection for the family. A desire to escape the repetition of the scenes through which France has passed during the last thirty years, no doubt, keeps them quiet under a Bourbon, as it would under any other existing sovereign; but to secure anything like a firm footing in the esteem of the people, must be the work of time and of a wise and liberal policy. Far otherwise thinks, at least writes, the courtier, whose pages are before us. No exaggeration is too gross for his palate; and he construes the effects of vulgar curiosity in bringing together the multitude, into symptoms of real affliction for the King's decease. But first, he lays it down that the characteristic of the Bourbons is to make finer ends than any other family in the known world; which makes it the more singular, that during the wars so long carried on for their individual benefit, they showed but little disposition to do at all what they so much excelled in doing well.

"For a long time it has been the lot of the bravest people to have at their head a race of kings, who die the best. From the example of history we shall be authorized to say proverbially, 'Die like a Bourbon,' to signify everything magnanimous displayed by a man in his last hour. Louis XVIII. did not depart from this family intrepidity. After receiving the Holy Viaticum in the middle of his court, the eldest son of the Church blessed, with a trembling hand, but with a serene countenance, the brother once more summoned to a deathbed—the nephew, whom he called the son of his choice—the niece, twice an orphan, and the widow, twice a mother."

The nonsense of this is its principal recommendation; but, suppose the author should screw up his nerves to assert, that while Louis was ill, the people were eagerly reading the bulletins to descry some ray of hope,—that they were all dissolved in tears,—that they crowded near the palace, but spoke in whispers, lest they might disturb the patient,—that, in the excess of their sorrow, they had recourse to religion for consolation, and filled the churches to seek that assistance from above, without which they could not bear their load of grief—should we not then pronounce that, of a truth, there is nothing so degrading, so debasing to human nature, as the spirit of pure monarchy,

toryism, ultra-monarchy, call it what you will,—that spirit which bows to kings as such, regards them as the objects for whose benefit power is established, not the depositaries of authority in trust for the people, and venerates them as the end of political institutions, instead of respecting them as the means?—Incredible as it may seem, M. de Chateaubriand has actually brought himself to paint in these colours the state of the Parisians at a time when it must have been almost physically impossible that any one tear should be shed for the dying King, or any heart beat, except through idle curiosity, to know whether the event had taken place which was to number with the dead an old man who had been dying for months. He has literally described the people, not merely as if they were suffering under the momentary expectation of some great public calamity, but as if each individual were in a state of personal affliction; and his sketch of their state of mind would perhaps be reckoned somewhat extravagant, certainly fully adequate to the occasion, if a sudden pestilence had broken out and carried off the favourite member of each family in Paris.

"The people, however, displayed *unequivocal signs of their sorrow.* Essentially monarchical and Christian when they are left to themselves, they surrounded the palace *and filled the churches;* they gathered the least news with avidity, read and commented on the bulletins, *seeking in them some rays of hope.* Nothing could be more affecting than that multitude who spoke in whispers about the Tuileries. *Fearing to disturb the august patient,* the dying King was watched over and guarded by his people. Often forgotten in prosperity, but *always invoked in adversity,* religion increased the respect and the tenderness, by its prayers and its solicitations. It chanted before the image of the living God that canticle of Ezekiel which French genius has adopted from the inspiration of Holy Writ, that *Domine, salvum fac Regem,* which our love to our King has rendered so popular. *Tears ran down every face,* when the different bodies of magistrates passed on foot, going to Notre Dame, in order to implore Heaven for him from whom all justice in France emanates. It was remarked particularly, that at the head of the Chief Court was that illustrious old man who, after having defended the life of Louis XVI. before the tribunal of man, was going now to ask the life of Louis XVIII. of a Judge who has never condemned the innocent. This sovereign Judge, in calling to the place of repose our suffering King, *fatigued and satiated with life,* is preparing to pronounce on him a sentence of deliverance, and not of condemnation."

Having, in the close of this inimitable passage, taken upon himself to disclose Louis's treatment after death, in a manner which would be reckoned impious in any but a friend of the "throne and altar," we are surprised to find the author revert to the very subordinate consideration of the funeral. "Soon he will be placed in those subterraneous abodes, the solitude of which his piety has begun to repeople." The reader is at first puzzled—nay, possibly he may feel alarmed—at so equivocal a panegyric upon a deceased king, as that he was going where he had sent so many before him; but it turns out that this is only one of the feats performed by that extremely bad taste too prevalent among modern French writers, but of which M. Chateaubriand may be allowed to be the most eminent example, and which absolutely prohibits the saying anything, however plain or insignificant, in a simple, intelligible manner. Without some explanation, the sense of the passage could really not have been discovered by the common run of guessers of riddles. The author therefore adds a solution; it makes his meaning barely intelligible, but in a form of speech infinitely conceited and ridiculous. "Soon he will be placed in those subterraneous abodes, the solitude of which his piety has begun to repeople. When he arrived in France, he found the tomb of the kings deserted, and their throne vacant; restorer of all our legitimacies, he has given, *by a brotherly division*, the former to Louis XVI., and he leaves the latter to Charles X." Fired by the sound, &c. No sooner has he named this name, now become so very interesting, than he bursts forth into an unmeasured praise of the new King, the best comfort for the loss of the old one; and finding in him all imaginable good qualities (except those of a warrior, which, with a most discreet recollection of the history of the war, he wholly passes over), he calls upon his countrymen to "bless a tutelary hereditary succession," to which is owing the certainty of another king being always ready as soon as one dies, or, as this author is pleased to phrase it, "Legitimacy brings forth her new king *without pain*." Really, on reading this, we are tempted to think that the Noble Viscount's memory is as tenacious, and his feelings

about as acute as those of a set of church-bells, which (like himself), upon royal demises, ring alternately a mournful and a merry peal; for he who now denies that there is, or can be any pain attendant upon a change of kings, had, only the moment before, been dissolved in such cruel woe as only the comforts of the Church could assuage, and they but very imperfectly.

The burthen of his song to Charles X. is an urgent exhortation that he would be crowned at Rheims, according to the ancient customs of the monarchy. To this operation, and every part of it, our author attaches the utmost importance. He dwells upon select portions of it with enthusiasm; and fondly runs over the names of the royal family who are to take part in it, lauding them all with equal devotion, down to the poor infant, the Duke of Bordeaux, whom he calls the "*Child of Europe*"—"*the new Henry*"—that is, he has already discovered in him a second Henry IV. But there must positively be a coronation; all the kings of the third race have been crowned except Louis XVII. and Louis XVIII., and a certain John I., who died before he had time for the ceremony. Not only must there be a coronation, but it must be at Rheims; for there, says he, all these monarchs, except Henry IV., were crowned. With great submission to M. Chateaubriand, there was another exception, Louis the Fat (we do not mean the late king, but Louis-le-Gros), who was anointed at Orleans. To encourage his most Christian Majesty, the saying of a certain Archbishop Aldaberon, is cited to Hugh Capet, "the founder of the race." Our author does not add how he came to be its founder, because that would have shown that the third race came in upon what we should in England call revolution principles, the Carlovingians having been set aside by the peers and the people. He recites with much complacency the prayer and the promises made at the coronation, omitting one which he says was introduced in the thirteenth century, and is not in harmony with present customs. This promise, however, we must remind M. Chateaubriand, is nearly of the age of St. Louis, the best times of Royalism; and what right he, on his principles, can have to discard it,

we cannot comprehend. He will not even tell his readers what it is. We take the liberty therefore to subjoin it; nor shall we, as good believers in things established, which have the experience of six centuries in their favour, and especially which concern the union of the "throne and altar," be satisfied with its omission at Rheims. "Also I will seriously endeavour to extirpate all heretics, so branded by the Church, out of my land, and the government subject to me." It seems a part of the ancient ceremony is letting fly birds into the church. Our author exclaims upon this —"a simple symbol of the liberty of the French." However, it is positively laid down in the ceremonial, that they are let fly from the lobby into the church. Our author can only make this a symbol of deliverance by an addition of his own—namely, that the church doors are at the same time thrown open. We rather wonder that he has left out the most singular part of the whole proceeding, and upon which his predecessors have dwelt with the greatest fondness,—we mean the touching for the King's evil. M. Menin, councillor to the Parliament of Metz, has written a learned work upon the subject of French coronations. As he published it during the regency, he magnifies Louis XV. much, but the Duke of Orleans more. The former, being fully five years of age, is exceedingly praised for "the religion, piety, love to the memory of the deceased King, and affection to his people, shown in his Lettre de Cachet to the Parliament of Paris, dictated by wisdom itself." But the government of the Regent is pronounced to be "a perfect one," and the choice of him "a certain presage of happiness to the public;" although the work is written as late as 1722, when the regency had drawn to a close. M. Chateaubriand himself could hardly go beyond this. We therefore marvel the more, that from the book of so congenial a spirit, he did not take the leaf respecting the evil; he has indeed omitted the very highest attribute of royalty. Hasten we, therefore, to supply the deficiency in the words of his learned predecessor. "The third day after the coronation, our kings, *whose piety does not in the least degenerate,* are accustomed to go, according to an ancient usage, from Rheims to Cartigny, to visit the

church of St. Marcoul, and there to touch those that are afflicted with the King's evil, who always appear at that place in great numbers on such an occasion." "This miraculous power of the Kings of France," adds the learned and enlightened councillor of Metz, "to cure by their touch a malady almost incurable by human remedies, is a gift from Heaven that has no cause but the will of the Almighty, expressing thus, by sensible wonders, his extraordinary love for the eldest sons of his Church, and giving them the admiration and respect of all nations of the universe, above all the Kings of the world." He then gives an account of the first cure by Clovis, who received the gift in return for his conversion to Christianity, and tried it with success on his favourite. But lest it should be thought that the gift is obsolete, and that therefore M. Chateaubriand was entitled to pass over it, we must add the councillor's gratifying testimony to the supernatural powers of the Third Race. "It is observed that these cures have been more frequent under the third race of our Kings than under the two former, whether it be that the Kings of the third race excelled the rest in piety and righteousness, or that the distemper is now more universal."

According to M. Chateaubriand, and indeed the whole school of "*Church and King*," which allows of no improvement, nor values anything excepting in proportion as it has antiquity on its side, "our present constitution is only the renovated text of our old franchises." We therefore presume, that it is by a mere oversight that he omits another part of the ancient coronation ceremony—the opening all the prison-doors of the sacred and kingly city of Rheims. "This operates," says M. Menin, "as a general pardon to delinquents, whatever they be;" he terms it an "act of clemency worthy of the majesty and power of our Kings;" and affirms it to be a "custom of equal antiquity with the monarchy itself." It is wonderful with what delight this learned and loyal person dwells upon the usage at Henry II.'s coronation; he says, 415 were released, "among whom were murderers, robbers, coiners, and others,"—(no mention is made of any persons confined for sedition or

heresy). This privilege of the prisons at Rheims is of course well known; and M. Menin says, that "for some days before the coronation, an infinite number of criminals never fail to get into them." At Louis XIV.'s coronation, about 10,000 were discharged by this royal road to freedom—this legitimate gaol delivery. At the next coronation, however, in 1722, there appears to have been a sad falling off in "the power and clemency of the third race;" only 600 were set at liberty, and an inquiry seems to have been made into their cases. The origin of this truly rational and expedient practice, he traces to remote antiquity. Saul signalized his success over the King of the Ammonites, by pardoning, says he, all capital offenders. The fact is, that Saul's example is much more worthy of imitation; for the pardon he gave in honour of his victory, was to those who had taken part in the war against himself. (1 Sam. 11.) The precedent of the Roman Emperors is also cited; and no doubt legitimacy may derive much support from that quarter.[1] We cannot, however, help thinking that the flight of the birds, which M. Chateaubriand is so greatly comforted with, bears reference to the clearing of the gaols, though good Catholics may possibly object to one part of the allegory. The prisoners, when let loose from their cage, took refuge in the church.

We have already noted the risk which a writer upon the Liberal side would run, were he to make as free with sacred subjects as the Legitimates. M. Chateaubriand's conclusion is a further illustration of the remark, and must be allowed to be in his highest strain of exaggeration. He is never satisfied if he cannot deify the objects of his flattery, be they Bourbons or Buonapartes; and as the young Napoleon's birth was likened to the coming of the

[1] The reader cannot have failed to remark the similarity of the language and topics of the Royalist school in all ages. M. Menin, only that he is more learned, and writes more plainly and far better, is in spirit the Chateaubriand of the pure and virtuous regency—of which he chants the praises, without the candour of another of its panegyrists (in the *Vie Privée de Louis XV.*), who says that it must be admitted to have had two faults; and when we look attentively to them, they turn out to be total want of public faith, and a gross private immorality.

Messiah, the death of Louis XVI. must be compared, in plain terms, to the Crucifixion.[1]

[1] We fear that it must be admitted that our own High-Church divines furnished the example of these comparisons, so offensive to all who have any real feelings of a religious nature, or even any sense of common propriety, and so well suited to men whose only principle is subserviency, and whose idols are the powers that be. The following passage is taken from a sermon preached before Charles II. by the Bishop of Down:—"The person now murdered (Charles I.) was not the Lord of glory, but a glorious lord—Christ's own vicar, his lieutenant and vicegerent here on earth, and therefore by all laws, divine and human, he was privileged from any punishment which could be inflicted by men. Albeit he was an inferior to Christ, as man is to God, yet was his *privilege of inviolability far more clear than was Christ's*; for Christ was not a temporal prince; his kingdom was not of this world; and, therefore, when he vouchsafed to come into this world, and to become the Son of man, he did subject himself to the law; but our gracious Sovereign was well known to be a temporal prince, a free monarch, and their undoubted sovereign, to whom they did all owe and had sworn allegiance. The Parliament is the great council, and hath acted all and more against their lord and sovereign than the other did against Christ; *the proceedings against our Sovereign were more illegal, and in many things more cruel.* The true religion delivered unto us in Scripture, and professed in the true ancient and Catholic Church, doth teach us to honour and obey the king, as God's minister set over us; and that the *injuries of kings, though ever so great*, are to be endured by their subjects, who have no other remedy, and are to use no other arms against their king, than to pray unto God *for him*, who hath the hearts of kings in his hand, and may turn them when he thinks fit." These impieties were extremely common in the pulpits of the High Church down to the end of Queen Anne's reign; indeed, they derived some countenance from the Liturgy of the Church of England, which denominates Charles "the Blessed," and "the Blessed Martyr" of God; compares his conduct to that of Christ; ascribes his preservation in the oak to a miracle. Nor was this tone of slavish loyalty, and we may say blasphemy, confined to the clergy. "From the creation" (says General Wigley, in a letter to Ormond) "to the accursed day of this damnable murther, nothing parallel to it was ever heard of. Even the crucifying our Blessed Saviour, if we consider him only in his human nature, *did nothing equal this*, his kingdom not being of this world; and he, though unjustly condemned, yet judged at a lawful tribunal." No man can deny the consistency, at least, of these Tories or Ultras, the worshippers of pure legitimacy. Had they lived in the time of Herod and Pontius Pilate, it is plain that they would have acquiesced most loyally in all the proceedings of the government; have prayed for the former when he massacred the innocents, and bowed to the sentence which put Jesus to death.

"Charles X., after having received his power from the hands of religion, would appear still more august in quitting, consecrated by the holy unction, those fountains where Clovis was regenerated. It is of immense consequence for our country, under its present circumstances, that a King tranquilly dying in the midst of his subjects, transmits his heritage to his successor. The latest event of this kind was fifty years ago, for Louis XVI. cannot be included. The holocaust of the martyred King had no funeral pomp, and was followed by no coronation; the new reign did not begin at the foot of the altar, and there was then in France some part of that darkness which covered Jerusalem at the death of the Just. May God grant to Louis XVIII. the immortal crown of Saint Louis! May God bless on the head of Charles X. the mortal crown of Saint Louis!—The King is dead. Long live the King!"

We have seen the grief of the French at its height, or rather the description given by the Royalist faction, of a grief which never existed among that enlightened people. An equally extravagant account is given of their unbounded joy the moment after, and with absurdities nearly equal, and inconsistencies somewhat greater. When Charles X. enters Paris after the funeral, he is met at the gate by the Prefect; and he would fain reconcile the necessary contradictions of deep sorrow for the best of Kings, who, according to the worthy magistrate and M. Chateaubriand, had left nothing to be done for his subjects, or wished by them; and ecstacies of delight at the succession of a King better than the best, who in a trice has changed the face of affairs, and, by a kind of *plusquam-perfecting* operation, greaty improved upon perfection.

"Sire,—The aspect of your Majesty comes to dissipate the funeral veil which covers these walls. *This immense population wept for their father;* to-day they recover their King—*and, as in times past, they have wholly surmounted their grief.* Beloved Sovereign, you will see them faithful and unanimous, manifesting their joy. You have reigned for *some days*, Sire, and the dignity of the Royal Family is *already extended.* The great thought of the State fortifies itself even in the centre; repeated acts of clemency and goodness signalize the happy commencement of your reign. Enjoy, Sire, your first benefits; enjoy the scene offered to your view. *Confidence has entered the heart;* credit is extending; *everything takes a new life;* and opinions are united, mingled in one sentiment of hope and love, as on the ever-memorable day when the capital received you, Sire, and carried you to the palace of your ancestors."—"Our ancient *monuments seem to*

pride themselves in adding another king to the ancient dynasty which founded them, to the long list of the kings your ancestors, all of whom were pleased to embellish and to promote the prosperity of their capital. Proud of being the cradle of the most noble and *most glorious famil'y of the universe*—proud of possessing its new King, Paris may aspire to the character of Queen of Cities, by its magnificence, as its people will be before all others in their fidelity, their devotedness, and their love. Accept, Sire, these keys, the marks of its submission and its respect; allow us to lay them at your Majesty's feet, as we there lay the homage of the *transports and of the unanimous sentiments* of this immense multitude, who have hastened forth to see their King. Vive le Roi!"

We will not say that the worthy magistrate is outdone, for that would require a miracle, but he is equalled, by the most reverend prelate, who "takes up the wondrous tale" when the eldest Son of the Church arrives at Notre Dame. Like the Prefect, the Archbishop is somewhat troubled with the suddenness of the transition from unutterable woe to inexpressible rapture; but his Grace's theory seems (if we rightly follow it) to be, that the joy was there all the while, but only impeded in finding a vent, by the tears through which it had, as it were, to bubble up; in the course of which operation it was itself condensed, and formed a substance of which the vulgar name is tears of joy. We cannot help viewing this doctrine, however ingenious, as savouring more of the profane learning of the age, than becomes the "first pastor of the Most Christian King,"—as a kind of tribute to modern improvements unworthy of a supporter of the venerable obscurity of Legitimacy,—a great pillar of darkness, like the high priest of the Gallican church. The doctrine with which his Grace is, or ought to be familiar, might have reminded him, that the transmutation of fluids is with his craft an every-day operation, and suggested, that one kind of tears could with ease be changed into another. There is nothing in the most reverend prelate's address more remarkable than his ready assumption, that, up to the moment of its delivery, nothing whatever had been done for religion, even by Louis XVIII., "the restorer of all legitimacies," whose piety they had been just extolling, and whose immediate and certain salvation M. Chateaubriand had ten days before announced, with a further

prayer for his accession to the immortal crown of Saint Louis.

"Sire,—*All hearts* hasten before the King at his return to his capital; grief and respect *can no longer* restrain the joy and the transports of your people. Tears give place to other tears, and acclamations succeed to deepest silence. Sire, it is love which weeps, and it is love which now rejoices. Before mounting to the palace of your fathers—before there taking that repose which will also be ours—your Majesty *comes this day*, in the most splendid manner, *to raise religion, beaten down* by the same blow which struck his Most Christian Majesty. It is your will, Sire, that it should be the first to receive that consolation which you bring to all. May it bless you! Enter into its sanctuary—come and give it your Royal hand—and receive from *its faithful mouth* the promise of *its Divine gratitude*. For us, Sire, who are its ministers and your subjects, we beg of you, Sire, on the threshold of this temple, to receive with favour the respect and the vows which I, at this moment, am so happy and so honoured in offering to your Majesty, of your First Pastor."

We suspect, that if his Most Christian Majesty does not make haste to heap favours on the Church, "its Divine gratitude" will be withholden, and "its faithful mouth" may prove clamorous. The Archbishop seems, warily enough, to make the promise of love somewhat conditional; he plainly expects more from him than had been bestowed by his brother; and adds, in a strain of fervour, pretty distinctly intimating the presence in his mind of "that lively sense of favours to come," in which peculiarly consists the gratitude of those who

> "Adore their Maker, and respect their God;
> And wait, good men, all earthly things forgot,
> In humble hope of Enoch's happy lot"

—that they will not fail to remind him of his duties on another occasion, which, like M. Chateaubriand, they doubtless are longing for—part of the ceremony being a truly Royalist and Clerical lecture, administered to the Sovereign the moment before the enthronization, for the purpose of showing him that his title, which till then had been from pure hereditary right, is now something higher, coming from Divine authority, and conveyed through the Bishops; and for the further purpose of reminding him what duty he owes them in return. "Stand fast," says the Archbishop, "and keep from henceforth the station

which thou hast preserved hitherto by paternal succession, as it has been conveyed down to thee by hereditary right, through the authority of Almighty God *and our present delivery of it*; namely, that of all the Bishops and the other servants of God; and by how much the nearer to the holy altars thou viewest the clergy, by so much the greater honour thou shouldst remember to confer upon them in the places that are suitable to them." And, to do them justice, they were never very nice in France, but would *suit* themselves with any place, civil as well as ecclesiastical, however high or lucrative, including that of Prime Minister.

Thus far the constituted authorities. The Journals, as on the lugubrious, so on the festive occasion, bear their full share in the noise. The novelty of his Majesty being seen upon a horse, seems chiefly to have edified them, and, next to that, the astonishing fact, that he actually could ride in the rain. "Arrived at Porte Maillot, his Majesty mounted his horse, notwithstanding the heavy rain." The heavens indeed seemed propitious to the display of this qualification, for "the rain began again when the King left Notre Dame." This horsemanship forthwith turns out to be a very material part of the case; on it is grounded no less than a comparison of the King with Henry IV.'s statue, and from thence, if we rightly follow the argument, an identification of his Majesty with that famous monarch himself. "On the return from Notre Dame, the procession passed before the statue of Henry IV. The King, *like the representation of Henry*, was on horseback, and returning to his capital. The cry of '*Vive Henry IV.!*' resounded in every direction, and was accompanied with that of 'Vive Charles X.!'" The raptures of the people (that is, of the writer and his servile employers) now wax greater and greater.

"The enthusiasm inspired by his presence it is impossible to describe. On every side nothing was heard but shouts of 'Long live the King!'—'Long live Charles X.!'—'Long live the Dauphin!'—'Long live the Bourbons!' The Monarch evinced the pleasure he experienced by the affable manner in which he saluted his people. His Majesty deigned to receive, himself, with the most gracious condescension, more than four hundred petitions which were pre-

sented to him. The King often spoke to the Officers, and *even to the National Guard.* The *ecstacy* of the whole population was at its height. This was a holiday—a day of general happiness—*destined to be for ever memorable in our annals.*"

But wisely judging that, in order to touch the heart, you must come from generals to an individual case, an "affecting anecdote" quickly succeeds these fervours, and gives a pathetic turn to the intoxication of joy into which the multitude had been thrown; so that just as it is approaching to a phrenzy, it is mercifully relieved by copious floods of tears. A young woman, it seems, approached with a petition, and appeared to be weeping. "Allow," exclaimed he, with an air of kindness *so common to the Bourbons*, "allow her to approach;" and the Monarch himself extended his hand to the young woman, who threw herself at his feet. His Majesty took her petition, thanking her at the same time as if she had done him a service. "I am much obliged to you, my child" (*bien obligé, mon enfant*), said the King. "Never did a sovereign return thanks in a more impressive manner. The people, affected even to tears by *this action*, no longer kept within bounds; their enthusiasm was at its height; with the greatest possible difficulty was the crowd prevented from pressing in upon his Majesty, who was then accompanied with universal acclamation to the Tuileries."

It is hardly necessary to add, that, in the rear of the Journalists, but far outdoing them in the vehemence of his whining flattery, comes again M. de Chateaubriand with a second pamphlet, to salute the first act of the new reign; and one which deserved a much more respectable and manly eulogist, the wise edict removing the censorship. Almost before his last tract had been forgotten, that is, within about a week from its appearance, and on the day, or day but one, after the event it celebrates, comes forth within a little month, the third of these truly ephemeral works—ephemeral in a double sense, for they are written one day and read another. There is one advantage in the removal of the censorship which seems chiefly to delight him; and, like all his fine things, it is distinguished by being extremely unnatural and far-fetched, and by being

closely allied to mean and time-serving sentiments. "We can now" (says he, with exultation) "praise our Princes without any restriction—we may declare our thoughts without its being said that this declaration is dictated by the Police." He is only afraid, it seems, lest his extravagant flattery should be palliated by the excuse that the rigours of the police had extorted, or at least heightened it. He is under no apprehensions of the ignominy with which he must be covered if it should be supposed voluntary. But he assumes, gratuitously enough, that its sincerity follows as a matter of course, from its being uttered without compulsion; whereas the falsest tongues that wag are those of volunteer sycophants; and indeed it is to them only that insincerity can with justice be imputed. "It is necessary," says he, "that Europe should know that everything is true in the sentiments of the French; that opinions are unanimous; that opposition meets at the foot of the throne to support and bless it." All this goes on smoothly enough, till Louis XVIII., whom he had the week before exalted to the skies, comes across him; and as he is now engaged in magnifying Charles X. for beginning his reign by undoing the last act of Louis, the difficulty was really somewhat perplexing. "Louis XVIII. extends his benefits beyond his life!"—"and his death, the object of such just regrets, has, however, consolidated the restoration, by"—we suppose enabling his successor to overturn the worst measure of his reign?—no such thing: but simply, "by putting one reign between the restoration and the accession of Charles X."—which service, be it observed, the very weakest and worst Prince that ever lived must just have rendered equally to the restoration. Nothing, surely, can be conceived more sickening than this mean style—this mixture of unceasing, slavish adoration with childish, clumsy conceits, which have no one merit, nor anything to distinguish them, except not being obvious. However, the censorship being removed, and all flatterers being so willing at least, if not hearty, M. Chateaubriand is resolved to have his fill of it.

"Charles X. may boast of now being as powerful as Louis XIV. was; of being obeyed with as much zeal and as much activity *as the*

most absolute Monarch of Europe. To know where we have arrived with the Monarchy, one must have seen the Monarch going to *Notre Dame.* The whole of this great people, in spite of the inclemency of the weather, saluting *their King on horseback*, who advanced before his poorest subjects to take their petitions, with *that air which belongs only to him*—(one of the others had said, it was 'the air so common to all the Bourbons,' see last extract)—one must have seen him at the Champs de Mars, in the middle of the National Guards, the Royal Guards, and 300,000 spectators.—Day of power and liberty which showed the Crown in all its force, and which gave to opinion its organs and its independence. A King is well placed in the middle of his soldiers, when he leaves to his people all which can contribute to the dignity of man. The sword is for him, it can destroy everything, and he only uses it for the preservation of all. Thus the enthusiasm was not feigned; it was not of that species which dies on the lips of *the hired beggar*, charged under Tyrants to express the public joy, or rather the public misery, the cries came from the bottom of the heart, where it beats with force, when it is filled with love and gratitude."

But here, again, he is haunted by Louis XVIII.—not having apparently forgotten his last pamphlet so quickly as the public had; and being forced to admit indirectly that his late Majesty had destroyed the constitution, because he is in the act of lauding his present Majesty for reviving it, he can think of no better way of making it up with the defunct and himself, than the following rhapsody, of which part is really incomprehensible, and part seems to imply that Louis, if he did destroy the Charter, was only taking liberties with his own handiwork.

"If the blessings of a people, as we cannot doubt, call down the blessings of Heaven, they have descended on the head of our Sovereign and the Royal Family. Never was France happier, more glorious, or more free, than on this day. But at seeing this family in mourning in the midst of so much joy, the mind turns tenderly towards that other monarch, who is not yet descended to the tomb; the aspect of a multitude, free from every sort of slavery, and protected by generous institutions, recals the memory of the august author of the Charter. What a country is France! The cities bring their keys to the funeral beds of their Generals, and the people offer the homage of their liberty on the coffin of their Kings!"

It must be acknowledged, that servility like this presents no very attractive features; and is not calculated to make us enamoured of the Tory principles, which can thus degrade their advocates. But lest it should be thought that such persons as M. de Chateaubriand and his fellows, are

not of sufficient account either for talents or respectability, to evince the debasing influence of the tenets in question, we shall add an example, from our own country, and in the person of a very celebrated man,—no less able, learned, and honest a one than Lord Clarendon. His talents and accomplishments were undeniably of a high order; his integrity is allowed now, to have been incorruptible; and was admitted in times much nearer his own, and by persons of parties the most adverse to his, as Bishop Burnet. (*History of his Own Times*, i. 94; ii. 254.) Indeed he is, of all his party, the most liberal and the least an enemy of freedom. The only stain upon his character undoubtedly is, the slavish love of Royalty which had taken such deep root in his mind, as to make it sometimes callous both to honourable and to natural feelings. The instances we are going to give are of unquestionable authenticity; for he is himself the only witness by whom we shall prove them.

When it was discovered that his eldest and favourite daughter was with child by the King's brother, and presumptive heir, he relates, that he "broke out into a very immoderate passion against her wickedness; and said with all imaginable earnestness, that as soon as he came home he would turn her out of his house as a strumpet, to shift for herself, and would never see her again;" feelings and expressions exceedingly natural, and perfectly consistent with the rigid virtue, which, so much to his honour, withheld him constantly, and almost alone of the King's ministers, from ever visiting any of his mistresses. But no sooner was he informed that it was understood the Duke and his daughter were privately married, and that the plan was to have the marriage declared, than the Tory prevailed over the father and the man, and the circumstance was regarded as aggravating her offence tenfold, exasperating his own sufferings, and turning into bitterness what ought naturally to have been a healing balm. "He fell into new commotions," (we cite his own words, Continuation, p. 29), "and said, if that were true," (viz., that his daughter was wholly blameless as far as regarded her chastity, being the Duke's wife), "he was well prepared to

advise what was to be done, that he had much rather his daughter should be the Duke's whore than his wife; in the former case, nobody could blame him for the resolution he had taken, for he was not obliged to keep a whore for the greatest prince alive; and the indignity he would submit to as the pleasure of God. But if there were any reason to suspect the other," (viz., that they were lawfully married), "he was ready to give a positive judgment, in which he hoped their lordships" (Ormond and Southampton, his bosom friends) "would concur with him, that the King should immediately cause the woman to be sent to the Tower, and to be cast into a dungeon, under so strict a guard, that no person living should be admitted to come to her; and then, that an Act of Parliament should be immediately passed for the cutting off her head, to which he would not only give his consent, but would very willingly be the first man that should propose it."—"And whoever knew the man" (adds the noble author, speaking of himself) "will believe that he said all this very heartily."

We are accustomed to see the fanatics of the same age much vituperated, and more laughed at for the excessive rigour of their principles, and their abhorrence of the fashionable immoralities. What should we not have heard of their unnatural callousness, and phrenzied enthusiasm, had one of their chiefs treated a daughter detected in the commission of a real enormity, whether regarded in a moral or religious point of view, as this flower of the Cavaliers treats his child, not for any immoral or irreligious conduct, but for being accessary to some injury or inconvenience brought upon the Crown, by marrying the King's brother? Nor was this merely the sudden resolution of the Chancellor, taken up in a moment of violence. When the King, "looking upon him with wonderful benignity," desired him to advise calmly upon the subject, and broached the topic of the marriage, the answer he received was, "Sir, I hope I need make no apology to you for myself and of my own in this matter, upon which I look with so much detestation, that though I could have wished that your brother had not thought it fit to have put this disgrace upon me, I had much rather submit and bear it with

all humility, than that it should be repaired by making her his wife; the thought whereof I do so much abominate, that I had much rather see her dead, with all the infamy that is due to her presumption;" and then he repeated all the advice about sending her to the Tower, "beseeching the King to pursue it," as the most likely means of making others "take heed how they impudently offended." When he afterwards ascertained that the marriage had been validly solemnized, he even then still urged the putting his daughter to death by a Bill of Attainder, as the only way of remedying the mischief. (p. 31.)

The grateful return which Charles made for all this affectionate devotion is well known; nor was his father's treatment of Strafford more notable, though in him it has been more remarked, because his life contained fewer passages of this kind. When Clarendon was impeached, one of the grand charges was for advising the King to govern by an army without a Parliament: Being asked by the Duke whether it was true or anything like it, Charles answered that he had never given him such counsel in his life, but, on the contrary, his fault was that he always insisted too much upon the law;" and the Duke asking whether he might repeat this testimony to others, the King said, "with all his heart." The Duke did so through Wren, his secretary; and the effect of such an authority was manifest in obstructing the proceedings against Clarendon. Charles was now informed by the opposite party, that Wren's communications were likely to save Clarendon from the charges of treason altogether;—"to which his Majesty answered, that Wren was a lying fellow, and that he had never held any such discourse with his brother." The King then complained to the Duke of Wren's discourses; but James avowed himself as the author, and asserted, that his brother had not only said everything as reported, but had given leave to divulge it. The only answer his Majesty was pleased to make, was, that "he should be hereafter more careful of what he said to him." He then succeeded in making Clarendon leave the country, and gave his assent to the bill banishing him, and forbidding all persons to hold any communication with him.

That such treatment should never draw from the noble penman one harsh expression respecting Charles, is perhaps only an evidence of his extraordinary magnanimity. That it should not incline him to paint his character in its true colours, is nothing more than a proof, that his loyalty interfered with his duty as an historian. But that, in the midst of such injustice, cruelty, treachery, and black ingratitude, Clarendon should stoop to indite the letter which he has recorded against himself, can only be credited, because *he* is the witness,—and only explained by supposing that love of monarchy had destroyed, not indeed the love of virtue, but certainly the honest pride which forms its natural accompaniment. To what a pitch of servile adoration towards a fellow-creature, and one too of the most worthless of his species, must so powerful a mind as Clarendon's have been humbled, when he could bring himself thus to write! "I am so broken under the daily insupportable instances of your Majesty's terrible displeasure, that I know not what to do, hardly what to wish."—"God knows I am innocent as I ought to be. But alas! your Majesty's declared anger and indignation deprives me of the comfort and support even of my own innocence, and exposes me to the rage and fury of those who have some excuse for being my enemies; whom I have sometimes displeased, when (and only then) your Majesty believed them not to be your friends. I hope they may be changed; I am sure I am not, but have the same duty, passion, and affection for you, that I had when you thought it most unquestionable, and which was and is as great as ever man had for any mortal creature. I should die in peace (and truly I do heartily wish that God Almighty would free you from further trouble by taking me to himself) if I could know or guess at the ground of your displeasure."—"As I have hope in heaven, I have never willingly offended your Majesty in my life, and do upon my knees beg your pardon for any over-bold or saucy expressions I have ever used to you; which being a natural disease in old servants who have received too much countenance," &c.—"I hope your Majesty believes that the sharp chastisement I have received from the best-

natured and most bountiful master in the world, and whose kindness alone made my condition these many years supportable, has both enough mortified me as to this world, and that I have not the presumption, or the madness to imagine, or desire, ever to be admitted to any employment or trust again:" and he concludes by imploring the King to be allowed "to spend the small remainder of his life in some parts beyond the seas, never to return, where he may pray for the King, and never suffer the least diminution in his duty or obedience." (*Clarendon*, p. 453.) All this is recorded "for the information of his children, who will find in it nothing that can make them ashamed of their father's memory." (*Ib.* p. 2.)

The King's detestable conduct is ascribed by Bishop Burnet to the "perpetual railing of the mistress and the whole bedchamber at him."—"Princes," he remarks, "are so little sensible of merit or great services, that they sacrifice their best servants not only when their affairs seem to require it, but to gratify the humours of a mistress, or the passion of a rising favourite." (i. 257.) Now, without any leaning towards republican principles, and with a rational conviction that, upon a balance of good and evil, the preference should be given to a limited monarchy, at least in Europe, it may be reasonably doubted whether the annals of any commonwealth in modern times ever afforded so melancholy a proof of the power of political attachment to debase its victim as we have just been contemplating, in the case of a man remarkable in almost all the other passages of his life for a strong understanding and undeviating honesty.

If we were desirous of comparing the effects produced by the slavish principles of Toryism with those which flow from even the excessive devotion to the free institutions of a commonwealth, we might contrast the demeanour of Lord Clarendon with that of such men as Colonel Hutchinson, one of those "who judged the King to die." That he was warmly attached to the Independents, is unquestionable; he belonged to their sect; he was deeply sensible of the vast merits of their leaders, and felt the utmost gratitude to Cromwell for the incalculable services which, in his

better days, he rendered to the cause. Yet all his gratitude, his habits of hearty co-operation to attain a grand, and once a common object, his intimate knowledge of the man's extraordinary talents—all could not blind him to his dangerous designs or reconcile him to bear, for an instant, with his desertion of his principles. He became his adversary, but an open and a manly one; and abhorring as he did the course he had plunged into, himself still an enthusiast for liberty, he yet gave him indirectly such information of a plot which he accidentally became acquainted with, as proved the means of saving him from the conspirators.

If, again, a contrast were wanted to the servile spirit displayed by the French Royalists in the present day, we should look to the interesting spectacle, now exhibited by the American people, of honest and enlightened affection for their ancient benefactor and fellow-soldier in the cause of freedom. We will own, that, to us, there is something peculiarly touching in the enthusiasm which that great nation has shown upon the arrival of the truly venerable person who seeks, in their affections, a temporary refuge from the persecutions of his own government. No man can be named who has, through a long life, acted with more undeviating integrity, and who, with more strict consistency, has pursued his course of devotion to the sacred cause of liberty, and opposed all despotism, whether exercised by the genius of Napoleon, or by those successors to his throne whose powers form so mighty a contrast with their stations. La Fayette may have fallen into errors; in flying from one danger, he did not perceive that liberty might have a double hazard to encounter, both from oppression and from conquest; but faults he has never been charged with by any whose good opinion deserves his regard; and the honours which he has received in America are as entirely due to the inflexible virtue of his riper years, and his willing sacrifice of himself on all occasions to the cause of liberty in his own country, as they are peculiarly fit to hail his reappearance in a country which the generous devotion of his younger days had helped to make a powerful State of a few dependent colonies. He

must be far gone in the servile feelings of French Royalism who can read, without a blush, the productions we have cited in this article; but every friend of liberal principles can feel only sympathy and pride in following the progress of this great patriot through the United States, even where its details are recorded with the least reserve, and by the most ordinary chroniclers of the times.

Among the strange sights of the present day, connected with this subject, it is impossible to pass over the solemn mockery lately performed at Paris by the orders, it is said, though it seems hardly credible, of the English Government, in removing the remains of James II., and depositing them in a new church. There was something intelligible and consistent in the restored government of France ordering funeral rites to be celebrated for Louis XVI. and his unfortunate Queen. Nor could any one have greatly blamed Charles II. in this country, had he done something of the same kind upon his returning, instead of basely insulting the ashes of the great leaders of the Commonwealth. Some eleven or twelve years ago, the remains of Charles I. were discovered at Windsor; and it was not deemed necessary, perhaps not considered very expedient, to bestow any funeral honours upon the dust of him whom the Church of England, in her great loyalty and (we good Presbyterians are bound to add) idolatry, denominates the Blessed Martyr of Almighty God—a Saint who followed the steps of the Saviour, and the shedding of whose blood nothing but the blood of the Son of God can expiate. Whence comes it to pass, then, that such singular respect should have been paid to the remains of him whom the same Church stigmatizes as a cruel and bloodthirsty enemy of herself and the State, and for deliverance from whose Popish tyranny and arbitrary power, by the instrumentality of those who dethroned him, she periodically offers up unfeigned thanks? Those expressions, indeed, seem to have been wholly forgotten by the conductors of this strange solemnity. He who was driven from the throne into exile for his misgovernment, and deemed by his criminality to have forfeited the crown, is treated as a lawful sovereign, and one to whom nothing worse than bad fortune could be imputed. "Reliquiæ

Jacobi II. qui in secundo civitatis gradu clarus triumphis, *in primo infelicior*;" and the King, who owes his crown to the resistance which our ancestors made against this tyrant, is represented as ordering to be paid honours due to the royal race,—" quo decet honore in stirpem regiam!" But his issue were as much entitled to royal honours, because they were as much of the royal stock as himself; and yet the Parliament, King and all, of this country, thought fit to set a price upon their heads. It really looks as if there were some foolish Tories about the court, who deemed the title of the Royal Family, under the Act of Settlement, less firm than it would be, if the descendants of the Duchess of Orleans, Charles I.'s youngest daughter, were extinct, and those of his sister, the Queen of Bohemia, could claim by the exploded hereditary title which the Revolution 1688 has for ever set aside. Yet, strange to tell, those very persons seem to have the greatest horror of everything like Popery, and, from a senseless enmity to a mere name, are perpetuating the misgovernment and the misery of a third part of the King's dominions. The whole ceremonial upon the occasion we are alluding to, was of course purely Popish, accompanied with prayers for the soul of the deceased, and, as the accounts add, with "all the solemnities, so powerful in their effect, which distinguish the Catholic Church service." It is reasonable to conclude from this, that no prejudice against Popery having stood in the way of the King's servants honouring the memory of a dethroned tyrant, none will now prevent their adopting those measures necessary to the peace, prosperity, and indeed the safety, of the empire.[1]

It may afford a fit conclusion to these reflections, if we appeal to the great established fountains of Tory doctrine for a statement of what it consists in, and of what our modern friends of High Church principles would bring us back to. The famous decree of the University of Oxford, in 1683, passed immediately after, and in support of,

[1] We shall now expect to be informed of the inscription substituted for that which was not allowed to be placed upon the remains of her late Majesty—one of the immediate branches of the "*Stirps Regia*," by blood as well as marriage, and whose title had never been defeated by Parliament—like that of James II.

those judicial murders, as the legislature afterwards termed them, which destroyed Russell and Sidney, speaks the deliberate sentiments of that learned and loyal body; and the Cambridge address upon the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament, two years before, indicates an almost equal proficiency in the most slavish principles. The Oxonian doctors denounce, as the cause of the dangers to which "the breath of their nostrils, the anointed of the Lord," is exposed; and "decree, judge, and declare to be false, seditious, and impious, heretical and blasphemous," all the doctrines in which the grounds of civil liberty are contained; not only the propositions, that civil authority is derived from the people; and that there is a virtual compact between the prince and the people; and that governors becoming tyrants forfeit their right to govern; but the propositions, that the sovereignty in England is in the Three Estates; that self-preservation may become the overruling motive with the people; and that a title to the Crown, derived by descent, may be set aside by the consent of the realm. And they explicitly enjoin all persons having the care of youth, "diligently to instruct them in that most necessary doctrine, *which in a manner is the badge and character of the Church of England,* of submitting to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether it be unto the King as supreme, or unto governors sent by him; teaching that this submission and obedience is to be clear, *absolute*, and without exception of any state or order of men." They were likewise pleased to order the books containing these doctrines to be burnt publicly, and to forbid the perusal of them under severe penalties. The Cambridge doctors avow their "belief that our kings derive not their power from the people, but from God; that to him only they are accountable; that it belongs not to subjects either to create or censure, but to honour and obey their sovereign, who comes to be so by a fundamental, hereditary right of succession, which no religion, no law, no fault or forfeiture, can alter or diminish."

The fate of those most dutiful and devoted bodies is eminently instructive to all time-servers. Having pronounced unqualified obedience to be the duty of all subjects, the men of Oxford were in little more than a year

commanded by the King to expel Locke; and after some time spent in shuffling and attempting to escape, they complied with this infamous requisition. In less than four years after their digest of servility had been completed and promulgated, its authors were again called upon to practise their odious doctrines, by choosing a man recommended by the Sovereign, but disqualified by their statutes. Having condemned all resistance whatever as impious and unchristian, they were the first who resisted the tyrant; and having announced, that whoever maintained the right to deprive a King, for any reason whatever, of his Crown, or to exclude his heir, merited damnation, they themselves melted their plate to assist the Prince, who came to dethrone the reigning sovereign, and exclude his son from the succession! Their famous decree was afterwards, by the authority of Parliament, burnt by the hands of the common hangman; but this act of public justice did not prevent them from adhering strenuously to the proscribed doctrines in theory, and all the while opposing the monarch *de facto*, for no other reason but because he held his authority from the choice of the people, and was placed at the head of a free government. The like misfortune befel Cambridge. An order being issued by the King to confer a degree upon a monk, they who so lately had maintained, that "to subjects it belongs only to honour and obey their sovereign," refused to comply, and were, in conformity with their own principles, punished for the contempt. After the Revolution, it must be admitted that they held opinions much more consonant to the principles of free governments than the sister University.[1]

[1] Writers of the most opposite parties agree in their opinions of the Oxford decree. Mr. Fox charges it with condemning "every principle upon which the constitution of this or any other free country can maintain itself" (p. 51). And Hume (VIII. 199) says, in nearly the same terms, that it "condemns some doctrines which they denominated republican, but which indeed are, most of them, the only tenets on which liberty and a limited constitution can be founded." He, however, is careful to keep very much in generals, and gives none of the preposterous assertions of the decree. The reader will find it at length in *Woodrow*, II., *App.*, *No.* xci.; and part of the Cambridge Address is in *Neal's History of the Puritans*, II., p. 585. Mr. Fox's remarks upon the Oxford decree are worthy of all acceptation; and Hume's joining in condemning it affords

If we are asked, why we dwell at such length upon the reprobation due to doctrines which hardly any one, in this country at least, will in the present day openly avow; we answer, that, of late years, the number and station of those who do venture upon such avowal has sensibly increased; and that, at all events, they are secretly cherished by many, and systematically acted upon by still more, who never have stated them to their own minds in terms, but who nevertheless, by adhering to the spirit of them, have grievously injured, and still continue to injure, the best interests of the country. A blind, servile obedience to whatever the personal wishes of the reigning sovereign may be supposed to dictate, is a very natural corollary from the proposition, that kings have rights as individuals, wholly independent of their relation to the state, as depositaries of a public trust; that the prince is the object of regard for his own sake; and that he holds his powers for his own advantage, not for that of his people. How fruitful in mischief has this corollary proved! The American war nearly in whole, the French war in great part, the misgovernment and wretchedness of Ireland almost altogether, have been its hateful progeny. The prejudices of the late King were for years avowedly the reason with many for opposing measures which they deemed essential to the safety of the State! Some had the hardihood even to say so openly in their places in Parliament—a pitch of contempt for the fundamental maxims of the constitution never reached, at least in so downright a fashion, by the Tories of Filmer's and Sacheverell's times. "Deference to the monarch's feelings," was the prevailing objection for a long while to our taking an active part in the South American question. It was said by the court sycophants,

one instance among many others, to show that the doctrines of Toryism, in their naked deformity, will shock many a one who is prepared to embrace them when clothed with some thin disguise; or that, presented to him all at once, he will reject them, though ready enough to take them piecemeal. "Such" (says Mr. Fox, in the honest indignation of his heart), "such are the absurdities which men are not ashamed to utter, in order to cast odious imputations upon their adversaries; and such the manner in which churchmen will abuse, when it suits their policy, the holy name of that religion, whose first precept is to love one another, for the purpose of teaching us to hate our neighbours with more than ordinary rancour."

that "his Majesty naturally must be averse to any interference with colonies, after what he had himself suffered in North America." But besides that some such notions are abundantly familiar in certain quarters at the present moment, and influence in all probability the policy of the country, both towards Ireland and South America, from the impression that those who are near the Throne inherit the prejudices of its last occupant, we cannot doubt that the same principles of high Toryism are working in favour of the greatest danger this country's independence was ever exposed to,—the conspiracy of foreign despots against the liberties of mankind. We verily believe, that if all Great Britain were polled, not a hundred sincere voices would be raised in favour of that unprincipled league: But there are many persons whose hatred of it is kept within very moderate limits; and not a few who are ready to apologize for it, as far as they dare, by the knowledge that it is a favourite with persons of all but the highest station; and they will, at least, though indirectly and under various pretences, thwart every attempt to expose its machinations, and to prepare for resisting them! An affectation of courtly principles is becoming more prevalent than formerly, among certain politicians who used to be satisfied with supporting bad measures because they were in place, or dependents on placemen, without pretending that they did so upon the principles of the Tories, who a few years ago would have been treated as rebels. Much nonsense has been consequently promulgated in various forms, from plain statement of what is inconsistent with fact, to highflown affected romance; and it may prove a wholesome exercise to look now and then at the real nature of the principles in question, and the effects they produce on the conduct of those who act under their influence. Whoever has read the preceding pages will probably admit, that those persons do not display very great claims to respect; and will be apt to feel but little enthusiasm in behalf of a system, the fruits of which are so noxious and so nauseous.

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LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

00001436

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 02 April, 2016